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Abstract
Representative democracy is inherently difficult in multi-ethnic societies, where 
ethnicity is a politically-salient cleavage around which interests are organised for 
political purposes. These divided societies are prone to develop ‘centrifugal’ politics 
which reward extremist ethnic appeals, zero-sum political behaviour and ethnic conflict, 
and which consequently often lead to the breakdown of democracy. Careful design of 
political institutions is therefore required if the routines of accommodation and 
negotiation necessary to ensure peaceful democratic politics are to become consolidated.
Many political scientists see the choice of electoral system as one of the most important 
institutional decisions for such societies. Some scholars argue that electoral systems 
which encourage politicians to appeal for the second-choice votes of rival communities 
are necessary to engineer moderate, accommodative politics at the constituency level. 
The best electoral systems to encourage such behaviour, according to these arguments, 
are ‘preferential’ systems such as the alternative vote, which encourage rival groups to 
cooperate and negotiate for secondary support. Prescriptions based on ‘preference- 
swapping’ form the centrepiece of a wider model of constitutional design for divided 
societies typified as ‘centripetalism’. Centripetalism stands in contrast to the dominant 
model of democracy in divided societies, consociationalism, which emphasises the need 
for divided societies to institute proportional representation elections and mechanisms 
for elite power-sharing if democracy is to survive the travails of deep ethnic divisions.
A major criticism of centripetal theories to date has been the lack of empirical examples 
of centripetalism in action. This thesis attempts to provide this missing evidence and to 
evaluate the empirical record of centripetalism in divided societies, primarily by 
reference to elections in the highly ethnically-fragmented state of Papua New Guinea 
(PNG). Detailed analysis of elections in PNG, which used the alternative vote in the 
1960s and 1970s, lends support to the theory that centripetal institutions will, under 
certain circumstances, encourage accommodative political behaviour on the part of both 
candidates and their supporters. Further analysis of moves away from accommodative 
politics following PNG’s change of electoral rules in 1975 is also presented. The 
evidence from PNG supports the argument that political actors will modify their 
behaviour according to the constitutional ‘rules of the game’, and that deliberate 
‘engineering’ of those rules can thus have a substantive impact upon political outcomes.
Comparative evidence from other states that have adopted centripetal electoral 
institutions — such as Australia, Sri Lanka and Fiji — is also examined, and lends further 
support to the theory that the use of centripetal electoral systems can encourage 
moderate and accommodatory political behaviour under certain circumstances. This 
comparative evidence raises the possibility of developing a general model of centripetal 
approaches to democracy in divided societies. The thesis concludes that the application 
of the centripetal model is highly dependent upon demographic and socio-structural 
conditions, particularly the size, number and geographic dispersion of contending ethnic 
groups. It is likely to work well either in situations of extreme ethnic fragmentation 
(such as in Papua New Guinea) or in situations where competing groups are widely 
dispersed and inter-mixed with each other (such as in Fiji). While uncommon in some 
regions, this type of ethnic group distribution is found to be relatively widespread in the 
Asia-Pacific region, due in part to the influences of colonialism and the presence of 
large Chinese and Indian diasporas. Comparative analysis suggests that centripetal 
institutions may offer the most appropriate choices for engineering accommodative 
politics in many of the ethnically-divided states of the Asia-Pacific region.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
The question of whether, and how, democracy can survive in divided societies has long 
been a source of considerable controversy in political science. Some of the greatest 
political thinkers have argued that stable democracy is only possible in relatively 
homogenous societies. John Stuart Mill, for example, argued that democracy was 
incompatible with the structure of a multi-ethnic society, as “free institutions are next to 
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities” (1958, 230). This was a 
prevalent view amongst many scholars and policy makers until at least the 1960s, with 
the perils of ‘tribalism’ and ethnic division frequently cited as the root causes for the 
failure of democracy in the newly independent states of Africa and Asia in the post-war 
period.1 Much of this conventional wisdom regarded ethnic conflicts as primordial and 
irrational manifestations of traditional rivalries and passions, leaving little room for 
explanations based on the objectives and interests of those involved in the conflict. 
When scholars did turn their attention towards such interests, many saw more reasons 
for the failure of democracy in such societies than for its persistence. A classic example 
is the rational-actor arguments against the likelihood of stable democracy in divided 
societies put by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), who argue that political entrepreneurs 
typically find the rewards of ‘outbidding’ on ethnic issues greater than those of 
moderation.
Following Rabushka and Shepsle, I define a society as being ‘divided’ if it is both 
ethnically diverse and if ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests 
are organised for political purposes, such as elections (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 21). 
Democracy is inherently difficult in such cases because of the strong tendency towards 
politicization of ethnic demands, which in turn often lead to zero-sum, winner-take-all 
politics in which some groups are permanently included and some permanently 
excluded. Because ethnic identities tend to be highly salient in divided societies, 
potential leaders have a strong incentive to attempt to harness these identities as a 
political force, and to use communal demands as the base instigator of constituency 
mobilization. This mobilization often leads to divisiveness and conflict because such 
demands generally come at the expense of other groups, thus instigating countervailing
1 See, for example, Low 1991, 272-73.
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claims and counter-claims. Because demands based on ‘outbidding’ are often easier to 
instigate and maintain than those based on accommodation, politics in divided societies 
can quickly become characterised by centrifugal forces, in which the moderate political 
centre is overwhelmed by extremist forces. The failure of democratic politics is often 
the result.2
Since the early 1970s, however, a revised focus on the possibilities and prospects for 
democracy in divided societies has been evident. At the base of this new wave of 
interest in democracy was a recognition that democratic government, rather than 
oligarchy or authoritarianism, presented by far the best prospects for managing deep 
societal divisions, and that democracy itself operates, as Prezworski (1991, 10-14) has 
argued, as a system for managing and processing conflict, rather than resolving it. 
Democracy increasingly came to be seen as not just possible, but necessary, for the 
peaceful management of divided societies. This more optimistic assessment of the 
potential of democracy has been greatly boosted by what Huntington (1991) 
characterised as the ‘third wave’ of democratisation. Beginning in the 1970s and 
gaining pace in the early 1990s, the ‘third wave’ has seen a threefold increase in the 
number of democratic governments around the world.
The country at the centre of this study, Papua New Guinea, attained self-government in 
1973 and independence in 1975, and thus represents one of the founding members of 
this third wave (Huntington 1991, 24). On many indicators, Papua New Guinea is one 
of the most successful democracies in the developing world, with a record of unbroken 
competitive democracy which exceeds that of almost all comparable ‘Third World’ 
countries, and a number of ‘Western’ countries (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece) as well. It 
is also an ethnically-divided state, home to several thousand clan-based ethnic groups. 
As we shall see, Papua New Guinea represents one of the few cases of an ethnically- 
divided society in which ‘centripetal’ political institutions have been used, thus 
providing vital empirical evidence for wider questions of democracy in divided 
societies. In particular, examination of Papua New Guinea’s democratic record enables 
us to shed new light on two of the most basic questions of political science: is
democracy possible in divided societies? And, if so, which institutional arrangements 
are most likely to secure stable and legitimate democratic government?
2 See Sisk 1995, 23.
2
Scholars concerned with these questions have increasingly found that examination of 
political institutions is central to understanding the procedural aspects of democracy, 
where “multiple political forces compete inside an institutional framework” (Prezworski 
1991, 11). The rise of rational choice theory and the ‘new institutionalism’ have both 
refocussed attention on the organisation of political life, and the need to analyse the 
incentives for action presented by political institutions, when attempting to understand 
the behaviour of political actors. There is also a strongly normative aspect to this 
process. A better understanding of the effect of political institutions presents the 
possibility of being able to design institutions so that desired outcomes — for example, 
cooperation and compromise — are promoted and thereby encouraged to further 
develop. Three broad categories of political institutions have received particular 
attention in this regard: the territorial structure of the state (particularly the question of 
unitary versus federal approaches); the form of the state’s legislative and executive 
functions (particularly the question of parliamentary versus presidential forms of 
government); and the nature of political representation (which focuses predominantly on 
the effects of different electoral systems). It is this final area of representation, 
concerning the design of electoral systems, that is of central concern to this thesis.
The new institutionalism
The past decade has seen a burgeoning academic interest in political institutions, 
examining how they function, why they develop, and the reasons behind their success or 
failure. In the 1980s, as the limits of behavioural approaches to political science became 
increasingly apparent, institutions such as parliaments, executives and electoral systems 
increasingly became the focus of study in their own right. The expanded interest in 
institutions such as electoral systems was fired in part by the belated recognition that 
changes to institutions could, under certain circumstances, effect significant change on 
the wider political system. Arend Lijphart, one of the leading comparative politics 
scholars, has characterised the rebirth of interest in politics’ institutional aspects as 
being
based on the conviction that institutions do matter, that they are not merely weak and 
inconsequential superstructures dependent on a ‘truly’ determinant socioeconomic, cultural, or 
other non-institutional base. For political engineers, and democratic political engineers in 
particular, this new approach means that different institutional forms, rules, and practices can have 
major consequences both for the degree o f  democracy in a democratic system and for the 
operation of the system (1991e, ix).
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In 1984, March and Olsen heralded the appearance of a ‘new institutionalism’ in 
political science. Political institutions, they argued, were gaining a more autonomous 
role as subjects of academic study: “democracy depends not only on economic and 
social conditions but also on the design of political institutions ... They are political 
actors in their own right” (1984, 738). The natural corollary of viewing institutions as 
‘actors’ rather than inert structures is that they take on new roles within a political 
system: they both influence and are influenced by other actors (this is particularly 
apposite to the theoretical debate on electoral systems, which will be dealt with below). 
These relationships with other elements are seldom straightforward, often working 
within a complex, multi-directional arena: institutions which affect the distribution of 
resources, for example, also affect the power of political actors, which in turn affects 
political institutions. Constitutions and other formal legal instruments constrain some 
potential actions while encouraging others. Particularly in traditional societies, some 
forms of behaviour may be constrained by the modem legal apparatus but not by 
traditional cultural and social mores, and vice versa. To the political engineer, then, 
institutions change outcomes, and changing formal political institutions can result in 
changes in political behaviour and political practice. This message has been echoed by 
a number of recent studies, reflecting an emerging scholarly orthodoxy concerning the 
importance of political institutions and institutional design.3
The collective action problem
A more specific reason for focussing on the design of political institutions is their role 
as conduits for collective political activity. In this role, they are key agents in mediating 
between the political activities of social organisations (such as political parties or ethnic 
groups) and the activities of elites (such as elected politicians or tribal leaders). But 
there is a logical paradox to the interplay between the two that political theorists have 
dubbed the ‘collective action problem’. Simply stated, the problem of collective action 
holds that, while it is logical to assume that rational individuals will act according to 
their own self-interest and personal welfare, it does not follow that groups of individuals 
will act in this way. In fact, the assumption that groups of individuals will act together 
to achieve their interests has been shown to be logically inconsistent with the
3 See, for example, Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Shugart and Carey 1992; Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1994.
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assumption that individuals will rationally act to further their own interests. Mancur 
Olson, who uncovered the collective action problem, writes that
unless the number o f individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some 
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests (1971, 2, emphasis in original).
Although Olson’s theories have had a considerable impact in many areas of social 
research, they have had a particular influence on discussions of public policy, theories 
of common goods, and more generally upon questions of political institutions. 
Together, theories of collective action and the new institutionalism have become 
increasingly identified with the tools derived from rational choice theory, particularly 
those dealing with decision-making rules and outcomes.4 According to one recent 
overview, rational choice analysis has introduced a synthesising element to discussions 
of political institutions:
Pre-behavioural political science focused strongly on analyzing the establishment and operation o f  
institutions, such as legislatures, constitutions and bureaucracies ... The problem, however, was 
that the traditional approach had no way o f telling, except by intuition, which institutions were 
really important, or what their effects were on political behaviour. Rational choice theory’s great 
contribution has been to furnish us with such an idea: namely, that the important institutions are 
the ones which are capable o f solving the problem o f collective action, which is to say, the ones 
that make co-operation seem possible and rational for the agents involved (Rothstein 1996, 159, 
emphasis added).
A fundamental argument of this thesis is that certain electoral systems, in certain 
circumstances, will provide precisely these incentives towards co-operation if political 
actors act in a rational manner, while others will logically lead to hostile, non- 
accommodative behaviour if individuals act rationally. The presumptions of rational 
choice theory thus inform this thesis, even if the methodology used has little relation to 
the often highly abstract modelling that typifies many rational choice analyses. A 
related issue concerns the way political institutions themselves serve to structure the 
way political choices are understood and expressed: some voting systems enable much 
more sophisticated gradations of preferences to be expressed than others, for instance 
(Grofrnan 1989, 1). The theoretical debate concerning the logical consequences of the 
way different voting systems aggregate preferences will be examined in Chapter Seven.
4 See Shepsle 1989, 131-37.
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A procedural definition o f democracy
In keeping with this revised focus on institutions, modem discussions of democracy and 
democratisation increasingly emphasise normative concerns and the role of appropriate 
procedural rules. The most influential definition of democracy along these utilitarian 
lines was first formulated by Joseph Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1947), who defined the democratic method as “that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1947, 269).
The advantage of such a definition, which has become a touchstone for many 
contemporary discussions of democracy, is that it enables meaningful empirical 
analyses and comparisons. This “modest meaning of democracy” (Huntington 1989) as 
a set of institutional procedures, rather than abstract conceptualisations, greatly assisted 
the trend towards examination and comparison of demonstrated tendencies of 
democracy across different regions and cultures. By the 1970s, Huntington argues, the 
Schumpeterian definition was widely accepted:
theorists increasingly drew distinctions between rationalistic, utopian, idealistic definitions of 
democracy, on the one hand, and empirical, descriptive, institutional, and procedural definitions 
on the other, and concluded that only the latter type of definition provided the analytical precision 
and empirical referents that make the concept a useful one (1989, 6-7).
Successive generations of political scientists have attempted to refine or restate 
Schumpeter’s basic definition. Thus Riker (1964, 25), for example, argues that “the 
essential democratic institution is the ballot box and all that goes with it”; while 
Huntington himself defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic “to the 
extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest 
and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which 
virtually all the adult population is able to vote” (1991, 29).
Similarly, Diamond, Linz and Lipset, in their study of democracy in developing 
countries, define democracy as a system of government that meets three essential 
conditions: meaningful competition for political power amongst individuals and
organised groups; inclusive participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least 
through free and fair elections; and a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to 
ensure the integrity of political competition and participation (1995, xvi). This is itself a 
refinement of Dahl’s much-cited definition of democracy (which he called ‘polyarchy’)
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as a process of participation and contestation which approximates rather than fully 
satisfies democratic ideals, and will be the working definition of democracy used 
throughout this thesis (Dahl 1971, 1-7).
As Rothchild has shown, the importance of democratic procedures in situations of deep- 
rooted conflict is that they enable regimes to build a sense of a common fate amongst all 
significant groups, so that norms of reciprocity and bargaining can be developed and 
collective conflict can be focussed on negotiable issues:
As learning occurs and the routines of political bargaining become accepted, informal practices of 
cooperation become evident in executive, legislative, and party affairs ... By means o f a sequential 
process, bargaining can induce a series o f responses that can lead over time to established 
organized principles of action. Acceptance of such basic principles can lay a foundation that 
allows for an operating consensus without the necessity o f regular negotiations on each issue ... 
Majoritarian democracy, then, is distinguishable from its partially authoritarian counterparts in the 
determined way it structures incentives for cooperative behaviour (1997, 45).
The result is that as democratic practices become increasingly regularised, and 
democratic procedures become deeply internalised by political actors, so democratic 
practices progress towards becoming part of a self-enforcing system which helps to 
create the conditions for its own persistence (Prezworski 1991, 26).
The third wave o f democratisation
The renewed interest in democracy and political institutions was not just triggered by 
changes in academic thinking but also, and much more importantly, by the striking 
movement towards democratic government in a range of previously authoritarian states 
over the past decade, and the re-emergence of constitutional and other structural issues 
as matters of significant debate in many established democracies. Between 1974 and 
1991, roughly one-third of the world’s 170-odd independent nation states transformed 
their political institutions into participatory democracies in a process Huntington (1991) 
characterised as the ‘third wave’ of democratisation.5 This process has naturally 
encouraged a considerable literature dealing with democratic transitions and their 
consequences, and the relationship between institutional choices and the consolidation 
of democracy.6 A number of scholars have argued that the greatest challenge facing
5 But while PNG's independence was contemporaneous with the ‘third wave’ democracies, it came as a 
result o f colonial withdrawal and institutional transfer rather than the overthrow o f authoritarianism which 
characterised most o f the third wave in other regions.
6 See, for example, Huntington 1991; Diamond and Plattner 1996; Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988, 1989 
and 1995; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986.
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new democracies relates to their representative institutions — many “don’t have the 
institutions to articulate the real interests of the people” (Pye 1990). Diamond, for 
example, suggests that “the single most important and urgent factor in the consolidation 
of democracy is not civil society but political institutionalization” (1996, 238). To 
survive, he says, new democracies need above all “robust political institutions” such as 
secure executives and effective legislatures composed of coherent, broadly-based parties 
encouraged by aggregative electoral institutions.
The 1970s and 1980s also saw a re-emergence amongst established democracies of 
constitutional and other institutional reforms as first-order concerns. Since 1970 six 
established European democracies have adopted new constitutions; more recently Italy, 
Japan and New Zealand have adopted radically new electoral systems which effectively 
amount to a new constitutional basis for politics in these countries. All of these 
developments have encouraged the move from viewing institutions as inert 
epiphenomena, expressions of an underlying political culture which itself ought to be 
the prime object of analysis, to being central to an appreciation of the modem state.7
Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995) have argued that political institutionalization is 
strongly related to the persistence and stability of democracy, for several reasons. First, 
they argue, because institutions structure behaviour into stable, predictable and recurring 
patterns, institutionalised democracies are less volatile and more enduring than others. 
The nature of the electoral process, for example, is characterised by a recurring 
uncertainty of outcomes, thus encouraging a ‘rule bounded’ commitment amongst 
political actors to the process itself. Second, regardless of how they perform 
economically, democracies that have coherent and effective political institutions will be 
more likely to maintain order, ensure civil liberties and provide meaningful 
representation, competition, choice and accountability. Third, over the long run, well- 
institutionalised democracies are also more likely to produce workable, sustainable and 
effective social and economic policies. Finally, largely because of these first three 
factors, coherent democratic institutions are better able to limit military involvement in 
politics and assert civilian control (1995, 33). Institutional choices are thus of great 
importance for the longer-term prospects of democratic consolidation and sustainability.
7 See Bogdanor 1988.
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Constitutional engineering
The explicit possibilities of ‘engineering’ the development of a political system by the 
design of political institutions was given prominence in Sartori’s “Political 
Development and Political Engineering” (1968), which encouraged political scientists to 
take up the challenge of becoming participants in the building of political institutions 
(as, he argued, economists had long been involved with the economy), rather than being 
passive observers. Sartori was particularly interested in the possibilities of deliberate 
‘constitutional engineering’. ‘Constitutional engineering’ refers to attempts to induce 
particular political outcomes by the design of political institutions. Some institutions of 
government can be purposively designed so as to reward particular types of behaviour 
and thus achieve particular outcomes. Electoral systems, for example, can be structured 
so as to enable minority groups or opinions to be represented in parliament, or they can 
ensure domination by one or two large parties. This dichotomy between inclusion and 
exclusion has many wider ramifications, particularly on the degree to which political 
behaviour is focussed at the centre or instead is increasingly drawn towards extreme 
positions. Political development in new democracies, Sartori argued, can be aided by 
the adoption of institutions which constrain the centrifugal tendencies which affect 
many newly-created nations. Electoral systems are particularly important to this process 
because they are, according to Sartori, “the most specific manipulable instrument of 
politics” (1968, 273). This oft-quoted formulation is now widely accepted: Lijphart, 
for example, reflects the scholarly consensus when he writes “if one wants to change the 
nature of a particular democracy, the electoral system is likely to be the most suitable 
and effective instrument for doing so” (1995a, 412).
Electoral systems have long been recognised as one of the most important institutional 
mechanisms for shaping the nature of political competition, firstly because of the 
inherent manipulability identified by Sartori — that is, they can be purposively designed 
with a view to achieving particular outcomes — and secondly, because they structure 
the arena of political competition, offering incentives for political actors to behave in 
certain ways, and rewarding those who respond to these incentives with electoral 
success. In other words, electoral system design has the potential to influence political 
outcomes by rewarding particular types of behaviour and placing constraints on others. 
In terms of divided societies, where ethnicity represents a fundamental political
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cleavage, particular electoral systems can be designed to reward candidates and parties 
who act in a co-operative, accommodatory manner to rival groups; or they can punish 
these candidates and instead reward those who appeal only to their own ethnic group.
There are many ways of studying elections and electoral systems. At the most basic 
level, electoral systems can be viewed as either dependent or independent variables. In 
other words, we can look at the way electoral systems are shaped by their political 
environment — for example, the causes behind the introduction of particular electoral 
systems, such as those expounded by Stein Rokkan (1970) in his influential analysis of 
the adoption of proportional representation in continental Europe; or we can look at the 
consequences of electoral systems for other parts of a political system — for example, 
Rae’s (1971) seminal investigation of the effects of electoral laws on political parties. If 
we look at electoral systems as being dependent variables, then we can begin by asking 
the question ‘Why was this electoral system, and not some other, adopted?’. This 
question has become considerably more important since the events of 1989, as vast 
numbers of new democracies have rushed to adopt new electoral laws, and a number of 
established democracies have refashioned their old ones.
In a critical review of research on electoral systems, however, Lijphart (1985a, 7-8) has 
suggested that the more important task of electoral systems research is to examine 
electoral systems as independent variables, and thus to illuminate the consequences of 
these choices. Lijphart identifies the central preoccupations of the electoral systems 
literature concerning the consequences of election laws as being the degree of 
multipartism, the relationship between seats and votes, and the extent of 
‘manufacturing’ of majorities for one or another (1985b, 8). All these preoccupations 
are clearly dependent upon the presence of functioning political parties. In fact, the 
question of the relationship between votes and seats has become something of a sine 
qua non of the entire electoral studies field. One influential work went so far as to claim 
that the seats-votes relationship “may be the Rosetta Stone” for unlocking a true science 
of politics “in the sense of a cumulation and interlinkage of quantitatively testable 
theory” (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 246). Given this focus, it is perhaps not 
surprising that discussions of how to examine the effects of electoral systems in ways 
which do not focus on questions of proportionality and the seats-votes relationship are 
rare in the electoral studies literature. This presents particular difficulties when
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discussing electoral systems in countries where political parties are weak or non­
existent. When these underlying presumptions are excluded, much of the literature on 
elections and electoral systems has limited usefulness for a study of this type. 
Conversely, other ways in which ‘engineering’ of electoral rules can inter-relate with 
other elements of a political system — for example, the way the incentives presented by 
particular electoral rules can encourage or discourage certain types of behaviour on the 
part of politicians and candidates — are not well covered in the general literature, but 
are central to the concerns of this study.
Choosing an electoral system8
The choice of electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for 
any democracy. Yet most states do not utilise electoral systems that have been 
consciously and deliberately chosen. Often, the choice of electoral system is essentially 
accidental: the result of an unusual combination of circumstances, of a passing trend, or 
of a quirk of history. The impacts of colonialism and the effects of influential 
neighbours are often especially strong. Yet in almost all cases the effects of a particular 
electoral system choice have a profound effect on the future political life of the country 
concerned. In most cases electoral systems, once chosen, tend to remain relatively 
unchanged for long periods, as political interests quickly congeal around and respond to 
the incentives presented by the system. Because electoral laws, once established, must 
be changed by politicians elected under the old system, there is a strong in-built inertia 
in all electoral systems. Changes to electoral systems typically occur at times of 
political crisis where public confidence in the existing system has been severely shaken 
(Italy in 1993), as a bargaining weapon for parliamentary support in a hung parliament 
(Japan in 1994) or by a combination of political miscalculation and a significant public 
desire for change (New Zealand 1994). But by and large, electoral systems tend to be 
constant factors rather than variables in most political systems, and thus the question of 
the most appropriate electoral system to choose is one of the most important 
constitutional issues facing new democracies.
An electoral system is designed to do three main jobs. First, it will translate the votes 
cast into seats won in a legislative chamber or presidential office, and will often thus 
have a major influence upon the formation of governments. Even with the exact same
8 This discussion draws on a similar section in Reynolds and Reilly 1997.
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number of votes for parties, one system might lead to a coalition government while 
another to a single party assuming majority control. Secondly, electoral systems act as 
the conduit through which the people can hold their elected representatives accountable, 
in terms of both their performance as representatives and their ‘geographic 
accountability’ to their electorate. Most electoral systems build in some element of 
constituency representation, with single-member district systems seen as maximising 
this factor and the large, multi-member districts associated with proportional 
representation seen as minimising it. Third, different electoral systems serve to 
structure the incentives for those competing for power in distinct ways, rewarding some 
forms of behaviour while penalising others. Some systems, for example, require 
candidates from the same party to compete with each other for votes, thus encouraging 
individualistic campaigns, while others make the contest for election the exclusive 
preserve of political parties, thus maximising the power of party leaders.
There are countless electoral system variations, but essentially they can be split into ten 
main systems which fall into three broad families: plurality-majority systems; semi- 
proportional systems; and proportional representation (PR) systems. These constitute 
the major electoral system variations used for national elections in the world today.
Plurality-maioritv systems
The five types of plurality-majority systems comprise two plurality systems, first past 
the post and the block vote, and three majority systems, and the two-round system, the 
alternative vote and the contingent vote. The distinguishing feature of all of these 
systems is that they usually utilise single-member electoral districts, and thus lead to 
majoritarian results.
Under a First Past the Post (FPTP) system the winner is the candidate who gains the 
most votes, but not necessarily an absolute majority of the votes. FPTP electoral 
contests are held in single-member districts, voters choose their favoured candidate with 
a tick or a cross on the ballot paper, and the winner is simply the candidate who gains a 
plurality of votes. FPTP is the world’s most commonly-used electoral system for both 
presidential and parliamentary elections (Reynolds and Reilly 1997, 19). Countries 
using this system include the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Canada, and 
most countries that were once part of the British Empire.
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The Block Vote (BV) is the application of FPTP in multi- rather than single-member 
districts. Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and the highest- 
polling candidates fill the positions regardless of the percentage of the vote they actually 
achieve. This system is used in some parts of Asia and the Middle East. A further 
variation on the block vote is the ‘party block’ system used in Singapore, where voters 
choose between parties rather than candidates, and the highest-polling party wins all 
seats in the district.
The most common form of majority system, the two-round system (TRS), takes place in 
two rounds of voting, often a week or a fortnight apart. The first round is conducted in 
the same way as a normal FPTP election. If a candidate receives an absolute majority of 
the vote, then he or she is elected outright, with no need for a second ballot. If, 
however, no candidate has received an absolute majority, then a second round of voting 
is conducted, usually as a run-off between the two highest polling candidates from the 
first-round, and the winner of this round is declared elected.9 This system is widely used 
for presidential elections, and also for legislative elections in France, most former French 
colonies, and some parts of the former Soviet Union.
The alternative vote (AV) is another type of majority system. Like elections under 
FPTP, AV elections are usually held in single-member districts. Unlike FPTP, however, 
AV enables electors to rank candidates in the order of their choice, by marking a ‘ V  for 
their favoured candidate, ‘2’ for their second choice, ‘3’ for their third choice, and so on. 
The system thus enables voters to express their preferences between candidates, rather 
than simply their first choice. If no candidate has over 50 percent of first-preferences, 
lower order preference votes are transferred until a majority winner emerges. This 
system is currently used in Australia, Nauru and for presidential elections in Ireland. As 
much of this thesis discusses, it was also used in Papua New Guinea from 1964-1975.
A final type of majority system, the contingent vote (CV), can be seen as a mid-point 
between AV and TRS. Under this system, voters mark their preferences on the ballot
9A variant on this procedure is used for legislative elections in France, the country most often 
associated with the two-round system. For these elections, any candidate who has received 
the votes of over 12.5 per cent of the registered electorate in the first round can stand in the 
second round. Whoever wins the highest numbers of votes in the second round is then 
declared elected, regardless of whether they have won an absolute majority or not.
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paper in the same way as under an AV system. However, if no candidate has a majority 
of first preference votes, the election is decided by simultaneously eliminating all 
candidates bar the top two from the count, and redistributing all available preferences to 
one or the other of these two leaders to determine the winner. The CV is thus an instant 
run-off system which takes place in one round, rather than the two rounds needed for 
TRS. This system is used today for presidential elections in Sri Lanka.
Semi-proportional systems
Semi-proportional systems are those which translate votes cast into seats won in a way 
that falls somewhere in between the proportionality of PR systems and the 
majoritarianism of plurality-majority systems. The two semi-PR electoral systems used 
for legislative elections are the single non-transferable vote, and parallel (or mixed) 
systems.
In a single non-transferable \ote (SNTV) system, each elector has one vote but there are 
several seats in the district to be filled, and the candidates with the highest number of 
votes fill these positions. This means that in a four-member district, for example, one 
would on average need only just over 20% of the vote to be elected. This system is used 
today only in Jordan and Vanuatu, but is most often associated with Japan, which used 
SNTV until 1993.
Parallel systems use both PR lists (see below) and single-member districts running side- 
by-side (hence the term ‘parallel’). Part of the parliament is elected by proportional 
representation, part by some type of plurality or majority method. Parallel systems have 
been widely adopted by new democracies in the 1990s, perhaps because, on the face of 
it, they appear to combine the benefits of PR lists with single-member district 
representation.
Proportional representation systems
The rationale underpinning proportional representation (PR) systems is to closely 
approximate a party’s share of the national vote with its share of parliamentary seats. 
For example, if a major party wins 40 percent of the votes, it should also win 
approximately 40 percent of the seats, and a minor party with 10 percent of the votes 
should similarly gain 10 percent of the parliamentary seats.
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List PR systems are the most common type of proportional representation electoral 
system. Most forms of list PR are held in large, multi-member districts which maximise 
proportionality but minimise geographic accountability. List PR requires each party to 
present a list of candidates to the electorate. Electors vote for a party rather than a 
candidate; and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the national 
vote. Winning candidates are usually taken from the lists in order of their respective 
positions. This system is widely used in continental Europe, Latin America and 
southern Africa.
Mixed member proportional (MMP) systems, used in Germany, New Zealand, South 
Korea, Bolivia, Italy, Mexico, Venezuela, and Hungary, attempt to combine the positive 
attributes of both majoritarian and PR electoral systems. A proportion of the parliament 
(approximately half in the cases of Germany and New Zealand) is elected from single­
member districts, while the remainder is constituted by PR lists, with the PR seats being 
used to compensate for any disproportionality produced by the district seat results. By 
using some single-member districts, MMP also ensures that voters have geographical 
representation.
Finally, the single transferable vote (STV) form of PR uses multi-member districts, with 
voters ranking candidates in order of preference on the ballot paper in the same manner 
as the alternative vote. After all first-preference votes are tallied, the count begins by 
establishing the ‘quota’ of votes required for the election of a single candidate. Any 
candidate who has more first preferences than the quota is immediately elected. If no- 
one has achieved the quota, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is 
eliminated, with his or her second preferences being redistributed to the candidates left 
in the race. At the same time, the surplus votes of elected candidates (i.e. those votes 
above the quota) are redistributed according to the second preferences on the ballot 
papers until all seats for the constituency are filled. At the national level, this system is 
used in Ireland, Malta and the Australian Senate.
Of these ten forms of electoral system used in the world today, three enable electors to 
rank-order candidates in the order of their choice on the ballot, and are thus what we call 
preferential systems: the alternative vote (AV), the contingent vote (CV), and the single 
transferable vote (STV). In this thesis, the term ‘preferential’ is used to refer to any of 
these three voting systems which utilise preference marking. The terms AV, CV and
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STV will be used when discussing a particular system. There are, however, differences 
in nomenclature between different regions. In Australia (where voters must rank order 
all candidates on the ballot paper) the alternative vote is usually known as the 
'preferential vote'. In Papua New Guinea (where the marking of preferences was 
optional) the system is also known as the ‘preferential vote’ or sometimes the 'optional 
preferential vote' (OPV). Both of these are synonymous with the term ‘AV’, which will 
be used whenever possible in this thesis.
Centripetalism versus consociationalism
Advocates of constitutional engineering are in widespread agreement that the electoral 
system is a key mechanism in shaping the wider political arena. Horowitz, for example, 
argues that “the electoral system is by far the most powerful lever of constitutional 
engineering for accommodation and harmony in severely divided societies, as indeed it 
is a powerful tool for many other purposes” (1991a, 163), while Lijphart says that “the 
electoral system has long been recognized as probably the most powerful instrument for 
shaping the political system” (1991a, 91). Sisk writes that electoral systems “play an 
important role in ‘engineering’ the results of democratic voting, and along with other 
institutional choices can have a profound impact on the nature of political parties and 
the general character of democracy” (1993, 79). Beyond this consensus on the 
importance of electoral systems, however, there is profound disagreement between 
theorists as to which electoral systems are most appropriate for divided societies.
Two schools of thought predominate. The scholarly orthodoxy has long rejected 
majoritarian approaches and instead argued that some form of proportional 
representation (PR) is all but essential if democracy is to survive the travails of deep- 
rooted ethnic divisions. For example, Sir Arthur Lewis’s experience of the failure of 
post-colonial democracy in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone in the 
late 1950s and 1960s prompted him to argue that a divided society
needs a system which will give minorities adequate representation, discourage parochialism, and
force moderation on the political parties ... proportional representation with a few large several-
member constituencies is better than electoral systems with many single-member constituencies.
( 1965, 73).
The most prominent advocate of this orthodoxy is Arend Lijphart, who is primarily 
responsible for the development and prominence of consociationalism as a model for
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managing ethnic cleavages in divided societies. Consociationalism emphasises the need 
for divided societies to develop mechanisms for elite power-sharing if democracy is to 
survive the travails of ethnic or other conflicts. The mechanisms for ensuring 
sustainable power-sharing arrangements are encapsulated in four key features: grand 
coalition governments in which all ethnic groups are represented; proportional 
representation of different groups in the distribution of legislative seats and in the civil 
service; segmental autonomy via federalism or similar devices; and a power of veto over 
key decisions by minority groups (Lijphart 1977). Lijphart developed this institutional 
prescription from a detailed examination of the features of power-sharing democracy in 
some continental European countries (the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland), and 
there is disagreement over how far these measures can work when applied to ethnic 
conflict in developing countries (if at all).10 However, there is little doubt that 
consociationalism represents the dominant — and according to Lijphart, the only — 
model of democratic government for divided societies.* 11 In terms of electoral systems, 
consociationalists argue that list PR forms of proportional representation are by far the 
best choice for divided societies, as they enable all politically-significant ethnic groups, 
including minorities, access to legislative representation, while minimising ‘wasted’ 
votes and maximising the likelihood of coalition governments (Lijphart 1990, 13). List 
PR in large districts is particularly favoured, as it has been shown to maximise 
proportionality (and hence the chances for even small minorities to gain representation), 
and because it is a relatively simple system for both voters and electoral officials to use 
and understand. This enables ethnic groups to “define themselves” into several large, 
ethnically-based parties which can then form the basis of an ‘oversized’ government 
coalition (Lijphart 1990, 10-11).
By contrast, some scholars argue that the best way to mitigate the destructive effects of 
ethnicity in divided societies is not to simply replicate existing ethnic divisions in the 
legislature, but rather to utilise electoral systems that encourage co-operation and 
accommodation between rival groups, and that therefore tend to break down the salience 
of ethnicity rather than foster its representation in parliament. The theoretical basis for 
this approach owes much to arguments put forward by Donald L. Horowitz in Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict (1985) and A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering
10 See Horowitz 1991b, 451-76; Sisk 1996, 27-45.
11 See Lijphart 199Id, 491-509.
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in a Divided Society (1991), both of which deal with the need for divided societies to 
adopt political institutions which encourage moderation and accommodation on the part 
of political actors. The broad approach to the management of ethnic conflict presented 
in these works centres on the need for divided societies to adopt ‘integrative’ 
mechanisms and institutions — that is, institutions which encourage integration across 
communal divides (Sisk 1995, 35). Integrative institutions promote accommodation 
between rival groups and moderation on the part of rational politicians by offering them 
incentives to appeal to voters outside their own communal segments. Electoral 
incentives reward those politicians, leading to the election of moderate political leaders 
committed to accommodative policies.
The most powerful ‘integrative’ institution available to constitutional engineers, 
according to Horowitz (1991a, 163), is the electoral system. Some electoral systems, 
such as that used for presidential elections in Nigeria, can be structured in such a way as 
to require the winning candidate to gain support from different regions, thus helping to 
break down the claims of narrow parochialism or regionalism. Others attempt to defuse 
the importance of ethnicity by pre-assigning ethnic proportions in parliament and in 
each constituency, thus forcing parties to present the same balance of ethnically-mixed 
slates of candidates and making voters choose between them on issues other than 
ethnicity, as at parliamentary elections in Lebanon. However, the most powerful 
electoral systems for divided societies are those which actively attempt to break down 
the salience of ethnicity by promoting accommodation and bargaining across ethnic 
lines. Certain electoral systems which enable electors to rank candidates in the order of 
their choice on the ballot — that is, those we call preferential systems — can provide 
parties and candidates in divided societies with an incentive to ‘pool votes’ via the 
exchange of preferences between their supporters. Parties which broaden their support 
base in search of second preferences from other groups are more likely to win seats than 
parties which are unable to gamer preferences outside their own communal group. This 
can in turn provide parties seeking these lower-order preferences from other groups with 
an incentive towards moderation and accommodation on ethnic issues, and can thus 
have substantial impacts upon the prospects for sustainable democracy in divided 
societies.
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At the core of this approach is the need “to make politicians reciprocally dependent on 
the votes of members of groups other than their own” (Horowitz 1991b, 471). Under a 
preferential voting system, Horowitz argues, many elections will turn on second and 
third preferences. Parties that succeed in negotiating for second and third preferences 
will be rewarded, thus presenting them with a strong incentive to moderate their policy 
positions on key ethnic issues so as to broaden their appeal. Of the preferential systems, 
Horowitz favours the alternative vote (AV) (1991a, chap. 5) and the contingent vote 
(CV) (1985, 639-42) — both majority systems rather than proportional ones. He argues 
that the more common plurality-majority system, FPTP, is likely to result in the 
exclusion of minorities and to intensify conflict in divided societies (1985, 164, 202). 
Horowitz does not reject proportional alternatives out of hand, noting that if the choice 
is between PR and FPTP, then proportional systems are to be preferred, but that “STV is 
a far better choice than list-system PR” (1985, 171, 173). The difference between the 
two is that preferential systems can harness the forces of moderation at the local level: 
rather than relying on political leaders to behave accommodatively after an election, 
they can instead encourage the formation “of electoral coalitions by constituents as they 
specify their second or third preferences beyond their narrow group interests” (Sisk 
1995, 38, emphasis in original). The result, Horowitz argues, will be the formation of 
pre-election pacts or multi-ethnic coalitions, resulting in strong and enduring “coalitions 
of commitment” in government, as opposed to the weak and tenuous “coalitions of 
convenience” which he sees as characterising consociational agreements (1985, 365-95).
Horowitz’s recommendations for constitutional engineering stood as the centrepiece of a 
package of institutional devices designed to mitigate the destructive effects of ethnic 
conflict by breaking down the salience of ethnic issues in electoral politics and 
integrating them into other broader and less damaging cross-cutting cleavages. 
Horowitz identifies four other mechanisms which characterise his approach to 
moderating the potentially harmful effects of inter-ethnic competition: arrangements 
which proliferate the points of power “so as to take the heat off a single focal point”, 
such as a constitutional separation of powers or federalism; devolution or ethnically- 
reserved offices to foster intra-ethnic conflict at the local level; public policies which 
encourage the growth of less damaging ‘cross-cutting cleavages’, such as class 
identification, to act as counterweights to ethnic identification; and measures which 
serve to reduce inter-ethnic inequalities and disparities “so that dissatisfaction declines”
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(1985, 597-600). Sisk has argued that this approach is accurately described as 
centripetalism, “because the explicit aim is to engineer a centripetal spin to the political 
system — to pull the parties towards moderate, compromising policies and to discover 
and reinforce the centre of a deeply divided political spectrum” (1995, 19). Following 
Sisk, the term ‘centripetalism’ will be used in this thesis to describe a political system or 
strategy designed to focus competition at the moderate centre rather than the extremes 
by making politicians seek electoral support from groups other than their own ethnic 
community.
Supporting evidence for centripetalism
A recurring criticism of centripetal theories in general, and the case for preferential 
voting methods in particular, has focused on a lack of real world examples (Sisk 1996, 
44). This thesis defends the case for centripetalism and the accommodative incentives 
of preferential electoral methods by drawing on new evidence, not cited by either 
Horowitz or Lijphart, from the electoral history of Papua New Guinea (PNG), an 
ethnically-fragmented state in the South Pacific in which both AV and FPTP electoral 
systems have been used. PNG provides a unique opportunity to study the effects of 
different electoral system in a divided, but nonetheless robustly democratic, state. It 
thus facilitates meaningful evaluations of the impact of these systems, and particularly 
the arguments advanced for the integrative effects of AV. PNG used an AV system for 
its first three mass-suffrage elections in 1964, 1968 and 1972, when it was an Australian 
Territory (comprising an Australian colony, Papua, and a United Nations Trust 
Territory, ex-League of Nations Mandate, New Guinea, administered as a single unit) 
undergoing preparation for decolonisation and independence. The three elections held 
during this period represent the only national example of AV parliamentary elections in 
what could be argued to be a divided society to date, and are thus deserving of serious 
examination when evaluating Horowitz’s proposals.
While the implications of the PNG case for the arguments for and against centripetalism 
will be examined in detail in Chapter Six, it is important to note at this stage that until 
now virtually no empirical evidence has been put forward in support of the integrative 
effects of AV in an ethnically-divided society, resulting in substantial criticism of
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Horowitz’s arguments.12 This thesis — and the published articles and book chapters 
based on its research13 — attempts to provide this missing evidence. The PNG case 
functions as what Eckstein (1992, 117-76) calls a ‘crucial case study’ for the theoretical 
arguments for centripetalism: that is, a case study which provides the key test of a 
theory’s validity, and a more rigorous assessment than even a large-N comparative 
study.
However, one case rarely provides sufficient evidence on which to build a theory. A 
more appropriate approach is to use a combination of case-study and comparative 
analysis. This thesis therefore combines both a focussed ‘crucial case study’ approach, 
via sustained examination of PNG, with a wider comparative analysis which examines 
the effects of preferential electoral systems in states such as Sri Lanka, Fiji, and 
Australia. The combined evidence from these cases suggests that, under certain 
conditions, AV electoral methods can indeed encourage co-operative political behaviour 
and accommodative outcomes. However, the evidence also suggests that the 
applicability of the centripetal model is highly dependent upon socio-structural 
conditions, particularly the size, number and geographic dispersion of contending ethnic 
groups, and is likely to lead to accommodative outcomes only under certain facilitating 
conditions. This thesis thus attempts to provide validating evidence for an as yet 
largely-unsubstantiated theory, but also to circumscribe and limit the applicability of the 
theory. The implications of this will be discussed in detail in the concluding chapter.
By combining case and comparative study, this thesis is part of a widespread 
synthesising trend in political science in which the ‘new institutionalism’ has stimulated 
political scientists to
no longer think in either/or terms o f science or story-telling, wide-ranging cross-national 
comparisons or carefully crafted case studies unique unto themselves: virtually all serious
students o f the subject now see the merit in attending to local detail and appreciate the possibilities 
o f systematic, statistically compelling study even in small-N situations (Goodin and Klingemann, 
1996, 12).
In reality, some type of comparative method informs most if not all empirical political 
studies, because in most cases it is only by comparing the performance of states, 
governments or any other political variable that meaningful judgements can be made
12 See Sisk 1996, 44, 62; Diamond and Plattner 1994, xxiv.
13 These are: Reilly 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d.
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about their relative merits (Lane and Ersson 1994, 1). The significance of the 
comparative methodology to this thesis is twofold. First, comparative politics has 
tended to be strongly institutionalist in approach: its aim has traditionally been to 
develop an understanding of how different institutional mechanisms work within 
different contexts. Lane and Ersson, for example, argue that comparative politics 
“implicitly or explicitly ... discusses questions about the institutional structure of the 
state as it affects stability and performance” (1994, 26). One example of this focus is 
the contention that political institutions, if suitably designed, contribute towards a 
state’s democratic prospects — an argument classically put by John Stuart Mill in the 
nineteenth century and advanced by many political scientists since. The other reason 
comparative politics is significant to this thesis is its concern with normative issues. 
The normative dimension of political science implies, amongst other things, a capacity 
on the part of political scientists to specify particular courses of action, such as 
institutional reform or policy programs, which can be used to guide states towards 
particular outcomes. In this way, research findings such as those presented in this thesis 
can have substantial public policy implications.
It is important to note that, while the evidence put forward in this thesis suggests that 
AV can indeed encourage accommodation in divided societies, this is not always in the 
same ways or for the same reasons as those postulated by Horowitz. Likewise, the 
conclusions of this thesis, while broadly consistent with Horowitz’s arguments, differ 
from his in a number of important respects, particularly in the area of appropriate 
electoral system choice and the importance of social and demographic factors in limiting 
the application of centripetal prescriptions. Nonetheless, the foundations (if not the 
conclusions) of the arguments for the accommodative effects of preferential voting 
systems put forward in this thesis owe a clear, and acknowledged, intellectual debt to 
Horowitz’s work.14
The PNG case and its relevance
As Horowitz (1985, 602) himself has noted, now and then political systems create 
quasi-experimental conditions under which propositions can be tested. The use of two
14 Similarly, many of the techniques employed for analysing the effects o f electoral systems owe a debt to 
the pioneering comparative work o f Arend Lijphart, but the conclusions are different to (and sometimes in 
opposition to) Lijphart’s own.
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different electoral systems in PNG — AV from 1964-1975 and FPTP from 1975 
onwards — provides the type of quasi-experimental conditions necessary to evaluate the 
impact of these systems. While there were several significant changes to other variables 
at the same time as the change of electoral system in PNG (especially the attainment of 
independence and the withdrawal of the Australian colonial apparatus in 1975), the 
major elements of a competitive political system (e.g. an elected legislature, mass 
suffrage elections, a nascent party system) were already in place prior to the change of 
electoral rules. Many of the political actors quoted or cited in this study experienced 
elections under both systems and are thus able to compare their experiences under the 
two systems. It is therefore possible to make meaningful and specific comparisons 
about the effects of the two electoral systems in a way that would not be possible under 
a country-by-country study. This is particularly important because AV and FPTP are 
often discussed as if they were variations of the same system in terms of results and 
consequences (Rae 1971, 108). Critics of centripetalism have queried whether “the 
incentives for moderation inherent in the alternative vote are much greater than 
incentives in other majoritarian systems” and suggested that differences between the 
two are likely to be negligible (Lijphart 1995b, 863). The evidence from PNG refutes 
both claims: there is strong evidence, presented in Chapter Four, that AV and FPTP had 
quite different effects upon party system development, levels of candidature and, most 
particularly, the incentives for moderation or violence presented to candidates and their 
supporters.
Papua New Guinea remains an obscure and poorly-understood example of a functioning 
multi-ethnic democracy in the developing world. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, 
the PNG case has many lessons for students of comparative politics. The most 
important reason for urging greater attention to PNG in the field of comparative politics 
is simply its longevity as a participatory competitive democracy. In this respect PNG, 
like its national symbol, the kumul,15 is a rare bird: an ethnically-fragmented and 
economically underdeveloped country in the ‘Third World’ which has nonetheless 
maintained, over a long period (more than 30 years), democratic government and 
meaningful elections. A number of comparative studies have confirmed PNG’s unusual 
status in this regard. Myron Weiner’s study of elections in the developing world, for
15 The tokpisin word for ‘bird of paradise’.
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example, found that PNG was one of a select group of six developing countries with 
populations over one million that had remained more or less continuously democratic 
since independence (the others were India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Jamaica, and Trinidad 
and Tobago) (Weiner 1987, 18-19). A similar but more recent formulation found PNG 
one of a group of ten developing countries with populations above one million that had 
maintained democracy, or at least a constitutional ‘near-democracy’, continuously from 
1965 (the others were India, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Botswana and Mauritius) (Diamond 1992, 127). Reviewing the 
findings of their monumental four-volume, 26-nation study of democracy in developing 
countries, Diamond, Linz and Lipset found that PNG was one of a select group of five 
developing countries that could be classified as ‘stable democracies’ (the others were 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, India and Botswana). (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995, 35). 
And, in the forthcoming second edition of Lijphart’s classic work Democracies, PNG is 
one of only four developing countries that are also classified as ‘established’ 
democracies — defined as countries with a population of over 250,000 which are 
democratic now and have been continuously democratic for at least 20 years (India, 
Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago being the others).16
Other studies of democratic consolidation have further emphasised PNG’s unique status 
amongst developing-world democracies. Power and Gasiorowski’s (1997) examination 
of the outcomes of 56 transitions to democracy in the Third World between 1930 and 
1995, for example, found that Papua New Guinea was, along with India, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago, one of the developing world’s only ‘consolidated’ parliamentary 
democracies.17 Democratic consolidation was measured by the presence of three 
criteria: the holding of a second election subsequent to the democratic transition
(which, in many cases, coincided with the granting of independence); at least one 
alternation in executive power; and 12 years of democratic experience (Power and 
Gasiorowski 1997, 132-33). Another more demanding test of consolidation is provided 
by Huntington’s ‘two-turnover test’, which occurs when the party or group that takes 
power in an initial election loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those 
election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the
16 Personal communication, Professor Arend Lijphart, University of California at San Diego, 13 August 
1997.
17 Consolidated presidential democracies were Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
and Venezuela.
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winners of a later election (1991, 266-67). This criterion would result in the exclusion 
of a number of the above countries, such as Botswana and Malaysia (neither of which 
has experienced a change of government party yet), but would be easily met by PNG. 
The paucity of cases outside the developed west which could meet either of these 
relatively undemanding tests of democratic consolidation emphasise just how far Papua 
New Guinea — with its five post-independence elections, eight transitions of 
government and over 30 years of continuous democratic experience — deviates from 
the comparative norm.
PNG also has some of the least favourable social and economic conditions for 
democratic success, including high levels of unemployment and violent crime and low 
levels of literacy, education and per capita GDP.18 As Table 1.1 shows, on almost all 
indicators of economic and social development, PNG ranks near the bottom compared 
to other ‘continuous democracies or near-democracies’ in the developing world. 
Amongst this group, its literacy rate is lower than all others bar Botswana and India. Its 
Gross Domestic Product per capita is lower than all except India. Similarly, PNG’s 
ranking on the United Nation’s Index of Human Development (a composite measure of 
socio-economic indicators which includes information on health, education and 
unemployment levels), is higher only than the South Asian countries. In comparative 
terms, there is a strong relationship between a low score on these indicators and 
democratic instability.19 And yet, as we have seen, PNG has one of the most successful 
and unbroken democratic records of this entire group.
18 See United Nations Development Programme 1997.
19 For a summary o f knowledge to date, see Lipset 1995, 350-56.
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Table 1.1: Indicators of Economic and Social Development in Developing-World
Democracies
Population Area (sq. km) Literacy 
Rate (%)
GDP (US 
dollars)
HDI
Index
Botswana 1,443,000 582,000 68.0 2,658 0.741
Colombia 34,520,000 1,142,000 90.6 1,873 0.840
Costa Rica 3,071,000 51,100 94.5 2,729 0.884
India 952,590,000 3,167,000 43.6 311 0.436
Jamaica 2,411,000 11,430 84.1 1,593 0.702
Mauritius 1,070,000 2,040 81.7 2,515 0.825
Papua New Guinea 4,107,000 462,840 70.5 1,058 0.504
Sri Lanka 17,865,000 65,610 89.6 656 0.698
Trinidad & Tobago 1,237,000 5,130 97.6 4,217 0.872
Venezuela 20,712,000 912,050 90.6 2,897 0.859
Source: International IDEA 1997. Figures are based on those present at most recent elections as of May
1997.
In many ways PNG also operates as a salutary correction to some of the more 
complacent findings of comparative political scientists in the electoral studies field. To 
take but one example: under Duverger’s well-known ‘sociological law’ concerning the 
relationship between electoral and party systems, PNG’s first-past-the-post electoral 
system should have produced a relatively stable two-party system.20 In fact, the PNG 
party system, such as it exists at all, is characterised by a weak and highly-fragmented 
multipartism and other factors which, according to Ghai, are usually associated with 
proportional representation: “multiple parties, large candidature, coalitions, and weak 
governments” (1988, 73). As noted earlier, one explanation for this divergence between 
theory and practice lies in the almost entirely Western focus of traditional electoral 
studies, many of which are based exclusively on examination of elections in 
industrialised countries only.21 Another reason for comparative politics specialists to 
give more attention to PNG is because it provides another relatively unusual case: a 
country that has changed from one electoral system to a different one. While 
incremental adjustments to electoral laws are relatively common, examples of wholesale 
electoral system change remain unusual, given the in-built inertia of electoral laws 22
20 First formulated in Duverger 1954.
21 See, for example, Bogdanor and Butler 1983; Farrell 1997.
22 See Rose 1983,42-43.
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This has traditionally hampered the comparative study of electoral systems: most
discussions require a particular system in one country to be compared with a similar 
system in a different country. Even for two very similar polities, the vast number of 
different variables in a country-to-country comparison makes it difficult to assess the 
effect of a single constant such as an electoral system in isolation from the rest of a 
political system. This means that it is often difficult to make substantial assessments 
about the effects of one system or another: we are not comparing like with like. This 
thesis, by contrast, compares two different electoral systems — one of which (AV) is 
unusual by world standards — in one polity, PNG, over a period of over 30 years.
Papua New Guinea’s political institutions have not received a great deal of academic 
attention. There has been an invaluable series of election studies published after every 
PNG election to date23, but with one or two exceptions these have concentrated 
overwhelmingly on a seat-by-seat description and analysis of election campaigns, with 
minimal attention paid to formal election rules or the way these rules influence styles of 
political competition. This reflects the preoccupations of the respective authors and 
editors: PNG elections are often interpreted as clashes between traditional culture and 
the modem world of representative politics, the “counterpoint between traditional and 
modem bases for status-competition” in the words of one author (Strathem 1976, 283). 
Most election studies to date have implicitly viewed elections as an arena in which the 
forces of tradition and modernity can be played out, and in which the social customs and 
obligations of voters and candidates play a dominant role. The formal rules of the 
electoral system, by contrast, have tended to be seen as being of marginal importance. 
In part, this reflects the traditional dominance among the social science disciplines of 
anthropology in studies of PNG, which has long represented something of a Mecca for 
anthropologists due to the diversity and isolation from external influences of many of its 
traditional societies. A considerable amount of research and scholarship on politics in 
PNG, including electoral studies, has been conducted not by political scientists but by 
anthropologists, who have understandably given more attention to social forces than 
political institutions.24 The comparative lack of attention to the impacts of modem 
political institutions has hampered a comprehensive understanding of the political
23 These are: Bettison, Hughes and van der Veur 1965; Epstein, Parker and Reay 1971; Stone 1976; 
Hegarty 1983; King 1989, Oliver 1989; Saffu 1996.
24 Amongst the scholars cited in this thesis, Marie Reay, Andrew Strathem and Bill Standish are all 
anthropologists by training.
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process in PNG, and led to a tendency to ascribe the causes for political activity 
overwhelmingly to traditional ‘cultural’ factors, with insufficient attention given to the 
rational calculations made by PNG’s political actors as they interact with PNG’s 
political institutions.
This thesis will attempt to show that many of the features of PNG’s electoral politics 
usually seen as having social, cultural or other explanations are often influenced by, and 
sometimes reactions to, the incentives presented by the electoral system. In examining 
and giving prominence to an ‘institutionalist’ line of inquiry in this thesis, the centrality 
of political culture to questions of political behaviour and democratic performance may 
sometimes appear to have been forgotten. This is emphatically not the case. The 
reasons advanced in Chapter Two for PNG’s somewhat surprising democratic success 
are essentially cultural ones: the combination of traditional social structures of political 
leadership with the constitutionalism and willingness to abide by the ‘rules of the game’ 
inculcated amongst the political elite by the Australian colonial administration. A 
nation’s political culture is also, however, extraordinarily difficult to manipulate and 
almost impossible to change from above. By contrast, political institutions such as 
constitutions and electoral systems are considerably less influential but, unlike a 
nation’s historical or socio-economic situation, can be changed with relative ease. The 
aim of this thesis is essentially to explore the question of which political institutions will 
best work to promote peaceful and effective democratic government in a particular 
social setting. This type of institutionalist inquiry is necessarily, as Juan Linz has noted, 
“a modest quest, but a worthy one” (1996, 161).
Conclusion
Because of the relative obscurity of PNG for many political scientists, and its unusual 
status as a competitive democracy in the developing world, part of this thesis will 
necessarily deal with the history of competitive democracy in PNG. Chapter Two 
argues that PNG is in many ways a deviant case for students of comparative politics, 
and one which challenges a number of well-established theories concerning the 
relationship between democratic sustainability, ethnic fragmentation and political 
institutions. Chapters Three and Four of this thesis present a description and analysis of 
elections in PNG, from the first elections in 1964 until the most recent elections in
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1997. By accumulating and calculating data on voting trends such as party vote shares, 
turnover of MPs, margins of victory, turnout rates, party hopping, seats won and other 
electoral outcomes, this thesis provides the data and analysis to enable the PNG case to 
be incorporated more fully into the wider field of comparative politics.25 Chapter Four 
concentrates on the core hypothesis of this thesis: the extent to which co-operative 
political behaviour and accommodative outcomes were encouraged by PNG’s 
centripetal political institutions in the pre-independence period, and the extent to which 
this behaviour changed as PNG political actors responded to the new ‘rules of the game’ 
after independence.
While Chapters Two through Four are exclusively devoted to PNG, Chapters Five to 
Eight are comparative. Despite the evidence from PNG in support of centripetal 
theories presented in Chapter Four, it would be unwise to put too much weight on the 
PNG example alone, especially considering the unusually fragmented nature of PNG 
society and the colonial environment in which the relevant elections were held. For this 
reason, it is important to examine other ethnically-divided societies in which similar 
electoral arrangements have been adopted to attempt to encourage inter-ethnic 
accommodation. There are two such cases: Fiji, which in 1997 introduced an AV 
electoral system for all future elections for this very purpose; and Sri Lanka, which has 
used a CV system to elect its President since 1978. These two cases are examined in 
Chapter Five and are found to provide mostly speculative but still important evidence to 
support the findings of the PNG case.
Having presented the key data from those divided societies in which centripetal 
institutions have been used, the remainder of the thesis evaluates the implications of the 
material presented. Chapter Six assesses the specific implications of the PNG, Fiji and 
Sri Lanka cases for the arguments for and against centripetal theories of democracy in 
divided societies as advanced by Horowitz, Lijphart, Sisk and others. It also looks at 
the experience of AV elections in Australia, the longest-running example of the system. 
Although Australia is an ethnically-diverse society, it is not an ethnically-divided 
society, in the sense of ethnicity representing a fundamental political cleavage around 
which political interests are formed and mobilised, and so cannot be used to directly
25 For example, the second edition of Arend Lijphart’sDemocracies (forthcoming), which utilises data 
from this thesis.
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evaluate arguments for or against centripetalism. Australia does offer, however, the 
case which best illustrates the way preference-swapping can promote tangible policy 
changes on the part of parties and governments. Chapter Six concludes by examining 
the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical case for AV as an instrument for 
managing ethnic conflict, finding it to be most applicable to situations where there is a 
degree of fluidity to ethnic identities and relationships.
Although most of the evidence presented in the earlier chapters concerns the alternative 
vote, this is not the only preferential electoral system that has been recommended by 
centripetal enthusiasts. Chapter Seven therefore examines the comparative experience 
of preferential voting systems around the world. There are three forms of preferential 
electoral system used for national elections: the alternative vote; the single transferable 
vote; and the contingent vote. These systems can themselves be further broken down 
according to whether the system makes the numbering of all preferences compulsory or 
leaves the decision as to whether to mark preferences beyond the first in the hands of the 
voter; and, in the case of AV and CV, whether it is used in single-member districts or 
multi-member districts. Examination of the experience of these variations suggests that 
not all preferential systems are equally effective at promoting accommodation in 
divided societies, and that apparently minor technical differences between systems can 
have major effects in terms of outcomes.
The concluding Chapter of this thesis attempts to put the collected evidence for 
centripetalism in context. On the basis of the evidence and analysis presented in the 
preceding chapters, some general facilitating conditions for centripetal approaches to 
democracy in divided societies are suggested. The central conclusion is that the 
application of the centripetal model is highly dependent upon socio-structural conditions 
— particularly the size, number and geographic dispersion of the contending ethnic 
groups. To be effective, centripetal electoral approaches require ethnically- 
heterogeneous electoral districts, and are thus likely to work effectively only in 
situations of extreme ethnic fragmentation (such as Papua New Guinea) or in situations 
where competing groups are widely dispersed and inter-mixed (such as in Fiji). While 
uncommon in some regions, there are numerous examples of this type of ethnic group 
distribution in the Asia-Pacific region, due in part to the influences of colonialism and 
the presence of large Chinese and Indian diasporas. In addition, all the identified
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examples of centripetalism occur in Asia-Pacific states. It is thus likely that centripetal 
institutions may offer the most appropriate choices for engineering accommodative 
politics in many of the ethnically-divided states of the Asia-Pacific region in particular, 
and more generally in situations of high ethnic group inter-mixture or fragmentation in 
other regions.
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Chapter Two:
Representative democracy in PNG — a deviant case?
The state of Papua New Guinea (PNG) comprises roughly half of the world’s second 
largest island, New Guinea, and about 600 smaller islands. It shares its western border 
with Irian Jaya, a province of Indonesia (see Map One). PNG was formed by the 
merger at independence of the Territory of Papua, which had been under Australian rule 
from 1906, with the Trust Territory of New Guinea, which had been a German colonial 
territory from 1884 to 1914, and had thenceforth been administered by Australia — first 
under military rule, then under a League of Nations mandate granted in 1920, and later 
under United Nations trusteeship from 1945. The two territories were jointly 
administered by Australia as an administrative union until 1975. The Territory of Papua 
New Guinea became self-governing in December 1973 and attained full independence 
on 16 September 1975.
PNG is home to approximately 4 million people, predominantly of Melanesian race. 
Traditional forms of social organisation play an important role in PNG society, and 
continue to be significant influences upon the conduct of modem representative politics. 
The practice of representative democracy in PNG is characterised by a diffuse and 
fragmented party system, high candidacy rates, very low support levels for some 
successful candidates, vote-splitting, low party identification on the part of the 
electorate, high turnover of politicians from one election to the next, and frequent 
‘party-hopping’ on the part of MPs. Political parties are weak and tend to coalesce 
around personalities rather than issues or ideologies, although they do play a limited 
role in mobilising and campaigning at election time and in the formation of 
governments following elections.
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The highly fragmented nature of much of PNG society means that there is a greater 
number of politicised ‘ethnic groups’ in PNG than in almost any comparable country. 
In fact, with over 800 distinct languages spoken by several thousand competing clan- 
based ethnic polities, PNG is almost certainly the world’s most ethnically heterogeneous 
state in terms of the sheer numbers of independent ethno-linguistic groups. The 
conventional wisdom is that such a level of ethnic diversity poses significant challenges 
to successful nation-building and democratic government. Observers of PNG politics, 
for example, have argued that its ethnic fragmentation represents a “formidable and 
intractable” impediment to nation-building (Premdas 1989, 246); and that PNG’s 
“10,000 micro-societies” and 800 language groups, the largest of which numbers only 
150,000 people, presents an almost insurmountable barrier to stable democracy (Griffin 
1974, 142-43).
The historical record to date, however, does not support this conventional wisdom. 
While PNG has experienced a number of secessionist movements (including a long- 
running civil war on the eastern island of Bougainville), it has so far been able to 
maintain both its territorial unity and an impressive record of competitive democracy.1 
As we have seen, on most indicators of democratic consolidation PNG ranks as one of 
the best-established democracies in the developing world. Despite being faced with 
difficulties similar to those of many newly-independent African states (e.g. ethnic 
divisions, tribal conflict, economic underdevelopment, low literacy and educational 
levels) democratic procedures have not just survived in PNG but, on many indicators, 
appear to have flourished. Freely contested and highly competitive elections have 
occurred regularly since 1964. Participation has been inclusive. Civil and political 
liberties have generally remained unrestricted, as have the media and labour unions. 
Voter turnout has been consistently high. There is thus some justification for Larry 
Diamond’s assessment that PNG’s “remarkably vibrant and resilient democratic 
system” makes it, with India, the most successful democracy of any of the ‘Asian’ 
developing countries (1989, 1), and for David Lipset’s similar conclusion that “the 
democratic system in PNG has been highly successful in terms of ... any comparative 
scale” (1989, 409). As Saffu notes, in terms of uncertainty of electoral outcomes and
1 See Premdas 1977.
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the extent of contestation and participation for office, “PNG must be counted as one of 
the most democratic states in the world” (1996, 1).
Crucially, there has been a genuine contest for political power at each post­
independence election, and PNG thus stands in stark contrast to a number of other 
developing countries which also have reasonably competitive elections but have yet to 
experience a change of government (Malaysia and Botswana both fall into this 
category). In contrast to these ‘dominant-party systems’, peaceful changes of 
government in PNG have been common. In the post-independence period alone, to 
1997 there had been eight changes of government: once at independence, three times at 
general elections and four times on the floor of parliament. The success of democracy 
in PNG is thus at least partly explicable by reference to Prezworski’s description of 
democracy as “organized uncertainty”, whereby winners in one election become losers 
in the next, and where all outcomes are necessarily temporary and uncertain (1991, 13).
PNG’s democratic sustainability also represents a deviant case for students of political 
institutions. PNG’s electoral institutions are highly ‘majoritarian’, despite the 
prevailing viewpoint amongst scholars that proportional representation is required for 
ethnically-fragmented societies and that “plurality and majority methods will work less 
successfully in deeply divided or plural societies than in homogeneous ones” (Bogdanor 
1987, 195). For its three pre-independence elections, PNG used a majority electoral 
system — the alternative vote, inherited from Australia. This was changed to a plurality 
or first-past-the-post (FPTP) system at independence in 1975. PNG’s wider institutions 
of government are also highly majoritarian, featuring a Westminster-style parliament 
and, more recently, a shift from the quasi-federal structure established at independence 
towards a unitary state.2 The National Parliament is a unicameral body, in which the 
executive is formed by and responsible to the legislature. There is a separate 
independent judiciary. The head of state is the British monarch, represented locally by a 
governor-general. The prime ministership is determined by a vote on the floor of the 
parliament. Parliament is effectively sovereign: the Constitution can be amended by 
two successive ‘super-majority’ votes of parliament, not by referendum. These features
2 For the most influential example o f this typology see Lijphart’s Democracies: Patterns o f Majoritarian 
and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (1984). As the title suggests, Lijphart seeks to 
demonstrate a basic division in established democracies between those utilising majoritarian political 
institutions (such as majority electoral laws and single-party governments) and those which place 
constraints on majority mle via proportional representation, coalitions and other ‘consensual’ devices.
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were all introduced in PNG’s ‘autochthonous’ 1975 Constitution, following an 
exhaustive consultative tour throughout Papua New Guinea by the body charged with 
drawing up an independence constitution for PNG, the Constitutional Planning 
Committee (hereafter CPC). Between 1972 and 1974, members of the Committee 
engaged in widespread consultations concerning the nature of an independent 
government in PNG which involved over 100 local meetings attended by an estimated 
60,000 local people (CPC 1974, 1/1). The Constitution’s autochthony was underlined 
by the decision of the national parliament to reconvene itself as a constituent assembly 
in order to debate and then formally adopt the Constitution in 1975.
The CPC’s final report avoided discussion of alternatives to what was, for colonial 
PNG, a familiar Westminster-style system of parliamentary government (1974, 6/1), 
despite some observers arguing that PNG “may not be suitable soil to plant the seed of 
Westminster” (Waddell 1973, 30). In this it followed trends elsewhere in the 
‘decolonisation decades’ of the 1960s and early 1970s. As Madden has shown, the 
indigenous elite in British colonies almost invariably opted for the Westminster model 
at independence, despite consistent misgivings from the imperial parliament that it was 
“of doubtful value as an export to tropical colonies, to primitive societies in Africa and 
to complex societies in India” (1980, 20). Often, the presumption appears to have been 
that by adopting the formal institutions of Westminster, a British-style system of two 
strong parties alternating in power would follow. In PNG as in most other developing 
countries, such presumptions proved to be deeply mistaken.
Despite the ‘home grown’ process which led to the drafting of the Constitution, PNG’s 
basic institutions of government thus represent a familiar example of a Westminster 
parliamentary system, and in terms of political institutions PNG must rate as one of the 
purer and more majoritarian examples of the Westminster system in the world today.3 
There is a widespread scholarly consensus that such centralised, majoritarian institutions 
are inappropriate and dangerous for plural societies.4 Similarly, many scholars argue 
that modem representative democracy demands meaningful and effective political 
parties, yet PNG has a party system that is weak, fragmented and increasingly
3 See Lijphart 1984, 1-20.
4 See, for example, Lewis 1965; Lijphart 1977, 1991d.
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irrelevant.5 As argued in the previous chapter, despite a weak and dissolute party 
system, majoritarian institutions of government, and an extremely high degree of ethnic 
fragmentation, on many indicators of democratic consolidation PNG is one of the best- 
established democracies in the developing world. In this sense, PNG boasts a successful 
democratic record which represents a significant deviant case for students of democracy 
and comparative politics. How do we explain this apparent conundrum?
This chapter suggests that the reason for PNG’s democratic success lies in a 
combination of favourable structural, social and historical factors. Foremost among 
these is the sheer diversity of PNG’s ethnic structure, which virtually guarantees that no 
one group will ever be able to single-handedly gain control of political power. Social 
organisational factors — particularly the competitive and often egalitarian nature of 
traditional society exemplified by the ‘big-man’ model of leadership — are also 
adjudged to be an advantage. In addition, the Australian colonial administration was, it 
is argued, relatively successful in inculcating a respect for constitutionalism and 
willingness to play by the ‘rules of the game’ amongst PNG’s indigenous elite. By 
contrast, a serious weakness for democratic consolidation is posed by the increasing 
weakness of the PNG party system, and particularly the failure of PNG parties to 
penetrate to any meaningful level into PNG society, or to develop the necessary 
coherence to act as disciplined parliamentary machines. The combination of PNG’s 
weak party system with its robust history of competitive democracy also represents a 
challenge to the conventional wisdom concerning the relationship between a well- 
developed party system and democratic sustainability.
Democracy and ethnic conflict in PNG
Ethnically-divided states can be structured in very different ways, and the PNG case 
represents a situation in which a large number of ethnic groups are included within the 
state “with no single group dominant” (May 1996a, 10). Ethnic groups in PNG are 
“both small and multiple” (Regan 1995, 9). With no common history of statehood, “its 
people are fragmented into hundreds of often mutually antipathetic ethnic groupings” 
(Hegarty 1979, 188). At the latest count there were approximately 840 distinct 
languages spoken in PNG, around a quarter of the world’s stock, reflecting enormous
5 See Strom 1995a, 933.
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cultural divisions: “in a very real sense the country is a nation of minorities” (Minority 
Rights Group 1997, 682). Deklin writes that “PNG is a land of many cultures and, if we 
take the number of languages in the country as a rough criterion, there are some 1,000 
cultures” (1992, 35).
Defining what constitutes an ‘ethnic group’ in PNG is no easy task. According to 
Lijphart, an ethnic group can be defined as a group of people who see themselves as a 
distinct cultural community, often sharing a “common language, religion, kinship, 
and/or physical characteristics (such as skin colour); and who tend to harbour negative 
and hostile feelings towards members of other groups” (Lijphart 1995b, 853). This is 
quite a broad definition of ethnicity, including as it does reference to factors such as race 
and religion. Esman has contrasted this to a ‘narrower definition’ of ethnic identity 
which denotes a community that claims common origins, possesses distinctive and 
valued cultural markers such as customs, dress and, especially, language, and that 
expects to share a common destiny (Esman 1994, 15). This narrower definition may be 
more applicable to PNG, where groups are divided less on overt ascriptive criteria such 
as race or religion than on kinship, custom, language and region. Levine writes that
if  ethnic communities are understood to be groups possessing a distinctive language, custom and 
memories —  traits that give its members a sense of unity and cause them to distinguish themselves 
(and be distinguished by) others —  then PNG may have more than one thousand such ethnic 
groups within its borders (1997,479).
Part of the difficulty of defining what constitutes an ethnic group in PNG is the sheer 
variation of its ethnic structure, which limits the ability to make generalisations. For 
example, in lowlands areas the population of ethno-linguistic units normally ranges 
from a few hundred to four or five thousand, whereas in the highlands these groups may 
number up to 60,000 members (de Lepervanche 1973, 1065). In the highlands regions 
the largest autonomous groups have tended to be defined in the scholarly literature as 
‘tribes’, ‘phratries’, or ‘clans’; in coastal areas the literature more often refers to 
‘villages’, ‘territories’, ‘neighbourhoods’ or similar terms (Langness 1973, 924). For 
the purposes of this thesis, an ‘ethnic group’ constitutes any of these larger or smaller 
cultural-linguistic groupings which tend to act collectively for political purposes, such 
as voting in elections. My concern here is not to overly generalise about PNG’s 
extremely complex social structure, but rather to provide a common unit of analysis 
across all the cases cited in this thesis. This definition of ‘ethnic group’ draws on my
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earlier definition of a divided society: that is, a society in which ethnicity is a politically 
salient cleavage and in which ethnic groups act collectively for political purposes.
Ethnic structure in PNG
PNG exhibits one of the most ethnically fragmented social structures known in the 
world today. At the root of this social structure are unilateral descent groups usually 
described as ‘clans’ — ascriptive extended family networks which are the primary, and 
sometimes the only, unit of political and social loyalty in many areas.6 Considering the 
lack of overt racial distinction between them, the depth of cleavages between groups is 
often striking, and can be partly explained by two related factors: geography and 
language. PNG has some of the world’s most dramatic terrain, with a vast range of 
mountains and valleys running though the middle of the mainland and an extensive arc 
of populated volcanic islands off the coast — all of which create severe difficulties in 
terms of isolation, access and transport. Accordingly, “most groups developed their 
own physical and cultural identity in isolation ... communities living on different sides 
of the same highland valley sometimes speak languages as distinct from one another as 
Spanish is from Italian” (Souter 1963, 49). While few groups were entirely isolated, 
and many had ‘ally’ groups with which they conducted trade and marriage, relations 
between many were characterised as much by hostility as by co-operation. Traditional 
contact in the highlands, for example, often took the form of intermittent tribal warfare 
between clan groups.7 Moreover, within the main language groups themselves, there 
are also often deep and bitter internal divisions.8
There has been little detailed assessment of the total number of ethnic groups in PNG, 
but estimates from informed observers are in the region of 5000-7000 separate groups.9 
This means that PNG is probably the world’s most heterogeneous society in terms of the 
number of distinct polities (which continue to be based, overwhelmingly, on ascriptive 
ethnic identities), with estimates of the number of separate ‘political units’ ranging from 
2000 to 18000.10 If a larger unit of base measurement is used, such as ‘tribes’ (i.e.
6 See Hogbin 1973, 23.
7 See Reay 1982, 630-36.
8 See de Lepervanche 1973, 1066.
9 Personal communication, Dr Bill Standish, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian 
National University, 28 September 1996.
10 Personal communication, Dr John Burton, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian 
National University, 24 December 1996.
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aligned or related clan groupings), then we are still dealing with an extremely 
fragmented society: a rough average of 2000 members per tribe against PNG’s total 
population of approximately 4 million people gives a figure of around 2000 separate 
tribes. Even using conservative figures, then, we are dealing with a level of 
fragmentation which makes divided societies elsewhere look relatively homogeneous by 
comparison.
The findings of a number of comparative, large-N research studies suggest that this 
degree of ethnic fragmentation has serious implications for a polity’s democratic 
prospects. There is widespread agreement from cross-national studies of the effect of 
ethnic heterogeneity on political stability that as the number of ethnic groups in a state 
increases, the prospects for sustainable democracy decreases. Unfortunately, almost 
none of this substantial body of comparative political science research includes Papua 
New Guinea as a unit of analysis. One of the first such studies, Robert Dahl’s 
Polyarchies, utilising data collected in the 1960s, concluded that although democracy in 
highly fragmented countries was not impossible, “a competitive political system is less 
likely in countries with a considerable measure of subcultural pluralism” (1971, 111). 
Rabushka and Shepsle found that one of the “striking regularities” amongst ethnically- 
fragmented societies was that “democracy frequently gives way to forms of 
authoritarian rule” (1972, 177-78). Similarly, Lijphart has argued in his work on 
consociational democracy, Democracy in Plural Societies, that the optimal number of 
segments for a consociationalist approach to ethnic conflict management to work is 
three or four, and conditions become progressively less favourable as segments increase, 
because co-operation among groups becomes more difficult as the number of groups 
increase (1977, 56). Using similar data on ethnic fragmentation, Lane and Ersson 
(1990, 138) also found a negative correlation between ethnic diversity and democratic 
persistence. They refined this finding in more recent research which found a “weak 
negative relationship” between ethnic fragmentation and factors such as state stability 
and civic and political rights, prompting the conclusion that ethnic fragmentation may 
be a contributory factor to state instability, but that it is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition (Lane and Ersson 1994, 149).
Probably the most sophisticated study to date of this issue has been Powell’s 
Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. A cross-national
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multivariate analysis of factors affecting democratic prospects utilising data from 29 
democracies, Powell’s study found that ethnic fractionalisation was positively related to 
executive instability. He also found a strong positive relationship between ethnic 
fractionalisation and death by violence, with majoritarian constitutional systems like 
PNG’s experiencing more serious violence than other constitutional types (1982, 44-46, 
221). This study is particularly relevant to PNG because, unlike most comparative 
analyses of democracies11, it includes developing countries such as Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, India and Jamaica in its analysis — countries which, as Weiner noted, are 
comparable to PNG in terms of democratic success and which also face serious ethnic 
problems.12 Unfortunately, PNG was not included in Powell’s study.
Possibly the most substantive comparative evidence for PNG’s unique combination of 
unfavourable socio-economic conditions with highly democratic processes comes from 
Tatu Vanhanen’s Prospects o f Democracy, which attempts to make predictions for the 
democratic success or failure of almost every country in the world based on each state’s 
distribution of economic, land and intellectual resources. Vanhanen’s statistical 
modelling found that PNG was the most extreme deviant case in his entire 172-country 
sample, with low resource distribution values combined with high indicators of 
democratic participation and competitiveness. Vanhanen’s perplexed conclusion was 
that
Papua New Guinea has been a deviating democracy since its independence in 1975 ... The poverty 
of the population and a low level o f higher education are unfavourable structural factors [but] 
Papua New Guinea’s high level o f democratization and low level o f resource distribution show a 
discrepancy that cannot be explained away ... a partial failure o f democratic institutions would not 
be surprising (1997, 152-53).
One possible explanation for PNG’s ‘deviance’ in this regard concerns the difference 
between ethnic divisions in PNG that are mostly expressed at the local level — for 
example, in a contest to have a member of one’s own clan or tribe elected in a 
constituency — and the contest for national hegemony that characterises ethnic conflict 
in other, less fragmented societies. As will be argued in more detail below, PNG’s 
extreme ethnic fragmentation may actually increase prospects for sustainable democracy
11 For example, Lijphart 1984.
12 The other comparable case from Weiner’s list, Trinidad and Tobago, was omitted from Powell’s study 
“for simple reasons o f lack o f data” (Powell 1982, 4).
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by dispersing conflict and guaranteeing that no one group will be able to command 
power alone.
Some analysts have argued that group fragmentation actually helps democratic 
prospects. Crouch, for example, argues that democracy in states such as India and the 
Philippines is facilitated “by ethnic compositions which make it difficult for any single 
ethnic group to predominate, and therefore encourage the formation of multi-ethnic 
alliances” (1993, 83). In other cases of extreme group fragmentation, where “some 
groups are so small in size and so geographically concentrated ... it makes little sense for 
them to devote energy to political activity much beyond their locality” (Horowitz 1985, 
37). Under this scenario,
states embrace a large number o f dispersed ethnic groups, none of them large or powerful enough 
to threaten to dominate the center ... from the standpoint o f ethnic conflict, however, much o f the 
pressure is o ff the center. In dispersed systems, group loyalties are parochial, and ethnic conflict is 
localized ... In such circumstances, the center usually has some flexibility. The demands o f one 
group can sometimes be granted without injuring the interests o f others (Horowitz 1985, 37-38).
A further positive feature of democracy in such systems is that key agencies of the state, 
such as the police force and the military, tend to be composed in such an ethnically- 
heterogeneous way that no group interest can predominate internally, while centre-based 
civilian politics is itself so heterogeneous as to act in most cases as a relatively neutral 
agent on ethnic issues. Both of these factors have often been cited as contributing 
factors to PNG’s democratic longevity.13 This suggests the possibility of a more 
complex relationship between ethnic fragmentation and democratic sustainability, with 
both very low (i.e. highly homogenous) and very high (i.e. highly heterogeneous) levels 
of ethnic fragmentation more conducive to democracy than those in-between.14
Ethnic identity in PNG
Despite PNG’s extraordinary degree of ethnic fragmentation, which significantly 
distinguishes it from the more familiar cases of ‘bi-communal’ or majority/minority 
ethnic structure found in many regions, ethnic identity in PNG, as elsewhere, tends to be
13 See May 1993, 75.
14 The findings also point to the need for a more nuanced distinction in the scholarly literature between 
those multiethnic societies in which ethnicity is apolitically-salient cleavage, such as India, Sri Lanka, 
Fiji or PNG, compared to multiethnic societies like the United States or Australia in which ethnic issues 
are, for the most part, relatively peripheral to the political process.
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manifested as a mixture of ‘primordial’ and ‘constructed’ factors.15 Under this 
typology, ethnic identity can be seen, on the one hand, as being based on ascriptive and 
relatively immutable factors (such as clan, tribe, racial or linguistic identity) — a 
position often characterised in the scholarly literature as ‘primordialism’ — and, on the 
other hand, as being a more malleable function of constructed social identities formed 
by colonialism and by post-colonial developments or operationalised by ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurs’.16 In reality, most examples of politicised ethnic identities exhibit a 
combination of both ‘primordial’ historical associations and ‘instrumental’ opportunistic 
adaptations (Esman 1994, 14). Many analyses of ethnicity in PNG, for example, 
emphasise the extent to which ethnic identities are both a salient feature of traditional 
society and also a reaction to colonialism, modernisation and independence.17 
Unsurprisingly, descriptions of ‘traditional’ ethnic identities in PNG tend to privilege 
primordial characteristics of ascription, competition and dynamism. Parker and Wolfers 
characterised the traditional situation in PNG as one in which
political entities ... were both relatively unstable and small. Not many effective political units 
contained more than a few hundred people, although on occasions thousands might co-operate for 
a specific battle, or in trade and ceremonial exchange. Membership of even the smallest primary 
groups was unstable —  as people married in and out, disputes arose between rival leaders, and 
inter-group warfare forced some members of each group to choose between the claims to their 
loyalties of, say, their residential or their kin group (1971, 16).
Primordial factors remain strong at all levels of PNG politics. Political loyalties are 
focused primarily at the level of family, clan and regional allegiances, rather than along 
party or ideological lines. Standish notes that “most PNG people maintain a mind-set of 
primary attachment and loyalty to their clan and tribal group, sometimes known as 
wantok, the Tokpisin [i.e. Pidgin] word for people who speak the same language” 
(Standish 1994, 60). The importance of ethnicity in PNG political life is thus that it taps 
deep levels of socialisation, experience and culture, with the result that “instinctive 
loyalty, as well as considerations of personal and family security and of group sanctions, 
tie individuals to their ethnic community, especially under conditions of intergroup 
tension and conflict” (Esman 1994, 15).
15 The term primordialism is usually associated with Geertz 1963. For a discussion o f this typology in 
the scholarly literature, see Esman 1994, 9-16.
16 There is a considerable literature on ethnicity and ethnic identity. See Young 1976; Brass 1985; 
Rothschild 1981; Smith 1986; Horowitz 1985; Esman 1994.
17 See Premdas 1989, 246.
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Ethnie identity as a political factor in PNG tends to be played out at different levels, and 
may manifest itself as a salient factor, in varying strengths, at the levels of extended 
family, clan, tribe, region and even along the colonial divisions of the state between 
Papua and New Guinea (Parker and Wolfers 1971, 16-17). The strength of ethnic 
attachments is thus dependent to a significant extent upon social context. In PNG, as in 
other plural societies, nearly all persons are carriers of multiple ethnic identities, but 
with what Sevese Morea has called the “ethnic belly button” of village or wantok 
politics usually of foremost salience.18 Demographically, PNG is also fragmented at 
several levels — at the clan, village and immediate region level, but also along the over­
arching geographical axes of south coast (Papua), north coast (New Guinea), highlands 
and islands — and wantok identities often extend into these larger regional levels as 
well as the clan or village ones (Standish 1994, 60).
Despite this degree of variation, it is possible to make some limited generalised 
observations about ethnicity and politics in PNG. The most important of these, for the 
purposes of this thesis, concerns the way ethnic groups are mobilised for electoral 
purposes. Elections in PNG often have the effect of underlining the significance of 
basic, clan or village-level ethnic attachments. Premdas notes that
the general electoral pattem since the introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1964 and through 
subsequent elections ... has underscored unequivocally that ethnic identity, usually at the pies tok 
[i.e. village language] level, is the foremost determinant of voter preference (1989, 251).
Especially in the pre-independence elections which are of primary concern to this thesis, 
there appears to have been a high correlation between ethnic affiliation and voting 
behaviour. Thus Parker’s analysis of the 1968 election notes that most indigenous 
candidates “commanded a more or less automatic bloc vote. Its core was usually to be 
found in their own or their more notable relatives’ kinship or clan groups” (1971, 316). 
More recent elections, however, have illustrated the increasing importance of other 
factors — such as education and familiarity with the skills and occupational experience 
of the modem world — as influences upon voting choice. Saffu’s survey of electoral 
behaviour at the 1987 election, for example, found that the most significant explanatory 
variable of voter choice was the perceived leadership ability of the candidate, and their 
ability to get the job done and deliver development to the electorate, rather than their 
clan identity (1989, 30). Burton’s extensive analysis of voting patterns in the Hagen
18 See Premdas 1989, 247.
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Open seat in 1987 found that although ethnic groups tended to give strong, and 
sometimes overwhelming, support to their ‘home’ candidate, it did not follow that the 
biggest group inevitably carried the day: perceptions of leadership qualities, social 
factors overriding clan loyalties, ‘swinging’ voters and the shifting allegiances of non- 
aligned blocks and clan groups all played their part (Burton 1989, 279).
These ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ are important for discussions of constitutional 
engineering in PNG, because they suggest that some electors, under some 
circumstances, will be prepared to vote for a member of a group different to their own 
even in situations of deep and enduring ethnic attachments. Similar findings will be 
evidenced by later studies of Fiji and Sri Lanka, both of which are examples of societies 
which face deep ‘bi-polar’ ethnic divisions, rather than the highly fragmented ethnic 
structure of PNG. But despite its structural differences, elections in PNG exhibit 
comparable types of politicised ethnicity to many other plural states — a combination of 
ascriptive ethnic political identities combined with countervailing, but usually less 
salient, ‘cross-cutting’ cleavages. In sum, even in recent elections, the salience of ethnic 
identity in PNG society means that parochial loyalties continue to be the primary, but 
not the only, basis for voter mobilisation.19
Ethnic conflict in PNG
Most discussions of ethnic conflict and politics focus on the concept of political 
‘cleavage’. Used in this context, cleavage refers to the alignment of a population around 
particular social dimensions which are conducive to conflict between them .20 In PNG, 
the nature of such cleavages tends to be manifested at several levels. The most 
important conflicts to date have been at the macro level, in terms of ethno-nationalist 
movements and secessionist struggles.21 By far the most persistent and deadly of these 
has been the long-running civil war on Bougainville, which has claimed several 
thousand lives to date.22 Most conflicts in PNG, however, are manifested not at the 
‘macro’ ethno-nationalist level, but at the micro-level as violence between PNG’s many 
small, competitive ethnic groups. The nature of ethnic conflict between these groups is
19 See Standish 1994, 60.
2® See Rae and Taylor 1970.
21 See Premdas 1977; May 1982.
22 See Lawson 1993.
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traditionally played out locally, often via inter-tribal fighting, rather than as part of an 
ethno-nationalist quest or a competition for regional or national hegemony, although it 
is no less deadly for that. Over 100 people are killed every year in tribal fights in PNG 
(Domey 1990, 310). Reports have estimated that around 20 percent of the population is 
affected by such violence, with a marked concentration in highlands regions (Clifford, 
Morauta and Stuart 1984, 94-95). Recently, guns have supplanted more traditional 
weapons in tribal wars, thus raising their stakes and increasing their deadliness (Domey 
1990, 310-11). Barnes claims that “a characteristic of Highlands cultures, and perhaps 
of Melanesia as a whole, is the high value placed on violence”23, and it is notable that 
conflicts between clan groups in many parts of PNG are considerably more violent than 
relations between communities in such ‘deeply-divided’ states as Malaysia, Fiji, 
Trinidad and Tobago and many other plural societies.
The imposition of representative government via competitive national elections has 
tended to sharpen ethnic cleavages, as the salience of ethnicity in PNG “tends to come 
to the fore ... during national election campaigns” (Howard 1989, 45). It is thus perhaps 
not surprising that ethnic violence increases at election time (Strathem 1993, 51). 
Strathem has argued that post-independence elections in PNG have encouraged a 
‘retribalisation’ of ethnic groups, in which the commodification of the voting process 
has led increasingly to rigidified ethnic group boundaries and inter-ethnic armed conflict 
(1993, 48). Elections are thus one of the primary ways in which traditional enmities are 
mobilised in contemporary PNG, even though in most cases contestation is very much 
for election to office itself, rather than larger concerns such as policy implementation, 
government formation or national ideology (Dinnen 1996; Standish 1996). Traditional 
clan, tribe and xvantok affiliations remain for the most part ascriptive and competitive 
categories, sometimes violently so, and continue to represent the primary, but far from 
the only, explanation of voting behaviour. In this sense, the politicised nature of ethnic 
conflict in PNG via clan contests for electoral victory is comparable to the less 
fragmented cases of ethnic groups in conflict found in many other developing countries. 
This point is important for the analysis of electoral behaviour under different voting 
systems presented in later chapters.
23 As quoted in May 1982, 641.
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Democracy in PNG: facilitating factors
Many scholarly analyses focus on the democratic nature of many traditional social 
organisations as one of the most important contributing factors to PNG’s democratic 
success: Lipset, for example, has argued that perhaps Australia’s greatest contribution 
as a colonial power was that it allowed “the democratic features of traditional 
Melanesian politics” to become institutionalised within the postcolonial political 
environment (1989, 413). One official source has described democracy in the South 
Pacific as generally having “fairly shallow roots”, but with better prospects in Melanesian 
countries like PNG “because of their traditional consensus approach to decision-making” 
(Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 1989, 162). Deklin has 
similarly argued that the reason for PNG’s democratic continuity lies in the “somewhat 
coincidental marriage” between PNG’s traditional Melanesian culture and value system 
and the process of modem representative government (1992, 47). In opposition to this 
view, a number of indigenous elite commentators have argued that democratic systems 
based on the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy may not be suitable for 
Pacific island states such as PNG. According to these arguments, the ‘Melanesian way’ 
of consensual decision making is inconsistent with the adversarial style of Westminster 
politics; while traditional sources of authority (such as hereditary chiefs) and cultural 
mores can be at odds with the concepts of elected government, universal suffrage and 
constitutional guarantees of rights found in most Western political systems.24
Because of its brevity of contact with the outside world and the late introduction of 
democratic institutions by the colonial power, the citizens of PNG do not have the 
benefit of a well-established democratic heritage on which to draw. Contact with the 
developed West came to PNG extremely late by comparative terms: regular contact 
along PNG’s coastal areas occurred only intermittently until well into the nineteenth 
century, while much of the more populous highlands region did not come into contact 
with the outside world until Jim Taylor and the Leahy brothers’ venture to the Waghi 
Valley in 1933.25 Despite this, PNG is one of the developing world’s most successful 
democracies on indicators of consolidation, participation and competitiveness. The
24 For a discussion see Kotobalavu 1989, 29.
2  ^For a history of these expeditions, see Souter 1963.
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most important reason for PNG’s continuing democratic success, I will argue below, is 
its extremely high degree of ethnic fragmentation — the same factor identified by 
comparative studies as being negatively associated with democratic persistence. PNG’s 
deviance in this regard is so marked as to call into question a number of the findings 
linking ethnic fragmentation to democratic instability. Other reasons for PNG’s 
ongoing democratic success noted in the introduction to this chapter are also discussed: 
traditional political structures which emphasise competition for leadership; reciprocal 
obligations and individualistic achievement; and the ‘British model’ of elite 
constitutional inculcation and rapid decolonisation performed by the departing 
Australian administration prior to independence in 1975.
Ethnic fragmentation
At first glance, it seems perverse to assert that PNG’s highly fragmented collection of 
tribes, clans and language groups should assist democratic persistence. Such an 
argument flies in the face of many academic analyses concerning the relationship 
between democratic sustainability and ethnic fragmentation discussed earlier. The key 
to the beneficial effects of ethnic fragmentation in PNG is its dispersive effects on 
ethnic conflict, which is typically expressed at the periphery (in the form of local-level 
disputes and tribal fighting) rather than at the centre (in the form of a contest for 
government by one or two dominant groups). This attribute was identified well before 
PNG became independent, when in 1970 the Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui argued that
The worst troubles we have had in Africa have been in countries with very big tribes competing 
with each other ... To this extent, one of Papua New Guinea’s greatest assets may well be its acute 
ethnic fragmentation. Small ethnic groups may fight each other, but because there are so many 
their conflicts may remain localised. They need not shake the nation to its very foundation, as did 
the tensions between big ethnic giants in Nigeria, the Congo, Kenya and Uganda (1970, 54-55).
The reality of PNG’s extraordinary ethnic structure is that no group is ever likely to 
have sufficient support to attempt to control power at the national level, and the one 
ethno-regional numeric majority that could conceivably make such a claim — the 
highlanders, which make up close to half of PNG’s population — are probably the most 
fragmented and divided of all regional groups in PNG. Attempts to mobilise ethno- 
regional forces in Papua, for example, where there is a relatively high degree of regional 
consciousness, have contributed to changes of government, but never to a level 
sufficient for Papuans to act as a hegemonic ethnic power. This is a major advantage so 
far as democratic prospects are concerned, as no group “is either subject to strong
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pressure to take exclusive control of the state or capable of doing so if it wishes to” 
(Regan 1995, 9). While ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ from the larger and more conspicuous 
ethno-regional groups make periodic attempts at mobilising support through appeals to 
ethnic consciousness (e.g. Josephine Abaijah’s Papua Besena separatist movement in 
the 1970s, or Iambakey Okuk’s similar attempts to harness some type of pan-highlander 
consciousness in the early 1980s), the fact is that no group to date has been able, nor 
seriously attempted, to stake a claim for national domination. And, while there has been 
a noticeable ethno-regional quality to some governing coalitions in recent parliaments, 
this also appears to rotate, with governments headed by a coastal New Guinean under 
Michael Somare and islanders under prime ministers Chan and Namaliu giving way to 
the supremacy of highlanders and Papuans under prime ministers Paias Wingti and Bill 
Skate respectively. With the major exception of the secessionist civil war on 
Bougainville, and some more minor historical incidents26, ethnic conflict in PNG is 
predominantly a local-level phenomenon, although no less serious or deadly because of 
that.
Just as the nature of ethnic cleavage in PNG is fragmented by its extraordinary level of 
clan-based diversity, so PNG does not suffer from the bi-polar linguistic divisions that 
have moulded political development in Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium and some 
African states. Like the question of racial fractionalisation, a multiplicity of languages 
at the micro-level has by necessity led to a degree of integration at the national level, 
with English as the language of official communication and Tokpisin the neutral lingua 
franca of the masses — largely replacing Hiri Motu, which was once the lingua franca 
of Papua. As Mazrui has argued, this process has been aided, not hindered, by PNG’s 
“incredible linguistic diversity” (1970, 55). In addition, the rise of Tokpisin as a 
national language has provided PNG with an integrative means of mutual 
communication, while the widespread use of English amongst the elite facilitates 
communication with the developed world — both necessary if not sufficient 
requirements for successful nation-building.
26 For example, the violence between 'Papuans' and N ew  Guineans' following a Papua versus New  
Guinea rugby league match in Port Moresby in June 1968, which was later reported as “one of the worst 
outbreaks o f inter-tribal fighting to occur” in Port Moresby, although in reality it demonstrated how 
arbitrary and introduced loyalties can be used in much the same way as traditional divisions to structure 
difference and conflict. See Nelson 1974, 26.
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Traditional leadership structures
Traditional sources of authority in PNG have been viewed by many scholars as being 
essentially egalitarian and consensual, and thus amenable to the concept of a 
competitive meritocracy embodied in modem representative democracy. In fact, the 
combination of traditional consultative and communal decision-making with widely- 
distributed traditions of social fluidity are often cited as the main reasons for the 
successful marriage between traditional culture and modem representative democracy in 
PNG.27 Griffin has argued that PNG’s “dearth of durable forms of wealth helped to 
ensure that society would be egalitarian rather than hierarchical in structure” (1974, 142- 
43). Excepting a few societies which possessed hereditary chieftaincies, leadership was 
typically by ‘big-men’, who achieved their status through competition, and community 
decision making was predominantly consensual (May 1997, 1). The village or tribal 
authority exercised by a ‘big-man’ was acquired and maintained through a two-way 
system of patronage and exchange with their followers. Big-men positions were rarely 
gained by hereditary right but usually through prowess in battle, skills in public debate 
and the accumulation and distribution of wealth.28 As Standish notes, the “core of the 
‘big-man’ theory is the open nature of the competition for leadership, which is achieved 
on merit rather than ascription ... The ‘Big-man’ model stresses accommodation within 
the group” (Standish 1978, 33-34).
In addition, the type of qualities expected of the traditional big man — including 
oratorical skills, ability to mobilise and organise supporters and the capacity to both 
accumulate and distribute resources — are some of the key skills needed to be a 
successful parliamentarian in most modem democracies, including PNG. Past electoral 
studies have pointed out how the “counterpoint between traditional and modem bases 
for status-competition” (Strathem 1976, 283) defines elections in many parts of PNG, 
with the result that there is a strong two-way incentive for a rational candidate seeking 
election to build up his ceremonial exchange links and for others to invest in him. 
Elections thus provide an arena in which traditional rivalries can be fought out. 
Traditional political leadership was closely linked to the active day-to-day control, 
acquisition and ceremonial disposal of community wealth (Bettison, Hughes and van
27 See, for example, Deklin 1992, 35-48.
28 See Morauta 1984, 9.
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der Veur 1965, 3). Many accounts of recent elections serve to underline just how 
similar the current expectation of leadership duties is to this traditional role in many 
areas.29 While not directly analogous, the traditional ‘big-man’ leadership structure is 
thus surprisingly amenable to the concept of modem political representation via 
parliamentary democracy.
Big-man leadership structures in Melanesian countries like PNG are often contrasted to 
the chiefly systems which predominate in Polynesia, where leadership is inherited and 
franchises are often limited to traditional nobles or chiefs: hence the argument that 
democracy has deeper roots and better prospects in Melanesia.30 In recent years, 
however, there has been some re-evaluation of this argument as increasing evidence has 
come to light of the role of chiefly status and hereditary advantage in many areas of 
PNG 31 The key factor seems to be that a mixture of ‘hereditary’ and ‘big-man’ models 
often co-existed. It appears that a big-man’s children, for example, clearly had better 
prospects than their peers of becoming ‘big-men’ themselves. But although it is clear 
that forms of hereditary succession do occur in many parts of PNG, particularly in some 
of the islands and lowlands areas, it is also clear that these tend to be coexist with 
elements of the big-man model.32 In other words, even in the relatively rare cases of 
clear hereditary assumption of office in traditional PNG society, elements of the big- 
man model often remain. Social leadership structures based on a ‘big-man’ model are, 
by definition, dynamic: as a new leader rises, so an old leader is displaced. PNG has 
now enjoyed over 30 years of competitive elections — elections in which, in 
conspicuous contrast to many other comparable states, governments have changed both 
on the floor of parliament and at elections, and more parliamentarians are thrown out of 
office at each election than are re-elected. While this degree of incumbent turnover has 
a number of very real drawbacks (these will be examined in detail in the following 
chapter) it also provides the elements of dynamism and competition for office which lie 
at the heart of modem electoral democracy — and is the antithesis of the authoritarian 
forms of government which have taken hold in many new states in the developing 
world.
29 See, for example, Standish 1989, 164, 191.
30 First put by Sahlins 1963.
3 * Summarised in May 1997.
32 See Standish 1978.
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Finally, just as PNG traditional society appears to have adapted relatively easily to the 
procedures of modem representative democracy, so democracy has necessarily been 
adapted to suit the needs of PNG’s aspiring political elite. Because no group is capable 
of fully capturing or subverting the state to serve their own ends, the most rational 
strategy for aspiring leaders has been to gain access to the state — which, in the 
circumstances of the PNG economy, is itself by far the most effective way to access 
wealth — by constitutional means. In electoral terms in PNG, this means first 
accumulating personal wealth, and then distributing this wealth to one’s supporter base 
so as to solidify one’s position in power and the wealth associated with it. In this sense, 
the apparent constitutionalism of elites in PNG may be less a genuine commitment to 
democratic values than a rational strategy for gaining and maintaining power. However, 
the fact remains that the electoral arena is almost universally accepted as the appropriate 
and legitimate route to power — suggesting a clear commitment to the procedures, if 
not the values, of liberal democracy.33
Constitutionalism and decolonisation
The scramble by Western powers to decolonise the Pacific Islands had, in many ways, 
as great an impact as the scramble to colonise a century or so earlier 34 In some ways, 
the nature and timing of PNG’s somewhat hasty decolonisation and independence can 
be seen as assisting its progress towards democracy. PNG did not attain internal self- 
government until December 1973, and independence was not attained until 1975. 
Coming near the end of a worldwide era of decolonisation that had begun almost thirty 
years before, this relatively late start meant that the nation’s new leaders had the 
opportunity to observe the successes and failures of decolonisation elsewhere, and to 
learn from the experience of other post-independence countries in Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific. The experience of democratic failure in the new African states was particularly 
timely: scholarly justifications, for example, for a ‘one party system’ in PNG, which 
were relatively common in the period immediately prior to independence, quickly lost 
their appeal35 Other lessons were similarly well-taken and given effect in the 
Constitution or soon after independence: the military was placed under civilian control,
33 See Regan 1995, 9-11.
34 For a general overview see Davidson 1971.
3  ^ For a discussion of arguments supporting a ‘one-party system’ in PNG, see Premdas and Steeves 1983,
18-20.
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the role of the opposition was recognised, government was decentralised and attempts 
were made to involve all backbenchers in the legislative process through an extended 
ffontbench and a committee system. While some of these exercises have been less than 
successful in terms of efficient government (e.g. the establishment of provincial 
governments as part of the attempts at decentralisation), they have almost certainly 
contributed to PNG’s relative success compared to most new democracies.
Signs of a shift in Australian policy towards self-government in PNG started to become 
apparent around the time of Harold Macmillan’s famous ‘winds of change’ speech to 
the South African parliament in 1960, which signalled a speeding up of Britain’s 
decolonisation program. While in the early 1960s most of the Australian administration 
“seemed to conceive of the political development of Papua New Guinea as essentially 
an educative process” (Loveday and Wolfers 1976, 4), with thoughts of self-government 
still many decades away, international observers and a small but influential number of 
Papua New Guineans saw indefinite extension of colonial rule as misguided and 
unacceptable. In 1962, a United Nations Visiting Mission led by Sir Hugh Foot 
recommended that a 100-member elected parliament should be established in PNG 
before 1964 (Thompson 1996, 167). The Australian administration, partly in response to 
the Foot Report, as it was known, in 1964 established a 64-member House of Assembly, 
54 of whom were directly elected. In his speech to the Australian parliament on the 
introduction of the Papua and New Guinea Bill 1963, which provided for mass suffrage 
elections for the new Assembly, Hasluck made it clear that he saw PNG’s political 
development in the same terms as that of the original Australian colonies: that is, a 
gradual historical progression towards constitutional government, extension of the 
franchise, and ultimately a fully independent parliamentary democracy (House of 
Representatives 1963, passim).
In reality, the actual progression to independence in PNG was more akin to a rush to the 
finish line of independence rather than a gradual and measured process of constitutional 
and political development. While later UN missions criticised the relatively slow pace 
of PNG’s move towards self-government (Loveday and Wolfers 1976, 4), increasing 
nationalist and independence-oriented political movements in various parts of the 
country meant that the Australian administration ultimately departed with considerably 
more haste than was earlier anticipated — although primarily in response to what it saw
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as its own interests. Thus, whereas in Australia the process of ‘nation building’ and the 
struggle for political power and sovereignty led to the formation of representative 
institutions and popular suffrage over a fifty year period in the second half of the 19th 
century, in PNG the situation was reversed: parliamentary democracy and mass 
suffrage elections were seen by the Australian government as the beginning of the 
nation building process, and the total period from the first elections to the attainment of 
independence was a mere 11 years. Even this short period did, however, serve to 
introduce and begin to inculcate the values and practices of competitive democracy to 
large sections of the indigenous population, thereby broadening understanding and 
acceptance of the electoral process. Emerging elites in particular had already been co­
opted, to a large extent, into embracing the democratic process as the legitimate and 
acceptable means for accessing political power. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
decolonisation process which took place in many failed democracies in Asia and Africa, 
where the sudden introduction of an often poorly-understood model of elected 
democracy almost guaranteed its subsequent failure.36
While decolonisation came late, forms of representative government came somewhat 
earlier to PNG. Local government councils were established under the active initiative 
of the Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck, during the 1950s. By 1960 they covered 
approximately one-third of the country, and Hasluck considered they had provided 
PNG’s indigenous population with enough experience to elect a number of their 
countrymen to the Territory’s (largely appointed) Legislative Council, which had 
featured only three nominated local members since 1951 (Thompson 1996, 167). The 
final Legislative Council which met in April 1961 had nine elected and three nominated 
nationals in its total of 37 members. Elected representative democracy in PNG began in 
1964, with the mass suffrage election of the first House of Assembly to replace a largely 
non-elected Legislative Council. The magnitude of the change involved was alluded to 
at the opening of the fifth (and final) Legislative Council by the Territory’s 
Administrator, Sir Dallas Brooks:
At this meeting o f the Council the people of the Territory cross the threshold of a new political 
life. The Australian Parliament, in enacting the constitutional reform which led to the changes in 
this Council, had it clearly in mind that there should be continuous political growth and 
progressive constitutional change. It is their belief that political growth and constitutional change 
should go hand in hand so that the political advancement o f the people is never hampered by
36 Similar arguments have been mounted to explain Botswana’s democratic success in comparison to the 
rest o f Africa. See Holm 1987, 143-45.
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having to work through institutions which have become out of date and unsuitable; and so that the 
institutions themselves will never fail to serve their purpose through any lack o f political capacity 
among those who use them (Hasluck 1976, 394-95).
While the speech was delivered by Brooks, it had been drafted by Hasluck, who noted 
in his memoirs that although he was “not in the least doctrinaire on questions of 
political theory” he did confess “to being somewhat doctrinaire on questions of political 
institutions” (Hasluck 1976, 395). By this he appears to have meant that there was no 
question of anything other than a Westminster model of parliamentary representation 
being considered for the new House of Assembly, and that within this context 
Australia’s governmental institutions would be transplanted, where appropriate, to the 
Territory. The Territory’s former Deputy Administrator, Sir John Gunther, summed up 
the rationale thus:
I never had any reservations about it; I was sure it was the right thing to do. Now I could use two 
arguments. One is that we introduced what we knew about. I think in these kinds o f situations 
where you’re moving rapidly towards independence, experimentation might be dangerous. So you 
implant what you know rather than try and fmd something different. Number two is that we never 
proposed that anything we did should be everlasting. We always said, ‘Look, the day after they 
get independence they can repeal, amend, do anything they like. But w e’re giving them 
something we know about, it mightn’t work for them, but it does work for us, and we think it can 
work for them. So w e’ll use it (quoted in Nelson 1982, 217-18).
On the eve of self-government, the new Minister for External Territories, Andrew 
Peacock, expressed similar sentiments, saying “naturally, my preference would be for 
the form of government I espouse myself and the government of Australia and the 
Territory here has developed” (Waddell 1973, 27). He also said that, unless there was a 
strong reaction against it, “future constitutional development would be aimed at 
furthering the establishment of a Westminster-type system” (Waddell 1973, 27). Five 
years earlier, in 1968, the Public Relations Advisory Committee of the Australian 
administration in PNG had introduced a political education program to “instruct people 
in the theory of Westminster government and its practice as applied in Papua New 
Guinea” which was specifically instructed to avoid discussing any political systems 
other than Westminster (May 1976, 33) — even though the Australian version (with a 
written constitution, federalism, and a powerful elected upper house) owes as much to 
Washington as Westminster.37 May found that the program was notable for an 
“excessive emphasis” on the formal elements of the Westminster system, rather than on 
the more general questions of political activity and participation (May 1976, 35), while
37 See Thompson 1980.
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Parker argued that the successful transplanting of the Westminster system was one of 
“four overt aims” of Australian policy in PNG (1971, 348). Following the 1972 
elections, the forms of the House of Assembly increasingly resembled a genuinely 
sovereign parliament, with the Westminster format of government and opposition being 
institutionalised by the appointment of Matthias ToLiman as leader of the opposition to 
Michael Somare’s National Coalition government (Waddell 1973, 28fn).
The ‘British model ’ o f constitutional inculcation
The way the institutions of elected parliamentary government were developed was also 
of great importance to the consolidation of democracy in PNG. In Weiner’s study of 
elections in developing countries cited earlier, the six successful developing-world 
democracies (PNG, India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) 
were assessed as having little close relationship on almost any social or economic 
indicator, but “one common feature ... all are former British colonies” (1987, 19). 
While PNG’s major colonial influence came from Australia (itself an artefact of British 
colonialism), the significance of Weiner’s argument is based on the common democratic 
heritage afforded to many former members of the British Empire as part of the ‘British 
model’ of democratic tutelage and decolonisation, a model followed in form — and 
largely in function — by the Australian government in relation to PNG. Weiner’s 
conclusion about the importance of British colonialism has been reinforced by S.M. 
Lipset, who has found that past experience with British rule emerges as one of the most 
powerful correlates of democracy in the developing world (1996, 153).
The ‘British model’ (and the Australian model) of democratisation and decolonisation 
was typified by two basic components: the creation of bureaucratic structures which 
stressed the legitimate role of state authority (e.g. the police and the judiciary; functions 
exercised in colonial PNG largely the Australian patrol officers known as kiapsf and 
the establishment and institutionalisation of the principles of representative democracy 
and free and fair elections. By institutionalising rules and procedures as a starting point 
for democratic politics, and by emphasising the primacy of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism as guiding and binding forces upon political competition, the ‘British 
model’ created a well-defined arena for political competition before such competition 
was effectively unleashed in the form of mass suffrage elections and full indigenous 
participation in politics. Eckstein has argued that this process of building consent and
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commitment to democratic principles is the crucial element in making democracies 
work. The British, he maintains, “invest with very high affect the procedural aspects of 
their government and with very low affect its substantive aspects ... Procedures, to them, 
are not merely procedures, but sacred rituals” (quoted in Weiner 1987, 14).
This commitment to procedures is more significant than it perhaps first appears. Weiner 
argues that the tradition of imposing limits on government, establishing norms for the 
conduct of those in power and creating procedures for the management of conflict has 
been hugely influential in the establishment and consolidation of democracy in 
developing countries (1987, 20). He concludes that the ‘British model’ of tutelary 
democracy is the single most effective colonial model of democratisation, due to its 
creation of centralising institutions that can gradually be made indigenous, and the 
establishment of democratic institutions and free and fair elections. This 
institutionalisation of political conflict into an adversarial system of political 
competition bounded by established rules leads to an acceptance of these rules and 
procedures amongst members of the political elite. In this way, the institutional 
framework for democracy “helps create the conditions of its own persistence” by 
enabling the emergence of classes which have an interest in the maintenance of these 
institutions, and by nurturing popular attitudes supportive of democratic procedures 
(Weiner 1987, 32).
Regan has described constitutionalism in PNG as being characterised by an acceptance 
amongst elites that the constitution is the appropriate instrument for managing political 
secession and mediating elite competition (Regan 1995, 10). A number of incidents 
have demonstrated the success of this acceptance of the legitimacy of the constitutional 
arena, and of what Saffu typifies as the “strong hold” of constitutionalism on PNG’s 
political actors (1985, 531). On 11 March 1980, Michael Somare’s government, which 
had been in power since the introduction of self-government in 1973, was defeated on 
the floor of parliament by a vote of no-confidence. This was the first time that PNG’s 
governing elite had faced the prospect of an alternation of power under the rules of a 
parliamentary system. To the surprise of some observers, Somare immediately stepped 
aside and transferred the prime ministership in a peaceful and orderly manner to the 
sponsor of the no-confidence motion (and Somare’s former deputy of two years earlier), 
Julius Chan. This first transfer of executive authority can be seen as a testament to the
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success of the Australian government’s attempts to emulate the British model of 
decolonisation by instilling a commitment to constitutionalism and democratic process.
A series of other potential crises has also been handled within the boundaries of the 
constitutional ‘rules of the game’. In 1991 the governor-general, Sir Serei Eri, refused 
to follow constitutionally-binding advice to dismiss the deputy prime minister, Ted 
Diro, after the release of adverse findings against Diro by a leadership tribunal inquiry 
into corruption. Instead, Eri defused this potential crisis by resigning from office, to be 
replaced by a new governor-general who had no hesitation in sacking Diro. More 
recently, in September 1993, the then prime minister, Paias Wingti, organised a 
constitutionally questionable parliamentary manoeuvre: a surprise resignation and 
immediate parliamentary re-election after 14 months in office in order to circumvent a 
constitutional provision permitting votes of no-confidence after 18 months in office, 
thus gaining another 18 months of valuable governing time. In August 1994, Wingti’s 
own appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court led a full bench of seven judges 
who all ruled that the resignation was valid but that the constitutional requirements of 
the re-election had not been met, thus forcing a new election by the parliament which 
enabled Wingti’s former deputy, Sir Julius Chan, to return to the prime ministership. 
Again, these transfers of power were conducted in an orderly fashion, and Wingti 
accepted the Court’s decision. The acceptance of these and other rulings by political 
actors are themselves a persuasive example of the resilience of PNG’s constitutional 
structures.
The most serious threat to the existence of constitutional government to date was the 
military insurrection in March 1997 against the Chan government’s decision to hire 
foreign mercenaries to assist the government in its ongoing secessionist war on 
Bougainville (Dinnen, May and Regan 1997). This revolt was led by the commander of 
the Defence Force, Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, who stopped well short of a full- 
scale attempted coup but who nonetheless was able to mobilise sufficient numbers of 
the armed forces to make his call for the resignation of Prime Minister Chan a serious 
threat to parliamentary democracy. While the army’s push for Chan’s resignation and 
pressure on the government to drop their contract with the mercenaries was clearly 
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, they were equally concerned that their actions 
were seen as having a constitutional basis. Army leaders consistently advanced the
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rhetoric of constitutionalism to justify their extraordinary actions. Singirok, for 
example, claimed that “We’ve allowed the democratic process to take place ... I was 
exercising my constitutional rights as a Papua New Guinea citizen”. His ally, Major 
Walter Enuma, asserted that the army was actually exercising its constitutional 
obligation to intervene in the crisis: “we fought against corruption, but the Constitution 
of the country must be upheld” (‘Army says it will now take a back seat’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 27 March 1997). Moreover, and more importantly, the crisis was 
settled by constitutional means, with Chan stepping aside from the prime ministership 
pending an inquiry into the hiring of the mercenaries, and an acting prime minister, John 
Giheno, taking his place until Chan’s return just prior to the 1997 national elections. At 
the 1997 election, Chan and another former prime minister, Paias Wingti, both lost their 
seats, along with most of Chan’s cabinet.
Political parties in PNG
While PNG stands as a relatively rare example of democratic longevity in the 
developing world, its party system appears to be heading in the other direction, towards 
fragmentation and ultimately, perhaps, dissolution. The PNG party system is unstable 
(no government since independence has survived as elected for a full parliamentary 
term), fragmented (there were 20 registered parties prior to the 1997 election), highly 
personalised (parties tend to operate as parliamentary factions, based on one or two 
dominant personalities, rather than as coherent, broad-based vehicles for translating 
public preferences into government policy) and increasingly irrelevant (the largest 
‘party’ at each of the last two elections has been independents, who have won over 50 
percent of the vote on each occasion).
Rabushka and Shepsle have argued that this type of weak party system is typical of 
ethnically-fragmented societies, which are characterised both by the presence of many 
groups and the inability of any of them to dominate the political process. In post­
colonial situations, where the rewards of political success become a valuable prize, 
parties proliferate but multi-party coalitions become difficult to form and hold together: 
“effective party politics ... does not usually emerge in the fragmented setting; no party 
is large enough to rule and the multiplicity of culture groups frustrates any attempts to 
form long-run multiethnic coalitions” (1972, 178). But the PNG case does not support
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their conclusion that the absence of effective brokerage institutions such as political 
parties leads, in such cases, to the breakdown of democracy. In fact, the comparative 
literature appears to be largely silent on how to interpret instances where continuous 
democracy seems to coincide with the lack of a meaningful party system, such as 
appears to be the case in PNG.
Many political scientists appear to view a meaningful party system as a sine qua non of 
representative government, and often identify a functioning party system with 
democracy itself (Strom 1995b, 924). Strong party systems, some contend, are both 
reflections of and indispensable prerequisites for “good democratic performance” 
(Powell 1982, 74). Diamond sums up the prevailing view of many scholars, arguing 
that
one of the most important institutional arenas for democracy is the party system ... political parties 
remain important if  not essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests, 
aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, 
organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy­
making agenda, forming effective governments, and integrating groups and individuals into the 
democratic process (1997, xxiii).
Despite its democratic longevity, parties in PNG provide few, if any, of these 
aggregative and policy-related functions. Increasingly, PNG’s political parties appear to 
be little more than parliamentary factions. The scholarly literature suggests that this 
should present significant problems for the consolidation of democracy in PNG. As 
Powell notes, “virtually no party theorists favor fractionalized parties not linked to 
social groups. Multiple parties that represent only elite factions and personal followings 
receive few favourable reviews” (Powell 1982, 76-77). Huntington similarly argues that 
a key function of political parties is to present clear choices to voters and to link them 
closely to the political process; fractionalised and personalised systems which fail to do 
this are extremely damaging for democratic prospects and are, consequently, found 
widely in the failed democracies of the Third World (1968, chap. 7).
The empirical evidence appears to confirm these theoretical expectations. Reviewing 
the findings of their 26-nation study of democracy in developing countries, Diamond, 
Linz and Lipset found that their cases generally supported the proposition that “a system 
of two or a few parties, with broad social and ideological bases, may be conducive to 
stable democracy” (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995, 35). Papua New Guinea, however, 
proved to be an exception to this generalisation. Of the five developing-world cases
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classified as ‘stable democracies’, two (Venezuela and Costa Rica) featured two-party 
systems, two (India and Botswana) exhibited one-party dominant systems, and only one 
(PNG) had a multiparty system.38 Similarly, Power and Gasiorowski’s comparative 
examination of democratic consolidation found that Papua New Guinea was the 
developing world’s only consolidated parliamentary democracy which featured a 
multiparty system, defined as three or more parliamentary parties (1997, 144).39 Again, 
the evidence from PNG appears to be a deviant case for comparative politics specialists, 
and a challenge to the prevailing wisdom. How do we explain this apparent 
conundrum?
The PNG party system
Like most other modem institutions in PNG, political parties are very recent 
phenomena. The oldest party, the Pangu Pati, was formed in 1967 and headed by the 
country’s first prime minister, Michael Somare. It attracted a group of young 
indigenous candidates and supporters and pushed the Australian government to increase 
the speed of decolonisation. A rival grouping formed as a counterbalance to Pangu and 
to their pressure for immediate self-government, the United Party, was supported mainly 
by highlanders and expatriate plantation owners. Since independence, parties have 
come and gone with increasing regularity, with three major parties participating in most 
coalition governments: the People’s Progress Party, led by Julius Chan, which draws 
most of its support from the Islands region; the People’s Democratic Movement, led by 
Paias Wingti, which is often seen as a highlanders’ party; and Pangu, which has national 
aspirations but continues to be identified with the Sepik region. Other parties of 
influence in the post-independence period include the People’s Action Party, led by Ted 
Diro, the dominant ‘Papuan’ party; the Melanesian Alliance led by John Momis from 
Bougainville; the League for National Advancement headed at various times by Tony 
Siaguru and Barry Holloway; and, in the lead-up to the 1997 elections, the National 
Alliance headed by former prime minister Somare and the People’s National Congress 
headed by the prime minister elected following the 1997 elections, Bill Skate.
38 Increasing party system fragmentation in recent years in two of these cases, India and Venezuela, has 
been associated with increasing political instability (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995, 35).
39 Power and Gasiorowski also identified Israel as being a consolidated third world ‘multi-party’ 
democracy, but most comparative analyses place Israel squarely in the ‘developed world’ locus (see, for 
example, Lijphart 1984,40-41).
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Any attempt at analysing the nature of the PNG party system needs to begin with the 
difference in terms of political recruitment between parties in PNG and those in most 
other countries. Unlike their counterparts in other ‘established’ democracies, political 
parties in PNG have virtually no mass base and very limited input into the policy­
making process. They function almost solely as parliamentary factions. Their extra- 
parliamentary functions range from the limited (intermittent roles as electoral machines) 
to the non-existent. The importance of parties lies in their role as aggregative groupings 
from which parliamentary coalitions can be built, and party leaders thus have an 
incentive to tie those candidates with a chance of electoral success to their party prior to 
an election. The combination of these factors has created a tendency for strong 
candidates to choose parties, rather than parties choosing the candidates, and for some 
parties in recent elections to ‘endorse’ multiple candidates in each seat, in the hope that 
the winner will thus vote with them once in parliament. This practice — which 
represents an attempt by party' leaders, in the absence of other mobilising factors such as 
a party vote, to increase the prospects of a winner being aligned to ‘their’ party — itself 
contributes to the weakness of party loyalty and party discipline.
Although their importance has declined at each election, parties remain one of the few 
potential ‘nationalising’ institutions of PNG’s political system, and can operate as a 
conduit for local candidates’ identification with major personalities on the national 
stage. A party label enables a candidate to claim some form of relationship to a Somare, 
a Wingti or whoever, even if the two have never met and have no formal relationship 
whatsoever. Parties can thus provide a useful method of aligning a candidate to broader 
national politics within their own constituency, and to use the reflected prestige of major 
figures to help define their allegiances. In 1977, for example, Pangu campaigned under 
the slogan ‘A vote for Pangu is a vote for Somare’; by 1982 a number of other parties 
had adopted this approach (Pokawin 1989, 245). This tendency was reinforced by the 
Electoral Commission’s decision in 1987 to show photographs of the relevant party 
leader next to the names (and photographs) of all endorsed candidates on the ballot 
paper. Parties thus serve a functional purpose which actually reinforces the dominance 
of personality — a curious paradox, as the dominance of personality politics is one of 
the most frequently-cited factors undermining the development of political parties as 
meaningful entities in PNG politics (Saffii 1996, 6).
62
The other major rationale for intending candidates to claim a party endorsement is to 
take advantage of the utility of parties as resource providers — particularly for badges, 
t-shirts and other campaign material. Often, this appears to be the predominant reason 
for candidates claiming an association with a party in the first place. Parties also play a 
useful legitimating role, especially in cases of very high candidature, which enables 
some (endorsed) candidates to distinguish themselves from their (non-endorsed) 
competitors. Perhaps most importantly, parties may pay nomination fees, contribute to 
campaign expenses, and provide the paraphernalia of electoral campaign material. 
Pokawin has claimed that “the fact of financial support determined the affiliation of 
most candidates who claimed membership of political parties” (1989, 245). Candidates 
who receive financial assistance from a party are presumed more likely to remain 
faithful to that party in the post-election ‘horse-trading’ to build parliamentary 
majorities, where parties routinely extend financial ‘support’ to tempt potential party- 
swappers to gravitate to their camp post-election. Following the 1987 election, one 
newly-elected member claimed that he was offered K10,000 to change his support from 
the Wingti government to the opposition (Domey 1990, 73).
Reasons for a weak party system
Most indicators of party strength in PNG (see Chapter Three) suggest that the influence 
of party, which has never been strong, has declined since a ‘peak’ in 1982, as increasing 
numbers of voters and candidates choose the option of independent candidacy rather 
than party affiliation. This coincides with similar long term trends, also analysed in 
Chapter Three, towards increasing numbers of candidates, high turnover rates of 
executive governments and elected politicians, increasingly small plurality vote totals 
for winning candidates and increasing levels of electoral violence and instability.
Explanations for the lack of institutionalisation of a meaningful party system in PNG 
can be divided into two broad categories: historical explanations, which emphasise 
those factors that ensured that PNG political parties were never an important part of the 
political landscape prior to independence, and contemporary explanations, which 
emphasise the reasons for the decline of the nascent party system present at the 
beginning of self-government in 1973. Historical explanations are largely based on the 
absence of nationalism as a political force in pre-independence PNG. Contemporary 
explanations focus more on the absence of defining cleavages in post-independence
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PNG society around which parties can coalesce and develop. Both schools of thought 
are, of course, inter-related. Explanations for the lack of a meaningful party system 
replicate, in many ways, those advanced for the lack of any substantial nationalist 
movement: the dominance of traditional cultural and social cleavages, and the
extremely localised and fragmented expression of these cleavages in a predominantly 
rural polity, which makes the development of any form of organised social movement, 
including political parties, extremely difficult.
In terms of historical explanations, Hegarty has argued that the development of 
nationalistic movements in PNG, and hence the development of political parties, was 
inhibited by three main factors. First, PNG’s extreme ethnic fragmentation and 
topographical diversity hindered the development of a national consciousness, and the 
ongoing mutual antipathy between ethnic groups prevented co-operation or association 
between social elements. Secondly, Australian colonial rule was often paternalistic and 
tended to be authoritarian, non-participatory, and restrictive of political activity — to 
the extent of assigning special branch police to meetings of the first indigenous political 
party, the New Guinea United National Party, in 1965.40 The third, and perhaps most 
important, factor in inhibiting the development of a nationalist movement was the 
absence of a sufficiently large and independent elite or middle class capable of 
sustaining such a movement. The class-based party structure of many other 
Westminster systems has never appeared likely in PNG.41 PNG’s indigenous elite was, 
at least initially, far too small to sustain any organised political movement; later, as the 
elite was co-opted into the process of colonial political and economic development, 
mobilisation of mass sentiment become unnecessary to the continuation of elite power 
(Hegarty 1979, 188).
Contemporary explanations for PNG’s weak party system continue this theme. 
Relatively strong parties of the pre-independence period, such as Pangu and the United 
Party, were formed primarily to contest the issue of PNG’s independence, and quickly 
lost their essential raison d ’etre with the announcement of the Australian departure and 
the handover of self-government. The main division between the parties — the question 
of the timing of self-government and independence — provided a sufficiently
40 See Wolfers 1970, 446, 475.
41 See May 1984.
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meaningful issue around which parties could coalesce. No similar issue has appeared in 
the post-independence period. Increasingly, party policies have converged towards a 
broad espousal of development-based politics within the framework of an (implicitly) 
capitalist state, with personalities becoming increasingly important, and patronage a 
more influential factor in electoral success than party backing. Even in Pangu’s early 
period of mass support, the personal following of major figures like Michael Somare, 
Pita Lus and Tony Voutas was considerably more potent than that of the party itself. 
With the removal of the clear issue of the nature and timing of self-government and 
independence, personality became a dominant formative influence upon political parties 
in PNG.
In short, mass-based parties were initially unfeasible and later, by the time they were 
feasible, were generally seen as irrelevant to the core task of mobilising political 
support. Oliver has described PNG parties as “politicians’ parties” which exist as 
“organisations for gaining access to governmental power pure and simple” (1989a, 10). 
He argues that the lack of any independence struggle was a defining point not just in the 
weakness of parties, but in their pervasive localism:
Because [parties] had not had to mobilize the electorate as a whole around a vital cause, like 
liberation, they were able to adapt themselves to the political culture of the village, rather than 
becoming an agency for change in that political culture. A political party could be quite 
successful if  it just picked as candidates the people who most closely met the image of the 
successful leader that village political culture produced. It did not have to appeal to a national 
audience ... All the party had to do was pick the right man in the right place and give him enough 
backing to let him win (1989a, 10).
Similarly, Michael Somare has attributed the weakness of PNG’s political parties at 
least partly to the nature of village life:
Here I fmd it difficult to organise political parties because they serve no purpose to an ordinary 
villager or even an urban worker, as he does not see the purpose of political organisation ... There 
is no common issue or enemy to bind the people together (1970,490-91).
Both of these arguments make unconscious use of the cleavage model of party 
development, in which parties are formed and develop according to their reflection of 
underlying social, religious, economic or other cleavages within a society. Oliver 
recognises this to a degree, arguing that PNG is remarkable “in grafting village political 
perceptions onto a system of party government that seems inherently to demand a 
political culture that leads voters to choose on the basis of parties” (1989a, 10).
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This pattern towards localised, policy-free politics was set from PNG’s first elections 
under Australian rule in the 1960s. Because PNG had been given universal suffrage and 
national elections before it gained self-government (in contrast to the evolutionary 
progression of suffrage and democracy in the West), its first three national elections 
were a contest for prestige and village-level power, but not (with the partial exception of 
the 1972 election) a contest for government. Real political power remained in the hands 
of the colonial Administration, and ultimately with the Australian government, which 
retained a power of veto over House of Assembly legislation. This led to an imbalance 
between the executive and legislative roles of the House of Assembly: a parliament that 
facilitated representation but had little or no executive power was, as Paul Hasluck 
noted, more a glorified debating chamber, “a place for the expression of opinion”, than a 
functioning legislature (1976, 398). Elected members predominantly saw themselves as 
“apprentice politicians rather than as parliamentarians elected to govern the country” 
(Colebatch, Colebatch, Reay and Strathem 1971, 222). Hence the Australian 
government’s decision to attach some (indigenous) elected members as under­
secretaries to (non-indigenous) official members to learn about the process of executive 
government and ministerial responsibilities. Thus one explanation for PNG’s failure to 
develop a meaningful party system in the 1960s and 1970s was that parties were 
unnecessary: as there was no contest for real political power, there was no incentive for 
parties to form — they could not change government. The fact that the lack of 
disciplined parties is still apparent after more than 20 years of independence has forced 
a re-evaluation of this line of argument. Nonetheless, it remains clear that the early 
development of an effective party system in PNG was hampered by the way in which 
the lead-up to self-government and decolonisation was handled by the Australian 
colonial administration.
There has been a number of overt attempts by the PNG government to encourage the 
development of a meaningful party system in recent years. Since 1987 the PNG 
Electoral Commission has overtly attempted to encourage voters to identify with a 
particular party when casting their ballot by placing party names on the ballot paper and
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by placing photos of the party leader on the ballot paper next to photos of the endorsed 
party candidate.42 The results, according to Oliver, were mixed:
Voters simply couldn’t ignore the fact that when voting for a candidate they were also voting for a 
party, unless of course they were supporting an independent. No-one, it seems, believes that the 
impact of this decision was significant; more than anything else, one suspects it raises the question 
o f  how far an electoral commissioner should go in attempting to influence the outcome o f an 
election (1989a, 11).
More substantial mechanisms to encourage the growth and presence of political parties 
can be instituted via a system of registration and (most importantly) public funding of 
political parties. Such devices are a feature of many Western democracies, where party 
registration entitles parties to receive public funding and correspondingly obliges them 
to submit annual returns of income, expenditure and debts. For many parties, especially 
the smaller ones, public funding is essential to their continued financial viability. 
Despite occasional discussion, public funding of political parties has not been instituted 
in PNG, although a Constitutional Commission report in 1996 recommended that a legal 
regime regulating party registration and funding be instituted in PNG (Constitutional 
Review Commission 1996).
There thus remain few institutional incentives towards party formation and development 
inherent in PNG’s electoral or parliamentary laws. Moreover, there are some provisions 
that could be viewed as disincentives to party formation and which contribute to parties 
remaining weak and undeveloped. A good example is the way Electoral Development 
Funds (EDFs) are distributed. Many of the ‘exchange’ obligations of contemporary 
politicians as traditional leaders are delivered via these funds, which are allocated to 
each MP for spending at his discretion within his electorate. EDFs were originally 
envisaged as a useful initiative for utilising a sitting member’s intimate knowledge of 
local needs to by-pass bureaucratic bottlenecks and fund roads, bridges and other basic 
infrastructure where they were most needed in an electorate, thus (presumably) 
increasing overall living standards and cohesion. In practice, the provision of such 
direct funding has more often served to reinforce divisions at the local level, as funding 
is widely expected to be utilised by the winning candidate to reward his immediate clan 
network in order to fulfil exchange obligations and service supporters. The weakness of
42 Although at recent elections some candidates have specifically rejected party leaders’ photographs on 
their election material and publicly disassociated themselves from their party leaders. Thanks to Ron May 
for this point.
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the party system, the short periods in office of most politicians and the narrow ethnic 
base of electoral support for many members are all factors which encourage them to 
extract and distribute as much as possible from the state. Numerous MPs have openly 
favoured their own clan base in the distribution of EDFs; some have openly used the 
scheme to acquire personal wealth (Sherlock 1992, 4). In 1996, following pressure from 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other donors, the EDF was 
abolished — only to be replaced by the Rural Action Program, which enables the 
spending of up to K500,000 in each electorate.43 Like the EDFs, however, the fact that 
candidates rather than parties are the beneficiaries of and the conduits of these funds 
serves to reinforce the irrelevance and powerlessness of political parties in PNG.
The future o f the PNG party system
Parties are in decline not just in PNG but in most Western democracies as well. The 
reason for the ‘dealignment’ of voters from parties in Western democracies is complex, 
but one common cause appears to be the fact that those cleavages that enabled parties to 
penetrate deeply into societies — particularly class and religion, but to some extent 
‘ideology’ as well — are themselves on the decline as factors affecting electoral 
behaviour (Bogdanor 1988, 385). Other common cleavages around which parties can 
form — such as regional or linguistic divisions — are also being mitigated by advances 
in communication technology and moves towards globalisation. It is important, 
therefore, to not evaluate developing countries such as PNG against some spurious 
‘Western model’ of party structure, even if one existed. In PNG, class and ideology 
appear to be largely irrelevant as factors affecting voting behaviour. Religion is a factor 
in some areas where candidates attempt to use their membership of a church group to 
further their candidacy, but there is little evidence that it is a strong factor. Language 
and territorial divisions remain strong, but cleavages tend to exist at a micro-level, and 
are thus so fragmented as to hamper wider political association within an open 
electorate, much less a regional one. This leaves little beyond the personal capacity of 
the candidate concerned as a major factor in assessing voting patterns.
43 An electorate committee including members of provincial assemblies has the power to approve all 
Rural Action Program spending, rather than responsibility resting with the member alone, as was the case 
with EDFs. The committee will, however, be chaired by the MP for the electorate concerned, and 
together with committee members appointed by the MP, he or she will form part o f a majority of 
committee membership.
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If the experience of other countries is any guide, parties are unlikely to gain any real 
penetration into the hearts and minds of PNG voters until they are formed along 
cleavages which have some meaning to electors, both in terms of a distinctive policy 
platform and as a method of distinguishing their candidates from others. The most 
likely cleavage around which modem parties are likely to form remains one of region, 
but history suggests that the precursor for this is the emergence of a dominant 
personality figure around which other members of the budding political elite can 
coalesce, rather than the mobilisation of a distinctive grass-roots political sentiment. 
Nevertheless, Saffu’s analysis of political behaviour in PNG found that, alone amongst 
the major social variables (class, gender, age, religion, region of origin and residence) 
which affect voter choice, “only the region of residence appears to lead to significant 
political differences” (1989, 30). Other experienced observers of PNG elections have 
reinforced this conclusion: May’s assessment of over 20 years of analysing elections in 
East Sepik, for example, concluded that “there has been little progress towards an 
integrative, ideologically-based party system” and that even in the East Sepik, where 
party loyalty has been maintained over several elections, the value of party endorsement 
lies in the identification of some parties with the Sepik itself (May 1996b, 239). 
However, any development of parties based predominantly on regional considerations is 
more likely to encourage local autonomy movements and separatism than be a focus for 
national politics (Griffin and Kawona 1989, 241).
Conclusion
The continuing weakness of PNG’s party system has been a surprise to some academic 
observers who clearly expected the development of some type of meaningful party 
system after independence.44 More than just not developing, the salience of political 
parties in PNG has declined considerably since the early 1980s. In 1979, Hegarty 
argued that the important role played by parties in PNG was not as entities to mobilise 
popular sentiment, but rather as mechanisms through which the political elite gain 
access to, manipulate and retain political power (Hegarty 1979, 188). Even this limited 
definition of function is now questionable, as increasingly it has become clear that 
independent status is no hindrance to a successful candidature — over half of all 
candidates and approximately one-third of elected members at the 1992 and 1997
44 See, for example, Clunies Ross 1970, 517-27.
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elections were actually independents. With the erosion of this mechanistic function has 
gone much of the raison d ’etre for parties’ extra-parliamentary existence. In the 
absence of any cleavage powerful enough to encourage the development of parties 
which have strong mass appeal, it is likely that the PNG party system will continue to 
fragment and dissipate in the foreseeable future.45 It also appears likely, however, that 
PNG’s ability to ‘muddle through’ as a competitive democracy will proceed as well, 
making it one of the more unusual examples of a competitive democracy for scholars of 
comparative politics in the world today.
45 For a discussion and similar conclusion about the role of parties in PNG, see Constitutional Review  
Commission 1996, 20-26.
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Chapter Three:
Elections in Papua New Guinea 1964-1997
The previous chapter has suggested that the persistence of democracy in PNG can be 
explained by the combination of PNG’s extraordinary ethnic fragmentation, its 
traditionally competitive social structures and the successful inculcation of British-style 
constitutionalism by the Australian administration in the lead up to self-government and 
independence in the early 1970s. But if PNG’s social structures and colonial history are 
not in conflict with the concept of democracy, the practice of representative democracy 
in PNG has increasingly been questioned since independence. In particular a number of 
factors have been identified which are at variance with the practice of parliamentary 
government in established democracies and which are increasingly seen as evidence of a 
slide towards ‘ungovernability’ in PNG.1 At the electoral level, these factors include: a 
diffuse and fragmented party system; high candidacy rates; very low support levels for 
some successful candidates; vote-splitting, electoral fraud, vote-buying and other ‘anti­
system’ activities; low party identification on the part of the electorate; frequent ‘party­
hopping’ on the part of MPs; high turnover of MPs from one election to the next; high 
levels of election petitions and other protests from unsuccessful candidates involving 
allegations of improper practice and occasional judicial overturning of election results; 
frequent votes of no-confidence on the floor of the house, and a rejection of accepted 
parliamentary conventions such as ministerial responsibility or cabinet solidarity. Not 
all of these factors are in themselves problematic; indeed some (such as high candidacy 
rates) would, in other circumstances, be evidence of a highly participatory political 
culture. However, when taken together — and many of the factors listed above are 
intimately related — they suggest serious difficulties with PNG’s system of 
government. In particular, they highlight a range of problems concerning PNG’s 
electoral system.
The issue of PNG’s electoral system has been identified by a number of senior 
government figures in both Port Moresby and Canberra as one of PNG’s major public 
policy concerns. Former Public Service Minister, Anthony Siaguru, for example, has 
identified failures in PNG’s constitutional and electoral systems as the primary security 
issue facing PNG2, while the Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee on Foreign
1 See Jennings 1990, 16.
2 See Siaguru 1989, 63.
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Affairs, Defence and Trade has expressed similar sentiments in two official reports 
(1989, 205-6; 1991, 34-5). The level of electoral violence and electoral fraud in some 
highlands areas has reached the point where a number of observers have warned that it 
threatens the very existence of the PNG state.3
Increasing attention has been given to the role of political institutions in fostering or 
retarding these trends. Former Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan has argued for a series of 
constitutional changes to PNG’s electoral and parliamentary systems to alter the balance 
of the executive-legislature relationship (1988, 248). Former Electoral Commissioner 
Luke Lucas, Siaguru and numerous other politicians and commentators have called for a 
return to the AV electoral system in use until independence (‘Lucas outlines poll 
proposals’, Post-Courier, 23 June 1988; Griffin and King 1982, 33; ‘Dutton: voting 
system cause of difficulties’, Post-Courier, 31 August 1995), or for more radical 
changes to the electoral system such as the introduction of proportional representation 
(‘Somare Calls for Reforms’, Post Courier, 4 May 1988; Deklin 1992, 44). Tony 
Regan, a legal adviser to the PNG government, has said that “changes to the electoral 
system which might make elected politicians more accountable to a wider electorate 
might have positive benefits for constitutionalism in PNG” (1995, 15). Even Australian 
defence analysts have expressed similar sentiments, arguing that “some comparatively 
minor ‘tinkering’ with constitutional clauses or with electoral legislation can have a 
major impact” on more stable politics in PNG (Jennings 1990, 17). The failure of the 
electoral system to produce stable and effective government is thus seen as an issue that 
goes beyond one of government function to having wider implications for PNG’s 
security, stability and long-term viability as a nation state. This is a particularly striking 
aspect of debate on electoral reform in PNG. Electoral systems in most democracies are 
rarely argued about (except by a small handful of political scientists), more rarely 
changed, and almost never equated with wider questions of defence and security 
interests. In PNG, by contrast, these issues are periodically at the centre of political 
debate, and have been for some time.
The centrality given to questions of constitutional and electoral reform raises the 
question of the effect of political institutions such as the electoral system upon politics 
in PNG. As will be detailed in Chapter Four, at one level the effect has varied quite
3 See, for example, Standish 1994, 71.
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dramatically: elections under the AV system used in the 1964-1972 period tended to 
produce a more co-operative, moderate style of campaigning, while elections under 
FPTP have increasingly become violent, zero-sum contests for success. Chapter Four 
will also examine the way in which FPTP elections appear to have encouraged 
increasingly high levels of candidature, due in part to the extremely small vote totals 
needed for election under that system. But other areas of the electoral system have 
exhibited considerable continuity, regardless of the electoral system in use, and are 
indicative of the weakness of PNG’s party system and the exceptionally competitive and 
participative nature of elections in PNG. These include a number of characteristics 
which are quite striking in comparative terms: a ‘parish pump’ concentration on local 
and regional rather than national issues; a high degree of turnover of politicians from 
one election to the next; a weak and fragmented party system; an unstable executive 
government characterised by frequent ‘party-hopping’ by elected MPs; and high levels 
of participation and turnout by the electorate. This chapter will place these 
characteristics of PNG politics in the context of PNG’s strong local societies but weak 
state institutions. These factors will then be examined in terms of their effect upon the 
conduct of PNG politics.
Strong society, weak state: the importance of elections in PNG
New states such as PNG face many diffuse impediments to nation-building: the need to 
tailor their introduced political systems to the reality of their indigenous political 
cultures; the need to come to terms with the disparities between class, ethnic and 
regional groupings within a state; the realities of their geography and consequent 
pressures towards fragmentation or secession; the conflict between traditional and 
modem approaches to resource distribution; and the weakness of the state apparatus 
itself. In fact, in many ways PNG is an extreme example of what Migdal (1988) called 
a ‘strong society, weak state’, in which the strength and importance of traditional social 
forces far outstrips the capacity of the modem state. But paradoxically, the role of the 
state in PNG is often more significant than in many ‘developed’ countries. Traditional 
Western conceptualisations of the state have tended to regard it ideally as a detached or 
neutral agent which constructs an arena for political competition through universally 
accepted legitimising devices such as concepts of democracy, freedom of speech, the 
rule of law and the idea of citizenship. In developing countries like PNG, however,
73
these concepts are relatively unimportant in terms of mobilising the consent of the 
governed. By contrast, the state plays an interventionist role via its centrality in 
controlling access to resources and in directly mediating conflict.
In PNG, as in many other developing countries, access to the resources of the state is a 
(perhaps the) crucial determinant of political action, as the state, not the market, is itself 
the primary instrument for accumulation of resources such as foreign aid and domestic 
revenue. Few Papua New Guineans have significant roles in the limited private sector 
that exists in PNG, and hence there is a tendency to view the state as the main avenue 
for accessing wealth. The structure of state institutions is thus of importance not just in 
the political arena, but also in the wider arena of competition for goods, services and 
other resources. This in turn means that the struggle for control of the state is a game 
with much higher stakes than simply access to political power: it also holds out the 
promise of access to considerable financial resources which are effectively unattainable 
elsewhere.
But while the state is clearly forced into playing this role in PNG, it is equally clearly 
incapable of delivering satisfactory outcomes to all players. As the stakes are raised, the 
capacity of the state to deliver acceptable outcomes decreases, because increasing 
numbers of actors are competing for the same rewards. Heightened competition means 
heightened divisions between competing actors, with a consequently sharpened 
delineation of clan, ethnic, linguistic and regional cleavages. As Brown has argued, in 
such a situation state institutions and political parties increasingly tend to function as 
“political machines for the distribution of resources” and politics itself becomes a 
competition for access to the state (Brown 1989, 52-53). This sharpened delineation 
tends, if anything, to reinforce the centrality of the state as a means of accessing wealth: 
some of the most hard-fought conflicts, such as election campaigns, are directly 
concerned with access to the state, thus reinforcing the message that the state is the key 
to power, prestige and resources, and encouraging more and more participants in the 
future. The institutional structures which provide the means of access to the state are 
thus of crucial importance. In PNG, the most effective means of access to the state is by 
being elected as a Member of Parliament. Because the structure of funding for 
infrastructure and other projects is often more closely aligned to individual MPs than the 
central bureaucracy (particularly via the Electoral Development Funds scheme and its
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replacement, the Rural Action Program, described in the previous Chapter), elected 
parliamentarians are often the central conduit for the distribution of large amounts of 
public funds, especially in rural areas. This places additional pressure on the institutions 
of state which determine access to these parliamentary positions.
The primary institution which determines access to parliamentary membership and 
additional perquisites such as ministerial office is, of course, the electoral system. 
Elections in general are also events which have a wider meaning in PNG than the action 
of voting for candidates to the National Parliament. For many areas of PNG, elections 
also provide one of the few ‘nationalising’ events in which citizens participate. In some 
remote areas, for example, the five-yearly cycle of candidate selection, campaigning and 
polling day may be one of the only times that they have an opportunity to interact with 
the state. The fact that this activity is performed as part of a national event, with 
national implications, makes it especially significant.4
The structure of parliamentary representation
Papua New Guinea has a unicameral national parliament composed of a two-tier system 
of 109 members elected from 89 ‘open’ electorates of approximately equal population 
size, and 20 ‘regional’ electorates based on the boundaries of the 19 provinces and the 
National Capital District. Parliamentary terms last for five years, and parliaments have 
so far run their full term, despite several changes of government on the floor of 
parliament. National elections have been held in 1964, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 
1992 and 1997.
For most of its independent history PNG had a ‘quasi-federal’ system of local and 
provincial government, as part of a package of constitutional amendments passed in 
1976 designed to head-off the looming secessionism on Bougainville and elsewhere 
(May and Regan 1997). While the 1975 Constitution provided for a unitary state, the 
rise of secessionist sentiment in Bougainville, the Gazelle Peninsula, Papua and 
elsewhere around the time of independence prompted the first Prime Minister, Michael 
Somare, to agree in August 1976 to a system of provincial and local governments 
similar to those originally proposed by the CPC (Ghai and Regan 1992, 49-76). The
4 I am indebted to Hank Nelson for this point.
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boundaries of the 19 provinces thus adopted in general followed those of the 19 
administrative districts of the former Australian administration, plus the National 
Capital District (which is treated as a province for representational purposes). Between 
1977 and 1995, each of these provinces had its own elected assembly and an executive 
council headed by a premier, and were constitutionally responsible for a range of 
specified powers. In 1995, however, there was a marked shift back towards 
centralisation of power following the abolition of provincial governments in all 
provinces save Bougainville, where the provincial government system continues to 
operate under special arrangements. The 1995 Organic Law on Provincial 
Governments and Local-Level Governments provides for provincial assemblies, 
exercising a similar range of functions to their predecessors, composed of all members 
of the National Parliament from the province; heads of rural local-level governments; 
one representative of the heads of urban authorities and urban councils; up to three 
paramount chiefs or their appointed nominees representing local areas where the 
chieftaincy system is in existence and is accepted; one nominated woman 
representative; and up to three additional members. Taken together, these reforms have 
introduced a number of changes in terms of representation at the provincial level, 
including a form of direct election to a statutory position (as the elected regional MP 
will automatically become the chair of the provincial assembly and head of the 
provincial government), functional representation for specified groups, representation of 
traditional interests in the form of paramount chiefs, and the statutory inclusion of a 
female representative.5
The membership of the National Parliament is determined by section 101 of the 
Constitution, which provides for three different types of members. The most common 
form of members are those from ‘open electorates’. Section 101 of the Constitution 
provides for “a number of members to be elected from single-member open electorates”, 
with the precise number of these electorates to be provided in an Organic Law.6 Section 
34(1) of the Organic Law on National Elections (hereafter OLNE) states that “in no 
case shall the number of open electorates be less than 81 or more than 91”. These open 
electorates must also be approximately equal in population, within a tolerance of plus or
5 For more information see May, forthcoming.
6 ‘Organic laws’ have the status of constitutional law, and were introduced in PNG in order to keep the 
Constitution focussed on basic principles and institutions. Despite this, the PNG Constitution is one of the 
longest in the world.
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minus 20%, and must not cut across provincial boundaries (OLNE, s.35). Since the first 
and (so far) only post-independence boundary determination in 1977, there have been 
89 open electorates. These electorates were demarcated on the basis of census figures 
from 1971, and have not been revised to take account of changes in population. The 
average population size of each open electorate at the 1997 election was around 46,000 
people, or 38,360 registered voters — a number that varied considerably from the 
largest electorate (Lagaip-Pogera Open in the highlands, which had 84,578 registered 
voters) to the smallest (Rabaul Open with 15,977 registered voters).7
Section 101 of the Constitution also provides for “a number of members elected from 
single-member provincial electorates”. These provincial electorates have their origins 
in ten ‘Special Electorates’ reserved for expatriate candidates at the 1964 elections. 
After extensive consultations following the 1964 election, the Select Committee on 
Constitutional Development recommended the establishment of fifteen non-racial 
regional electorates to replace the ten existing Special Electorates.8 However, de facto 
racial qualifications remained through educational qualifications for nomination.9 In 
1971, the Second Select Committee on Constitutional Development reported an 
“overwhelming request for increased representation” around the country. The 
Committee noted that there had been some call for the removal of regional electorates, 
although the Committee itself made it clear it did not support this view. But by 1975, 
there had been “a considerable shift in opinion on this matter”, and the CPC 
unanimously recommended that regional electorates be abolished, arguing that “the 
original reasons for regional electorates has been largely invalidated by the increasing 
numbers of well educated people returned from open electorates” (1974, 6/1). 
Moreover, the constitutional provisions on citizenship, and increasing standards of 
literacy, meant that the formal educational qualifications which were the basis of 
regional electorates were no longer necessary. The government, however, successfully 
argued for a retention of such electorates “in order to retain greater representation in the 
Parliament for the less populous districts” (Goldring 1978, 41-42).
7 Figures supplied by PNG Electoral Commission.
8 The 15 electorates which were eventually demarcated followed the existing boundaries o f 12 
administrative districts, with three others encompassing two adjacent districts (Gulf and Western in Papua, 
East and West New Britain, and New Ireland and Manus).
9 The racial qualification for candidature was replaced with an educational qualification, the Territory 
Intermediate Certificate ‘or equivalent’. See Parker and Wolfers 1971, 36-37.
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Some commentators have also argued that provincial electorates serve a useful purpose 
by forcing candidates “to transcend narrow, localized tribal and clan loyalties in 
reaching out for support in a larger territorial unit”, and point out that a number of 
PNG’s most prominent politicians have been elected from provincial electorates 
(Wijeweera 1989, 40). There is persuasive evidence for this latter point: of the 1992- 
1997 parliament, such prominent figures as Michael Somare (East Sepik), John Momis 
(Bougainville), Paias Wingti (Western Highlands), Chris Haiveta (Gulf) and Peter 
Barter (Madang) were all elected from regional, rather than open, electorates. Although 
it is impossible to be categorical, it seems likely that the need for candidates to appeal to 
a much wider cross-section of voters may encourage candidature from those who have 
more to offer than a solid clan or tribal support base alone. The requirement to appeal to 
a wider political audience than one’s own extended kinship network means that 
judgements about a candidate’s suitability for public office — their intelligence, 
tolerance, impartiality or genuine devotion to public sendee — are likely to play a more 
important role than questions of their clan affiliations. It also means that those people 
possessed of these relatively rare qualities (which includes, it should be stated, an ability 
to put the public interest before their own) are more likely to run for office if they are 
being judged on their personal characteristics rather than their tribal support base. The 
reality of PNG politics means that it is almost impossible for even a genuinely 
outstanding candidate to be elected in many open seats without a substantial clan 
support base.
Prior to independence, a coherent sense of national identity had not emerged under the 
Australian colonial administration, and the majority of political activity was regional 
and parochial. The devolution of power to provincial governments following 
independence was a tacit acknowledgment of heterogeneity. The quasi-federal nature of 
this arrangement was also an acceptance of the special needs and interests of PNG’s 
provinces. One consequence of this was the effective introduction of a regional 
weighting in favour of the smaller provinces, particularly the Island Provinces, into 
PNG politics, which remains today. While such arrangements are not uncommon in 
other diverse federal societies (Australia and the USA both use their Senate to weight 
representation in favour of smaller, less populous States), the incorporation of this 
weighting in a unicameral legislature is relatively unusual. The advantages of this 
structure of representation has long been recognised by some of the more astute islands
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politicians: Julius Chan told the Select Committee on Constitutional Development in 
1971 that regional seats were useful in providing adequate representation for districts 
with small populations.10 A comparison of the relative sizes of provincial electorates at 
the 1997 election confirms this: they varied in size from 364,191 voters (Southern 
Highlands Provincial) to 26,833 voters (Manus Provincial).
The constitutional provision for the third type of member provided by the Constitution 
has never, in fact, been utilised.* 11 Under section 101, up to three members may be 
‘nominated’ to office by a two-thirds majority of the parliament, rather than elected to it. 
There is a history of official and non-appointed members in PNG legislative bodies, 
going back to the colonial legislative councils of the 1950s, and this provision reflects 
this history, being intended to give the PNG parliament the opportunity to include 
expertise from outside the legislature within its ranks. However, the nominated seat 
provision has never been used and, in the words of the General Constitutional 
Commission,
there is no prospect that it ever will be used ... in our system o f democracy representatives from all 
levels o f government should be directly elected by the people. There should be no exception made 
for any one who is going to enjoy the same powers, rights and privileges as those whose mandate 
is hard-won through direct election (1983, 113).
This view remains current today. The contest for parliamentary office in PNG is too 
intense, and the rewards too great, to countenance its being given away to an outsider. 
The closest the provision has come to being used was at the height of the Bougainville 
crisis in 1991, when the then Minister for the Interior, Karl Stack, urged the government 
to consider using the provision to appoint three Bougainvilleans to parliament, arguing 
that such steps were crucial to ensuring the survival of the PNG state.12
Taken together, these representative arrangements of overlapping ‘open’ and 
‘provincial’ electorates reflect PNG’s geographic and ethnic diversity — a diversity 
which was to be emphasised after independence by a change in redistribution criteria. 
Prior to 1975 many of the electoral and local government boundaries reflected the sub­
districts and census divisions of the colonial administration and were thus “based on 
ethnic considerations” (Stone, 1976a, 46) — explicitly in the case of the distribution
10 See Stone 1976a, 43.
11 Nominated members have, however, been appointed to provincial assemblies.
12 See Hansard, 20 August 1991, passim.
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criteria used in 1964, which divided the country into ‘electoral zones’, made up of 
autonomous ‘Open’ and ‘Special’ Electorates, “determined on the basis of geographic 
isolation (as in the cases of the island districts), ethnography and communications” 
(Chief Electoral Officer, 1964, 1). The zones agreed upon were the five major island 
groups of Manus, New Ireland, Bougainville and New Britain, and a corresponding 
division of the mainland (into Milne Bay, Sepik, South, North-East and Highlands). 
Each zone was then divided into electorates “on a strictly mathematical basis”, 
following the (then) Australian practice of a maximum 20 percent deviation from the 
mean size of electorates. “Tribal and linguistic affiliations” were to be taken into 
account where possible, as were issues of accessibility in “sparsely populated areas” 
(Chief Electoral Officer 1964a, 2). While the extreme fragmentation of PNG’s ethnic 
groups means that this criteria was not (and could not have been) directed at forming 
electorates dominated by one ethnic group, it did mean that ethnic factors could at least 
be considered so that (for example) villages would not be divided in two by an electoral 
boundary.
Since independence, this situation has changed markedly. The role of recommending 
the number and boundaries of open electorates is in the hands of an independent 
Boundaries Commission, whose recommendations parliament can accept or reject but 
not amend. This latter provision has had a major impact on the composition of the 
National Parliament, as the past three Boundary Commission reports (in 1981, 1985 and 
1991) were rejected by parliament for what appeared to be shamelessly self-interest 
reasons. As a consequence, the boundaries delimited for the first post-independence 
elections in 1977, utilising census data from 1971, have been used ever since. The 
primary criterion for the drawing of these boundaries was the requirement for equality 
of representation laid down in section 125(2) of the Constitution (Wijeweera 1989, 38- 
40). This has effectively changed the dominant criterion for assessing electoral 
boundaries from one of ‘community of interest’ issues, such as language, ethnicity and 
geography, to numeric equality.13 The high growth rate and mobility of PNG’s 
population means that most electorates are today almost certainly malapportioned, as
13 This factor is an almost universal aspect of uninominal district electoral boundaries drawn to maintain 
population parity, as it is a rare community whose natural borders coincide with electoral ones. As Steed 
has noted, “most single-member constituencies are thoroughly artificial, ephemeral pieces o f territory 
which have no meaning outside the electoral context” (1985, 282).
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the above-mentioned disparity between enrolments in Lagaip-Pogera and Rabaul well 
illustrates.
Table 3.1 outlines the changing composition of the PNG legislature since the first 
national elections in 1964, consisting of a series of rapid changes in the period prior to 
independence followed by a period of stability and in some ways sclerosis since then.
Table 3.1: Composition of House of Assembly and National Parliament 1964-1997
Year Open Electorates Regional Electorates Other Total Parliam ent­
ary M em bership
1964 44 m em bers 10 m em bers elected from  
“Special Electorates”, 
reserved for non-indigenous 
candidates
10 official 
m em bers, m ade up 
o f  senior 
Adm inistration 
officials
64 m em bers in total 
—  54 elected, 10 
appointed
1968 69 m em bers 15 m em bers elected from  
“Regional Electorates” , 
reserved for candidates 
holding Intermediate 
Certificate or equivalent
10 official 
m em bers, m ade up 
o f  senior 
A dm inistration 
officials
94 m em bers in total 
—  84 elected, 10 
appointed
1972 82 m em bers 18 m em bers elected from  
“Regional Electorates” , 
reserved for candidates 
holding Interm ediate 
Certificate or equivalent
4 official
mem bers, m ade up 
o f  senior 
Adm inistration 
officials
104 m em bers in total 
—  100 elected, 4 
appointed
1977-
1997
89 m em bers 20 m em bers elected from  
“Provincial E lectorates” 
dem arcated on the 19 
Provinces and the N ational 
Capital D istrict
None 109 m em bers in total 
—  all elected
Characteristics of PNG elections
There are a number of ways in which the electoral system appears to have impacted 
upon the conduct of politics in PNG. Some of these are examined in detail in the 
following chapter, as they appear to be specific responses to the different mechanics of 
the two systems used in PNG to date. For example, it will be argued that the co­
operative and accommodative behaviour by candidates evidenced at PNG’s early 
elections was, in part, encouraged by the incentives for election presented by the AV 
voting system used until 1975. Similarly, factors such as increasingly high candidate 
rates and increasing electoral violence are argued to be directly related to the 
introduction of FPTP at independence. But there are other factors which, regardless of 
the specific electoral formula used, are nonetheless characteristic features of elections in
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PNG, and which appear to be encouraged by other aspects of PNG’s electoral 
institutions. Five of these are particularly notable by comparative standards and will be 
examined here: the significance of local factors and regionalism in PNG electoral 
politics; the marked turnover of incumbent politicians from one election to the next; the 
weak and fragmented party system; the instability of membership amongst 
parliamentary parties and governing coalitions; and the consistently high rates of voter 
participation and turnout in all PNG elections to date.
Regionalism
In a state with significant regional divisions, elections can serve to accentuate the 
polarising effects of regional variation: Lewis has written of the need to find electoral 
systems which avoid “geographical conflict, and the racial, religious or other differences 
which go with geography” (1965, 72). At election time, geographical conflict can be 
manifested in a number of ways. The very action of dividing territory into smaller 
political units has implications for future geographical conflicts. Where boundaries run 
along ethnic lines, they serve to regulate a pre-existing state of affairs, focusing conflict 
between constituencies and representatives. These conflicts can also be expressed at the 
parliamentary level through the elected representatives, and via party groupings based 
on regional and/or ethnic ties. Some scholars argue that the choice of electoral system 
can have a substantial influence on the degree of regionalism apparent in a political 
system, and that single-member district systems in particular serve to encourage a 
regionally-based politics. Irvine, for example, contends that politicians seeking to 
maximise their chances of electoral success will
frame their appeals and expend campaign resources of time and money (including whatever pre­
election patronage they can muster) in those regions where they have the best chance o f success 
and to ignore regions that are less favourable to their party ... as a result o f these incentives, 
strongest in a country with a plurality electoral system, party support becomes increasingly 
concentrated in particular regions of the country (1988, 15-16).
Because single-member systems seek to find the ‘best’ single representative for a 
territorially defined community, it is not in candidates’ interests to seek to reflect a 
range of ideologies and policy preferences. Rather, as Irvine has shown, they seek to 
avoid such issues and concentrate their efforts away from specific ideological or policy 
platforms (1988, 23). This feature of single-member representation is amplified in PNG 
by the FPTP electoral system and the lack of an ideologically-coherent party system. In 
competitive and fragmented areas such as those in the highlands, candidates can (and
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often do) ignore large sections of unfriendly territory, concentrating instead on 
maximising their vote in their ‘home’ regions — a point which will be examined in 
more detail in the following chapter. The result is that rational candidates, responding 
to electoral incentives, will emphasise both the importance of region and the irrelevance 
of ideology or policy in their platforms. They will also attempt to campaign as 
efficiently and inexpensively as possible — which, in PNG, often means localising their 
appeal and effort as much as possible to secure the (minimum) plurality vote needed for 
election.
PNG elections tend to be highly localised affairs, and the parish-pump nature of most 
campaigns encourages a high degree of personal contact (and exchange) between 
campaigning politicians and voters. A succession of electoral studies has emphasised 
the need for visibility and personal contact when campaigning: the importance of 
“seeing the face” of a candidate.14 This factor is accentuated by PNG’s Westminster 
political institutions and, particularly, its use of single-member electoral districts as the 
base geographic unit of the political system. By confining electoral competition to a 
small, geographically-defined area, PNG’s political institutions accentuate local or 
regional cleavages within electorates and emphasise the importance of personalities — a 
tendency which sharply affects the development of a localistic political culture and a 
personality-based party system. Because of the importance of local issues, rational 
politicians in PNG need to devote much of their time and energy to constituency 
service. In this they are similar to their counterparts in Australia, Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, all of whom expend significant energies on servicing 
their constituency. In a landmark comparative study, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) 
found that those members who engaged in extensive constituency service were better 
known, more favourably evaluated by their electorate, and more successful electorally 
than less conscientious members. Significantly, the single-member district system was 
seen as being a major institutional explanation for their behaviour (1987, chap. 9). The 
focus on constituency issues that typifies the behaviour of many PNG politicians is thus, 
as in other areas, partly a rational response to the institutional incentives presented by 
the electoral system.
14 Summarised in Saffu 1989, 19-20.
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The highly localised focus of PNG politics is accentuated by provisions concerning the 
eligibility of candidates to nominate for election. While many countries require a 
budding local member to have established some prior contact with the district he or she 
wants to represent prior to standing for election, PNG goes further than most by 
requiring the intending member to have a prior residence-based relationship with the 
constituency: any nominating candidate must be at least 25 years old, be a qualified 
voter and be bom in that electorate or have been continuously resident there for the two 
years prior to nomination or for five years at any time (Constitution, section 103).
This takes the legislative requirement for localism farther than most democracies 
elsewhere and, when combined with the powerful institutional and social forces outlined 
above, is a further pressure towards constituency-focused politics. Such residential 
qualifications can also lead to surreal administrative difficulties, such as the reported 
occasion in the late 1960s when a star-fix had to be obtained to clarify in which 
electorate a particular candidate, whose home-base straddled two electorates, was 
qualified to stand.85
This responsiveness at the level of the individual constituency leads to collective 
irresponsibility at the level of the national political system. There is simply not enough 
incentive for PNG parliamentarians to focus on national, as opposed to local and 
regional, interests (even those of the electorate as a whole rather than the candidate’s 
‘home’ area). The parliamentarian has two mutually incompatible responsibilities: a 
focus on the national good, and a focus on expressing the interests of his constituency, 
and extracting benefits for them from the state. While this conflict is fed by PNG’s clan- 
based society and non-ideological, development-based politics, it is pushed along by the 
clientelist nature of localised politics focused on territorial representation. To quote 
Bogdanor:
There is, in fact, a deep-seated conflict between the notions of geographical representation and 
responsible party government, between the representation of territory and the representation of 
opinion. In a political system dominated by the clash of parties, the parliamentarian’s 
constituency is likely to be of subordinate importance for him; while a system in which the 
dominant focus is the constituency will probably not articulate opposing interests and opinions 
very successfully (1983, 300).
85 See Wolfers and Regan 1988, 7/3.
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In the context of PNG’s divided and fragmented society, where the focus is indeed the 
constituency, there is a consistent emphasis upon constituency-based concerns rather 
than national policy interests. In their comparative study of constituency campaigning, 
Cain, Ferejohn and Firorina found that representatives in most countries saw 
constituency service as being important, but that those in marginal seats saw it as being 
of particular importance, and directed their efforts accordingly: “the level of casework 
effort is related to the representative’s vulnerability as measured by the margin of 
victory in the previous election” (1987, 96). In PNG, as Sir Julius Chan has noted, 
almost every seat is a marginal seat, and the logic of devoted constituency campaigning 
thus applies almost universally.16
The localism of party strategies is also strongly influenced by the electoral system. 
Under single-member systems such as AV or FPTP, there is an enormous electoral 
advantage in having an efficiently distributed vote. This does not, however, mean an 
evenly distributed vote. In fact, an even distribution of votes across all electorates 
would almost certainly see a party win no seats at all. In Australia, for example, the 
regionally-based National Party (which represents rural communities) and the 
ideologically-based Australian Democrats both receive around 10-15% of the vote at 
national elections, but the National Party is a well-established party in the House of 
Representatives while the Democrats have never won a lower-house seat. This is 
because the total size of a party’s vote is less relevant to winning single-member district 
seats than the spatial distribution of the votes between constituencies. A party that is 
regionally-based and assiduously cultivates its regional support can achieve a much 
higher seats-votes ratio than a party which spreads its support level too thinly over a 
wider area. Of course, a determined regional focus from a party presumes a significant 
level of party organisation and party identification amongst voters — two prerequisites 
in short supply in PNG.
Regionalism as a factor in PNG politics received limited attention in early electoral 
studies.17 However, the overriding importance of region of residence as a predictor of 
political behaviour which Saffu identified in his study of voting behaviour at the 1987 
election has served to highlight regional explanations of electoral choice (1989, 31).
16 See Domey 1990, 61.
17 For a survey see Anere 1989, 51-58.
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The incumbent electoral structure means that any party — particularly a new party — 
wishing to gain significant parliamentary representation will have to focus, at least 
initially, at the regional — rather than national — level. Most major parties in PNG 
have a regional base: for example, the Peoples Progress Party in the Islands region, the 
Peoples Democratic Movement in the Highlands, Pangu in Momase and the Peoples 
Action Party in Papua (Saffu 1996, 31-32). Even parties hailed as ‘ideological’, such as 
the Melanesian Alliance, appear to rely as much on their regional appeal as their policy 
platforms for their electoral success.18 The importance of regional factors also means 
that major groupings need to be included in positions of power to allay potential 
conflict. In PNG, ministries and other government positions are allocated at least partly 
on the basis of region, and the need to strike the right balance of Papuans, north coast 
New Guineans, Highlanders and Islanders. The National Executive Council (the PNG 
cabinet) invariably fills to its maximum possible size of 28 members (plus a host of 
associated or sometimes invented positions).
Incumbent turnover
One notable feature of the electoral system in PNG is its facility for encouraging a high 
degree of turnover of incumbent politicians. In all national elections since 1964 the 
turnover rates of incumbents has been extremely high by world standards. Roughly half 
of all members have been voted out after only one term of office, a rate that has held 
relatively constant for cabinet ministers and even party leaders. Only one member — 
Sir Pita Lus— has been elected to every parliament since the first elections in 1964, 
while one other high-profile politician — Sir Michael Somare— has been elected in 
seven successive national elections, and two others — John Momis and John Kaputin — 
in six. But most MPs are not returned to office — at the 1992 and 1997 elections, for 
example, over half of all sitting members were not re-elected. Table 3.2 sets out the rate 
of incumbent turnover for all PNG elections to date.
18 See King 1989, 25.
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Table 3.2: Turnover rates of PNG parliamentarians 1964-1997
Year Sitting MPs 
re-elected
Percentage re­
elected
Sitting MPs not 
re-elected
Percentage not 
re-elected
Total no of 
elected MPs
1968 23 50 23 50 84
1972 38 52 35 48 100
1977 35 38 56 62 109
1982 50 48 53 52 109
1987 56 53 48 47 109
1992 44 40 65 60 109
1997 51 48 57 52 109
Source: Electoral Office reports 1968-1997. The Table refers only to sitting MPs seeking re-election.
As Table 3.2 makes clear, the re-election rate of incumbent MPs has actually been quite 
consistent over six elections, hovering around the 50% mark, with a trough of 38% in 
1977, the first post-independence elections, and a high of 53% in 1987. While almost 
every examination of PNG politics mentions this high turnover rate of incumbents, there 
have been relatively few analyses of the reasons for it. ‘Social’ explanations have 
tended to focus on voters’ expectation of their MPs as a central point for ‘distributive’ 
politics. Under this explanation, members can increase their ‘bank’ of existing votes 
through increased prestige, displays of wealth, and, most importantly, direct patronage 
in the form of gifts, beer, pigs, petrol and increasingly cash. MPs who do not deliver are 
not re-elected. Government MPs should have an advantage over others by virtue of 
their access to government resources and opportunities to distribute patronage and, and 
there is some evidence of a higher re-election rate for government members than those 
in opposition.19 But in general sitting MPs, despite the built-in advantages of 
incumbency in terms of the prestige of their position and the resources available to 
them, are more likely to not be re-elected than they are to gain another term in office. In 
political science terms they are electorally ‘vulnerable’, and there are sufficient cases of 
MPs who have distributed large amounts of gifts and patronage (e.g. Iambakey Okuk in 
1982) or appear to hold positions of considerable personal prestige (e.g. party leader 
Tony Siaguru in 1987) losing their seats, to encourage a search for other explanations 
beyond these ‘social’ factors.
David Hegarty, who has conducted probably the most detailed examination of electoral 
vulnerability in PNG, concluded that MPs with low winning margins and high numbers
19 See Hegarty 1983, 15.
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of opponents are more likely to be defeated than those with substantial winning margins 
and few potential challengers (1982). This is intuitively obvious: assuming an even 
spread of votes then the higher the number of challengers, the lower the total vote share 
required for victory and the smaller the likely margin between first and second. The 
FPTP electoral system is again a factor here: by enabling candidates with very small 
total vote shares to be elected, the electoral system both encourages high candidate 
numbers and increases the likelihood that sitting MPs with a small bloc vote will fail to 
be re-elected. Moreover, the evidence of the pre-independence elections suggests that 
elections held under AV had a lower turnover rate than elections under FPTP (although 
the difference is not large: a 51.5 percent re-election rate under AV compared to a 45.4 
percent re-election rate under FPTP). Again, both these tendencies point to the electoral 
system being an important contributing factor to the high turnover rates of sitting MPs.
Finally, what have been the effects of the high rates of incumbent turnover upon PNG 
politics? There are two competing arguments. One is that the instability of support 
bases for most candidates and the consequent loss of continuity in parliamentary 
experience represents another facet of a crisis of legitimacy for PNG politics. The 
opposing view is that high incumbency turnover, like the high numbers of contesting 
candidates or the high rates of turnout by voters, are all evidence of a highly 
participatory political system in which voters are aware and involved in politics, have 
high expectations of their elected representatives, and have every opportunity to discard 
politicians who have failed to impress. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between. 
Although there is no doubt that the vulnerability of many MPs creates a heightened 
degree of accountability towards the electorate, and is further evidence of the essential 
dynamism of PNG political culture, the continued loss of experienced and able 
politicians at every election, particularly ministers who have proved their ability in the 
complex task of running a government, is a debilitating drain on PNG’s political capital.
A weak party system
Most broad indicators of party numbers and cohesion suggest a steady decline in the 
strength and importance of political parties in PNG since the introduction of self- 
government in 1973. There are a number of ways to measure the salience of political 
parties in a democracy. One is to look at the internal capacity and resources of parties 
by examining their membership levels (which, in PNG, are not verifiable and often not
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available in the first place); financial resources (ditto); constitutions and policy 
platforms, and so on. An alternative approach is to look at the number of candidates 
endorsed at each election — a reliable indicator of party strength in many instances, but 
potentially misleading in PNG due to some parties endorsing more than one candidate in 
a seat, and candidates ‘self-endorsing’ by choosing their own party label. The difficulty 
in obtaining reliable information on most of these issues in PNG is itself a telling 
indicator of the weakness of the current party system.
A more reliable measure of party strength in most countries is to look at the relative 
success of parties in the two most important aspects of competitive politics: the results 
of general elections, and the formation of governments. Both of these are difficult, but 
not impossible, to assess in PNG. In terms of the results of general elections, the major 
problem for traditional academic analysis is one of reliable data. Only since the 1987 
election have the official election statistics included information on party support levels. 
Prior to 1987, candidates were not identified by any party affiliation on the ballot paper 
(although since 1972, photographs have been used on the ballot paper wherever possible 
to identify the particular candidate for illiterate voters). Once elected, successful 
members would simply align themselves with their chosen party in parliament. This 
makes the traditional calculation of the relationship between a party’s vote share and its 
seat share — a mainstay of most discussions of a party’s electoral support in other 
jurisdictions — extremely difficult in practice and largely meaningless as a measure of 
electoral support. Such a calculation makes sense in most Western democracies, where 
politics is conducted on a national level by mass parties, and media coverage 
concentrates on key players like the prime minister, who ‘represent’ their party to a 
national audience. To adopt a similar approach in the case of PNG, where election 
campaigns are really a series of 109 individual battles in each seat, would be to privilege 
aggregate data with a significance it does not deserve. National factors, while not 
irrelevant, are often of extremely limited importance.
Nonetheless, it is possible to look at the relationship between a party’s seat and vote 
shares for all PNG elections since independence. Prior to independence, the best source 
for such comparative information is Loveday and Wolfers’ (1976) sophisticated analysis 
of voting patterns in the first three houses, which provides the best indicators of which 
elected members were associated with which parties once in parliament. As no party
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labels appeared on ballot papers until 1987, information on party affiliations from the 
1977 and 1982 elections comes mostly from knowledgeable academics and observers 
making their own estimates of which candidates were ‘associated’ with particular 
parties, and using this figure to calculate a crude estimate of a party’s overall vote share.
At the 1977 elections the best information available on the relationship between a 
party’s overall vote share and its share or parliamentary seats comes from Hegarty’s 
overview of the 1977 elections, where “a core of party stalwarts were returned but many 
incumbents were dumped heavily ... of the 109 winners, 76 had been endorsed by 
parties or movements” (1983, 9). Hegarty viewed party endorsement as often more “a 
question of convenience than of commitment to a philosophy, platform or leader”, 
noting that most studies from 1977 “show that parties had very little impact at all on the 
voter” (1983, 12). A later study by Ralph Premdas revised Hegarty’s party endorsement 
figure upwards, claiming that “the 1977 elections could be accurately described as a 
contest between the major parties ... nearly half of all candidates were either endorsed 
by a party or were openly or covertly affiliated to a party. Of the 108 elected 
parliamentarians, all but 10 had party connexions” (1978, 87). Unfortunately no 
statistics of a national party vote for the 1977 elections have been published, but it is
I
possible to make some informed estimates for comparative purposes. Using the sample 
of fifteen studies from Hegarty’s edited volume, I have attempted to estimate the overall 
support levels for the major parties.20 Considering the distribution and 
representativeness of these results, a rough estimate of overall support levels at the 1977 
election would be something like Pangu 35 percent, PPP 15 percent, United Party 10 
percent, Papua Besena 5 percent, Country Party 3 percent, National Party 2 percent, 
with independents gaining the remaining 30 percent.
By 1982, the situation had changed somewhat, with emerging signs of possible 
strengthening of the party system. The Pangu Pati maintained its dominance, but two 
new parties campaigned strongly for regional support: the National Party, which had
20 In the four urban seats around Port Moresby, the Papuan nationalist party, Papua Besena, won three 
seats with an average of 41 percent o f the vote; the Pangu Pati won one seat with an average o f 28 
percent; and the United Party won no seats but gained approximately 16 percent of the vote. Pangu won 
six o f seven seats in the East Sepik region with an average vote share o f 40 percent; one seat went to the 
United Party candidate with 31 percent. Pangu also won six o f the nine Eastern Highlands seats, at a vote 
average o f around 35 percent. The PPP gained around 30 percent of the vote in the Southern Highlands 
and in New Ireland, while the United Party maintained a strong support base in Enga and some other 
Highlands regions.
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been formed as a highlands equivalent of Pangu prior to the 1972 election but came to 
much greater prominence under the high-profile leadership of Iambakey Okuk; and the 
Melanesian Alliance, launched in 1980 by Father John Momis and John Kaputin, and 
which (unlike nearly all its rivals) had an ideological component to its platform in the 
shape of economic nationalist and ‘Christian-social’ policies. Jackson and Hegarty 
estimated the total vote share for each party in 1982 as follows: Pangu 34 percent, PPP 
10 percent, National Party 10 percent, Melanesian Alliance 9 percent, United Party 7 
percent, Ted Diro’s PNG Independent Group 7 percent, others 2 percent, independents 
21 percent (1983, 335).
At the 1987 election, the Electoral Commissioner for the first time attempted to identify 
candidates by their party affiliation wherever possible — a difficult task where some 
parties endorsed multiple candidates in a single seat or where candidates claimed a party 
allegiance which was not necessarily shared by the powers-that-be of the party itself. 
Nonetheless, for the 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections the Electoral Commission has 
published data on both party allegiance and overall levels of party support. When 
combined with the estimates of total vote share from the 1977 and 1982 elections, this 
enables us to compare the percentage of votes gained by each party and by independent 
candidates, and in most cases their raw vote totals as well, for all PNG elections since 
independence. It must be emphasised, however, that this type of information can be 
quite deceptive when attempting to analyse PNG electoral politics, as it can give the 
impression that some kind of meaningful party system exists, when in reality the data is 
simply the combined total of each party-endorsed candidate’s vote in each seat tallied 
up and presented, as far as possible, as some sort of national party vote figure. National 
factors and candidates’ party allegiance, while not necessarily irrelevant, are often of 
extremely limited importance. Mindful of this caveat, the following table presents an 
indication of party seat and vote shares for each election since independence in 1975.
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Table 3.3: Party vote totals and percentages 1977-1997
PARTY 1977
Votes %
1982
Votes %
1987
Votes %
1992
Votes %
1997
Votes %
Pangu NA 35 NA 34 408082 14.9 294738 9.3 237028 5.3
PPP NA 15 NA 10 168280 6.4 90465 2.9 288634 6.5
NP - 2 NA 10 135761 5.0 26303 0.8 16009 0.4
MA - - NA 9 153611 5.6 134903 4.3 81303 1.8
UP NA 10 NA 7 87243 3.2 2539 0.1 77917 1.8
NatA - - - - - - - - 288965 6.5
PP - - NA 2 34636 1.3 - - - -
IG - - NA 7 - - - - - -
Country NA 3 - - 10743 0.4 18646 0.6 - -
PB NA 5 - - 17122 0.6 - - - -
PDM - - - - 298715 10.9 247379 7.8 197331 4.4
PAP - - - - 87836 3.2 147538 4.7 182845 4.1
MIG - - - - 60922 2,2 - - - -
LNA - - - - 132001 4.8 68188 2.2 - -
Others - - - 1 19803 0.7 134972 4.2 351347 7.9
Indep. - 30 NA 21 1117635 40.9 1994132 63.1 2738520 61.4
TOTAL NA 100 NA 100 2732390 100 3159803 100 4459899 100
Note: some totals add to over 100% due to rounding.
Source: 1977: author’s estimates as detailed in text; 1982: Jackson and Hegarty 1983; 1987 and 1992: 
Saffu 1996 (note that Saffu 1996 misstates Pangu’s 1992 total as 408802); 1997: Electoral Commissioner 
1997.
Key: Pangu = Pangu Pati; PPP = Peoples Progress Party; NP = National Party; MA = Melanesian 
Alliance; NatA = National Alliance; UP = United Party; PP = Papua Party; IG = PNG Independent 
Group; CP = Country Party; PB = Papua Besena; PDM = Peoples Democratic Movement; PAP = Peoples 
Action Party; MIG = Morobe Independent Group; LNA = League for National Advancement; Indep. = 
Independents.
The most striking conclusion from these figures is how dramatically PNG deviates from 
the precepts of ‘Duverger’s law’ that “the plurality method tends to lead to a two-party 
system” (Duverger 1984, 35), or more generalised formulations that “the plurality rule 
corresponds to a low number of parties” (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 84). Even at the 
height o f ‘party strength’ in PNG in 1982, PNG had over six ‘effective’ electoral parties, 
and their number has risen at the same time as the salience of party has decreased.21 
Not only has PNG never had anything approaching a two-party system, but since its 
adoption of FPTP electoral laws it seems to be heading in the other direction, towards 
increasing party system fragmentation and ultimately, perhaps, dissolution.
21 As measured by the Laakso-Taagepera index (see Laakso and Taagepera 1979).
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Since 1986, six parties (Pangu, PDM, PPP, MA, PAP and National) have formed the 
core of two opposing coalitions in parliament (Saffu 1996, 29). But their importance 
and influence has been steadily decreasing. In 1987, their combined vote share was 46 
percent, winning 73 seats in parliament. By 1992 their share of the vote was down to 
only 30 percent, while still managing to win 64 parliamentary seats. By 1997, however, 
these ‘core’ parties of the political system had become almost irrelevant, winning just 
22 percent of the votes and less than half the seats (51) between them. At the same 
time, other parties have disappeared altogether and new parties arisen: between 1992 
and 1997, the League for National Advancement, Papua Party, Papua Besena and others 
virtually disappeared, while two new parties — the National Alliance and the Peoples 
National Congress — emerged as potential forces. The ephemeralism of political 
organisations in PNG is, according to Saffu, “a reminder of a strong tendency to 
political fragmentation in PNG, as if in imitation of the marked segmentation of PNG 
social structures” (1996, 31).
Executive instability
The combination of PNG’s fluid multi-party system and its majoritarian political 
institutions provides a dramatic illustration of a parliament which actually behaves in 
accordance with the oft-cited but rarely observed doctrine of ‘parliamentary supremacy’. 
This doctrine holds that, in a system of parliamentary government, the executive is 
responsible to the legislature, and is dependent upon the legislature’s support for its 
continuation in office. The rise of disciplined political parties in the first half of this 
century (and the widespread acceptance that functioning parties are an essential element 
of a functioning democracy) has seen this doctrine replaced by a more accurate ‘decline 
of parliaments’ thesis in most countries, as disciplined party voting has effectively 
transferred real control of the executive from the legislature to the party organisation.22
In PNG, by contrast, the weakness of political parties and the willingness of elected 
members to switch from one party to another means that the executive really is beholden 
to the backbench. The National Parliament is elected for a five-year term, but the 
government may be removed by a ‘constructive’ vote of no-confidence and replaced 
without the need for an election. While in theory early elections can be called by a 
majority vote of the parliament (or automatically following a successful no-confidence
22 See Loewenberg 1971.
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vote in the final year before a scheduled election), in practice PNG parliamentary terms 
are rigidly fixed. The high levels of incumbent rejection noted earlier is also important 
here: the most recent elections in 1997 saw 52% of PNG’s parliamentarians failing to 
be re-elected, including most of the previous cabinet. This pattern means that the 
National Parliament is most unlikely to ever voluntarily dissolve itself.
In 1974 the Constitutional Planning Commission recommended that ‘constructive’ votes 
of no-confidence (i.e. where an alternative prime minister is nominated) should be 
constitutionally guaranteed (1974, 7/6). No-confidence motions have since become a 
feature of PNG parliamentary politics. To date every elected government since 
independence has been deposed on the floor of parliament without reference to an 
election. The Constitution provides that a no-confidence vote cannot, however, be used 
to depose a government in the final year of a parliamentary term, and a further 
constitutional amendment in 1991 extended from six to eighteen months the ‘grace’ 
period a new government has from no-confidence votes — effectively leaving the 
middle two and a half years of any parliamentary term as a potential danger time. 
Parliamentary sittings thus tend to be minimised in frequency and duration, and much of 
the legislative program paralysed, during this two and a half year danger period.
Table 3.4 details the changes of executive in PNG since independence.
Table 3.4: Changes of Prime Minister in PNG, 1975-1997
Year Previous Prim e M inister New  Prim e M inister Reason for change
1975 - M ichael Somare Independence
1977 Som are retains Prime M inistership after General E lection
1980 M ichael Somare Julius Chan N o-confidence vote
1982 Julius Chan M ichael Somare General election
1985 M ichael Somare Paias W ingti N o-confidence vote
1987 W ing retains Prime M inistership after General E lection
1988 Paias W ingti Rabbie Nam aliu N o-confidence vote
1992 Rabbie Nam aliu Paias W ingti General E lection
1994 Paias W ingti Julius Chan Judicial decision
1997 Julius Chan B ill Skate General E lection
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Part of this executive instability relates to the way in which parliamentary coalitions are 
put together by the leading political actors after each general election. The weakness of 
PNG’s party system and the common ideology of almost all participants results in 
potential leaders engaging in frantic post-election tussles for commitments of loyalty 
from newly elected members, in the hope of being able to piece together a parliamentary 
majority. All members, not just the small parties and independents, are targeted as 
potential allies. Inducements are offered in return for support, and in some cases 
members are ‘locked’ in remote resorts or hotel rooms until they have given guarantees 
of loyalty (hence the usual reference to post-election meetings of potential coalition 
partners as ‘lock-ups’). A 1991 reduction in the period between the return of election 
writs and the first meeting of parliament from 21 to seven days, intended to reduce 
tension and instability in the post-election period, has had little apparent impact 
(Constitutional Planning Commission 1974, 7/6). The requirement that parliament meet 
within one week of the return of writs did not appear to alter the frantic bargaining for 
support that has always been a feature of the post-election scene in PNG: Standish 
reported that following the 1992 election, a period of “intense politicking followed the 
poll, in which helicopters plucked winners to ‘lockups’ in isolated resorts before 
Parliament convened” (1993, 212).
Party-hopping
The extent of post-election ‘party-hopping’ is another example of the inherent weakness 
of the PNG party system. A distinctive feature of PNG’s parliamentary politics is the 
willingness of members who stand for office under the endorsement of one party to join 
another party once elected to parliament — usually in return for a ministry or some 
other financial inducement. The phenomenon of party hopping, as it is known in PNG, 
is not unknown elsewhere (there have been several recent examples in Australia, the 
United Kingdom and other established Westminster systems), but has reached unusually 
high levels in PNG, where the incidence of MPs changing their party endorsement is so 
widespread as to seriously undermine executive government. Every post-independence 
government has been formed and reshaped by ‘the numbers game’ of MPs changing 
allegiances:
A great part o f the time o f the prime minister is spent on managing the coalition, which is
constantly threatened by competition for ministerial office among parliamentarians and given wide
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rein by the rules whereby a vote of no confidence leads to a change o f government and not to the 
dissolution o f parliament. Collective responsibility is difficult to maintain in these circumstances, 
especially when coalitions are based not on common policies but on an interest in the perks of 
power. Political stability is constantly threatened, for at the first whisper o f a conspiracy towards a 
vote of no confidence, normal executive and legislative functions are immobilized, as the prime 
ministers and their rivals go about mustering parliamentary support. Corruption and patronage are 
the natural results, while the political system becomes discredited (Ghai 1990, 329-30).
Party-hopping is also strongly connected to wider questions of PNG’s political culture. 
There is little opprobrium attached to party-hopping in PNG. Part of the reason for the 
unusually high level of inter-party mobility is that most constituents expect their 
member to put local interests before national ones. Oliver has noted that if an MP can 
improve his chance of becoming a minister, or simply enhances his access to patronage 
and influence, by joining the government benches, then whatever the element of 
personal advantage there may be in his action, he is widely seen as acting in the interests 
of his electoral supporters (1989a, 3). Whether such a member’s supporters would 
always agree with this assessment is another matter!
While party-hopping is by no means restricted to the immediate post-election period, it 
is usually in this period, when the most intense ‘horse-trading’ for support takes place, 
that changes of party allegiance are at their most frantic. This allows us to compare 
official records of pre-election party allegiance from the Electoral Commission with 
post-election voting patterns in parliament in order to measure the extent of movement 
from one party to another with more accuracy during the period from the return of 
election writs to the first sitting of parliament, when a new prime minister is chosen. 
Table 3.5 therefore gives an indication of the extent of party hopping in this period for 
each election since 1977.
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Table 3.5: Party strength at return of election writs and first sitting of parliament
1977-1997
Pangu PPP NP MA UP PP IG PB PDM PAP MIG LNA CP Oth. Indep. Total
1977
election 38 20 1 _ 27 7 _ _ 1 14 108*
p a rlia m en t 40 20 2 - 24 - 6 - - - - 0 5 11 108*
1982
elec tion 50 14 13 8 9 3 7 4 108*
p arlia m en t 61 13 19 6 6 3 - 108*
1987
election 26 5 12 7 1 3 - 17 6 4 3 22 106*
p a rlia m en t 27 10 10 7 2 3 - 26 14 4 3 - - - 106*
1992
election 20 8 2 7 15 12 4 2 39 109
p arlia m en t 22 10 2 9 - - - 15 13 - 5 - 3 30 109
1997
election 15 16 4 3 8 5 22 36 109
p arlia m en t 13 16 1 5 3 - - 8 4 - - - 23 36 109
* The election for one seat in 1977 and 1982 and three seats in 1987 were postponed due to the death of 
candidates during the campaign period.
Source: 1977: Hegarty 1983 andPremdas 1978; 1982: King 1989; 1987: Oliver 1989; 1992: Saffu 
1996; 1997: Electoral Commissioner 1997 and The Independent, 25 July 1997.
Key: as for Table 3.3.
The phenomenon of party hopping is, like many other aspects of PNG politics, primarily 
an indication of the weakness of PNG’s political institutions, particularly the party 
system. Party discipline cannot be imposed solely from above. It needs to be 
representative of an authentic differentiation between opposing political forces if it is to 
act as a motivating force for party members and political representatives alike. A 
political sphere in which party-identification factors are largely irrelevant to voting 
choice is one in which the coherence and stability of parties will be difficult to sustain. 
Parties have a very specific purpose in most political systems. Like other types of social 
movements, they are agents for common interests to meet and provide a forum for 
organised social activity. But unlike social movements, political parties typically have 
one over-riding defining objective; to have their endorsed members elected to 
parliament. The prevalence of party-hopping is thus primarily a consequence of the 
very weakness of PNG parties; and, in one of the frequent catch-22 situations of PNG
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politics, each individual act of party-hopping works to further undermine both the 
influence of existing political parties, and the concept of a party system itself.
Turnout levels
Turnout levels of voters in PNG are higher than those of many established democracies 
and are often cited as evidence of the health and strongly participatory nature of PNG 
democracy. Lijphart has argued that “turnout can be regarded as a measure of the 
quality of the democracy”, and if this is the case then PNG elections are indicative of a 
healthy democracy (1992, 24). Certainly, turnout levels are a good indication of the 
level of interest in an election on the part of voters, and of the legitimacy they accord to 
such an exercise. But they can also be evidence of other factors at work — compulsion, 
for example. Griffin claims that PNG “has one of the highest voting turnouts in the 
world” for a voluntary voting system (1997, 76). Examination of the comparative 
evidence does suggest that, if we look at the level of voter turnout in PNG compared to 
its eligible population, rather than just the figures based on the electoral roll, then 
political participation is extremely high at recent elections.
PNG’s first mass-suffrage elections in 1964 attracted a total turnout of 72 percent of 
enrolled voters, but this figure was undoubtedly boosted by the clear similarity between 
the mobile electoral patrols and the well-established (and compulsory) census patrols: 
many electors considered polling merely another prescribed exercise. A number of 
officials deliberately avoided disabusing electors of the widely-held belief that voting 
was in fact compulsory. In 1968, the official turnout dropped to 63 percent — still a 
reasonable level, but again boosted by the near 100 percent turnout field officers 
extracted in some villages. On the other hand, turnout in most areas fell below the 1964 
levels — perhaps because of the growing understanding that voting was voluntary, 
perhaps also because the promises and unrealistic expectations raised by some 
candidates at the first elections had not been fulfilled. The official report speaks of 
voter “disillusionment” and “bewilderment”, with the Chief Electoral Officer warning 
that the declining turnout could be a trend:
Whatever the reason may be the fact remains that there is a drop in voting of some 10% when 
comparing the 1964 to the 1968 elections. I would suggest that some serious thought be given to 
this problem before the 1972 General Election. If steps are not taken to alleviate the present 
situation I have no hesitation in prognosticating a further drop in voting percentages in 1972 
(1968,31).
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Despite predictions to the contrary by the Chief Electoral Officer immediately prior to 
the 1972 elections23, this prognostication proved correct: in 1972 turnout dropped to its 
lowest level, officially measured at 60 percent (Chief Electoral Officer 1973, 31). But 
there were considerable discrepancies: the Mt Wilhelm electorate in Chimbu province 
recorded a turnout of only 32 percent; Poroma-Kutubu in the Southern Highlands 
achieved a 90 percent turnout. The real differences were along regional lines, with most 
highlands electorates recording above-average turnout levels, perhaps reflecting “the 
continued influence of district administration officials in getting voters to the polls”, as 
well as the higher level of contestation for highlands seats (Stone 1976b, 530). Turnout 
in much of the rest of the country was recorded to be around the 50 percent mark — 
indicative, perhaps, of the quality of the electoral rolls as much as any genuine measure 
of participation.
Turnout since 1972 has become increasingly difficult to measure with any confidence. 
Figures for the 1977 election put total turnout at between 62 and 68.9 percent — a 
turnaround from the lows of 1972 (Hegarty 1983, 14; Electoral Commissioner 1987, 5). 
No election report was ever released after the 1982 elections, which even the Electoral 
Commission has admitted were hampered by ‘dubious’ electoral rolls which contained 
massive duplications (1987, 5). No turnout figures have been published by the Electoral 
Commission for the 1992 election, but the Electoral Commissioner has given a rate of 
82.6 percent.24 The Electoral Commissioner’s report on the 1997 elections estimates 
turnout at 66 percent, but argues that this figure substantially understates the actual rate 
due to problems with the electoral roll (1997, 11-12).
As Table 3.6 indicates, these official figures have almost certainly underestimated voter 
turnout in PNG due to the widespread presence of duplications on the electoral roll. The 
variation between the official and ‘estimated’ turnout rates for the 1997 election is a 
case in point: while the official turnout was 66 percent, on the basis of the estimated 
voting age population voter turnout was an extraordinary 98.7 percent, which suggests 
strongly that multiple voting is taking place in some areas.25 The table gives several 
estimates of turnout at all PNG elections to date. The first column is the year each
23 See Stone 1976b, 529.
24 Interview, Reuben Kailulo, PNG Electoral Commissoner, 23 July 1996.
25 For which there is certainly evidence from some highlands electorates. See ‘Democracy without taste’, 
The Independent, 25 July 1997.
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election has been held. The second column is an estimate of the total voting age 
population at each election (that is, the total number of persons eligible to enrol). This 
information was calculated from PNG census data and from United Nations estimates of 
PNG’s population over 18 years of age. The third column is the total number of 
enrolled voters at each election, as published in the official election reports or, in the 
case of the 1982 and 1987 figures, as estimated by informed commentators from official 
sources (Wolfers and Regan 1988, appendix 3). The fourth column is the total number 
of votes cast at each election, including informal votes, section votes, absentee votes and 
postal votes.26 The fifth column is the turnout percentage based on the figures in 
columns three and four — that is, the total number of votes cast as a straight percentage 
of the total number of enrolled voters. The sixth column is this same statistic as a 
percentage of the estimated voting age population. The final column is the official 
turnout figure published for each election.
Table 3.6: Voter Turnout in PNG Elections 1964-1997
Y e a r V o tin g  age  
p o p u la tio n
E n r o lle d
v o te r s
T o ta l
n u m b e r  o f  
v o te s  c a s t
T u r n o u t  as %  
o f  e n r o lle d  
v o te r s
T u rn o u t as %  
o f  v o tin g  age  
p opu la tio n
O ff ic ia l
tu r n o u t
(% )
19 6 4 1 113 5 3 0 1 0 2 8  3 3 9 7 4 3  4 8 9 7 2 .3 66 .7 7 2 .3
19 6 8 1 2 0 1  2 0 0 1 151 119* 7 3 4  1 18a 6 3 .8 61.1 63
197 2 1 34 1  6 0 0 1 3 8 6  845* 8 2 9  9 6 3 5 9 .8 61 .8 6 0
1 9 7 7 1 56 1  8 3 2 1 6 0 7  63 5 9 7 0  172 6 5 .6 67.5 6 8 .9
19 8 2 1 7 5 7  4 9 3 2 3 0 9  621 1 194 114 5 2 .0 68.3 6 6 .3
1 9 8 7 1 8 2 0  120 1 84 3  128 1 3 5 5  4 7 7 7 6 .0 7 7 .0 7 2 .9
199 2 2 0 3 8  9 1 0 1 9 8 7  9 9 4 1 6 1 4  251 8 1 .2 79 .2 8 1 .2
199 7 2 2 7 2  6 2 6 * * 3 4 1 4  0 7 2 2  2 4 4  531 6 6 .0 98 .7 6 6 .0
Source: to 1987: Turner and Hegarty; 1992: Electoral Commissioner 1992; 1997: Electoral 
Commissioner 1997.
* The 1968 and 1972 election reports give different enrolment figures for open and regional electorates. 
This is the open electorate data.
** Estimate by Institute for National Affairs, Port Moresby.
26 These separate categories were copied into the OLNE directly from the Australian electoral law. Prior 
to its repeal in 1991, section 141 of the OLNE enabled qualified electors whose name was omitted from 
the electoral roll due to official error to make a declaration vote. In practice, this entailed any person who 
claimed that their names had been erroneously left off the roll swearing to officials that they were over 18 
and had lived in the electorate for more than six months. This provision was widely believed to have been 
abused, especially by under-age electors, with some electorates recording over 50 percent of their total 
votes as ‘section’ votes.
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If we calculate turnout as a percentage of the total voting age population, which is 
widely accepted as the most accurate comparative measure (International IDEA 1997, 
10), then PNG’s average real turnout since independence, at approximately 69 percent 
(or 81 percent if the 1997 figure is included), is high by world standards. In fact, of 
Weiner’s comparable developing-world democracies of India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka and Trinidad and Tobago, PNG has easily the highest turnout rates (International 
IDEA 1997, passim). If these figures are correct, they raise several interesting 
questions: Why did participation rates dip sharply in 1968 and again in 1972 before 
recovering for the first post-independence elections in 1977? Why have turnout rates 
continued to rise since then? And why are participation rates higher in PNG than in 
many similar countries?
One reason for the trough of turnout levels in 1972 may be a matter of electoral law: in 
1971 PNG took the progressive step of reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years — a 
reform that predated similar moves in many Western countries. The Chief Electoral 
Officer estimated that such a move would increase the total number of eligible voters by 
approximately 225,000 people (1973, 11). It is likely that a large number of these 
newly eligible electors were unaware of their entitlement to vote, hence depressing 
overall turnout. The 1972 election report lamented that “young people showed very 
little interest in the national election” and that their votes “therefore made little 
difference to the results in key electorates” (1973, 12). Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that enrolment (which has always been technically compulsory, even if this has 
never been enforced) was conducted more effectively and accurately in the early 
elections.
The explanation behind the increasing and continually high turnout rates since 
independence is more problematic, especially considering the oft-heard view that the 
electorate in PNG, as elsewhere, is cynical about the political process. The key would 
appear to be the clan or wantok system which sits at the heart of PNG politics. This 
social structure facilitates ease of electoral mobilisation: village-based polities provide 
relatively discrete units of electors which can be mobilised behind chosen candidates. It 
also results in the phenomenon of ‘block voting’: most electors do not approach voting 
as free agents, but as members of a clan, and can thus be relied upon to act as a group 
when it comes to casting their vote. Moreover, the clientelist style of PNG politics,
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where voters are offered financial and other inducements by candidates to turn out and 
vote, provides a very real motivation for electors to be, and to be seen to be, fulfilling 
their side of the deal. Voting in PNG, as elsewhere in the world, is a social act with 
often elaborate preludes and postscripts. As in so many other areas of PNG electoral 
politics, then, institutional and social forces combine to produce unusual results.
But while the social forces stemming from clan-based behaviour and reciprocal 
obligations are persuasive explanations for a large part of the high turnout rates, they do 
not tell the whole story. As elsewhere, the first-past-the-post electoral system also plays 
a strong role: because FPTP enables a candidate with small but localised support levels 
to triumph over many other candidates with a relatively small percentage of the total 
vote, mobilisation of one’s clan is of crucial importance. Because most electors can be 
relied upon to act as agents for the clan rather than as ‘swinging’ voters in their electoral 
choice, candidates can devote time and resources to mobilisation rather than persuasion. 
And because FPTP encourages high candidate numbers, it also means that the threshold 
of victory or defeat in many cases is tiny: 10 or 20 votes can separate winners from 
losers. Under this scenario, candidates have a great incentive to coerce every possible 
supporter to turn out on polling day. This phenomenon will be examined in more detail 
in the following chapter, which turns to the key question of the way the electoral system 
has influenced political campaigning, and particularly the way different electoral laws 
have encouraged or discouraged co-operation and accommodation between both 
candidates and their supporters.
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Chapter Four:
The effects of electoral systems in Papua New Guinea
PNG’s electoral laws have been strongly influenced by its history of Australian 
colonialism. As already discussed, one of the abiding influences of colonial rule tends 
to be the similarity between the institutions of government of the metropolitan power 
and the institutions of the newly autonomous or independent colony. This tendency is 
well illustrated by the choice of electoral systems by new, post-colonial democracies 
since the Second World War: as PNG’s Constitutional Planning Commission itself 
noted, “most colonial territories inherit the voting system found in the countries that 
have ruled them” (1974, 6/15). Nearly all the former British colonies in the developing 
world adopted Westminster-style systems of government featuring first-past-the-post 
electoral systems at independence, just as the former Spanish, Belgian and Dutch 
colonies initially imitated the PR electoral rules of their colonisers (Lijphart 1977, 186- 
87). The experience of the two Australian external territories of Papua New Guinea and 
Nauru1 was consistent with these trends. As noted earlier, PNG was transferred the 
‘Australian’ electoral system of AV, slightly modified for local conditions2, for its first 
three elections in 1964, 1968 and 1972, before moving to a FPTP system at 
independence in 1975. The tiny Pacific island micro-state of Nauru, which came under 
Australian trusteeship following the Second World War, also inherited the Australian 
system at independence in 1968 but, in a unique departure from Australian practice, 
combines preferential voting with multi-member constituencies.3 This means that 
Australia (since 1918) and its two former colonies — Nauru since 1968 and PNG 
between 1964-1975 — provide the only national-level applications of AV elections 
anywhere in the world to date.4
Two separate electoral systems have thus been used in Papua New Guinea: AV from 
1964-1975, and FPTP from 1975 onwards. While these two systems possess markedly
1 For one o f the few discussions of politics in Nauru, see Crocombe 1988.
2 PNG's Electoral Ordinance 1963 was, for the most part, a direct copy o f the Australian Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918, a situation which led to unexpected problems when it was realised that the optional 
AV system used in PNG was incompatible with the requirement, lifted from the Australian act, that a 
candidate must receive an absolute majority o f all ballot papers, including exhausted ballot papers, to be 
elected. See Hughes and van der Veur 1965,412-16.
3 Preferences are counted as fractions of a vote (i.e. while a first preference is worth one vote, a second 
preference is counted as half a vote, a third preference as a third o f a vote, and so on).
4 However as detailed in the following Chapter, another South Pacific state, Fiji, will hold its future 
elections under an AV system.
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different institutional incentives, both tend to be classified as ‘majoritarian’ systems in 
the electoral studies literature. Lijphart, for example, states that AV and FPTP are both 
“a perfect reflection of majoritarian philosophy: the candidate supported by the largest 
number of voters wins, and all other voters remain unrepresented” (1984, 150). While 
indeed similar in many ways, the effects of these two systems in terms of the incentives 
they provide for accommodative political behaviour are sometimes very different — in 
fact in some ways they can be seen as polar opposites when applied to a highly- 
fragmented social and political structure such as that of PNG. This chapter will 
examine how these two electoral systems have encouraged very different types of 
election campaigning and political behaviour in PNG.
The Alternative Vote in Papua New Guinea
The introduction of AV to PNG was a straightforward example of a colonial 
‘institutional transfer’ described earlier, in which both the metropole and colony were 
happy to persist with familiar institutions rather than experiment with something new. 
Hughes noted that the first report of the 1962 Select Committee on Political 
Development, which was charged with making recommendations on the Territory’s 
future representative institutions, had favoured AV as “giving the fairest result” (Hughes 
1965, 36), declaring that four-fifths of witnesses to the Committee had supported this 
option. The recommendation was readily accepted by both the colonial administration 
and the Australian government (Hughes and van der Veur 1965, 406).
AV was first used to elect members of the (largely-appointed) Legislative Council in the 
early 1960s under what was known as the ‘College Electoral System’. This involved 
electors physically queuing up behind the candidate of their choice in what the Chief 
Electoral Officer called a system of ‘open preferential voting’:
If, on a count, no candidate had an absolute majority, i.e. more than half the voters present lined 
up behind him, then the candidate with the least number o f voters behind him moved away and his 
supporters redistributed themselves amongst other candidates ... this physical act o f  distributing 
one’s person to the candidate o f one’s choice and, if  he be eliminated, to one’s next choice, was 
simple and understandable in the eyes o f the voter (1968, 32).
While simple, such a system ignored the basic precept of the secrecy of the ballot, and 
was not practical for mass-suffrage elections. PNG’s first three national elections in 
1964, 1968 and 1972 were therefore held under the ‘optional preferential vote’ (OPV),
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based on the ‘full preferential’ AV method used for federal elections in Australia. 
Electors were required to express a first preference (defined as the number 1) for a 
candidate, and as many further preferences (2,3,4 etc) for other candidates as they so 
chose. In practice, low literacy rates meant that most electors were not capable of 
independently numbering preferences themselves, so the institution of the ‘whispering 
ballot’ — electors verbally expressing their preferences to a polling officer, who would 
mark the ballot paper for them — was extensively used.5 In a further departure from 
Australian practice, it was reasoned that it would not be necessary to compel voters to 
express preferences for all candidates (hence the description of the system as ‘optional 
preferential’), as a direct imitation of the Australian system would have seen numbering 
mistakes render a ballot paper invalid — which would have had dramatic ramifications 
considering PNG’s low literacy rates.6 Similarly, the Australian system of compulsory 
voting was not introduced “because of the novelty of the elections and the problems of 
terrain and climate” (Hughes and van der Veur 1965, 406). With those important 
exceptions, the remainder of the Territory’s Electoral Ordinance 1963 was a direct copy 
of the Australian Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. In no sense was the transfer of 
AV an example of conscious ‘constitutional engineering’; as Wolfers noted at the time, 
the principal raison d ’etre for the introduction of the preferential system was that it was 
the system used in Australia (1969, 29). By 1970, however, official documents were 
arguing that AV was particularly well-suited to PNG’s fragmented social structure, 
arguing that if voters
are unable to gather enough votes to have their ‘local’ man elected then their next preference is a 
man who can adequately represent them in the House because he is literate, articulate and able to 
move freely throughout the electorate. In addition they feel that such a man would represent all 
groups without prejudice, something they fear will not happen at this stage if  a man is elected from 
another language group (Electoral Commission o f Inquiry into Electoral Procedures 1970).
The adoption of AV in PNG was thus an example of the law of unintended 
consequences at work: in many ways, the social conditions present there were, as we 
shall see, almost uniquely well-suited to the use of a system which aggregated 
fragmented political choices to produce an overall winner. Nonetheless, the complexity 
of AV was an ongoing source of concern. For the first election in 1964, neither the
5 See Wolfers 1968b, 25.
6 The PNG Electoral Commission supported a move to full preferential voting after the initial first-past- 
the-post elections in 1977. They argued that the optional nature o f preference marking under the OPV 
system meant that “voting results tend to swing towards that” o f first-past-the-post. See PNG Electoral 
Commission 1983, 78.
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electoral system in general nor AV in particular were well understood by electors. 
Many of the individual chapters in the first PNG election study, The Papua-New Guinea 
Elections 1964, emphasised repeatedly the difficulties of explaining the concepts of 
representative democracy to an audience unfamiliar with them, including the vagaries of 
preferential voting. Reay, for example, found that “the bulk of electors never grasped 
the mechanics of the distribution of preferences and many placed misguided 
interpretations on orders of preferences” (1965, 151). Nevertheless, in the Minj Open 
electorate (one of 14 open electorates in the highlands in 1964), electors “were well 
accustomed to choosing between two alternatives and many compounded sets of such 
choices to construct their first two preferences” (Reay 1965, 155). As both ‘Open’ and 
‘Special’ electorate candidates were listed on the one ballot paper, Reay found that 
electors used their preferences distribution in an effective but unanticipated way to 
ensure that both a European and an indigenous candidate were elected:
Many saw the choice to be made as between electing a European and an indigenous candidate to 
observe and learn from him or electing an indigenous member and a European to advise and 
instruct him. Only the first two preferences were seen to be crucial, the first preference being cast 
for the prospective elected member and the second preference being cast to elect a pupil-observer 
(if the member were a European) or a teacher adviser (if the member were a native) (1965, 155).
Electors were thus assigning preferences without fully understanding that only one 
candidate could be elected:
The most common expectation was that the native candidate and the European candidate who 
gained the highest number o f first and second preferences should both go to Port Moresby. Some 
expressed the more precise opinion that the candidate who received the highest number o f first 
preferences should participate in the House o f Assembly as member and the candidate receiving 
the highest number o f second preferences should accompany him either as advisor or as pupil- 
observer (Reay 1965,177).
Despite these difficulties, Wolfers noted that, in general, “a remarkable proportion of 
the voters was able to indicate a rational, that is, a rationally ordered, set of preferences” 
(1966, 79). The use of disciplined preference-seeking campaigning by some candidates 
made full advantage of this. A number of electoral strategies based on winning 
preference votes were reported at the 1964 elections, with probably the most successful 
exponent being the expatriate candidate Bill Bloomfield in the electorate of Kaindi, who 
emerged as the winner of the seat after the preferences of seven candidates had been 
distributed. Without a strong local support base or home area, Bloomfield campaigned 
extensively, translated his speeches into local language and emphasised that if electors 
did not want to give him their first preference “then give me number two”. It was an
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extremely effective strategy which saw him carry a seat that he would have had no 
chance o f winning on first-preferences.7 Table 4.1 shows the extent o f preference 
swapping with indigenous candidates that Bloomfield achieved in winning the seat.
Table 4.1: Result of the Count in Kaindi Open Electorate, 1964
Sue
Kate
BQlBloo
infield
Anani Ninga 
Manlau Yamun
David
Iti
Mangi
Iom
James
Gould
Monbon Isom
Kala
Exhaus­
ted*
Total
votes
First pref. 
votes for each 
candidate
1842 4583 3372 1188 5425 369 254 801 1377 19211
254 votes of
GOULD
transferred
1852 4686 3388 1208 5440 388 Excluded 824 1392 33 19211
388 votes of 
IOM
transferred
1913 4720 3397 1225 5456 Excluded 939 1460 101 19211
939 votes of 
MONBONG 
transferred
1964 4984 3422 1379 5476 “ “ Excluded 1592 394 19211
1379 votes of
YAMUNG
transferred
2075 5341 3501 Excluded 5517 1708 997 19211
1780 votes of
KALA
transferred
2596 5796 3595 5793 ” • Excluded 1431 19211
2596 votes of
KATE
transferred
Excluded 7373 3974 6015 “ ” 1849 19211
3974 votes of 
MAN LAU 
transferred
9007 Excluded 6407 3797 19211
* An ‘exhausted’ vote comprises a ballot where preferences have not or cannot be assigned to a 
continuing candidate, hence ‘exhausting’ before the full distribution of preferences.
Source: Chief Electoral Officer 1964b.
While preferences were distributed in the majority o f electorates in 1964, the final result 
was different to that provided by a first-part-the-post system in only five o f the 44 
electorates: Henganofi, Tari, Kaindi, Markham and South Markham Special.
Henganofi provided a classic example o f the way the use of preferences by supporters of 
aligned candidates can overcome a single dominant plurality winner (see Table 4.2). 
Candidate Bono, with massive support from his own region but negligible support 
elsewhere, lost to candidate Ugi, situated in the centre o f the electorate and attracting a
7 See Hughes and van der Veur 1965,409.
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less partisan but considerably broader range of support. Ugi was well behind on first 
preferences, but gained the majority of all other candidate’s preferences to win the seat.
Table 4.2: Allocation of Preferences in Henganofi Open Electorate, 1964
C andidate First count Second count Third count Fourth count Final count
Forapi 787 - - - (787)
Posi 1758 12 - - (1770)
Punupa 3708 73 41 - (3822)
Bono 8028 12 35 224 8299
Ugi 3925 667 1362 3274 9228
Exhausted - 23 334 324 681
Source: As for Table 4.1.
As Wolfers noted, Ugi’s victory was a “quite remarkable” example of the way inter­
group preference-swapping could result in the election of a broadly acceptable 
candidate, and the outcome “was a tribute to the highly rational voting of his supporters, 
who were able to make a complex system of voting produce the desired result” (1966, 
79).
The real significance of these examples of strategic preference swapping was the pointer 
they give to a characteristic that emerged more strongly in later elections: regional 
alliances and co-operation between candidates. In the next election in 1968, for 
example, Parker found alliances for mutual support between two or more candidates in a 
number of different electorates. These typically involved a Regional candidate, who 
was usually an expatriate, being linked with one or more Open electorate candidates 
within the same district. It was a case of mutual advantage, although the Regional 
candidate “stood to gain more (and in most places did so) from the Open candidates’ 
intimate associations with places away from his ‘home area’, than they did from his 
name, his sharing of transport, or his financing of posters” (Parker 1971, 333). Such 
alliances continue to take place today in some regions. In other cases, such co-operation 
extended to rival candidates within the same electorate. Parker noted of the 1968 
election study that “most chapters give examples of mutual aid amongst candidates in 
the course of campaigning. The commonest form of this was the sharing of transport 
and of ‘platforms’ at election meetings” (1971, 321). In a verdict unlikely to be
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repeated today, the field teams at the 1968 elections saw such co-operative campaigning 
techniques “as an example of a peculiar mildness — compared to the practice in 
industrial countries — that seemed to characterise electoral competition in New Guinea” 
(1971,321)!
Preference-swapping amongst candidates was more prevalent in 1968 than in 1964, with 
59 of the 84 elected seats being decided on preferences, including 12 seats which were 
ultimately won, after preference distribution, by candidates who had not led on the 
primary count. In Goroka Open, for example, where 16 candidates stood, the system 
enabled Sabuemei Kofikai, who came third on the primary count, to win on preferences, 
as “he was clearly the popular compromise — his name figured near the top of almost 
every ballot paper” (Wolfers 1968b, 29). Wolfers argues that it was highly-contested 
highlands seats such as this where “the preferential system has the most obvious 
relevance in that it may assist in forging a compromise among groups of people who 
would not, initially at least, consider helping an outsider” (1968b, 29). Shrewd 
candidates found that they could pick up votes by campaigning outside their ‘home’ 
areas, particularly in areas which fielded no local candidate (a number of non-local 
candidates were elected to seats in Central Province in this way). In other regions, little 
or no preference swapping took place — especially in those regions where the 
candidates themselves (not to mention the electorate) had not grasped the mechanics of 
a preferential count, such as in most of the Milne Bay electorates (Gostin, Tomasetti and 
Young 1971, 97, 105). In the ten Western Highlands seats, over half of those who voted 
cast a single preference — although the rates varied widely between electorates, from 98 
percent in Kandep-Tambul to four percent in Jimi (where 76 percent of voters numbered 
all eight preferences) (Colebatch, Colebatch, Reay and Strathem 1971, 263-64). The 
most likely explanation for this difference was the variation in official procedures used 
to elicit preferences from voters, whereby some polling officials (in imitation, perhaps, 
of Australian practice) directly solicited all preference orderings while others were less 
insistent (Wolfers 1968b, 29). Official leaflets and radio education programs 
encouraged voters to fill in all their preferences, but the only explanation for this advice 
was that it was “for the good of the country”, a rationale that obviously left room for 
interpretation (Colebatch, Colebatch, Reay and Strathem 1971, 263).
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In general, with most voters giving their first preference to their ‘home’ candidate, 
second preferences at the 1968 election tended to go to candidates from geographically 
proximate tribes or, where possible, to expatriate candidates, who were often seen by 
voters as a better alternative than an indigenous member from another tribe. In the 
Western Highlands regional seat, for example, 93 percent of votes cast for the most 
popular indigenous candidate, Philip Wamell, gave their second preference to an 
expatriate. In most cases, however, candidates’ strategy seemed to be to gain as many 
first preferences as possible from their ‘home’ area, and then to expand this base as far 
as possible by soliciting second preferences from the supporters of others with whom 
they had some form of geographic connection or traditional alliance (Colebatch, 
Colebatch, Reay and Strathem 1971, 264-69).
The importance of these preference-swapping alliances between candidates is that they 
were the harbingers of the first forms of organised, co-operative political activity that 
began to emerge in PNG at the 1968 elections. Thus Parker cites a Pangu alliance 
between regional and open electorate candidates in Central Province, and similar 
behaviour on the part of the expatriate-based ‘All People’s Party’ in Madang, as 
evidence for “the promise of widening political horizons” and increasing political 
development in PNG (1971, 333). While political parties at this time were little more 
than “personal associations between individuals who felt they had common political 
views and aspirations” (Parker 1971, 333), their growth into agents for inter-electorate 
and (in the case of Pangu at least) inter-regional forces can be attributed, at least in part, 
to the associative qualities manifest in the type of accommodative campaigning 
encouraged by the preferential voting system. As will be discussed later, preferential 
voting systems can encourage the development of political parties by facilitating formal 
alliances and coalition arrangements sustained at the electoral level by preference 
exchanges (such as the long-standing coalition arrangement between the Liberal and 
National parties in Australia).
The last PNG election under AV rules was held in 1972, and accounts of campaigning 
from that contest provide the most detailed accounts of preference swapping 
arrangements leading to accommodative behaviour. What stands out in many accounts, 
according to S affix, was
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how extremely polite and civil candidates were towards one another. Although candidates could 
afford to be sporting in the pre-independence days when the stakes were not so high, the 
contribution o f the optional preferential system to the avoidance o f mudslinging could have been 
substantial (1996, 34).
In the contest for the Kula Open seat in Milne Bay, for example, candidates in one area 
“refrained from criticising each other” and instead “often asked for second or third 
preferences” in a rival’s home area (Leach 1976, 489). The eventual winning candidate, 
John Fifita, often did not ask for a first preference at all, merely requesting “a second or 
third vote if the people wanted to vote for others first” — and subsequently received a 
healthy share of other (eliminated) candidates’ preferences to win the seat (Leach 1976, 
487). Also important were candidates’ direct appeals for not just second preference 
votes, but for third and fourth preferences as well. In highlands areas, humorous 
requests for these were made in the idiom derived from the distribution of pork and pigs 
at festivals whenever a candidate appeared outside his immediate area of strength:
T just want to know if  you will give me a little piece of backbone and skin’, they would say, and 
were duly assured that this would be forthcoming, i.e. that either second or third preferences 
would be given to them (Leach 1976, 277).
A good example of disciplined preference swapping arrangements between hostile 
groups comes from Strathem’s (1976) account of the contest for the Dei Open 
Electorate in 1972. Dei Open was a new electorate in the Western Highlands which had 
been created in 1972 after tribal fighting in the former electorates became a problem. 
Despite inter-tribal violence immediately before the election, most candidates 
enunciated “a simple dogma of homogeneity and equality among all those standing” 
(Strathem 1976, 265), and this moderate philosophy, so different from the fiery rhetoric 
of modem contests, was reflected in formal preference-swapping arrangements entered 
into by rival tribes in the electorate (Kombukala, Minembi and Tipuka being the 
dominant tribes). Strathem sets out the negotiations for this process in some detail:
First, leaders of one tribe (Kombukala) were said to have held a meeting to select their own 
candidate, and to have invited a small number of Minembi leaders and possibly one or two Tipuka 
men with whom they had connections. Beer was offered to the guests, and the Minembi and 
Kombukala leaders agreed that their two candidates could exchange preferences ... Realising that 
they could take only marginal gains from one another’s areas of support, candidates ... carefully 
canvassed resettlement blocks and plantations within Dei, hoping to obtain the edge over rivals by 
securing votes from outsiders (Enga, Chimbu and Southern Highlands people) resident and 
working in these (1976, 276).
The accommodative incentives of AV are well illustrated by this account, in which 
previously hostile tribal leaders sat down and negotiated with each other for preference
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support. Even where the likely gains from preference swapping were only marginal, 
candidates nevertheless took the time to meet and discuss ways of harnessing this 
potential advantage. This process also worked in reverse, with dispossessed groups 
wooing potentially friendly candidates. The eventual winning candidate, Parua Kuri of 
the Tipuka tribe, was even entertained with teas and scones by residents of one 
resettlement block, who promised him their first preference votes (Strathem 1976, 276)! 
Kuri engaged in the most widespread and accommodative campaigning of any 
candidate, reaching further into more tribes than any of his competitors. Significantly, 
he also forged close connections with a traditional ally tribe via “intensive ties of 
ceremonial exchange” and, in a further example of rational preference-swapping, urged 
his supporters to cast their preferences for a member of a hostile rival tribe, Warike 
Warna, as well as for himself. Not surprisingly, when Warna was eliminated at the final 
count, a healthy proportion of his preferences went to Kuri himself, who won the seat on 
preferences. What Strathem typified as Kuri’s “growing importance in widening 
spheres of politics”, by which he “clearly united in himself the figures of traditional big- 
man and modem politician”, was facilitated by an electoral system that was able to 
reflect the complexity of both traditional and modem alliances, and enabled him to 
succeed by utilising tactics which emphasised negotiation and co-operation (1976, 277- 
83).
One of the most striking features of the 1972 elections is the extent to which AV was 
utilised by candidates who established broad, cross-tribal support bases to defeat 
opponents who would have easily won a FPTP contest. For example, Kuabaal’s 
description of candidates’ campaigns in 1972 in the Sinasina Open Electorate, a Chimbu 
electorate with seven major tribal groups each speaking a different dialect, noted that the 
eventual winning candidate concentrated his early campaigning in areas where he had 
no traditional alliance or denominational ties, and in fact gained 41 percent of his 
primary votes from such areas (1976, 350-72). The predominance of such strategies in 
the highlands, the site of the most fluid, aggressive and competitive traditional societies, 
was particularly marked. Table 4.3 sets out the electorates in which preference 
distribution ensured that the dominant plurality winner did not win the seat in 1964, 
1968 and 1972. Despite making up only 32 percent of all seats in 1972, 56 percent of 
non-plurality winners came from highlands electorates — i.e. those in Chimbu or the 
Eastern, Southern or Western Highlands districts. As will be detailed below, since 1975
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it has been these highlands provinces, where modem electoral contests are most highly 
contested and violent, and in which minority victories have been most prevalent and 
electoral violence most extreme under FPTP.
Table 4.3: Cases where leading candidate on first preferences was defeated after
distribution of preferences, 1964-1972
Year No of 
cases
Electorates involved Percentage o f all 
elected seats
1964 5 Kaindi, Henganofi, Tari, Markham, South Markham Special 9
1968 12 Central Regional, Finschhafen, Goilala, Goroka, Gumine, Ialibu, 
Kandep-Tambul, Kerowagi, Nawae, Sinasina, Sohe, Tari
14
1972 16 Bulolo, Hagen, Henganofi, Ialibu-Pangia, Kandrian-Gloucester, 
Koroba-Kopiago, Kundiawa, Lagaip, Lufa, Nawae, Nipa, North 
Fly, Okapa, Poroma-Kutubu, Sinasina, Tambul-Nebilyer
16
Source: Chief Electoral Officer (1964, 1968, 1972).
While one would expect the highlands to figure prominently in terms of overall 
preference distribution because of the high numbers of candidates and numerous clan 
support bases, it is less predictable that so many highlands candidates were able to win 
seats on the basis of preference support which they would have lost under FPTP. The 
strength of traditional ties rather than some form of party or policy-based affiliation is 
often the best explanation for their victories. For example, in Paypool’s account of the 
campaign in Ialibu-Pangia, an open electorate in the Southern Highlands, the two most 
prominent candidates, Turi Wari and Koke Itua, who came from different regions of the 
electorate, Ialibu and Pangia, collaborated closely during the campaign, with each 
campaigning for the other in his ‘home’ area. Voters from the two areas invariably gave 
their first preference to their clan candidate, but on the (relatively rare) occasions they 
decided to express preferences for a candidate from the rival area, they almost 
invariably chose Turi or Koke — the former winning the seat after eight counts, with 
Koke coming second (Paypool 1976, 288-90). Similar practices were followed by two 
young challengers to Tei Abal in the Wabag Open electorate who “campaigned hard on 
a common policy” and “shared their preferences” (Iangalio 1976, 302-3). In the 
campaign for the Chimbu Regional seat in 1972, candidates with similar religious 
affiliations swapped preferences, and traditional allegiances appeared to take precedence 
over party connections. Like the campaign in Dei Open, however, the candidate with 
the most widespread support base won the seat (Standish 1976, 326, 345-46). The
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important point here is that where accommodative behaviour is rewarded, traditional 
allegiances can be utilised in much the same way as more modem, policy-based 
connections.
Of course, just as there were many cases where preference swapping deals were 
instituted, there was also a considerable number of successful candidates who, judging 
that they would have majority support on first preferences, instructed their supporters to 
mark a ‘1’ only. Sometimes this was because they felt that preference instructions 
would confuse their supporters; sometimes it was because they were confident of 
winning the seat outright.8 Often, this assumption proved to be a miscalculation: 
assurances of support are easy to give, but not always reliable in the exchange-focused 
environment of PNG electoral politics, in which bloc votes are commodities to be 
exchanged, bought or sold. The dangers of candidates instructing their supporters to 
mark only a first preference were graphically illustrated in the contest for the Central 
Regional seat in 1968, where Andy Anderson, one of two collaborating expatriate 
candidates, had “deliberately and persistently instructed” his Goilala supporters not to 
allocate any preferences beyond their first, “fearing that the preferential system might 
confuse them and cause them to lodge informal votes”. When Anderson was eliminated 
his running mate, Ron Slaughter, gained few preferences, allowing an indigenous 
candidate to win the seat instead (Groves, Hamilton and McArthur 1971, 309). 
Similarly, in the Manus Open contest in 1972, lack of a preference swapping strategy 
almost turned a sure victory against an ageing incumbent candidate into a loss: a group 
of younger candidates “were unable or unwilling to work together and, failing to 
appreciate how the preferential system could be exploited to achieve their objective, 
might well have failed” (Stone 1976b, 535). In the Regional seat, by contrast, the 
eventual winning candidate was the only one to campaign for second preferences — of 
which he received the lion’s share, winning on the third count (Pokawin 1976, 412-13).
All of these examples illustrate the way rational candidates were able to use the 
mechanics of preferential voting to improve their chances of success by reaching out to 
voters from other clan or tribal groups. To do this, they had to overcome not just 
traditional enmities, but also the novelty of asking for support from areas in which they 
had little prior profile. Possibly the most important strategy to gain preference votes
8 See, for example, Pokawin 1976, 413.
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was the need to travel from village to village, being seen by all the different clans and 
tribes in an electorate. Anthony Voutas claimed that walking from village to village 
was the most crucial single factor in his 1968 election victory, writing that “in areas 
where there was no ‘favourite son’ candidate, I gained heavily. Where there was a 
‘favourite son’ candidate, I generally gained second or third preferences” (1970, 499). 
Similarly, the successful candidate in the Chimbu Regional contest, Iambakey Okuk, 
spent almost two years driving around his electorate prior to the 1972 election (Standish 
1976, 326). Such accommodative practices are virtually unimaginable in many areas of 
PNG today, where it is both dangerous and a waste of valuable resources to campaign 
outside one’s immediate ‘home’ areas (Standish 1994, 60).
It is significant to note that despite problems of literacy and numeracy, the percentage of 
voters in PNG utilising preferences increased with every election between 1964 and the 
last AV election in 1972. In addition, the incidence of preferences deciding outcomes 
increased over time. At the 1964 elections, while preferences were distributed in the 
great majority of electorates the final result was different to that provided by FPTP in 
only five of the 44 electorates. In 1968, due to the distribution of preferences, twelve 
electorates (out of a total of 84) returned results different to straight plurality contest. 
By 1972, preferences changed the result in 16 out of 100 elected seats — in other words, 
16 percent of seats returned different members than would have been the case under 
FPTP.9 This was a higher rate of results being changed than has ever been achieved in 
national elections in Australia, the ‘home’ of AV, and probably reflects the increasing 
recognition in PNG of the utility of preference allocation as a means of defeating 
candidates with strong but localised support in favour of a more widely acceptable 
candidate. Table 4.4 compares the experience of the two countries.
9 The CPC mistakenly mistakenly stated that in 1972 “in only 13 electorates was the candidate who led on 
the first count defeated after preferences had been distributed”. In addition to being incorrect, the use o f  
the word ‘only’ appeared to imply that this was a relatively small amount, when it in fact represents the 
highest rate o f results being changed of any national AV election. See CPC 1974, 6/15-6/16.
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Table 4.4: Proportion of seats where preferences distributed and outcomes 
changed in Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1963-1996
AUSTRALIA PAPUA NEW  G UINEA
Election Year Preferences 
distributed (%)
O utcom es 
changed (%)
Election Year Preferences 
distributed (% )
O utcom es 
changed (% )
1963 19.2 6.6 1964 52.3 11.4
1966 25.0 4.0 1968 73.8 9.2
1969 32.0 9.6 1972 69.0 16.0
1972 39.2 11.2 - - -
1974 26.0 7.9 - - -
1975 18.9 5.5 - - -
1977 36.2 3.1 - - -
1980 32.0 4.8 - - -
1983 24.8 1.6 - - -
1984 29.7 8.8 - - -
1987 36.5 2.7 - - -
1990 60.1 6.1 - - -
1993 42.2 8.2 - - -
1996 39.2 4.7 - - -
Source: As for Table 4.3, plus Hughes 1997, 166-67.
While examples of accommodative campaigning from the pre-independence era are 
relatively common, it appears that few commentators specifically attributed this 
behaviour to the incentives presented by the electoral system. Of the numerous studies, 
mostly by Australian authors, detailing the period leading up to independence, only 
Ballard noted the fact that AV “encouraged collaboration among candidates within an 
electorate” (1978, 11). More recent calls in PNG for the re-introduction of preferential 
voting have, however, implicitly endorsed the argument that preferential voting 
encourages inter-group accommodation, although not always in the policy-concession 
manner that Horowitz anticipated. These arguments will be examined in detail later in 
this chapter. First, however, the effects of FPTP upon political behaviour in PNG will 
be examined.
First-past-the-post in Papua New Guinea
The introduction of first-past-the-post
PNG abandoned AV for FPTP in 1975, on the grounds that it was excessively 
complicated and, as a system introduced by the Australian administration, a colonial
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institution unsuited to PNG’s needs. Other concerns focused on the potentially lengthy 
time taken to achieve a result, leading to increased tension and disputation. By contrast, 
FPTP was seen as being a simpler system which, in most cases, would deliver the same 
results as AV anyway (Ballard 1978, 11). Concerns about the suitability of the inherited 
AV system had surfaced following the 1968 election, with the Chief Electoral Officer 
writing that the “strongest argument against the preferential system is its complexity for 
the average voter and its complexity for the count... much has been said in this election 
of the merits of the ‘first past the post system’ and how simple it is to operate”. In a 
prescient remark, he also noted that FPTP in the (then) British Solomon Islands had 
resulted in one particular candidate being elected with 388 votes out of an electorate of 
10,000 voters (1968, 32-33)! The United Nations Visiting Mission stated that “while 
there were drawbacks in the preferential system it felt bound to acknowledge that it is 
probably the best system to use in the circumstances prevailing in the Territory” (1968, 
68).10 However opposition to preferential voting was growing amongst a small but 
influential band of commentators. Writing in January 1968, Wolfers claimed that the 
‘optional’ nature of preference marking under AV in PNG had “deceived” electors in 
the past — and that voters in two by-elections in 1965 and 1967 had accordingly 
“indicated far fewer preferences than in 1964”. He wrote:
a preferential system in which it is not compulsory to number all squares (as it is in Australia) may 
produce an almost random result: if it fails to produce a result identical with that which would 
result from a first-past-the-post vote, it can produce any o f a variety o f results, depending simply 
on how soon the supporters of the candidates first eliminated tire o f indicating their preferences. 
Is it any wonder that some candidates are urging their supporters to indicate only a first 
preference? (1968a, 70)
Support for a change to first-past-the-post gained momentum following the 1972 
elections. Several observers had previously argued that AV, because of its complexity, 
discouraged electors from voting and promoted invalid ballots (Colebatch, Colebatch, 
Reay and Strathem 1971, 226, 261-64; Parker 1971, 352). Without openly supporting a 
new electoral system, the Chief Electoral Officer, Simon Kaumi, writing under the 
heading “Preferential system versus first-past-the-post”, made it clear that the 
complexity of AV was causing difficulties:
* 0 The Mission went on to make the quite impractical recommendation that a minimum of four 
preferences should be expressed on all ballots where there were four or more candidates in future 
elections, a provision which was not adopted, as it would have resulted in a large number of votes being 
rendered informal.
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The preferential system is no doubt a fairer system than the first-past-the-post system but, while 
appreciating its fairness, it is becoming more and more complicated as well as time consuming. 
Papua New Guinea’s electoral system must be completely revised with a view to making it simple 
and less complicated so that it is easily understood by both polling officials and the voters. As the 
country approaches self-government, Papua New Guinea’s electoral system must be simplified ... I 
feel it is time Papua New Guinea looked realistically and critically at its voting system and made 
its own decisions as to what is suitable for its future democratic needs. The question is not one of 
democracy, rather one o f finding a voting system that is simple and suitable to the people o f this 
country (1973, 18).
These words clearly influenced the Constitutional Planning Committee, and were 
quoted approvingly in the CPC’s final report in 1974. Stating that “we fully agree with 
this view”, the CPC endorsed the suggestion that AV was unnecessarily complicated, 
and that FPTP would be “easier to understand, easier to run, and the results [would] 
become known much more quickly. For these reasons, we recommend a change to the 
‘first-past-the-post’ system” (1974, 6/15-6/16). The CPC considered other methods of 
election, such as proportional representation, to be excessively complicated and only 
suited to countries with a well-developed party system (1974, 6/15). The Constituent 
Assembly charged with enacting the independence constitution accepted the CPC’s 
recommendation, and the resulting Organic Law on National Elections, which has laid 
down the framework for all elections since 1977, provides for a FPTP electoral system.
The consequences of the new system were immediately apparent at the 1977 general 
election. Setting the pattern for all elections since then, a disturbingly high number of 
seats (42 — almost half the Parliament) were won by candidates with less than 30 
percent of the vote, and the related factor of ‘vote splitting’ — friendly candidates with 
little hope of winning the seat standing in order to ‘split’ an opposition block vote — 
first became a factor.11 Hegarty noted that vote-splitting tactics in 1977
heightened tension between clans and groups and in some cases polarized electorates to the point 
o f violent conflict ... this situation contrasted markedly with campaigning styles in previous 
elections where opposing candidates often toured their electorates together urging voters to cast 
preferences (1983, 15).
Hegarty went on to suggest that “a continuation of such aggressive campaigning in 
future elections could well weaken the credibility of the electoral system” (1983, 15). 
Similarly, Premdas described the results of PNG’s first FPTP election as “a great 
disappointment”, arguing that
11 For an illuminating discussion of the importance o f vote (or issue) 'splitting' as a central political tactic 
throughout the ages, see Riker 1986.
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Not only did informal voting not decrease, but much more 85% o f the candidates won their seats 
with less than a majority o f votes. Strikingly, about 45% of the victorious candidates won with 
30% or less. The immediate implications of the experiment with the first-past-the-post system 
have been twofold. First, the new electoral system encouraged candidates with the largest bloc of 
ethnic (clan) votes in an electorate to concentrate on his/her base alone rather than to seek co­
operative exchanges for second or third preferences with candidates from other clans. The first- 
past-the-post system imposed a clear-cut choice that provided no alternative to villagers but to 
express their choice in a ‘friendly’ versus ‘antagonistic’ pattern. In effect the first-past-the-post 
system did not encourage inter-clan and inter-community co-operation in a country which is 
notoriously socially and ethnically fragmented. Secondly, the first-past-the-post system 
diminishes the legitimacy o f the parliament as the decision-making body for the national 
government... it may very well be dumped for the next national elections (1978, 79-80).
Even the Electoral Commission, which had supported the change, appeared to have 
doubts about the new system. Echoing Wolfers’ earlier criticisms, the Electoral 
Commissioner, J.S. Mileng, expressed support for a change to a full preferential system 
as “a fairer system of voting” and suggested that the problem with the old AV system 
was that “the voter is not required to mark his/her full support for the running 
candidates, therefore the voting system tends to swing towards that of the ‘First Past the 
Post5 Voting System”. While FPTP was simpler and easier to administer than AV, it 
did not enable voters “to consider placing a second choice for the next best candidate ... 
a strong voting block always has the chance of electing its candidate outright, whilst 
candidates coming from a minority group would have no chance of getting elected” 
(PNG Electoral Commission 1983, 78-79). Similar criticisms were voiced by a number 
of other electoral officials, who claimed that FPTP facilitated voting blocks and enabled 
candidates with small localised support to triumph over their competitors. The 
following comment, from the Obura-Wonenara returning officer, was typical:
The first-past-the-post system was again criticised by the electors as well as the officials because it 
does not allow an elector to express his second and third choice for the remaining candidates. 
With the voting trends in the area, a heavy block tends to vote for its own man leaving no 
opportunity for a man from a less developed area (PNG Electoral Commission 1983, 78-79).
The relatively new phenomenon of campaign violence in 1977 was a recurring concern, 
with the Electoral Commission saying that the 1977 poll featured “the most hectic and 
wild campaign activities that were ever seen in Papua New Guinea”. Returning officers 
in Chimbu and Enga provinces stated that tribal fighting and attacks on polling staff 
were so widespread as to constitute a serious problem for electoral officials, and both 
returning officers’ reports stated that officials would not perform the same duties again 
due to the level of violence encountered (PNG Electoral Commission 1983, 88).
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The effects o f first-past-the-post
As noted earlier, elections in PNG evidence both continuity and change since 1964. 
However, in some areas the changes in PNG electoral politics appear to be directly 
related to the institutional consequences of the change of electoral system. Specifically, 
the introduction of FPTP in 1975 appears to be related to three characteristics of post­
independence electoral politics in PNG: the increasingly high rates of candidature at 
elections; the election of increasingly unrepresentative and minimally-supported 
candidates; and rising levels of electoral violence. The relationship of the electoral 
system to these factors will now be examined, and it will be argued that each of these 
distinguishing characteristics of contemporary PNG politics is at least partly explicable 
by reference to the incentives for behaviour presented by the electoral system.
Candidature rates
PNG elections have long been characterised by remarkably high rates of candidature. 
The first post-independence elections in 1977 saw an explosion in candidates numbers 
— 881 candidates standing for 109 seats, representing a 44 percent increase over the 
number contesting in 1972 and a 33 percent increase in the average number of 
candidates per seat. Hegarty argued that the increase was “largely due to the fact that, 
with independence, political power was at stake, and the fact that the first-past-the-post 
voting system gave candidates with a reasonably strong clan vote a chance of winning” 
(Hegarty 1983, 13). As detailed in Table 4.5 below, rates of candidature have remained 
high, and increased, with every election to date.
Table 4.5: Candidates per Electorate 1964-1997
Y ear N o  o f  E lectorates N o . o f  C and id ates A verage  p er e lec to ra te
1964 54 298 5.5
1968 84 484 5.8
1972 100 611 6.1
1977 109 879 8.1
1982 109 1125 10.3
1987 109 1513 13.9
1992 109 1654 15.2
1997 109 2370 21 .7
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Since independence, the increasing centrality of the state as a means of accessing 
resources and accumulating and distributing wealth has served to encourage more and 
more candidates to stand for election. As noted in the previous chapter, electoral victory 
provides the surest way of gaining access to the resources of the state itself. Some 
observers also argue that standing for election itself increases individual prestige 
regardless of the election outcome. In the Chimbu region of the highlands, for example, 
candidature
demonstrates local popularity, makes a ‘big man’, [and] shows how the candidate measures up 
against local rivals for clan and tribe leadership. In this competition, candidacy itself, having one's 
name on the ballot, posters, cars, supporters, is an indication o f being a big man. Secondly, 
success is measured by obtaining votes of the subclan, clan and tribe. Electoral success, that is, 
achieving office, against thirty or forty rivals, cannot be expected. In the local contest the one who 
receives the largest number of votes demonstrates that he has at least a local following (Brown 
1989, 251) .
What is sometimes overlooked in such analyses is the way PNG’s FPTP electoral 
system also encourages candidates to stand for election. The higher the number of 
candidates standing under FPTP, the smaller the total vote needed to gain a plurality and 
hence win the seat. For example, if 20 candidates with identical support bases stand for 
a seat, the winning candidate needs only (100 percent +  20 + 1), or just over 5 percent of 
the vote to be elected. In most countries with disciplined party systems, this example 
would seem ludicrous: two or three major parties would gain the vast majority of the 
votes, and the winning candidate would thus need considerably more than 5 percent to 
gain election. In PNG, by contrast, this type of scenario is relatively commonplace. 
Because many candidates rely, sometimes exclusively, on their own clan base for 
support, FPTP contests in electorates with many different clan groups of roughly equal 
size can produce winning candidates with only a marginal plurality of votes over other 
candidates. By contrast, other voting systems such as AV require successful candidates 
to gain an absolute majority of votes cast, and thus encourage alliances between parties 
or candidates, since the allies can each put up candidates without fear of splitting their 
combined vote.
The explosion in the number of candidates since independence was clearly not 
anticipated by the Constitutional Planning Commission and other influential players 
who supported a change to FPTP. The number of candidates almost doubled in the ten 
years between 1972 (the last AV election) and 1982, prompting the General 
Constitutional Commission (which was established in 1978 to review the workings of
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PNG’s independence Constitution) to suggest that, while FPTP was easier to 
understand, the desirability of a return to AV warranted consideration should the 
country’s changing circumstances require it (1983, 131). The explosion of candidate 
numbers in the post-independence era in PNG has many causes, but one of them appears 
to be the possibility anyone with a modicum of clan support to stand for election and 
have at least a chance of winning a seat under the FPTP electoral system.
As in so many other areas of PNG politics, regional factors also appear to influence the 
distribution of this phenomenon. As already noted, in regions of high contestation such 
as the highlands, where many similar-sized clans vie to have ‘their’ candidate elected, 
high candidacy rates are always to be expected. In most elections, the record number of 
candidates for an electorate tends to occur in highlands seats — 48 in Sinasina- 
Yonggamugl in 1992, 45 in Kerowagi in 1987 and 29 in Kundiawa in 1982 — although 
the latest record of 61 candidates contesting one seat occurred in Papua’s Northern 
Provincial electorate in 1997. The areas of high candidature are those in which a 
number of competing interest groups and issue dimensions are present, such as the 
National Capital District seats, which have consistently attracted large numbers of able 
candidates.12 By contrast, many contests in the lowlands and islands are characterised 
by small numbers of candidates and a more consensual, measured style of campaigning.
This raises the question of to what extent the number of clans in each electoral district is 
related to the total number of candidates standing for election. If we assume that there 
is roughly one candidate for each politicised clan or tribal group, then the number of 
candidates in an electorate should approximate the number of clans within that 
constituency. But there are several problems with this approach. First, the number of 
candidates standing for election has tripled since independence, suggesting a more fluid 
relationship between the two variables than a straight one-to-one ratio would imply. 
Also, there is clear evidence of social forces which both deter candidacy in some areas 
(thus reducing the candidate/clan ratio) and which encourage frivolous or ‘vote­
splitting’ candidates standing in others (thus increasing it). Burton found both of these 
tendencies taking place in his survey of the Hagen Open electorate in 1987, although the 
strength of the forces constraining candidacy (such as pre-election agreements by clan 
leaders on candidacy to avoid vote-splitting) appeared to be outweighed by those
12 See Griffin 1988.
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encouraging it (the accurate assessment by many candidates with a modicum of support 
that they have a chance of success) (1989, 272-73). Partly this is also the result of the 
willingness of parties in PNG to endorse multiple candidates and to generally align 
themselves with as many likely winners as possible. May’s analysis of the 1982 
elections in East Sepik, for example, found that parties had little control over candidates 
from different support bases standing and claiming party allegiance at the time of 
nomination — a phenomenon which, he argued, split the pro-Pangu vote (1989, 227). 
Pokawin found a similar situation in Manus, where every candidate voluntarily 
associated themselves with a political party, and no less than nine non-endorsed 
candidates publicly associated themselves with the Pangu Pati (1989,245).
Overall, however, the hypothesised relationship between candidature, clan numbers and 
electoral rules would appear to offer one explanation for PNG’s extremely high 
candidacy rates, as there is a clear relationship between areas of greater group 
fragmentation with higher rates of candidature. This corresponds to the theoretical 
expectations of the political science literature, which argues that the effective number of 
electoral candidates and parties in an election is a product of the interaction between 
social heterogeneity and electoral rules.13 Examination of the electoral impact of racial 
diversity in some areas of the United States, for example, has found that “the greater the 
level of racial (or social) heterogeneity in an electoral district (or nation), the greater the 
number of effective candidates there will be in the district (or national) elections” (Jones 
1997, 355). When applied to PNG, this theory would predict that the number of 
candidates per district would be higher in the more competitive and ethnically-diverse 
areas, such as the Port Moresby electorates and the highlands, than in the less divided 
islands region — which is indeed the case. At the 1997 elections, for example, the 
islands region had an average of 10.6 candidates per electorate, while candidature rates 
were twice as high in the highlands and over three times as high in the National Capital 
District (Electoral Commissioner 1997, 15).
Although high candidacy is one indicator of democratic participation, in PNG it has 
come to be seen as “excessive and undesirable both from the point of view of effective 
representation and the electoral process itself’ (Electoral Commissioner 1987, 5). In 
1991 the government introduced a number of measures intended to reduce the number
13 See Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997.
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of candidates contesting seats “so that the intending candidates will think seriously 
about contesting and will not be used to split the votes” (‘A Profile on the Electoral 
Commission of Papua New Guinea - Summary of Changes’, Post-Courier, 24 March 
1992). The nomination fee for prospective candidates, which had remained at 100 kina 
since 1975, was increased tenfold to 1000 kina (then about $A1200), making it one of 
the highest financial hurdles to contesting elections in place anywhere in the world. 
Only the winning candidate would have this amount refunded, all losers would forfeit 
their fee. Candidates now needed the support of 100 enrolled voters from their 
electorate before they could nominate, and the period in which nominations could take 
place was sharply reduced to five days.14 The Electoral Commission did not try to hide 
the fact that the new provisions were aimed squarely at reducing candidate numbers:
Both national and provincial elections have been characterised by a very large number of 
candidates, and the numbers are increasing with each election ... While the right to stand for 
elective office is accepted in principle it is contended that the restrictions proposed are reasonable 
and are overall in the public interest, in that they will only deter the ‘no-hope’ candidates and will 
reduce the confusion o f voters (N.d.a, 8).
As Table 4.5 makes clear, these measures have been a failure. The tradition of ‘zestful 
participatory democracy’15 continued in both 1992 and 1997. The best that can be said 
is that the growth in the number of candidates in 1992 was slowed somewhat, but still 
increased — to 1655 candidates. The 1997 election saw a record 2371 candidates 
standing for election — an increase of 43.4 percent on the 1992 figure. Saffu argues 
that what he sees as the two “fundamental features of Papua New Guinea elections” — 
the relative unimportance of political parties in the electoral process and the essentially 
local character of electoral politics — are both strongly related to the increasing levels 
of candidates standing for election (1996, 41). In such an analysis, institutional factors 
such as the electoral system have relatively little impact. Saffu argues that if AV were 
re-introduced, it would probably be adaptively domesticated by the use of ‘sponsoring 
strategies’ rather than ‘splitting strategies’, so that its direct impact upon the number of 
candidates standing would be reduced. Nonetheless, he says, “the fundamental problem
14 However, the provisions concerning nomination fee refunds were later overturned by the Supreme 
Court as being in breach of the PNG Constitution, while a drafting error meant that the reduction in the 
nomination period was not validly legislated. A further change, providing for the introduction o f a Voter 
Identification Card, was mied unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. See Kaiulo 1993.
15 The phrase is Jim Griffin's.
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that has to be addressed by any electoral reform in PNG is the large number of 
candidates in PNG elections” (1996, 34-35).
Minimal vote shares
One consequence of very high levels of candidature under a FPTP system is that many 
successful candidates will be elected on only a small plurality of votes, often well short 
of a majority. The 1992 results give a good indication of the relationship between the 
number of candidates and the vote share necessary to win the seat — Sinasina- 
Yonggamugl Open, with the highest number of candidates, required the lowest winning 
vote share of only 6.3 percent; while in Namatanai Open, with only two candidates, Sir 
Julius Chan scored 58.5 percent, the highest of any seat. There is no strict causal 
relationship between candidacy levels and a winning candidate’s vote share: each tends 
to encourage the other. The understanding that so few votes are needed to gain a place 
in the national parliament itself encourages candidature from those who would 
otherwise not consider standing, the higher candidature levels means that fewer votes 
than ever are needed to gain a plurality, and on it goes.
As noted earlier, under a FPTP system and assuming more or less equal support bases, 
the more candidates standing for election, the smaller the total vote share needed to win 
the seat. The Electoral Commissioner claims that this means that
the representativeness or otherwise o f many MPs could be called into question by their own 
electors. More and more candidates are winning with fewer and fewer percentages (sic) and with 
smaller and smaller margins over the runners-up. This year only 14 candidates (12.8%), compared 
with 22 in 1992 (20.2%), won with 30 per cent or more o f the formal votes cast in their 
electorates. At the other end o f the scale, the number o f candidates winning with less than 10 per 
cent o f the formal votes cast rose from 9 in 1992 (8.2%) to 15 this year (13.8%), with three 
winning candidates obtaining less than seven per cent of the votes (1997, 13-14).
As Table 4.6 indicates, the 1997 election continued the trend, apparent since 
independence, of increasing numbers of successful candidates being elected with 
minority support.
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Table 4.6: Percentage of votes gained by successful candidates 1977-1997
Year No o f  
seats
< 10%
Percentage o f form al votes gained by w inners 
10-19%  20-29%  30-39%  40-49% >50%
1977 109 - 11 37 26 16 19
1982 109 4 20 33 20 14 18
1987 106 2 39 41 13 4 7
1992 108 9 45 33 14 3 5
1997 107 15 47 31 8 2 4
Source: Electoral Commissioner 1997; Electoral Commissioner 1987.
These figures show a clear increase in minority victories at each election since 1977. 
Winning members supported by an absolute majority of voters have declined from 19 in 
1977 to just four in 1997. While only 11 members won with less than 20 percent of the 
vote in 1977, by 1997 only 45 elected members could gain more than this level of 
support. However, the figure of most immediate concern in 1997 was the 15 MPs 
elected with less than 10 percent of the vote. As in previous elections, most of these 
candidates were independents from the highlands, where inter-clan fragmentation and 
competition is most prevalent and the inclusive and accommodative candidacy which 
was a feature of AV elections is now virtually unknown. Recent elections in PNG have 
seen a high incidence of ‘dummy’ candidates being encouraged (and sometimes paid) to 
stand for a seat in order to split a strong block vote from an opposing clan (Domey 
1990, 59). By enabling a candidate with a very small support base to entertain hopes of 
winning, and by rewarding the placing of ‘dummy’ candidates and other vote splitting 
devices (such as paying the nomination fees or electoral expenses of a friendly candidate 
from a different grouping in order to divide an opposition clan's block vote), FPTP can 
reward tactics which undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process, and militate 
against electoral alliances.
While this pattem is now widespread, it is not universal. Burton has pointed to the 
example of tribal groups in the Mt Hagen area who negotiate candidature between 
themselves a year or more before the elections, ensuring both that candidate numbers 
are minimised and that clan groups deliver their 'block' votes to one or the other 
candidates well before the election date. Some clans agree not to put up candidates so
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as not to split a vote; others agree to support a particular candidate.16 In this way, a 
form of vote pooling takes place before the election. Note, however, that this vote 
pooling relies on the ability of separate clan leaders to negotiate selective candidate 
withdrawal and deliver a block of votes from their clan to a particular candidate.
The increasing minority support for many successful candidates is reflected in the 
election results: the 1987 elections saw one candidate in Kerowagi Open in Chimbu 
elected with 7.9 percent of the vote; and this was surpassed in 1992 where the winning 
candidate in the Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open electorate (also a Chimbu seat) attracted a 
bare 6.3 percent of the vote. As well as undermining the overall legitimacy of both the 
electoral process and the elected legislature, such results point to a change in the 
meaning and nature of a ‘constituency’: for many MPs, their actual constituency is not 
their electorate but the much smaller sub-group within their electorate to which they 
owe their allegiance, and their parliamentary positions. Standish, for example, has 
written that “it is assumed that ‘representatives’ will only work for the benefit of a small 
minority who actually voted for them, which can be as low as 7 per cent under the first- 
past-the-post ballot” and that “usually the majority ... of voters opposed the winner, and 
often refuse to let their elected member visit them” (1994, 60). Siaguru has argued that 
this localisation of politics has reached such a point that, even if MPs want to expand 
their base so as to more effectively represent their entire electorate, they cannot do so 
for fear of upsetting their clan base.17
Electoral violence
The high rate of candidature also appears to be a factor contributing to the increasingly 
common phenomenon of electoral violence. The Electoral Commissioner has defined 
electoral violence as including “intimidation of electors and electoral officials, 
particularly through the use of weapons; murders; unauthorised road-blocks; [and] 
snatching of ballot papers and ballot boxes”, and asserted that the 1997 elections were 
the most violent ever (1997, 7). Similar statements have been made after previous 
elections.18 Threats of violence against the electoral administration is an increasing 
problem in PNG, and recent elections in some of the more volatile highlands areas have
16 Personal communication, Dr John Burton, Research School o f Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian 
National University, 24 February 1996.
17 Interview, Sir Anthony Siaguru, 25 July 1996.
18 See PNG Electoral Commission 1983, 88.
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provided detailed evidence of electoral officials being intimidated, sometimes at 
gunpoint, into issuing multiple ballot papers.19
Electoral violence between opposing candidates and their supporters is probably the 
predominant form of election-related violence in PNG. Such disputes can take many 
forms, but many if not most incidents are related to ongoing inter-group conflict for 
which an election provides a temporary focus but not necessarily an underlying cause 
(Dinnen 1996). Many incidents are also the result of losing candidates and their 
supporters protesting the election result. Standish has described recent elections in 
Chimbu Province in the following terms:
Elections are times of frenzied collective competition between dozens o f candidates per electorate, 
each representing his group, offering inducements and making threats, with huge sums spent and 
much at stake ... in many polling booths officials were coerced with weapons (axes, knives and 
pistols) to give out ballot papers in bulk and accept people blatantly voting ten or twenty times ... 
One intending voter was chased from a booth and stoned to death, and five were killed in post­
election disturbances, including at least four for voting ‘the wrong way’, that is against the desire 
o f their communities (1994, 70-71).
While a cause of great concern, this type of ‘gunpoint democracy’ is not, however, a 
dominant pattem in PNG as a whole — at least, not yet.20 Indeed, there are clear 
regional and structural trends to election violence in PNG: it is precisely those
highlands regions such as Enga, Simbu and the Western and Eastern Highlands 
provinces where block voting and high candidacy are most pronounced that electoral 
violence also appears to be a factor.21
Most categorisations of electoral violence suggest that it is ‘anti-system’ behaviour 
which attacks the legitimacy of the democratic system itself (Electoral Commissioner 
1997, 7). While the causes of election violence are clearly complex and multi­
dimensional, and often appear to be spontaneous reactions to a host of grievances, there 
is also a sense in which electoral violence can be seen as an example of rational (if anti­
social) behaviour to the incentives presented by the FPTP electoral system: as 10 or 20 
votes sometimes separate the winner from the second-placed candidate, any action taken 
to influence only a small number of votes can have significant effects. Just as the small 
number of potential second-preferences gained under an AV system can be the threshold
19 See, for example, Standish 1996, 277-322 and Dinnen 1996, 91-95.
20 See Saffu 1996,41.
21 See Standish 1996, 277-322; Dinnen 1996, 91-98. See also ‘Polls officer warns against use o f  force’, 
The National, 14 January 1997.
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between victory and defeat, so small numbers of votes forcibly gained (or, more often, 
forcibly withheld) under FPTP can prove crucial. Instances of a candidate’s supporters 
hijacking and destroying ballot boxes containing ballots from ‘hostile’ regions of an 
electorate, as occurred in Komo-Margarima after the 1992 election22, would be less 
politically attractive when a candidate has the possibility of picking up second or third 
preferences from a rival’s home area.
While voting patterns in PNG have always been largely parochial and clan-based 
regardless of the electoral system, the pre-independence AV system clearly rewarded 
candidates who cultivated the support of those outside their own local area. Strathem, 
for example, has argued that pre-independence elections were characterised by “the idea 
of the politician as a collective advocate of the people” (1993, 49). By the 1980s, 
however,
it was understood that politicians are in power to benefit themselves and their factions, and they 
concentrate on consolidating their existing power bases. As a result o f armed conflict between 
groups these bases had become more, rather than less, rigidly defined and a process of 
neotribalization was well under way (Strathem 1993, 48).
Changes in the nature of campaigning have been among the most marked effects of the 
increasing incidence of election-related violence under FPTP. As noted earlier, pre­
independence election studies indicated that the winning candidates in many electorates 
were those who cultivated the preferences of those outside their own local area. Such 
spreading of the net is almost inconceivable in many parts of PNG today, where the 
risks of campaigning in a ‘hostile’ area tend to overshadow the (marginal) possibilities 
of picking up significant numbers of votes from rival areas. This pattern is particularly 
prevalent in highlands regions, where increasingly candidates are virtually restricted to 
campaigning only in their home base areas. For example, in the last three elections in 
1987, 1992 and 1997, few candidates in the highlands campaigned beyond their own 
locality due to the very real possibility of violence if they ventured into a rival’s clan or 
tribal region (Standish 1994, 1996). In other regions, particularly the larger and less 
developed electorates in the Gulf and Northern electorates, co-operative campaigning is 
still a factor today, although not always for co-operative reasons. Running a campaign 
in these areas requires considerable resources and energy, and constant expenditure on 
transport. In the Kerema Open electorate in the Gulf in 1987, for example, Oliver found
22 As documented in Dinnen 1996, 94-95.
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that boat and road transport difficulties forced candidates to work together, with the 
most common combination being Open and Provincial candidates from the same party 
sharing travel costs (1989b, 167). Similarly, a single candidate in a highly fragmented 
constituency needs to strike a judicious balance between appealing to home areas alone 
and to campaigning in hostile areas which offer extra votes. May’s analysis of ballot 
box results from Angoram Open in 1987 suggests that “energetic campaigning and 
‘being known’ (both of which parties facilitate) gain votes, but that local support factors 
are still of great importance, especially for minor candidates” (1989, 120).
One of the attributes of AV most frequently-cited in PNG is that it enables voters to 
give their second preferences to candidates from outside their immediate clan network, 
rather than being effectively forced to vote for the nominated clan candidate. In 1996, 
Angalimp-South Wahgi MP William Wii used this argument to suggest that the re- 
introduction of AV would help “minimise or prevent election-related problems”, 
claiming that FPTP “has created problems whereby an individual voter’s rights to vote 
for the candidate of his or her choice is not exercised”. In a letter to Electoral 
Commissioner Reuben Kaiulo, Wii argued that “people feared for their lives and 
property if they voted according to their own choice instead of voting as someone else 
demanded”, and that “voters were being forced with threats, sometimes at the point of a 
gun, to cast votes for certain candidates even if they disagreed with those candidates”. 
AV, he argued, would enable voters to give at least their second-preference for their 
preferred candidate, thus enabling “people to go to the polls in a good frame of mind” 
(‘Preferential system is best for voters - Wii’, Post-Courier, 1 April 1996).
There is some historical justification for Wii’s contention that the more aggressive 
campaigning patterns found under FPTP are directly related to the electoral system. 
Looking at the 1977 elections in the Southern Highlands, Ballard found that the 
competitiveness induced by the new FPTP system left “no incentive for collaboration 
through shared preferences”. One result was that
the campaign in the Southern Highlands was much more aggressive than in previous elections. In 
the past it was common for candidates to travel together, since rarely did they have access to then- 
own vehicles and it was common for them to ask people to ‘Vote for the best candidate; if  you 
think I am the best, vote for me, but if you think someone else is best, give me your second 
preference’ (1983, 188).
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While some candidates continued to conduct their campaigns in this style, others 
resorted to open criticism of opposing candidates, a new phenomenon which quickly 
increased tensions. In combination with the large jump in ‘ephemeral’ candidates 
attracted by the new FPTP electoral system, this led to a much more aggressive contest 
than had been the case in previous elections (Ballard 1983, 192). Rising levels of 
electoral violence, widespread dummy candidature and ‘vote-splitting’ and increasingly 
unrepresentative elected members appears to have been a result.
While FPTP in PNG does not appear to have had the same deleterious consequences 
upon minorities as in other ethnically-divided regions, there is some evidence to support 
Lewis’s oft-quoted contention that “the surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a 
plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post” 
(Lewis 1965, 71). Recent anthropological research in the Western Highlands, for 
example, has concluded that ‘traditional’ divisions between clans have been 
reformulated and reinforced by FPTP, placing some tribes which have a complex range 
of traditional alliances and allegiances with others “in an inescapable bind”, because the 
electoral system forces them to make one choice rather than express the true complexity 
of their relationships, whereas AV “would give them a way out by allowing them to 
distribute their preferences between or among candidates to whom they owe loyalty -  
and even have some left over for those they feel are just good candidates” (Rumsey, 
forthcoming). Rumsey argues that the use of FPTP in the Ku Warn region at recent 
elections has hindered efforts at local-level peacemaking between rival tribes based on 
traditional ties, whereas an AV system would have been fully compatible with such 
efforts. He concludes that the Ku Warn case thus provides “a powerful argument in 
favour” of the re-introduction of AV (Rumsey, forthcoming).
Attempts to re-introduce the Alternative Vote
As we have seen, questions about the suitability of FPTP for PNG appeared 
immediately after the 1977 election, with both academics and government officials 
citing its tendency to encourage ‘zero sum’ campaigning styles and enabling clan voting 
blocs to dominate electoral competition. Serious consideration of the reintroduction of 
AV began after the 1982 election, when the effect of ‘vote splitting’ and other negative 
aspects of the new electoral system became clearer. Reviewing the 1982 election,
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Premdas and Steeves wrote that FPTP “was the focus of widespread criticism”, as under 
PNG’s extremely heterogeneous social conditions “votes cast could be so fragmented 
that candidates were not encouraged to campaign beyond their village or kin group 
because they could win by only a slim plurality” (1983, 993). The PNG Electoral 
Commission similarly argued that while AV was time consuming and more complex 
than FPTP, it also ensured that “popular feeling was canvassed”. FPTP was simple and 
easy to understand, but failed to “encourage the people to look beyond their own 
linguistic group” and, by enabling candidates with a small but solid block of votes to 
win, did not “contribute to creating national attitudes towards the general elections” 
(1982,31-32).
The 1982 elections saw the Pangu Pati, riding on the back of the prestige of Prime 
Minister Michael Somare, score an overwhelming victory, with a sizeable parliamentary 
majority and the possibility of gaining the necessary two-thirds parliamentary vote 
necessary to reform the electoral system and amend the Constitution or an organic law. 
Under the influence of its chief strategist Tony Siaguru, Minister for the Public Service 
in Somare’s 1982 cabinet, Pangu had committed itself, upon winning government, to a 
series of constitutional and organic law amendments aimed at stabilising PNG 
parliamentary politics, including a return to AV. A later leader of a Pangu-breakaway 
party, the League for National Advancement, Siaguru has been probably the most 
perceptive critic of PNG’s current electoral system. He first campaigned publicly for 
electoral reform in 1982, proposing three fundamental changes aimed at stabilising 
parliamentary politics: a constitutional amendment to allow the prime minister to call 
an election if he lost the confidence of parliament; ‘anti-hopping’ provisions to force 
members who switched parties to face an immediate by-election; and the re-adoption of 
AV. Siaguru argued that a return to AV would result in the election of superior 
politicians with broader support bases:
(people) consider themselves bound by social and family obligations to cast their first vote for 
their relative or a person from their own clan, house line or language group. It might not be that 
that person is the best candidate in the judgement o f the voter! But he or she is obliged because of 
social traditions to vote for him. I know of elections in the past, when the optional preferential 
system was in use, where candidates went around the electorate saying “Don’t vote for me as your 
first choice. I know you will have to give your first choice to your line candidate. But give me 
second.” And they did get in on second preferences or third preferences. They did it with far
132
greater representative support than, say, the member who has got in with less than ten per cent o f  
the vote. That is ridiculous!22
Despite being supported by Prime Minister Somare’s Cabinet in 1982, none of the three 
proposed changes was ever put to Parliament. Sean Domey has told the story:
Within three months of Somare’s solid win in the 1982 elections, Cabinet approved the drafting of 
all three changes. They were put on the Parliamentary notice paper but withered for lack o f  
caucus support. Constitutional and Electoral Act amendments such as these require a two-thirds 
majority of parliament at two separate sittings not less than two months apart. This means the 
support of seventy-three members, not once but twice, with a gap between the votes. There was 
an outside chance that Somare could have pushed these amendments through in the first twelve 
months of the 1982-87 parliament. No PNG government has ever been in a stronger position than 
Somare’s was then ... [but] there was little support from his own backbench and none whatsoever 
amongst the members of his fractious coalition partner, the United Party. After the first twelve 
months it was all a lost cause as government numbers drifted and Pangu’s own internal problems 
intensified (1990, 79).
The proposals were thus scuttled by the very factors they were attempting to address — 
backbench domination of the executive leading to unstable parliamentary numbers and 
policy paralysis. The difficulty of change was emphasised when the Pangu government 
fell apart in 1985, with defections to Paias Wingti’s new People’s Democratic 
Movement, moves which would almost certainly not have taken place if the reform 
proposals had succeeded.24
Nonetheless, Siaguru continued his campaign for electoral and constitutional reform 
following the elections. In 1985, in an article published in both the Times o f Papua New 
Guinea and the Australian, he again put forward a case for widespread constitutional 
reform, arguing that PNG’s Westminster system was reminiscent of 18th-century 
England in its unstable factionalism and personality-driven politics. He suggested a 
number of measures to enhance effective government and strengthen the position of the 
Prime Minister, including (again) the re-introduction of AV; official registration of all 
political parties; halving (to 14) the size of the Ministry; compulsory by-elections for 
MPs changing parties after their election; and a constitutional amendment to allow a 
Prime Minister to request the governor-general to dissolve Parliament and call fresh 
elections.
Siaguru argued that AV is “complementary to the emergence of disciplined parties, 
since it encourages the presentation of disciplined philosophies of government as the
22 Quoted in Domey 1990, 78-79.
24 The irony of the situation was reinforced in 1986 when Siaguru himself defected from Pangu to form a 
new political party, the League for National Advancement.
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basis for the elector to cast his preferences” and would thus “be a major step in realising 
a national consciousness among Highlanders, Papuans, Islanders and New Guineans” 
(‘Why this brand of the Westminster system isn't working in today's Papua New 
Guinea’, The Times o f Papua New Guinea, 21 July 1985). Some scholars have made 
similar claims about the impact of AV in Australia, arguing that it has been a factor in 
ensuring that the major Australian parties maintain a strong presence across all regions, 
and that successive federal governments have not relied on localised support (Cullen 
1990, 29fn). Siaguru refined his arguments in a further newspaper article after the 1987 
elections, writing that
The recent election has borne out all my worst fears. The extreme multiplicity o f candidates, 
combined with first-past-the-post, has produced results not only absurd but dangerous. As more 
and more candidates stand, so the appeal to the electorate becomes more and more localised. The 
candidate with the largest localised support base wins. Elected members emerge with a 
ridiculously low percentage o f the vote ... The system no longer provides for the best 
representation, nor does it provide for the most able leaders. The consequences o f frustration and 
disillusionment among the electorate lead to violence and community upheaval. An optional 
preferential system will not only enable fairer representation, but by encouraging the presentation 
o f genuine philosophies (rather than parochial appeal) as a basis for the elector to cast his 
preferences, it will make for more disciplined political parties ( ‘Get it right this time’, Post- 
Courier, 5 August 1987).
In 1986, Siaguru introduced a private members bill, the Organic Law on National 
Elections (Preferential Voting) Amendment Bill, aimed specifically at reintroducing AV 
for PNG’s national elections. As a proposed amendment to an organic law, the bill was 
referred by parliament to the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional 
Laws and Acts, which effectively scuttled the proposal, arguing that it would 
disadvantage illiterate voters and cause confusion more generally (1986, 6). Unlike 
previous occasions, however, the bill was debated in Parliament and thus provides a 
valuable opportunity to consider the arguments for and against AV in the eyes of PNG 
parliamentarians.
There was considerable support for electoral reform amongst senior MPs, particularly 
those who had served in several parliaments (such as Iambakey Okuk, John Momis and 
Julius Chan). The then Minister for Justice, Warren Dutton, who had been elected 
under both electoral systems, argued that AV resulted in greater identification between 
the electorate and the elected member, saying
when I was first elected to this Parliament in 1968, even the people who had given me their sixth 
and last preference vote considered that they had in fact voted for me and therefore, I was their 
member and I would look after all o f them rather than just the small group o f people who gave me 
their first preferences (Hansard, 27 November 1986).
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The failure of FPTP to encourage this link between the electorate and their MP was one 
of the major weaknesses of FPTP, which he felt encouraged electoral violence and tribal 
fighting:
I would state categorically that the reason why we have had so many Courts of Disputed Returns, 
why we have had instances o f violence and other disruptions during elections, can be placed 
squarely on the first-past-the-post system. I, as the Minister for Police, visited the Chimbu area at 
one stage and went to two places where there were tribal fights in continuation. They were in 
continuation for four weeks before I got there. When I talked to the warring groups in both the 
fighting areas, the basic reason given was dissatisfaction with the provincial government election 
which was carried out a month or so before ... they were dissatisfied to the point o f taking up arms 
against each other because they felt that the person who had been elected to the Chimbu provincial 
government had not been elected fairly because only his tribesfolk had voted for him. None o f the 
rest o f the electorate, who were by far the great majority, had voted for him and as far as the 
majority o f the people in those two areas were concerned, the elected member was virtually illegal, 
improperly elected, because they had not had a proper say in his election ... if  we were able to pass 
these amendments I am prepared to guarantee that the elections that we will hold in 1987 would be 
more peaceful, more respected, and would return to Parliament members who were supported by 
the majority of the people in their electorates (Hansard, 27 November 1986).
Dutton also argued that incumbent MPs would be the likely beneficiaries of a return to 
AV, as they would be better known than their opponents and therefore more likely to 
gain second preferences “after the tribal obligations have been fulfilled by giving the 
first vote to the person of each and every tribe” {Hansard, 27 November 1986). If this 
argument was designed to appeal to members’ collective self-interest (always a good 
strategy in PNG), it was not successful. While numerous members from both sides of 
the Parliament stated their support for the amendment in principle, many went on to say 
that, with a national election due within six months, there was not enough time to make 
such a major change before the 1987 election. The government formally opposed the 
bill for this reason, and for the rather more disingenuous reason that it would be 
“selfish” behaviour on the part of sitting MPs to introduce a system which would 
improve their re-election chances as incumbents {Hansard, 27 November 1986)! Most 
speakers pledged to support the bill if it was re-submitted after the 1987 election. 
Unfortunately for Siaguru, he lost his seat of Moresby North-East after an acrimonious 
election campaign, and the momentum behind the proposed amendments disappeared 
with his political career.
Following the 1987 election, two academics with long connections with PNG, Ted 
Wolfers and Tony Regan, produced undoubtedly the most detailed and comprehensive 
review of PNG’s electoral system to date, The Electoral Process in Papua New Guinea: 
A Handbook o f Issues and Options (1988). As its title suggests, the review did not
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prescribe specific changes but covered options for reform in a large number of technical 
aspects of the electoral system. It avoided, however, discussion of the most pressing 
issue: whether FPTP should remain or be replaced. Nonetheless, pressure for serious 
reform of the electoral system continued. Following the 1987 elections the Electoral 
Commission addressed the possible benefits of a return to AV for the first time. Stating 
that previous election results had posed the question “as to whether the nation has an 
efficient democratic process”, the Electoral Commissioner argued that AV would reduce 
conflict, and that losers would more readily accept the result:
The question that has to be addressed is whether [AV] reduces conflict and generates greater 
acceptance o f the final result because “trading o ff ’ o f preferences between candidates will occur. 
This spreads the sense of the winner’s having relied on more electors than gave him/her their first 
option. In the final count of a preferential system the winner is seen as having an absolute 
majority over his nearest opponent. He can, therefore, be seen as having been invested with 
majority approval. First-past-the-post is simpler and should yield quicker results, but ... a small 
solid block o f votes from a lain or linguistic group can determine who wins. This does not 
engender responsibility to the whole electorate, nor, ultimately, national attitudes (1987, 4).
Although some technical aspects of the Commission’s reasoning were open to 
question25, the fact that it joined the debate on electoral reform at all was a significant 
step. In recent years, however, the Electoral Commission has tended to oppose any 
change of electoral system, arguing for the simplicity of the incumbent system and the 
complexity of the alternatives. The Commission’s submission to the Bi-partisan 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Provincial Government, for example, reiterated the 
arguments for first-past-the-post first put by the Constitutional Planning Committee in 
1974, and concluded by stating that FPTP has “proven to be simple and easy to 
understand, counting is much easier and results are known much quicker. I shudder to 
think about the various complications caused by a departure from this system” (PNG 
Electoral Commission N.d.b). The final report of the Bi-partisan Committee, when it 
came, did include a chapter on the electoral system, but did not canvass more 
substantive reforms. The only reference to the electoral system was a one-line 
recommendation that “the voting system of first-past-the-post be retained” (National 
Parliament of Papua New Guinea 1993, 7).
25 The argument that preferential voting delivers an absolute majority to the winning candidate applies 
more to a full preferential system than to an optional preferential one. This is because a system that makes 
marking of preferences compulsory will almost always result in an absolute majority o f formal votes for 
one candidate, whereas an optional preferential system will usually have a high number of'exhausted' 
votes, resulting in the winning candidate often achieving less than an absolute majority (an 'exhausted' 
vote comprises a ballot where the preferences for an excluded candidate cannot be passed on to any 
continuing candidate, hence 'exhausting' before the full distribution of preferences).
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The re-introduction o f A V?
Pressure for electoral reform in PNG has tended to come from a small handful of senior 
politicians and political observers. In September 1989, Minister of State Ted Diro said 
that the government was “seriously considering” substantial electoral reforms including 
a “limited preferential voting system” {Post-Courier, 19 September 1989). Following 
the 1992 election, the option for a change to AV was again raised, this time by the 
Minister for Provincial Affairs and Village Development, John Nilkare, who told 
parliament that “we need to instate an optional preference system of voting so that the 
most popular candidate in the constituency can win ... not ‘because I have the biggest 
tribe and therefore, I win”’ {Hansard, 12 March 1993). It was not until 1993, however, 
that the first serious steps towards electoral reform in PNG were undertaken, when 
Manus Province returned to AV for their provincial government elections, becoming the 
first province in the country to do so. Premier Stephen Pokawin was a strong supporter 
of the new system, claiming that it would provide the “legitimacy of leadership” that 
was lacking under FPTP, as “many national and provincial leaders could not claim to 
represent their people when they were voted in by a few who had given them a simple 
majority” (‘Manus to use preferential voting for new assembly’, Post-Courier, 8 August 
1993).
Manus’s AV elections were held in August 1993 and provided an ideal opportunity to 
see if a return to AV would be feasible, and whether it would result in candidates with 
more widespread support being elected. The results were encouraging for proponents of 
AV: of the 17 winning candidates, only one (Premier Pokawin) was able to win the seat 
on first preferences. Six others gained absolute majorities after the distribution of 
preferences. Importantly for those who claim that AV would deliver results similar to a 
straight plurality contest, in five electorates the winning candidate was not leading on 
first preferences. As the PNG Electoral Commission noted, under FPTP “those five 
people who enjoyed a greater mandate by the people would never have got in” (1995, 
6). Professor Yaw Saffii of the University of Papua New Guinea, who observed the 
elections as a guest of the province, concluded that
in my view there is no question that the more elaborate and complicated mechanics o f the optional 
preferential system presented no noticeable difficulties for either the voters or the electoral 
officials. It is also clear that the new voting system allowed all winners, except the Premier who 
won by an absolute majority on the fust count, to improve ... on the level o f  support they could 
claim to enjoy amongst their voters. In that sense, the cause for democracy and enhanced 
leadership has been served (PNG Electoral Commission 1995, 6).
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While this experiment (brukim bus in the words of Premier Pokawin) with AV was 
clearly a success, it took place in conditions unlikely to be replicated across the rest of 
PNG. Manus is a small island province with relatively good communications, high 
rates of literacy, an effective bureaucracy, a small centralised population and a relatively 
high degree of social cohesion. Few if any of these factors are typical of the rest of the 
country, particularly the mainland areas.
Nonetheless, the success of the Manus experiment has encouraged more serious 
consideration of re-introducing AV at the national level. At the 21st Waigani Seminar 
held in Port Moresby in August 1995, Warren Dutton, then a political advisor to Prime 
Minister Julius Chan, returned to the electoral systems debate, claiming that the decision 
to change from AV to FPTP was “the root cause of PNG’s current political problems”. 
Citing the case of the Member for Sinasina-Yonggamugl, Ben Okoro, who won his seat 
at the 1992 election with less than 7 percent of the vote, Dutton argued that this meant 
that 93 percent of the electorate concerned was effectively disenfranchised:
This is the prime cause o f our political problems today. What we’ve done is disenfranchised the 
people and they are rebelling ... Electoral statistics show that seven percent is the least number of  
votes a candidate can win by. Most members of parliament are elected with less than 50 percent 
and remarkably few are elected with more than 50 percent. Basically, our system o f representation 
is supposed to be based on representation o f all people, but in effect, in most electorates, a member 
is really representing only his own clan or an alliance of clans. In such a situation, the member is 
likely to distribute his EDF in the area of the 7 percent o f the voters who elected him. The 93 
percent o f the people who did not vote for him know that the member can do very little for them in 
his term o f office. This is why politicians are held in such low esteem (‘Dutton: voting system 
cause of difficulties’, Post-Courier, 31 August 1995).
In February 1995, the PNG Cabinet agreed that the 1997 election would be held under 
an optional preferential AV system, with preferences limited to three only (PNG 
Electoral Commission 1995, 1). The then Minister of State, Arnold Marsipal, 
announced the decision to Parliament on 16 March the same year. The proposals were 
initiated directly from the Prime Minister’s Office without recourse to the Electoral 
Commission, but significantly this time they had the support of the Electoral 
Commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, who argued that the change to AV would encourage 
campaigning members to reach out beyond their own clan areas in search of wider 
support rather than concentrating all their campaigning within their tribal ‘home’ area. 
Kaiulo advised Cabinet that whereas FPTP was adopted for its simplicity,
at a time when the electorate was considered to be unable to deal with a complex voting system ... 
the electorate is now more experienced and those who take the trouble to vote will be capable o f  
using the preferential system if they so choose, providing that the system has been explained to the
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voting public and the number of preferences is kept down to a manageable limit o f three. 
Preferential voting will ensure that the final result is more representative of the electorate’s wishes 
by taking into account the second and third preferences o f voters (PNG Electoral Commission 
1996, 3).
This would have significant benefits, he said, for the smooth running of the electoral 
process, the level of electoral violence, and the quality of representation provided by 
elected MPs.26
In July 1996, Dutton claimed that almost three-quarters of the National Parliament 
supported electoral reform, and that a change to AV would be “the most crucial thing in 
improving government in Papua New Guinea”. Dutton made a number of additional 
claims for the beneficial impact of AV, arguing that it would improve the conduct of the 
count, particularly in areas of high contestation such as the highlands, because the 
elimination of low-placed candidates would also enable the ejection of those candidates’ 
scrutineers and hopeful supporters from the counting station and surrounds (thus easing 
the chaos of a counting station in which every candidate is entitled to have two 
scrutineers present) while progressively enhancing the legitimacy of the remaining 
candidates (who can be seen to have built on the vote base of the eliminated candidates) 
as results are sequentially announced. Furthermore, Dutton argued that the need under 
AV to cover the whole electorate and reach out to other clan groups to gain preferences 
will require the assistance of party organisations — and thus that AV would help to 
strengthen PNG’s weak party system.27
Even with this level of support, by late 1996 it was clear that the reforms had again 
failed to attract sufficient parliamentary support. Despite amending legislation having 
been drafted, Prime Minister Chan was unable to convince his backbench that a change 
of electoral system would not harm their own interests. The proposed reforms were 
killed off in party meetings without ever reaching a vote in parliament. As in previous 
years, the large number of MPs elected with minimal support levels who would have 
been adversely affected by any reforms combined to effectively end the reform 
proposal. The lack of party discipline in PNG means that substantive electoral reform 
has thus become almost impossible to achieve: those who have the most to lose are the 
very parliamentarians who are being asked to approve the reforms. The failure of this
2  ^Interview, Reuben Kailulo, PNG Electoral Commissoner, 23 July 1996. 
27 Interview, Warren Dutton, Prime Minister's Advisor, 23 July 1996.
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concerted attempt at a return to AV means that such a reform must now be considered 
unlikely in PNG for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, pressure for change is likely to 
continue: a Commonwealth Observer Mission report on the 1997 elections
recommended that “given the numbers of candidates contesting elections in Papua New 
Guinea, serious consideration should be given to alternative systems of voting” 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 1997, 7). The new Prime Minister, Bill Skate, is apparently 
also a supporter of a change to AV, so further attempts at electoral reform are not out of 
the question.28
Conclusion
To what extent the increasing fragmentation of electoral competition and rising levels of 
electoral violence in PNG since independence can be attributed to the influence of the 
electoral system is difficult to estimate with any confidence. Because the change of 
electoral system was coterminous with decolonisation and the departure of the 
Australian colonial administration, AV elections were clearly affected by different 
circumstances than those held under FPTP. For example, pre-independence elections 
were not themselves a direct route to government, which was still controlled by the 
Australian administration until 1973, and were thus not necessarily as fiercely contested 
as future elections. Similarly, the ‘guided’ nature of democracy in PNG in these early 
years, with the hand of the Australian administration often visible, probably moulded 
political competition into more moderate expressions than would otherwise have been 
the case, and the influence of the Australian administration in the management of the 
electoral process was also a significant factor.
Nonetheless, relevant areas of both PNG’s traditional society (such as the importance of 
clan affiliations for electoral support) and the modem apparatus of representative 
government (such as mass suffrage elections to an elected legislature) evidenced 
continuity as well as change over this period. The evidence from this chapter suggests 
that AV encouraged co-operative campaigning behaviour in many electoral contests in 
the pre-independence days. Under AV, candidates from smaller clans or those without a 
‘block’ vote were able to campaign outside their home base area for other voters’ 
second preferences, in the full knowledge that first preferences would always go to the
28 Personal communication, Reuben Kaiulo, PNG Electoral Commissioner, 8 October 1997.
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‘local’ clan candidate. In areas where there was no clear majority candidate, 
accommodative campaigning practices were encouraged by the need to gamer second 
preferences which may be relatively small in number but could provide the necessary 
margin of victory. AV also enabled the votes of several aligned candidates to 
accumulate so that diverse but related electoral interests could be marshalled 
successfully without the vote being ‘split’ several ways.
Whether these accommodative effects would be replicated if PNG were to re-adopt an 
AV system must, however, remain speculative. PNG politics is much more competitive 
now than in the pre-independence days, and the stakes are much higher. What we can 
say with some confidence is that the PNG politicians quoted above clearly believe that 
the type of accommodative campaign strategies adopted by some candidates under AV 
are not rewarded under a FPTP system, where voters often feel bound to give their vote 
to their clan candidate. In addition, the tiny proportion of voters who actually elect their 
local member under FPTP in some seats appears to have undermined the 
representativeness of the legislature, and to have contributed to instances of electoral 
violence. It is also the case, however, that substantive electoral reform in PNG has 
become increasingly unlikely with the failure of the most recent reform attempts in 
1997. These characteristic features of PNG elections are therefore likely to continue, 
and probably increase, in the foreseeable future.
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Chapter Five:
Comparative evidence from other divided societies — the cases of Fiji
and Sri Lanka
As the previous chapter has outlined, there is evidence that preferential voting, when 
used in PNG’s early national elections, encouraged a degree of collaboration and 
accommodation between candidates for office. However, the circumstances of the PNG 
case are in many ways unique. PNG’s multitude of ethnic groups are typically small 
and isolated, with inter-group conflict being manifested at the local level rather than as a 
contest for state power; the elections in question took place at an early and relatively 
undeveloped stage of political competition; the electoral process was almost certainly 
administered more efficiently under the Australian administration than in the post­
independence period; and the pervasive influences of colonial rule make it difficult to 
disentangle just how much of the political behaviour witnessed at these early elections 
can legitimately be interpreted as a valid response to the system itself as compared to 
the strictures of the Australian administration.
Unfortunately for comparative purposes, there are few cases of similar electoral 
arrangements being used over a substantial time-period in other ethnically-divided 
societies which could help ascertain whether the apparently moderation-inducing effects 
of AV in pre-independence PNG are likely to be replicable elsewhere. In addition, the 
failure of electoral reform prior to the 1997 PNG election itself removed what may have 
been the best chance for examining this issue in a contemporary context. For this 
reason, it is important to examine the available evidence from what cases there are -  less 
substantial though they may be -  in which divided societies have adopted AV-like 
electoral systems in order to encourage more moderate political competition, but where 
the systems have not, as yet, been fully tested. There are two such cases: Fiji, which in 
1997 introduced an AV electoral system for all future elections for this very purpose; 
and Sri Lanka, which has used a form of preferential voting to elect its President since 
1978. These two cases provide mostly speculative but still important material to 
support the evidence presented in the previous chapter.
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Fiji
Fiji, an island of approximately 750 000 people in the South Pacific (see Map Two), has 
been the site of one of the most comprehensive attempts at constitutional engineering in 
recent years. The primary source of ethnic conflict in Fiji concerns relations between 
Fiji’s indigenous population and the Indian Fijian community. Fiji’s indigenous 
population is characterised by its mixture of Melanesian and Polynesian features — 
indicative of its geographical position at the interface between the two major population 
groups of the South Pacific islands. By contrast, Fiji’s Indian community are mostly the 
descendants of indentured labourers who came to Fiji in the 19th century to work on 
sugar plantations under British colonial rule. While other groups such as Chinese, 
Europeans and Rotumans are also present, in essence Fiji’s primary ethnic cleavage runs 
along a bi-polar division between these ‘Indo-Fijian’ (i.e. Indian) and indigenous (i.e. 
Melanesian and Polynesian) populations. Fijian society and politics has long been 
characterised by an uneasy co-existence between the two communities, with Indo- 
Fijians predominating in certain key sectors of the economy (particularly the sugar-cane 
industry) and indigenous Fijians owning 90% of the land (much of it under long-term 
lease for sugar production) but holding limited economic power. While the population 
ratios of the two groups are fairly similar — 50 percent indigenous Fijian, 44 percent 
Indo-Fijian on latest figures (Constitution Review Commission 1996, 790-791) — there 
is very limited informal social or economic interaction between the two communities. 
They speak different languages, practice different religions, work in different 
occupations, join different social groups, play different sports, and have very little 
casual day-to-day contact. Intermarriage between the two groups, one of the best 
indicators of communal relations, is still extremely rare. Fiji is thus a classic example of 
what Fumivall described as a ‘plural society’, one in which “different sections of the 
same community [live] side by side, but separately, within the same political un it... It is 
in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine” (1948, 304).
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After achieving independence from Britain in 1970 and making what appeared to be a 
relatively successful attempt at consolidating a new multiethnic democracy, Fiji shocked 
the Pacific region by experiencing two military coups in May and September 1987, 
following the election in April 1987 of a government seen by significant elements of the 
Fijian community, and particularly the indigenous Fijian-dominated military, as being 
overly close to the Indo-Fijian community. The new government comprised a coalition 
of the National Federation Party, which drew its support predominantly from Indo- 
Fijians, and the Fiji Labour Party, with cross-ethnic support, headed by an indigenous 
Fijian, Dr Timoci Bavadra. The coup leader, Major-General Sitiveni Rabuka, later 
claimed that the coups were carried out to prevent bloodshed that would have resulted 
from outraged expressions of Fijian nationalism had the elected government continued 
in office (Dean and Ritova 1988). There has been considerable academic debate 
concerning the true motivations behind the coup, with some analysts seeing it as a 
racially-motivated response by the indigenous Fijian community to the threat of Indo- 
Fijian domination (Scarr 1988), and others interpreting it as a more complex event 
encouraged by class interests, competition between chiefly and commoner indigenous 
Fijians, regional tensions and personal ambition (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988; Lai 
1988; Lawson 1991).
Under Fiji’s 1970 Constitution, the actual racial balance in the 52-seat parliament was 
pre-determined, with 22 seats reserved for Fijians, 22 seats reserved for Indo-Fijians and 
the remaining 8 seats reserved for ‘General Electors’ (i.e. Europeans, Chinese and 
others, who were thus proportionately over-represented in parliament compared to their 
numbers in the population). Electors were likewise divided into communal groups (i.e. 
Fijian, Indo-Fijian and General Electors) on the electoral roll (in other words, there were 
separate electoral rolls for each community, so that electoral competition took place 
within groups rather than between them). For the 22 seats reserved for each of the 
Fijian and the Indo-Fijian communities, in each case 12 were chosen purely by members 
of the relevant communal group, while the remaining ten were elected from ‘national’ 
seats, in which any elector could vote, even though the race of the candidate was pre­
determined. General Electors had three communal seats and five national seats. The 
national seats were introduced to encourage a degree of ‘cross-voting’ by members of 
one ethnic community for candidates from another community, so that elected members 
from these seats had to draw a degree of support from all ethnic groups. Each elector
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had four votes: one for their communal representative, and one each for the national 
candidate from each of the three designated communal groups. An indigenous Fijian 
voter, for example, would vote for a Fijian candidate in his or her communal electorate, 
and then cast three additional votes — one for a Fijian, one for an Indo-Fijian and for a 
General Elector — in the appropriate national electorates. A FPTP electoral system was 
used for all seats.
This complicated system was introduced with the assumption that members of one 
ethnic group would vote overwhelmingly for their communal candidate, with the ‘cross­
voting’ national seats designed specifically to induce a degree of non-communal 
electoral activity. Analysis of election results suggests that assumptions that communal 
interests would inevitably determine voter choice did not always hold, however. Prior 
to independence, analysis of election results indicate that Indo-Fijians in particular were 
far from a unified block when it came to voting, with approximately 40 percent of Indo- 
Fijian voters favouring a party other than the ‘Indian’ National Federation Party 
(Lawson 1991,185). After independence in 1970, there was also evidence of increasing 
internal competition within indigenous Fijian ranks, especially in terms of competition 
between the chiefly elite in eastern Fiji and increasingly assertive commoner interests in 
the west (Lawson 1991, 211). At the 1987 general election, the Bavadra coalition 
campaigned on a multi-racial platform and won 14 of the 25 national seats, suggesting a 
significant degree of cross-ethnic support. This supports the centripetalist theory that, 
even in ethnically-divided societies, there will usually be a sufficient number of 
‘floating voters’ prepared, under some circumstances, to give their vote to a candidate 
from another ethnic group to make cross-ethnic appeals worthwhile. Indeed, Lawson 
argues in her analysis of the 1987 elections that “this is the only possible explanation for 
the coalition’s victory in some of the marginal national constituencies” (1991, 250). 
Even in the communal Fijian seats, the coalition succeeded in winning a critical 9.6 
percent of the ethnic Fijian vote, indicating that a significant number of ethnic Fijians 
must have been prepared to support what was widely perceived as an Indo-Fijian 
dominated coalition (Payne 1995, 40). This fragmentation of party support is crucial to 
Fiji’s future adoption of a centripetal constitutional engineering package, as two of the 
key facilitating conditions for centripetal approaches -  a fragmentation of party support 
within ethnic groups, and a willingness of some voters, under some circumstances, to
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vote for a party associated with an ethnic group other than their own -  both appear to 
have been present in pre-coup Fiji.
Rabuka’s 1987 coups resulted in a new, ethnically-biased 1990 Constitution which 
enshrined a racial weighting in favour of the indigenous Fijian population over the 
Indian population in terms of both civil rights and political representation, via an 
electoral system based exclusively on communal political representation for the 
different ethnic groups. These electoral arrangements had their origin in the pre-coup 
electoral system, but dispensed with the ‘national’ seats featuring open competition on a 
non-racial basis for office in favour of a purely communal system heavily weighted in 
favour of indigenous Fijians, who were guaranteed an absolute majority of 
parliamentary seats (37 out of a total of 70 seats). By contrast, 27 seats were reserved 
for Indo-Fijians, five for General Voters and one seats was reserved for Rotumans (who 
had previously voted with Fijians). By under-representing the Indo-Fijian community, 
and reserving certain offices such as the prime ministership for indigenous Fijians, the 
1990 Constitution ensured that true inter-ethnic political competition was virtually 
impossible. The guarantee of a permanent majority of seats for ethnic Fijians turned the 
legislature into a classic in-group and out-group parliament: ethnic Fijians formed the 
government, while Indo-Fijians and others formed the opposition.
In late 1994, following international pressure, economic difficulties and high levels of 
external migration by the Indian community, the Fijian government established a 
Constitution Review Commission (CRC) with the express purpose of reviewing Fiji’s 
racially-based Constitution with a view towards recommending a more appropriate form 
of representation. The CRC recommended that Fiji move “gradually but decisively” 
away from communalism towards a free, open and multi-ethnic political system (CRC 
1996). The CRC’s report, The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future, recommended 
the adoption of a new non-racial constitution combining strong constitutional guarantees 
of human rights (such as a bill of rights and a human rights commission) with revised 
parliamentary and electoral arrangements designed to encourage the development of 
multi-ethnic politics in Fiji. Acknowledging that political parties in many ethnically- 
divided societies tend to be based around particular ethnic groups, the CRC’s stated 
objective was “to find ways of encouraging all, or a sufficient number, of them to come
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together for the purpose of governing the country in a way that gives all communities an 
opportunity to take part” (1996, 308).
One notable aspect of the report is the centrality given to the electoral system as a means 
of encouraging the development of accommodative inter-ethnic relations. Like a 
number of academic analyses, the CRC viewed the electoral system as the most 
powerful tool by which the nature of Fijian politics could be influenced and engineered. 
The CRC went through a careful process of assessing and evaluating major electoral 
systems against a set of specified criteria, the most important of which was the capacity 
to encourage multi-ethnic government. Other important criteria against which systems 
were evaluated included a recognition of the importance of political parties; the 
incentives presented for moderation and co-operation across ethnic lines; and effective 
representation of constituents. The report recommended that the most effective way to 
maximise these criteria would be via “the preferential system known as the Alternative 
Vote” (CRC 1996, 304). The CRC adopted a centripetalist approach to the question of 
encouraging democracy in divided societies. They posited politicians and political 
parties as the key actors in the political system who would respond rationally to the 
incentives and restraints imposed by the electoral system. As long as electorates were 
ethnically heterogeneous and there was a number of political parties contesting the 
elections, politicians and parties would need to attract the second or third preference 
votes of voters from another ethnic group to maximise their chances of electoral 
success. Candidates who adopted moderate positions on ethnic issues and attempted to 
represent the ‘middle ground’ would, under this logic, be more electorally successful 
than extremists. By making politicians from one group reliant on votes from the other 
group for their electoral success, AV could encourage a degree of ‘preference swapping’ 
between the two which could help to encourage accommodation between (and within) 
Fiji’s divided Indian and ethnic Fijian communities. The incentives for election would 
thus work to move Fijian politics away from the extremes towards a more moderate, 
centrist, multi-racial competition for power.
The arguments put forward for the accommodative effects of AV by the CRC thus 
replicate, to a significant extent, those put forward by advocates of AV in Papua New 
Guinea. Interestingly, an earlier commission of inquiry into Fiji’s electoral system in 
1975, chaired by Professor Harry Street, also came to a similar conclusion. The Street
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Commission, as it was known, recommended a series of reforms, based on implicit 
centripetal principles, to the electoral provisions of Fiji’s 1970 independence 
Constitution. They argued that Fiji needed an electoral system “which is fair and 
equitable, and which at the same time does not encourage or perpetuate communal 
thinking or communal politics”. Their conclusion was that the Fijian parliament should 
comprise a mixture of communal and open seats. They recommended that twenty-five 
members should be elected, in open competition, from five constituencies each 
returning five-members via the Single Transferable Vote; while 28 members should be 
elected from communal rolls in single-member districts via the Alternative Vote 
(Parliament of Fiji 1975, 12-16). It is instructive to note how similar these 
recommendations, which were never implemented, were to those put forward by the 
CRC over 20 years later, especially considering that the failure of democratic politics in 
Fiji has been attributed by some observers to the 1970 Constitution’s rigid communal 
structure (Lawson 1988; Lawson 1991).
Both the Street Commission and the CRC also specifically rejected the case for 
consociationalism, the best-established model of electoral competition in divided 
societies, which is based on the proportional representation of all ethnic groups in 
parliament, who can then form a ‘grand coalition’ government based on principles of 
power sharing between all major groups. Both commissions argued that the list PR 
electoral systems favoured by consociationalists give too much power to party bosses, 
unnecessarily constrain voter choice and, because of the need for large national or 
regional districts, often fails to provide the necessary links between a voter and his or 
her member of parliament (CRC 1996, 307; Parliament of Fiji 1975, 13). The CRC’s 
critique of list PR went on to question the arguments behind proportional representation 
in general. Under PR electoral rules, they argued, ethnic parties can expect to be 
represented in the legislature in proportion to their numbers in the community 
irrespective of whether they are inclined towards moderation or not. Hence PR, when 
combined with communal seats, offers “few incentives to parties to become more multi­
ethnic in their composition or more willing to take account of the interests of all 
communities” (CRC 1996, 312). While the CRC’s major objection to list PR was its 
lack of geographical accountability due to the need for large multi-member electoral 
districts, a related concern focussed on the distinction between minority representation 
facilitated by PR electoral rules and minority influence under AV:
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In the circumstances of the Fiji Islands, the Commission considers that electoral incentives are 
necessary to reinforce accommodations reached by agreement among ethnic communities. The 
system in force since before independence [i.e. communal roll elections] has, in effect, focussed 
on the need for their adequate representation. It is evident that such representation alone has not 
bought about multi-ethnic governments (1996, 312).
This is an important point, as the communal roll system used in Fiji ensured, if nothing 
else, that for many years the members of the respective communities were represented 
in the legislature in broad proportion to their numbers in the general community. In 
fact, Fiji’s communal-roll system, based on FPTP electoral rules, has been cited in the 
scholarly literature as an example of a system in which highly proportional results, if not 
institutions, were present.1 However, between 1970 and 1987, the proportionate 
representation of ethnic groups in the legislature resulted in one group forming a more- 
or-less permanent government, while the other formed the opposition.2 There was little 
if any genuine accommodation between groups — a situation no doubt magnified, but 
not caused, by the “artificial solidarity within communities resulting from representation 
through communal seats filled by voting on a communal roll” (CRC 1996, 312). 
Proportional ethnic representation in Fiji may thus have reinforced divisions between 
the indigenous and Indian communities; according to one account, “Fiji’s highly 
proportional electoral rules appear to have interacted with ethnic issues to cause the 
coup” (Bohrer 1997, 223).
The CRC recommended that the the Fijian parliament’s 70-seat lower house, to be 
called the Bose Lawa, should be retained but significantly reformed. Instead of the 
majority of seats being elected by communal voters only, as was the case under the 1970 
Constitution, the Commission recommended that most seats should be open contests 
between candidates from any group. Forty-five of the 70 seats would be elected from 
15 three-member ‘open’ constituencies, with boundaries drawn so as to ensure a 
significant degree of ethnic heterogeneity. There would be no communal qualifications 
for voters or candidates in these open seats. The remaining 25 seats would continue to 
be elected on a communal basis from single-member constituencies, with 12 seats 
reserved for indigenous Fijians, 10 seats for Indo-Fijians, two for General Voters and 
one for Rotumans. The upper house, to be called the Bose e Cake, would comprise 35 
seats, 28 of which would be elected in open competititon and six of which would be
1 See Bohrer 1997, 223.
2 See Lawson 1988, 35-47.
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appointed by the president. The president would be elected at a joint sitting of both 
houses of parliament. Elections for the Bose Lawa, Bose e Cake and the presidency 
would all be held under the alternative vote, although in an unusual variation the CRC 
suggested that, to avoid problems of intra-party competition in the multi-member seats, 
the first, second and third preferences given to each candidate should be added together, 
before the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated (CRC 1996, 329).
Following substantial public debate and evaluation of the CRC’s report by a series of 
parliamentary committees, the Fijian parliament adopted a new constitution in June 
1997. While largely in line with the CRC’s thinking, the electoral arrangements 
provided by the 1997 constitution differ from those advocated by the CRC in several 
crucial respects. Most importantly, the Fijian parliament did not make the decisive 
move away from communalism recommended, and in fact reversed the suggested 
breakdown between open and communal seats recommended by the CRC. Of the 70 
seats in the new parliament, 45 will continue to be elected on a communal basis, leaving 
only 25 ‘open’ seats in which genuine inter-ethnic competition will take place. Second, 
concerns about the workability of the multi-member AV system recommended by the 
CRC resulted in the system finally chosen being based on single-member electoral 
districts, rather than the multi-member districts recommended by the Commission. This 
means that to achieve the type of ‘preference-swapping’ between different communities 
envisaged by the Commission, the boundaries of these small districts will have to be 
drawn in such a way as to be ethnically-heterogeneous — a potentially difficult 
proposition. The CRC’s recommendation that preference votes be cumulated rather 
than counted separately in the new electoral system was also discarded following 
interventions pointing out the unworkability of such a scheme (Reilly 1997c, 83-89). 
The electoral system provided in the 1997 constitution is thus single-member AV, as 
used in Australia and in pre-independence PNG. The government also rejected a 
number of the CRC’s recommendations for an elected upper house. Finally, the new 
Constitution adds a significant element of consociationalism in its requirement for 
mandated power-sharing to the integrative electoral arrangements by providing that all 
parties that achieve at least 10 percent of the vote must be represented in the cabinet in 
proportion to their vote share.
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Fiji’s new Constitution is thus a good example of what Donald Horowitz (an influential 
adviser to the Commission) has called “a redundant dose” of institutional incentives 
towards power-sharing and co-operation (199la, 281). If the electoral system works as 
intended it should result in the election of a pool of moderate candidates dependent on 
the support of both political communities for their electoral survival, and thus a degree 
of accommodation between supporters of rival groups at the local level. But even if this 
does not occur, the mandated grand coalition cabinet provided by the Constitution 
should ensure that both communities have to work together at the elite level at least. 
This double-dose of accommodation-inducing mechanisms means that there is a number 
of ‘safety measures’ built into the new dispensation: if one should fail, backup
measures are there to ensure at least a modicum of power-sharing at another level. In 
particular, the combination of centripetal electoral institutions with consociational 
power-sharing provisions represents an interesting and potentially influential 
combination of two previously divergent approaches to constitutional engineering.
The CRC’s report also represents the most comprehensive and significant evaluation of 
the potential of constitutional engineering via centripetal electoral methods to date. The 
adoption of much of the CRC’s thinking in the new Fijian Constitution represent an 
important practical imprimatur for the possibilities of the centripetal model of ethnic 
conflict management. Fiji’s first elections under the new constitutional arrangements 
are scheduled to take place by early 1999. These elections will represent an ideal 
opportunity to see if the claims put forward for the accommodative effects of 
preference-swapping under AV electoral rules will materialise in a setting of deep and 
ongoing ethnic antagonisms. Until that time, however, the arguments of the CRC for 
the accommodative effects of their model must remain speculative: we simply do not 
know yet if AV will work to break down ethnic antagonisms in a divided ‘bi-polar’ 
state. We do, however, have some evidence from another divided bi-communal polity 
which has utilised preferential voting methods for national elections: the South Asian 
state of Sri Lanka.
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Sri Lanka
The island of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) is one of the foremost examples of a 
‘constitutional laboratory’ in the world today. Like Fiji, Sri Lanka is a plural society 
with clearly defined ethnic groups. The majority group, the Sinhalese, constitute 
approximately 74 percent of the population. Sri Lankan Tamils make up 12 percent, so- 
called ‘Indian’ Tamils approximately six percent, and Muslims another seven percent of 
the population. The groups are ethnically, religiously and regionally distinct, being 
concentrated in different parts of the island (see Map Three). The Sinhalese are mostly 
Buddhists who speak Sinhala, and predominate in the island’s southwest; both Tamil 
groups are Hindus who speak Tamil, with Sri Lankan Tamils concentrated in the 
northeast and Indian Tamils in the tea plantations in the centre of the island; and 
Muslims are found on both the east and west coasts, often speaking Arabic, in addition 
to other languages (Shastri 1997, 133-34).
A nation with a bloody recent history of ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhalese 
and minority Sri Lankan Tamil populations, Sri Lanka has experimented with a variety 
of innovative constitutional and electoral arrangements in its efforts to ensure minority 
groups have a meaningful stake in the political process, with varying degrees of success. 
Like many other former British colonies, Sri Lanka inherited a Westminster model of 
parliamentary government, with the first full general election for the Parliament 
(consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate) held in 1947. In 1971 Sri 
Lanka changed from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature with the abolition of the 
Senate. Although Sri Lanka achieved independence in 1948, it was not until 1972 that it 
adopted its current name and embarked on the process of writing its own constitution as 
an independent nation state. An elected Constituent Assembly drafted the First 
Republican Constitution which provided for a unicameral legislature known as the 
National State Assembly. In 1978 this body was renamed the Parliament after a select 
committee (under the chairmanship of the nation’s most dominant political figure to 
date, J.R. Jayewardene) drafted a revised constitution which transformed the Sri Lankan 
system of government into an executive presidency, with Jayewardene vacating his 
position as prime minister to assume the new office of an elected executive head of 
state.
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In terms of electoral arrangements, Sri Lanka adopted the British first-past-the-post 
system for its first general elections in 1947 (although with multi-member electorates as 
well as single-member ones), before converting in 1978 to a form of party list PR and 
preferential voting for its parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. In the 
process, Sri Lanka has experimented with a range of unusual and sometimes conflicting 
electoral arrangements, which has confirmed its self-proclaimed reputation as one of the 
world’s “constitutional guinea pigs”.3 Sri Lanka is of particular interest because it is the 
only country in the world which uses a preferential electoral system to elect an 
executive president.4 The structure of government chosen in 1978 was similar to the 
French ‘semi-presidential’ system: a powerful executive president counterbalanced by a 
legislature elected by proportional representation. Like her counterpart under the 
French model, the Sri Lankan president has substantial executive powers, with the 
added power of being able to hand-pick the ministry, including the prime minister — 
the only proviso being that all ministers must be members of the elected legislature. 
Hence the characterisation of the Sri Lankan Second Republic as ‘the Gaullist system in 
Asia’ (Wilson 1980).
Sri Lanka ’s electoral arrangements
Prior to the adoption of a new constitution in 1978, Sri Lanka’s electoral arrangements 
had been almost purely in the Westminster mode. Sri Lanka has a long and impressive 
history of competitive elections and democratic procedures, although these have been 
significantly marred by the ethnic conflict and political assassinations of the last two 
decades. Universal adult suffrage was introduced in 1931, giving Sri Lanka a record of 
democratic elections without equal in Asia. In 1959 the voting age was lowered to 
eighteen years, predating a similar move in most Western countries by at least a decade. 
Sri Lanka’s electoral administration is under the direct control of a commissioner of 
elections, a senior public servant independent of ministerial supervision who can only
3 Interview, R.K. Chandrananda de Silva, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 22 March 1996. de Silva was Sri Lanka’s 
Commissioner o f Elections between 1978 and 1994 and was responsible for a number o f the electoral 
experiments discussed in this chapter.
4 This statement needs some qualification due to the case o f the Republic o f Ireland. Ireland has a non­
executive president who occupies an almost exclusively ceremonial office but who is, nonetheless, 
popularly elected (although half o f all scheduled presidential elections to date have been uncontested). 
Article 12.2.3 of the Irish Constitution specifies that the electoral system for presidential elections shall be 
“proportional representation by means o f the single transferable vote”, which is identical to AV when used 
for elections of one representative, such as a president.
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be removed by Parliament itself, and elections have tended to be regarded as free from 
fraud or other forms of malpractice (Kearney 1987, 82).
Prior to independence in 1947, the British colonial authority introduced a written 
Constitution providing for parliamentary government, with executive authority reposing 
in a cabinet composed of ministers drawn from and responsible to the legislature. 
Election in most seats was by the first-past-the-post system in single-member 
constituencies, although a few multi-member constituencies returning two or three 
members were created at each redistribution, “with the intent of enhancing the chances of 
election o f candidates belonging to one of the island’s ethnic minorities” (Wilson 1980, 
80). The electoral devices used to facilitate this unusual arrangement give a pointer to 
Sri Lanka’s later adoption of preferential voting. In the multi-member constituencies 
each voter could cast as many votes as there were candidates to be elected; all the votes 
could be cast for a single candidate or distributed amongst several candidates (the 
assumption being that ethnic minorities would be likely to deliver all their votes to their 
ethnic candidate, an assumption that appears to have held true in respect of Sri Lanka’s 
Muslim population at least) (Wilson 1980, 80). These multi-member seats were, 
however, in a minority, with the overriding majority o f seats elected from single-member 
electorates under a FPTP electoral formula. The results, however, were quite unlike the 
fluid and fragmented party system experienced under FPTP in PNG: in Sri Lanka, the 
longstanding and deep-rooted cleavages along religious, ethnic, linguistic and ideological 
lines resulted in a well-developed system of competitive political parties based around 
particular ethnic groups.
Like the Fijian case, no one party had a monopoly of support from a particular ethnic 
group. The Sinhalese electorate, in particular, split its support almost equally between 
two large parties. The finely balanced nature of Sri Lanka’s multi-party system was 
characterised increasingly in the 1960s and 70s by competition for government between 
two major Sinhalese parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lankan 
Freedom Party (SLFP), with smaller Marxist or Tamil parties sometimes holding the 
balance of power. The ‘seat bonuses’ provided by the FPTP electoral system to the 
winning party meant that small changes in vote share could and did result in major 
changes in the make-up of parliament. Prior to 1978, Sri Lanka experienced a change of 
government at almost every election, with the winning party’s vote share often
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considerably smaller than their eventual proportion of seats. In 1970, for example, the 
SLFP gained 37 percent of the vote but won over 60 percent of seats in the legislature. 
In 1977 the UNP scored 51 percent of the vote but won 83 percent of all seats — results 
which led the Select Committee of the National State Assembly appointed to consider 
revision of the constitution to recommend a change to PR for parliamentary elections, 
arguing that “the legislature is not fairly representative of political opinion in the 
electorates” (Parliamentary Series 14 of the Second National State Assembly 1978, 
212). The other major difficulty of FPTP was the fact that it disadvantaged 
geographically dispersed minorities — a problem exacerbated by the fact that, until 
1978, electoral divisions were allocated on the basis of population (inclusive of non­
citizens) rather than electors. This meant that voters in those areas which had 
substantial numbers of non-Sri Lankan citizens (including many ‘Indian’ Tamils and Sri 
Lankans who had opted for Indian citizenship), who were not allowed to enrol and vote, 
were proportionately over-represented in the legislature. In practice, the effect of this 
provision was to give a disproportionate weighting in favour of the rural Sinhalese in 
many areas, to the disadvantage of minorities (de Silva 1994, 20). The Select 
Committee made it clear that it was the disproportionality of electoral results rather than 
the institutional discrimination against minorities which was the major factor in its 
decision to recommend dispensing with FPTP (Parliamentary Series 14 of the Second 
National State Assembly 1978, 214). Nonetheless, the change in 1978 to allocating 
seats on the basis of the number of enrolled electors rather than the total population has 
meant that minority groups are now considerably better represented in the Sri Lankan 
parliament, as they now form a larger proportion of enrolled voters in some electoral 
constituencies than was previously the case.
Electing the president
The greater institutional recognition of minorities, plus the move to a list system of PR 
for parliamentary elections, meant that no single party would be likely to gain an 
absolute majority of seats in the legislature. Thus it was all the more important that the 
new office of executive president be filled by a national figure representative of all 
groups in society and able to encourage consensual politics between the varying groups. 
This focused attention on the method of election to that office, and particularly on the 
means by which ethnic minorities could be included in the selection process rather than
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being overwhelmed by the Sinhalese majority. Implicit in this was the desire on the part 
of the governing UNP to end the endemic post-election violence “which has been a 
characteristic feature in Sri Lanka at least since 1965” (de Silva 1979, 198). The 
problem was this: the president would have to represent all groups in Sri Lankan 
society and be seen as a figure capable of moderating between opposing interests. The 
method of election for such a figure would thus be crucial to the fate of the office, which 
would require at least a majority of voters supporting the successful candidate. But only 
once since independence had any political party secured a majority of the vote at a 
national election; most governments were in fact elected with considerably less than 
that. The solution was to apply the preferential vote to the election of the presidency, so 
that presidential candidates would be forced to look beyond their own party or ethnic 
group for support because the successful candidate would have to be elected (either 
outright or via preferences) by an absolute majority of all voters.
Interestingly, there is no evidence that the Sri Lankan constitutional draftsmen on the 
select committee made reference to other countries like Australia when it came to 
devising a system of preferential voting.5 Instead, they appear to have started from first 
principles, seeking to ensure that any president would be elected by an absolute majority 
of voters and then devising the appropriate institutional mechanisms to achieve this. As 
much of the 1978 Constitution had its philosophic origins in the French fifth republic 
model of a strong executive presidency combined with an elected legislature, initial 
plans provided for a French-style two-round system of elections (Parliamentary Series 
14 of the Second National State Assembly 1978, 243). However, the extra cost and 
security issues associated with holding two separate elections within a two-week period 
appears to have prompted the decision to combine the initial and run-off rounds of 
voting into one election via the expression of preferences.6 According to K.M. de Silva, 
two men were chiefly responsible for the move to a preferential system: Lalith
Athulathmudali, a government minister and member of the Select Committee who was 
assassinated in April 1993, and Mark Fernando, who was then an adviser to the 
Committee.7 Justice Fernando, now a Supreme Court judge, has confirmed that the 
system was developed by the Committee without reference to Australia or any other
5 Interview, K. M. de Silva, Director, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka, 26 March 1996.
6 Interview, R.K. Chandrananda de Silva, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 22 March 1996.
7 Interview, K.M. de Silva, Director, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka, 26 March 1996.
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country, and that it was a compromise between the need to achieve majority support for 
a victor and the practical necessity in the Sri Lankan context of holding one rather than 
two elections. While initially attracted to the double ballot system, the Select 
Committee believed that the inconvenience and expense of a second election, and the 
undue maintenance o f the high degree of tension associated with electoral politics in Sri 
Lanka for a further two weeks, would not be conducive to democratic principles.8
The Select Committee effectively recommended a preferential electoral system so as to 
achieve both the initial and run-off stages of a double ballot election in one contest. In 
keeping close to the French model, preferences would only be distributed to the two 
leading candidates in the event that neither obtained an absolute majority on first 
preferences. This is a significant departure from the alternative vote, in which 
preferences from lower-placed candidates are transferred to all remaining candidates, 
not just the top two. In a further unique variation, a decision was taken to make the 
expression of preferences optional, but to restrict the number of preferences expressed to 
no more than three. Section 94(1) o f the 1978 constitution provides that
At the election of the President every voter casting his vote for any candidate may -
(a) where there are three candidates for election, specify his second preference; and
(b) where there are more than three candidates for election, specify his second and third 
preferences.
(2) The candidate, if any, who receives more than one-half of the valid votes cast shall be declared 
elected as President.
(3) Where no candidate is declared elected under paragraph (2) of this Article, the candidate or 
candidates, other than the candidates who received the highest and second highest number of 
votes, shall be eliminated from the contest, and-
(a) the second preference of each voter whose vote has been for a candidate eliminated from 
the contest, shall, if it is for one or the other of the remaining two candidates, be counted as a 
vote for such candidate and be added to the votes counted in his favour under paragraph (2), 
and
(b) the third preference of each voter referred to in sub-paragraph (a) whose second preference 
is not counted under that sub-paragraph shall, if it is for one or the other of the remaining two 
candidates, be counted as a vote for such candidate and be added to the votes counted in his 
favour under sub-paragraph (a) and paragraph (2),
and the candidate who receives the majority of the votes so counted shall be declared elected as 
President.
8 Interview, Justice Mark Fernando, Sri Lanka Supreme Court, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 3 April 1996.
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This was effectively a new example of the contingent vote which was first used in the 
Australian state of Queensland in 1892, and which is recognised in Australia as the 
forerunner to the alternative vote.9 If no candidate gains more than 50 percent of the 
vote, all candidates other than the top two are eliminated, and their second and third 
preferences redistributed to the remaining candidates. This is a significant 
simplification of the full AV system, both for the voters and the electoral administrators. 
The voters need only write the numbers one to three on the ballot, regardless of the 
number of candidates, which while somewhat restrictive is probably a more realistic 
assessment of the genuine preferences of most electors than requiring them to rank order 
every candidate. The task for those counting the vote is considerably simpler than under 
AV: instead of having to go through the process of eliminating each candidate
successively and distributing his or her votes to those remaining, the Sri Lankan contest 
effectively becomes a run-off between the top two candidates (as in the French system), 
but without the expense of a second election. Wilson’s assessment of Sri Lanka’s post- 
1978 system of government as “a hybrid, a cross between the British and the French” 
(1980, xiii) is thus right on target regarding the electoral system at least. It is a hybrid 
system, designed with particular political goals in mind, which utilises some of the basic 
aspects of both the alternative vote and the two-round system.
It is worth noting that these two systems — the alternative vote and the two-round 
system — have traditionally been lumped together by political scientists as the two 
examples of “majority formulae” found in Western countries10 — not because of any 
structural similarities, but rather because both strive to achieve a majority victor in each 
case. Lijphart, for example, argues that AV “may be thought of as a refinement of the 
majority-run-off formula in the sense that weak candidates are eliminated one at a time 
(instead of all but the top two candidates at the same time) and that voters do not have to 
go to the polls twice” (1994a, 19). The contingent vote as adopted in Sri Lanka is closer 
to the French run-off model than to the alternative vote, as all but the top two candidates 
are indeed eliminated at the same time. In fact, some parties such as the SLFP, argued 
in 1978 that a two-round system should be adopted instead of the contingent vote 
(Parliamentary Series 14 of the Second National State Assembly 1978, 151). In some 
Australian states such as New South Wales, the contingent vote was historically seen as
9 See Wright 1980, 34,58-61.
10 See Rae 1967, 107-10.
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a middle point between the two-round system and the alternative vote. In Sri Lanka, by 
contrast, there is no evidence that a move towards AV was ever contemplated, and in 
fact there has been pressure from some quarters for a return to FPTP for parliamentary 
elections.11 During yet another constitutional review taking place at the time of writing, 
there has been pressure to decentralise the political system and return to a Westminster 
system, with the office of president being turned into a figurehead position with no 
executive power (Samarasinghe 1994, 1031). Were this to happen, the requirement that 
the president be elected would also probably be scrapped.
The Sri Lankan experience of preferential voting
K.M. de Silva has argued that the presidential electoral system is “even more important 
than PR for its implications for ethnic relations in the island” (de Silva 1994, 22). The 
major effect of preferential voting upon the Sri Lankan political process, according to de 
Silva, is that it provides an incentive for the major parties to take account of minority 
groups in their campaigning and in their formal arrangements for preference sharing. 
This is a particularly significant change in Sri Lankan politics compared to the practices 
of earlier elections, where there was little or no disadvantage in a subtle or even blatant 
anti-Tamil campaign in the Sinhalese areas; indeed previous elections were won or lost 
in the Sinhalese areas, and the major parties could ignore the north and east of the island 
where the Sri Lankan Tamil population is concentrated. This situation has changed 
since the 1980s, and the experience of the three presidential elections held to date 
“shows that no party or individual aiming at the presidency could afford to alienate 
minorities, or fail to campaign in the Tamil areas of the north and east, as well as among 
the Indian plantation workers and the Muslims and Roman Catholics” (de Silva 1994, 
22-23).
There is no perfect electoral system, and some of the simplifying features of the Sri 
Lankan system have tended to undermine its effectiveness. As the preference marking 
is optional rather than compulsory there is no requirement to express second and later 
preferences, and few voters do so (Horowitz 1991a, 192). Initial estimates by the 
Commissioner of Elections after the 1982 presidential poll put the rate of preference 
marking as low as two percent, and its usage does not appear to have increased 
appreciably in later elections (Commissioner of Elections 1983, 60). In fact, the Deputy
11 Interview, R.K. Chandrananda de Silva, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 22 March 1996.
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Commissioner of Elections has claimed that some candidates specifically instruct their 
supporters not to mark any preferences.12 Some parties, notably the SLFP, objected 
strongly to the introduction of a system of preference marking, arguing that the system 
was “too complex for voters in backward areas” and would disenfranchise rural voters 
where illiteracy was a problem. The UNP response was that the rural voter was 
sophisticated enough to write 1, 2 and 3 in the order of his or her preference; in any 
event, the optional nature of the system made the SLFP’s objections somewhat 
questionable (de Silva 1979, 199). Nonetheless, some commentators have attributed the 
reduced turnout at Sri Lanka’s first presidential vote in 1982 to “the apparent 
complexity of the new preferential voting system” (Samarasinghe 1983, 162). Even the 
Commissioner of Elections initially opposed the introduction of preferential voting in 
1978, arguing that preferential voting “presupposes a sophisticated and literate 
community” and foreshadowing potential problems of illiteracy and confusion 
(Parliamentary Series 14 of the Second National State Assembly 1978, 151). While 
these problems do not appear to have eventuated, there is no hard evidence either way 
regarding the level of understanding of preferential voting on the part of voters or 
political parties, despite efforts by the Department of Elections to explain the mechanics 
of the system via press releases and media interviews (Commissioner of Elections 1992, 
321).
In reality, some of these objections are less serious than they first appear. The rate of 
illiteracy, for example, is considerably lower in Sri Lanka than in most other developing 
countries. The real reason for the SLFP’s objection to the new system appeared to be 
their well-founded concern that the preferences of the Tamil and other minorities would 
flow to the more moderate UNP candidate under a preferential ballot. The history of Sri 
Lanka’s three presidential elections to date (in 1982, 1988 and 1994) is not conclusive, 
but appears to bear this concern out. Unfortunately for comparative purposes, at each 
election to date the winning candidate has scored a clear majority, thus obviating the 
need for preferences to be counted, and the Elections Department has not surveyed 
either the extent or the nature of preference marking for this reason.13 We are thus left 
with the following hypothetical scenario postulated by Horowitz “to illustrate how
12 Interview, A.D. de Silva, Deputy Commissioner of Elections, Sri Lanka, 20 March 1996.
13 Interview, A.D. de Silva, Deputy Commissioner o f Elections, Sri Lanka, 20 March 1996.
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[preferential voting] would work and how it would produce conciliatory results” (1991a, 
191):
Suppose two main Sinhalese candidates are contesting the election. The first estimates 40 percent 
first-preference support, and the second estimates 35 percent. There is also a Sri Lankan Tamil 
candidate, who can count on perhaps 10-12 percent of all first-preference votes. A meeting is 
convened between the first Sinhalese candidate and the Tamil candidate. Since no candidate will 
have a majority of first-preferences, the conversation quickly turns to the subject o f Tamil second 
preferences. The Tamil leader is asked whether he would be willing to urge Tamil voters to give 
their second preferences to the Sinhalese candidate. He replies that his ability to do so depends on 
the Sinhalese candidate’s willingness to be hospitable to Tamil aspirations. Otherwise, his appeal 
to Tamil voters to cast second preference ballots for a Sinhalese candidate would be futile. Before 
long, concrete policy issues are being discussed. By the end o f the negotiations, the first Sinhalese 
candidate has emerged as decidedly more accommodating on Tamil issues than the second 
Sinhalese candidate (1991a, 193).
While Horowitz’s scenario may be hypothetical, the type of negotiations he postulates 
are not. At the 1994 presidential election the winning candidate, Chandrika 
Kumaratunga, had entered into formal coalition arrangements with the major Muslim 
party, and her candidature was backed by parties representing Sri Lankan and Indian 
Tamils as well, in recognition of her more moderate approach to ethnic issues 
(Schnaffer 1995, 423). Thus, while to date it is not possible to measure the extent of 
preference flows from minor to major party candidates in exchange for policy 
concessions, it is possible to make some observations about the effect of the new 
electoral laws on the election process, and particularly on the attitudes of major party 
candidates towards minority groups, although whether this has translated into 
identifiable changes in policies on ethnic issues or indeed in greater accommodation 
between ethnic groups at the non-party level remains unclear.
In 1982, the major parties were fairly well differentiated on the key issue of their 
attitude to Tamils, and the more moderate candidate, J.R. Jayewardene of the UNP, 
scored a clear victory with 52 percent of first preferences (Horowitz 1985, 641). While 
this may seem encouraging to the thesis that preferential voting encourages moderation 
and accommodation, it must be stated that the circumstances of the 1982 election were 
less than ideal: the rival SLFP candidate was not permitted to stand for election, and the 
major Tamil organisation also put forward no candidate in protest at its demands being 
ignored. The upshot was that no formal preference swapping arrangements were made 
and the new constitutional provisions were not tested. The Commissioner of Elections 
suggested in his report that the new preferential system “should be re-examined” as it
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had caused confusion amongst voters and there was doubt as to “whether there was any 
serious campaign for the marking of preferences” (1983, 61).
Inter-ethnic riots and Tamil terrorist attacks in 1983 saw a sharp decline in the prospects 
for inter-ethnic accommodation in Sri Lanka. By the time of the next presidential 
elections in 1988 a civil war was being fought in Tamil areas and Tamils again 
boycotted the poll, which was also won by the UNP candidate, Ranasinghe Premadasa, 
on first preferences by a slim majority (50.4 percent). Again, the vote-pooling potential 
of the preferential system was not tested, although the UNP was clearly the more 
conciliatory party and had the support of most of the minority groups taking part in the 
poll — including Indian Tamils, Muslims, Sinhalese Christians — and a substantial 
minority of Sinhalese Buddhists (Horowitz 1991a, 192fii).
As the 1988 campaign was the most closely-fought presidential election to date, it may 
be useful to examine in detail the process of the count. Under section 56 of the 
Presidential Elections Act 1981, preferences are not counted if one candidate has an 
absolute majority of all votes cast. If no candidate has an absolute majority, the act 
provides that the Electoral Commissioner:
(a) where there are three candidates at the election-
(i) eliminate from the contest the candidate who has received the lowest number o f votes, and
(ii) direct each returning officer to take such steps as may be necessary to count the second 
preferences o f each voter whose vote has been for the candidate eliminated under sub- 
paragraph (i) o f this paragraph, as a vote in favour o f one or the other of the remaining two 
candidates; or
(b) where there are more than three candidates at the election-
(i) eliminate from the contest the candidates other than the two candidates who received the 
highest number o f votes, and
(ii) direct each returning officer to take such steps as may be necessary-
(aa) to count the second preference of each voter whose vote has been for a candidate 
eliminated under sub-paragraph (i) o f this paragraph, if  it is for one o f the other o f the 
remaining two candidates, as a vote in favour of such remaining candidate; and
(bb) where the second preference of a voter is not counted under this sub-paragraph, to 
count the third preference of such voter if  it is for one or the other o f the remaining two 
candidates, as a vote in favour o f such remaining candidate.
In 1988, only three candidates stood for the poll and thus voters were restricted to 
marking a second preference only. As for many elections in South Asia, symbols (in
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this case an elephant, a hand and an eye) were allocated to each candidate to assist with 
party recognition and to enable illiterate electors to vote. Similar latitude is given 
regarding the expression of preferences: although a ‘1’ and a ‘2’ (and a ‘3’ where there 
are more than three candidates) are the specified means for marking preferences, other 
combinations (for example, a ‘1’ followed by a cross or a circle followed by a ‘2’) are 
accepted as valid votes “as long as the intention of the voter can be properly understood 
from the nature of the marks” (Commissioner of Elections 1992, 61). The final result 
on first preferences in 1988 is set out in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Result of the 1988 Sri Lankan Presidential Election
Candidate Vote % o f total
Ranasinghe Premadasa (UNP) 2 569 199 50.42
Sirimavo Bandaranaike (SLFP) 2 289 860 44.94
Oswin Abeygunasekera (SLMP*) 235 719 4.62
Total votes 5 094 778 100.00
*Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya
According to this tally, Ranasinghe Premadasa received just over 50% of all first 
preferences and was declared elected. Clearly, a shift of less than one percent of votes 
would have seen no candidate gain an absolute majority of votes, and second 
preferences would then have determined the outcome. As no provisional count of 
preferences is made if a candidate wins an absolute majority, it is not possible to say 
how preferences would have affected the outcome. What can be said with some 
confidence is that, with such a slim margin of victory, the 1988 result heightened the 
realisation amongst Sri Lanka’s political actors that second preferences may well 
become crucial in deciding future results. This is particularly the case considering that 
Sri Lankan Tamils boycotted the 1988 poll.
The most recent presidential elections, in November 1994, saw the first change of 
government in Sri Lanka for 17 years. Following victory at the August 1994 
parliamentary elections by the People’s Alliance (PA), an off-shoot of the old SLFP, the 
presidential elections saw a massive victory for the PA candidate Chandrika 
Kumaratunga, who won 62.3 percent of the first preference vote. Following such a 
massive win, preferences were once again irrelevant and uncounted, limiting our ability 
to analyse the effect that the electoral system may have had. It is significant to note,
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however, that the PA had entered into vote-pooling arrangements with some minor 
parties (notably the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress), that Kumaratunga’s candidature was 
backed by several Tamil parties, and that she gained support from almost all areas of the 
country. Commentators saw this as having significant implications for future ethnic 
relations on the island:
Kumaratunga’s massive triumph in the presidential election was as impressive in scope as in size. 
She carried all but one o f the country’s 160 polling places, losing only a remote area inhabited 
largely by aboriginal tribes people. She got solid support from the majority Sinhalese community, 
which comprises 74% of Sri Lanka’s population. She did even better amongst the minority Tamils 
(18.2%) and Muslims (7.4%). The magnitude o f her victory significantly consolidated the 
mandate o f the People’s Alliance as it sought to bring about major political and social reforms. It 
also greatly strengthened the new president’s hand as she moved forward to resolve the country’s 
chronic ethnic problem and end the eleven-year civil war it has spawned (Schnaffer 1995,409).
Again, however, while the more moderate candidate in the presidential contest 
triumphed, it is not possible to make any confident assessment of the impact of the 
electoral system on this outcome. The campaign was racked by ethnic violence. The 
UNP’s chosen candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, was assassinated by a suicide bomber 
two weeks prior to the poll: the party then erred seriously by appointing his widow, 
who had no previous political experience, as its presidential candidate. Victory for 
Kumaratunga was largely seen as a foregone conclusion after the results of the earlier 
parliamentary elections, and her personal popularity (she hails from a Sri Lankan 
political dynasty) was also a significant factor. As was the case in the 1988 election, 
however, Kumaratunga was clearly the most moderate and accommodative candidate, 
and the institutional incentives for embracing ethnic minorities (in the form of 
preferences) may well have impacted on the nature of her overall campaign. In other 
words, the possibility that preference distribution may decide the result may be as potent 
a factor as whether preferences ultimately do need to be counted.
Conclusion
One of the central hypotheses examined in this thesis is the proposition that preferential 
electoral systems can, in situations of ethnic division, be utilised to promote co­
operation between competing ethnic groups and ensure a stake in the political process 
for minority groups who would otherwise be excluded. How do the Fijian and Sri 
Lankan examples support the case for or against this hypothesis? While there is no 
weight of evidence either way, there is room for cautious support from both cases. The
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Fijian case represents a significant practical ‘victory’ for proponents of the centripetal 
model, but any more definitive judgement will have to wait until the first election under 
AV has been conducted. However, as the first state to consciously choose a preferential 
voting system in an attempt to engineer more moderate multi-ethnic politics, the 
potential implications of the Fijian case are considerable.
As noted earlier, Fijian electoral history also lends support to one key presumption of 
centripetal theory: that even in divided societies, there are sufficient ‘floating’ voters 
prepared to support candidates from rival ethnic groups to make vote-pooling possible. 
In Fiji, growing commoner assertiveness against chiefly rule, perceptions of regional 
privilege and discrimination, and an emerging class-consciousness amongst poorer 
ethnic Fijians all resulted in a fragmentation of the ethnic Fijian vote prior to the 1987 
coups. These emerging non-ethnic cleavages facilitated the emergence of ‘cross- 
cutting’ political concerns that overrode ethnicity, resulting in at least 10 percent of the 
ethnic Fijian vote in 1987 going to what was seen as an Indian-dominated coalition.14 
This challenges the argument made by Nordlinger and others that such cross-ethnic 
voting is unlikely in divided societies as “members of the opposing conflict group are 
not likely to change their party attachments on the basis of a secondary issue” 
(Nordlinger 1972, 102). In Fiji, ‘secondary issues’ did indeed result in a change of party 
attachments in 1987. This augurs well for the prospects of more meaningful centripetal 
politics under the new constitutional arrangements.
A similar situation of split party support and ‘cross-cutting’ issues affecting voter choice 
is also in evidence in Sri Lanka. The evidence for centripetalism from the Sri Lankan 
case is also modest, but has more substantive implications. While preferences have 
never been counted in Sri Lankan elections, the more moderate and ethnically 
accommodative candidate has won at every presidential election to date. And while 
parties do not as yet appear to have entered into the formal preference swapping 
arrangements hypothesised by Horowitz, there have been less formal coalition or vote­
pooling arrangements between major and minor parties. As K.M. de Silva has argued, 
while the question of the impact of preference swapping is still “up in the air” due to the 
results of the three presidential elections to date, the electoral process “does allow
14 These issues are explored in depth in Lai 1988.
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minorities to have a stake in the process”.15 Until preferences are counted at a 
presidential election it will be difficult to ascertain how sophisticated Sri Lankan 
political parties and voters are at utilising the potential of the system. One of the 
problems to date is that parties do not appear to have grasped the full potential inherent 
in a situation where second or third preferences may determine the election result. 
Unlike the practice of Australian elections (where preference marking is compulsory), 
parties in Sri Lanka do not distribute ‘how to vote’ cards specifying a preferred form of 
preference distribution on election day. While the Elections Department does make 
some efforts at public education, it is doubtful whether the full implications of 
preference distribution in the case of no candidate winning on first preferences is widely 
understood outside a relatively small group of educated and politically aware voters. If 
in future presidential elections no candidate wins an absolute majority on first 
preferences — which is quite likely under normal conditions, given the nature of Sri 
Lanka’s party system — it will be these voters whose preferences will determine the 
result.
The Sri Lankan example also points to the limits of constitutional engineering as a 
means of ethnic conflict management. While there is indeed evidence that the more 
moderate Sinhalese candidate has won each presidential election to date, it is unclear to 
what extent (if any) the preferential electoral system has impacted upon electoral 
strategies and outcomes. The fact that Tamils boycotted the 1982 and 1988 presidential 
elections is itself an indication of the impotence of strategies based on institutional 
incentives which presume that aggrieved political actors will remain ‘in the game’ rather 
than choose to carry on their fight outside the electoral arena (in the Sri Lankan case, by 
civil war). While moderates have indeed been elected to the presidency, there is little to 
suggest that this in itself has served to dampen the communal conflict in Sri Lanka. In 
fact, tensions have almost certainly escalated over the 20 years since the relevant 
constitutional reforms were introduced.
In Sri Lanka, the incentives for moderation are all in one direction — Sinhalese 
presidential candidates can realistically hope to pick up some Tamil second preferences 
were a Tamil to stand for president, but Tamil candidates could not realistically expect 
to achieve electoral victory via second preferences from Sinhalese voters. Electoral
15 Interview, K.M. de Silva, Director, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka, 26 March 1996.
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engineering may well be able to place a centripetal spin on political competition, but it 
cannot change the basic circumstances of a conflict in which a geographically- 
segregated minority has been engaged in decades of brutal civil war with a majority 
population. In Fiji, by contrast, the relative equality in size of the two populations, their 
geographical intermixture and the low-intensity nature of the conflict would all appear 
to provide much more favourable pre-conditions for centripetal constitutional 
engineering strategies to succeed. In both cases, however, the fragmentation of party 
support within the major ethnic groups, and the apparent existence of a small but 
potentially crucial number of voters prepared to case their votes (or allocate their 
preferences) to parties or candidates from other groups, presents favourable facilitating 
conditions for centripetalism as a realistic strategy for moderating political competition. 
The question of what other facilitating factors are likely to favour centripetal strategies 
for the management of ethnic conflict will be examined in more detail in the final three 
chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter Six:
Preferential voting and political engineering
The evidence, as detailed in the previous chapters, of accommodative behaviour on the 
part of candidates and electors at AV elections in PNG — apparently in reaction to the 
incentives provided by the electoral system — and their change in behaviour under the 
very different incentives provided by FPTP, is obviously of importance to the ongoing 
debate on electoral reform in PNG. But its significance also extends further than that. 
As noted in the first chapter of this thesis, the evidence from PNG provides important 
supporting evidence for a wider theory of ethnic conflict management and democracy 
first proposed by Donald L. Horowitz in his book Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985). In 
this work, Horowitz argued that electoral systems have a strong role in fostering or 
retarding ethnic conflict, via the incentives for particular types of behaviour they offer to 
campaigning politicians. The basic elements of an electoral system (such as the 
electoral formula and the structure of the ballot) all have a potential impact on “ethnic 
alignments, ethnic electoral appeals, multiethnic coalitions, the growth of extremist 
parties, and policy outcomes” (Horowitz 1985, 628). Looking specifically at the 
preferential electoral system introduced for presidential elections in Sri Lanka in 1978, 
Horowitz speculated that the majority threshold rule inherent in the new system may 
create inducements for minority Tamil parties to trade preferences with the majority 
Sinhalese parties for victory. This should, he argued, make the second and third 
preferences of Tamil voters “quite valuable commodities in political exchange”, with 
the result that a Sinhalese president elected on Tamil preferences would have a strong 
electoral incentive towards moderation on ethnic issues in order to maintain Tamil 
support. In this way, the Sri Lankan system may encourage moderate inter-ethnic 
politics and should “ultimately cement coalitions of commitment” between the 
bargaining Tamil parties and the more conciliatory Sinhalese parties (Horowitz 1985, 
639-42).
These theories were elaborated in Horowitz’s 1991 book A Democratic South Africa? 
Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society, which put forward a substantial case 
for constitutional engineering as a means of constructing a viable democracy in post­
apartheid South Africa. It was this work in which Horowitz developed his theory of 
‘vote pooling’ in detail, and which received the most attention from supporters and 
critics of the theory alike. In it, Horowitz recommended that an AV electoral system
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should form the centre-piece of a selection of accommodation-inducing structures 
(including federalism and a strong elected president) for the post-apartheid era in South 
Africa. According to Horowitz, an AV system could provide parties and candidates in 
divided societies such as South Africa’s with a strong incentive to search for the 
political ‘middle ground’. Parties which broadened their support base in search of 
second preferences from other parties would be more likely to win seats than parties 
which were unable to gamer preferences outside their primary support base. In order to 
gain this type of support, major parties and groups would have to attract at least some 
secondary support from minorities — which meant adopting favourable policy positions 
on key areas of interest to these groups. This could in turn provide an incentive towards 
moderation and accommodation between rival ethnic groups (Horowitz 1991a, chap. 5).
Horowitz’s proposal represented a considerable challenge to the scholarly orthodoxy 
concerning appropriate electoral systems for divided societies, which has long argued 
that some form of proportional representation is all but essential in cases of ethnic 
fragmentation and conflict. The most prominent advocate of this orthodoxy is Arend 
Lijphart, who in 1985 also advanced a detailed plan for post-apartheid South Africa, 
featuring a party-list form of PR (1985b, chap. 6). While Lijphart’s proposal was 
reasonably close to the actual electoral system introduced for South Africa’s first 
democratic elections in 1994, there is no evidence that Horowitz’s proposal for AV 
received serious consideration in South Africa itself: most South African political 
actors believed it was simply too complicated for what was, for most of the population, 
a first-generation election (Sisk 1993, 89). The case for AV has not been revived in 
future discussions of electoral options for South Africa, although Horowitz has 
continued to argue more generally for the importance of accommodative electoral 
institutions which encourage vote pooling1, and was an influential adviser to the Fijian 
Constitution Review Commission which, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
recommended a vote-pooling electoral system for future Fijian elections.
The Horowitz case
At the heart of Horowitz’s proposal for the AV is the need to create incentives for 
accommodation between competing interests, particularly in those societies which have
1 See, for example, Horowitz 1991c; Horowitz 1993.
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deep-seated ethnic or other cleavages. Horowitz argues that the most feasible path to 
inter-group accommodation at elections is by encouraging parties to swap preferences 
(or ‘pool votes’ as he puts it) — that is, to campaign for the second preferences of those 
electors who voted with their first preference for other parties. In situations where no 
candidate can command an absolute majority of first preferences, the need to broaden a 
party’s appeal in order to pick up these second preferences can make the difference 
between winning and losing a seat. Parties that adopt conciliatory policy positions and 
compromise with other parties are more likely to pick up second and later preferences 
than parties that maintain a narrowly-focused, non-compromise approach. Hence the 
apposite use of the term ‘centripetalism’ to describe this model: those candidates and 
parties who are broadly attractive to others will tend to be rewarded; those who have 
polarised support will generally not. To attract second-level preference support, 
candidates need to attract the votes of groups other than their own, and this is usually 
achieved by their moving to the centre on policy issues to attract floating voters, or by 
successfully accommodating ‘fringe’ issues into their broader policy. Candidates who 
are elected will thus be dependent on the votes of groups other than their own for their 
parliamentary positions, and can be expected to serve the needs of these groups as well 
as their own ethnic group if they are to establish their positions and gain re-election.
The arguments for the integrative effects of AV election rules are premised on the 
assumption that politicians are rational actors who will do what needs to be done to gain 
election. Under AV, ‘what needs to be done’ varies considerably depending on the 
makeup of the electorate. Where one candidate is confident of achieving an absolute 
majority of first preferences, he or she need only focus on maximising their vote share 
from their own supporters in order to win the seat. In cases where no candidate has 
outright majority support, however, the role of second and later preferences becomes 
crucial to attracting an overall majority. In cases of deep multi-ethnic divisions, policy- 
based cleavages are considerably less salient than ethnic or linguistic identities. The 
incentives to gamer secondary support operate in exactly the same manner, however: 
candidates will do what they need to do to gain election. At the core of this approach is 
the need “to make politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups 
other than their own” (Horowitz 1991b, 471). Where a candidate needs the support of 
other ethnic groups to gain election, there is a powerful incentive for him or her to reach 
out to these groups in search of their second preferences. To build support from other
172
groups, candidates must behave moderately and accommodatively towards them. In 
ethnically divided societies, this means that electoral incentives promote policy 
concessions: even small minorities have a value in terms of where their preferences are 
directed, as small numbers of votes could always make the difference between victory 
and defeat for major candidates.
Horowitz’s conclusion is that AV is particularly appropriate for heterogeneous societies 
where cleavages run along ethnic lines. Under a preferential voting system, he notes, 
many elections will turn on second and third preferences. Parties that succeed in 
negotiating for second and third preferences will be rewarded. The outcome, he hopes, 
will be parties that deliberately moderate their policy positions so as to broaden their 
appeal. In those societies where ethnicity is a fundamental issue this will, he argues, 
result in the election of governments committed to accommodative policies:
I have advocated ... an electoral system that will make moderation rewarding by making 
politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members o f groups other than their own. The 
dependence is only marginal, o f course, but it will sometimes be the margin o f  victory. Since 
parties must pool votes before they pool merely seats, they must find ways before the election to 
communicate their ethnically and racially conciliatory intentions to the voters. After the election, 
they must deliver on those commitments or risk electoral retribution (1991a, 196).
Horowitz’s hypothesis about the workings of AV has until now remained just that — an 
untested hypothesis. The evidence from pre-independence PNG, however, lends some 
support to the claim that AV can promote accommodative practices in divided societies. 
First, and most importantly, the electoral campaign techniques in PNG’s pre­
independence elections outlined in Chapter Four provide direct evidence of co-operative 
and accommodative campaign practices at AV elections. This is important because a 
lack of supporting examples has always been the Achilles heel of the centripetal ‘vote­
pooling’ model. Sisk summed up the prevailing situation in 1996 by arguing that 
“although vote pooling is theoretically compelling, there is simply insufficient empirical 
evidence at the level of national politics to support claims that subsequent preference 
voting can lead to accommodative outcomes” (1996, 62). However, thanks to the 
detailed observations and electoral studies of PNG’s three AV elections, there is some 
evidence for such claims, although it is a measure of the relative obscurity of Papua 
New Guinea for many political scientists that none of the commentators on this issue 
were aware of the PNG example until the publication of material from this thesis. The 
evidence from PNG, and to a lessor extent from Fiji and Sri Lanka, also provides
173
support for two of the other concerns raised by critics of Horowitz’s theories: the 
“questionable assumptions” that politicians in ethnically-divided societies will respond 
to electoral incentives for moderation, and the question of whether voters in divided 
societies would be willing to give second-preference support to candidates from outside 
their own ethnic group (Sisk 1992, 43).
The evidence presented in Chapter Four suggests that vote pooling took place in three 
primary ways in pre-independence PNG, all of which were predicated on the 
assumption that most voters would invariably give their first preference to their own 
clan or ‘home’ candidate. The most common and successful method of vote pooling 
was for a candidate who had a limited ‘home’ support base to campaign widely for 
second-level support amongst rival groups. This required a range of techniques, such as 
translating campaign speeches and travelling widely throughout an electorate, with the 
essential request being not for a first-preference vote but for a second preference. This 
enabled electors to cast their primary vote for their ascriptive candidate — an essential 
element in cases of ascriptive ethnic identity — but to also indicate their second choice 
if their ascriptive candidate was not elected. For this strategy to succeed, candidates 
needed to be able to sell themselves as the ‘second-best’ choice — which meant, in 
general, someone who would look after all groups, not just their own. Bill Bloomfield’s 
victory in the 1964 elections was a good example of this approach in action.2
A second strategy for victory under AV was for candidates with significant existing 
support bases to reach out to selected allies for secondary support. Traditional tribal 
contacts and allegiances, for example, could be utilised to create majority victors. This 
similarly necessitated a commitment to behave positively towards that group if elected. 
In the Dei Open Electorate at the 1972 elections, for example, tribal leaders of 
previously hostile groups made deals with each other for preference support. The 
winning candidate forged particularly close connections with a traditional ally tribe via 
‘intensive ties of ceremonial exchange’, had urged his supporters to cast their 
preferences for a member of a hostile rival tribe as well as for himself, and consequently 
received a generous proportion of that opponent’s second preferences to win the seat 
(Strathem 1976, 277-81). It is thus possible that the ‘exchange’ obligations of 
traditional PNG society were replicated in modem electoral contests by similar
2 See Hughes and van der Veur 1965,409.
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‘exchange deals’, but this time with votes rather than material goods as the unit of 
currency.
A third strategy, and increasingly common by the time of the third AV election in 1972, 
was for groups and candidates to form mutual alliances, sometimes campaigning 
together and urging voters to cast reciprocal preferences for one or the other. Such 
alliances were a response to the incentives presented by AV towards campaigning on a 
common platform, whereby the sharing of preferences was seen as a rational activity 
which maximised the prospects of electoral victory. Such mutual alliances also appear 
to have given some impetus to the need to organise politically, and can thus be seen as 
the forerunners to the establishment of political parties in PNG.
Of course, the fact that PNG’s three AV elections were all held before independence and 
at a relatively early stage of political awareness and competition must also be taken into 
account when using the PNG experience as confirming evidence for the Horowitz case. 
The claim that preferential voting leads directly to policy concessions, for example, is 
not testable in relation to the early PNG elections. However, such arguments are, I will 
argue below, consistent with the ‘centrist’ tendencies of political parties in Australia, the 
only established democracy to currently use AV for national elections. Although 
Australia is an ethnically-diverse society it is not an ethnically-divided society, in the 
sense of ethnicity representing a fundamental political cleavage around which political 
interests are formed and mobilised, and so cannot be used to directly evaluate arguments 
for or against centripetalism. Australia does offer, however, the best evidence of the 
way preferential voting can encourage policy concessions and lead to the incorporation 
of minority issues into mainstream public policy.
AV and policy moderation in Australia
While the evidence from PNG is largely supportive of the Horowitz hypothesis, it does 
not provide direct support for the contention that moderation on policy issues will result 
from preference swapping and vote pooling deals. The undeveloped nature of PNG 
political competition in the pre-independence period meant that it was rare for 
candidates to contest elections on a specific policy platform. To see how preferential 
voting leads to policy concessions we need to look at the experience of preference 
swapping deals in Australia, where preferential voting — in the form of AV in the
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House of Representatives and STV in the Senate — has long been a distinguishing 
feature of electoral politics.
Australia makes a particularly interesting case for students of centripetalism for three 
reasons. First, the Australian experience represents by the far the best-established and 
longest-running example of preferential voting in the world today, with all three of the 
major preferential electoral systems (AV, CV and STV) having been used for elections 
in various jurisdictions in Australia. All three systems were also developed or 
substantially refined in Australia, and the Australian development of electoral 
institutions represents one of the more distinctive national contributions to institutional 
design (McLean 1996, 369). Having been a feature of Australian politics since the early 
years of this century, preferential voting has become an embedded and well- 
institutionalized factor of Australian politics. The Australian experience thus enables us 
to examine the effects of preferential voting upon political competition over a long 
period in a stable political environment.
The second distinctive feature of Australia is its combination of high degrees of ethnic 
diversity with low levels of inter-ethnic conflict. Australia has one of the world’s most 
ethnically-diverse populations, with approximately 40 percent of the population being 
overseas-bom or the offspring of overseas-bom immigrants, most of whom come from 
non-English speaking countries in southern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Despite 
this level of ethnic diversity, ethnic relations in Australia have been characterised by 
high levels of inter-communal harmony and integration, without “the sharp-edged and 
sometimes violent racial tension which is found in Britain, West Germany or the United 
States” (Jupp 1991, 51-52). Kukathas argues that Australia represents
an attractive model o f a modem multi-cultural society ... its migrants have come from all parts o f  
the world to contribute to a population marked by ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. Yet 
while this diversity is no less substantial than that found in other multicultural societies such as the 
United States —  and is more considerable than that found in others such as Malaysia or Germany 
or France —  it prevails in circumstances that are far more peaceful, and politically and socially 
stable, than those in any o f these other countries (1991, 167).
Australia has thus been relatively successful in integrating millions of recent arrivals 
into a democratic society, though considerably less so in achieving equality for its 
aboriginal population. In general, ethnicity has not become politicised in Australia, and 
many studies emphasise the low political profile of both ethnic actors and ethnic issues 
in Australia compared to their prominence in similar countries (see Jupp 1984).
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Third, the institutions and policies of contemporary Australia represent one of the best 
approximations of a complete package of centripetal political institutions amongst 
comparable democracies (see Horowitz 1985, 597-600). Australia combines a federal 
system of government which disperses power geographically; preferential voting 
systems for state and federal elections; three levels of government (federal, state and 
local) contributing to devolution; formal and informal offices representing ethnic 
interests; government policies aimed at reducing inequalities for underprivileged groups 
(particularly Aborigines and immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds); and 
an accepted government policy of ‘multiculturalism’ which urges ethnic group 
integration but not assimilation (Jupp 1991). Australia’s relatively benign ethnic 
situation would thus appear to offer some positive empirical evidence for the 
relationship between these dispersive and integrative institutions and policies and a 
harmonious multi-ethnic society, even if the direction of causation is far from clear.3
While Australia may offer some useful evidence for centripetal theories, for our 
purposes its comparative value is limited. Despite its ethnically-diverse society, 
Australia is clearly not a divided society in the sense of ethnicity being a politically- 
salient cleavage — indeed, its harmonious inter-ethnic relations would scarcely be 
possible if this were the case. Because of this, the Australian experience of preferential 
voting cannot be used to directly evaluate arguments for or against the centripetalist 
arguments concerning the relationship between preference-swapping arrangements 
under AV elections and policy moderation in divided societies. Australia does, 
however, offer the case which best illustrates the way preference-swapping can promote 
tangible policy changes on the part of parties and governments, and is thus worthy of 
investigation on this score alone.
The historical development of preferential voting systems in Australia is discussed in 
detail in the following chapter. In 1918, AV was introduced at the federal level to 
replace the existing FPTP system, after it became clear that several aligned conservative 
candidates all standing in the same electorate could split their combined vote between 
them under FPTP, thus handing victory to the less popular but more disciplined forces 
of the new Australian Labor Party (ALP). The introduction of AV was thus directly 
related to the need to encourage and reward collaboration or coalition arrangements
3 See Jupp 1991, 51
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between parties.4 * This ability to aggregate aligned interests, rather than divide them, 
has long been a (largely unrecognised) feature of Australian electoral politics, but it has 
not been until relatively recently that the full potential of preference distribution as an 
instrument for influencing policy decisions has been evident.
The most graphic example of this process in action occurred in the campaign for the 
1990 federal election, where the incumbent Australian Labor Party (ALP) was trailing 
the conservative Coalition badly in opinion polls and looked to be heading for electoral 
defeat, and where voter support for left-of-centre minority parties such as the Australian 
Democrats and Greens reached its height. The ALP, under the influence of senior 
strategist Senator Graham Richardson, assiduously courted the green vote in the lead-up 
to the election, both indirectly via interactions with the major environmental lobby 
groups and directly via media appeals to potential green voters. Policy initiatives 
palatable to green voters were announced, and the then Prime Minister Hawke used 
important sections of an address to the National Press Club to plead directly for second 
preferences:
I want to say to those who intend to vote for third party and independent candidates that they 
should consider with the greatest care where they direct their second preferences. This is a vital 
election and it is —  I make no bones about it —  a tight election. And so I say specifically to them 
—  if you do not want Medicare gutted, the capital gains tax scrapped, more uranium mining, a 
uranium enrichment industry in Australia, up-front tuition fees, mining in Kakadu, then your
preference between the two major parties must be Labor. ^
The ALP repeated this message in a national radio and television advertising campaign, 
appealing directly for the second or third preferences of minor party supporters, offering 
policy concessions on key issues and arguing that the Labor Party was far closer to their 
core interests than the major alternative, the Liberal/National Coalition.6 This strategy 
appeared markedly successful: with minor party support levels at an all time high of 
around 17 percent, the ALP was the beneficiary of around two-thirds of all preferences 
from Democrat and Green voters — a figure which probably made the difference 
between it winning and losing the election (Papadakis and Bean 1995, 103-4). This was 
thus a ‘win-win’ situation for both groups: the ALP gained government with less than 
40 percent of the first-preference vote, while the minor parties, who did not win any
4 See Graham 1962, 164-79.
6 Quoted in Warhurst 1990, 31.
6 See Hughes 1990, 140-51.
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lower house seats, nonetheless saw their preferred major party in government and 
committed to favourable policies in their areas of concern.
To see how this type of preference swapping worked in practice, we can examine the 
victory of the ALP’s Neville Newell in the seat of Richmond at the 1990 federal 
election. Newell scored only 27 percent of the first preference vote. The coalition 
candidate (and then leader of the National Party) Charles Blunt won over 41 percent of 
first preferences, and looked set for an easy victory. However, the count saw a 
combination of preferences from minor parties and independents, especially the anti­
nuclear campaigner Helen Caldicott, flow through to Newell and enable him to win the 
seat with 50.5 percent of the full preference vote.
Table 6.1: Allocation of Preferences in Division of Richmond, 1990
C andidate First
count
Second
count
Third
count
Fourth
count
Fifth
count
Sixth
C ount
F inal
C ount
G ibbs
(A ustralian
D em ocrats)
4346 4380 4420 4504 4683 Excluded E xcluded
N ew ell 
(A ustralian  
L abor Party)
18423 18467 18484 18544 18683 20238 34664
(E lected)
B aillie
(Independent)
187 E xcluded Excluded E xcluded E xcluded E xcluded E xcluded
Sim s (C all to 
A ustra lia  Party)
1032 1053 1059 1116 Excluded Excluded E xcluded
Paterson
(Independent)
445 480 530 Excluded E xcluded E xcluded E xcluded
Leggett
(Independent)
279 294 Excluded E xcluded Excluded Excluded E xcluded
B lunt (N ational 
Party)
28257 28274 28303 28416 28978 29778 33980
C aldicott
(Independent)
16072 16091 16237 16438 16658 18903 E xcluded
Source: Australian Electoral Commission 1990.
Newell won the seat because he was able to secure over 77 percent of Caldicott’s 
preferences when she was excluded at the seventh count. Caldicott herself had received 
the majority of preferences from the other independent candidates. The ALP in 
Richmond, as in other seats, was thus the beneficiary of a strategy aimed at maximising 
not just its own vote but at maximising the preferences it received from others: the 
‘second preference’ strategy. As support for the Australian Democrats and green parties 
reached its height in 1990, so the ALP’s assiduous campaigning for second preferences
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saw it receive around two-thirds of the preferences from these parties, which proved 
decisive for its electoral victory (Papadakis and Bean 1995, 103-4).
In Australia, interest in preferential voting tends to increase with its perceived partisan 
effect. The influence of preferences on electoral outcomes has clearly increased in 
recent decades and played a crucial role in the 1990 Labor victory in particular (Hughes 
1990, 140-51). The collapse of the Democrat vote in 1993 and the Coalition landslide at 
the 1996 federal election has meant that the effects of preference distribution have 
received less attention since then, although it has facilitated the election of increasing 
numbers of independent candidates (two in 1993, five in 1996), most of whom win then- 
seats by overtaking major party candidates on preferences. Elections held under AV 
also enable the votes of several aligned candidates to accumulate so that diverse but 
related electoral interests can be marshalled successfully without the vote being ‘split’ 
several ways. The long-standing coalition arrangement between the Liberal and 
National Parties in Australia is probably the best example of this arrangement working 
in practice. Conversely, there is evidence that AV also punishes parties which fragment 
internally, giving political leaders powerful incentives to maintain party unity (Jackman 
1992).
Commentators on Australian politics have historically regarded AV as a variation of 
FPTP, in most cases giving outcomes near identical to that system in terms of election 
results and the structure of party systems. Douglas Rae, for example, in his seminal 
work on the consequences of electoral laws, stated baldly that “the Australian system 
behaves in all its particulars as if it were a single-member district plurality formula” 
(Rae 1967, 108). David Butler thought AV made little difference to Australian electoral 
results and had “never been central in determining how governments have been chosen” 
(Butler 1973, 96). Writing in 1977, Colin Hughes agreed: it was “unlikely” that AV 
would “determine who governs Australia” (1977, 294). The common element in all 
these judgements is that they were predominantly based on the Australian federal 
elections of the 1950s and 1960s where, with the notable exception of the Democratic 
Labor Party (DLP), preference distribution had little effect on electoral outcomes. 
Today preferences play a much more important role in deciding the outcome of 
Australian elections than in previous decades. It is not possible to assume that voters’ 
primary choice at Australian AV elections would be replicated under a FPTP system,
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but if it were the results of the 1961, 1969 and 1990 elections would probably have been 
reversed.
Analyses of the effects of AV in Australia have tended to concentrate almost 
exclusively on its partisan impacts. Some commentators have seen the system as an 
instrument for maintaining the dominance of the two major parties, the ALP and the 
Liberal/National Coalition, and for restricting the role of minor parties in the lower 
house to one of influencing the policies of the major parties rather than gaining election 
themselves (Hughes 1977, 294). Others claim that it can enhance the power and 
position of minor parties, especially if they have the potential to hold the balance of 
power between two major parties (Aitkin, Jinks and Warhurst 1989, 150). There is 
widespread agreement that AV has facilitated coalition arrangements such as that 
between the Liberal and National parties, and that it works to the advantage of centre 
candidates and parties, encouraging moderate policy positions and a search for the 
‘middle ground’ (Bean 1986, 65). The sometimes fiery and aggressive rhetoric of 
Australian politics has often distracted observers from recognising just how much co­
operative behaviour there is between parties — via preference swapping deals, for 
example — and how close the major parties are on most substantive policy issues. 
There is little doubt that the AV electoral system provides a significant institutional 
encouragement for these tendencies.
Criticisms of centripetalism
The most comprehensive critique of centripetal theory has been made by Arend 
Lijphart, who described Horowitz’s proposals as a courageous challenge to the scholarly 
consensus which “however courageous ... does not deserve to succeed” (1991a, 99). 
Lijphart made several telling criticisms of the Horowitz plan, such as Horowitz’s 
suggestion that the AV may have to be used with multi-member constituencies, which 
produced disastrously lopsided results when used at Australian Senate elections from 
1919-1946 (Reilly and Maley 1996), and his claim that AV can provide sufficiently 
proportional election results to encourage party proliferation. But his major criticisms 
were directed at Horowitz’s claims that the use of AV in ethnically-divided societies is 
likely to reward moderation and produce incentives for accommodation. Lijphart 
argued that there is no more incentive towards moderate behaviour inherent in AV than
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there is in FPTP. He characterised Horowitz’s arguments by citing three imaginary 
candidates A, B and C supported by 45 percent, 40 percent and 15 percent of the voters 
respectively. Under Horowitz’s vote-pooling scenario, A and B will have to bid for the 
second preferences of C’s supporters in order to win — which will, according to 
Horowitz, reward moderation. Lijphart argued that exactly the same argument can be 
made for a FPTP electoral system:
In the same example under FPTP mles, many of C’s supporters will not want to waste their votes 
on C’s hopeless candidacy, or may not even be able to vote for C at all because C wisely decides 
not to pursue a hopeless candidacy. Hence here too, A and B will have to appeal to C’s supporters 
in order to win ... the votes instead o f the second preferences o f C’s supporters would be traded. 
AV and FPTP provide exactly the same incentives (1991, 94).
This argument assumes that minor candidates will pull out of an electoral race when 
their low support levels become clear. While this may be a defensible premise in some 
(usually Western) scenarios, in situations of ethnically-based voting it is simply not 
realistic. In PNG, for example, many clans will put forward their own candidate for 
election, regardless of that candidate’s chances of winning. Under FPTP this is indeed 
often a hopeless strategy, although justified in terms of the prestige and opportunity for 
social advancement associated with standing for political office. Under AV, by 
contrast, candidates from smaller clans (or those with a small home vote, such as 
expatriate candidates) were able to campaign outside their home area for other voters’ 
second preferences, in the full knowledge that first preferences would mostly go to the 
‘local’ clan candidate. In areas where there was no clear majority candidate, 
accommodative campaigning practices were encouraged by the need to gamer second 
preferences which may be relatively small in number but could provide the necessary 
margin of victory. Sisk concurs with this assessment, arguing that Lijphart’s equating 
of AV and FPTP
is premised on assumptions ... that do not always hold, especially given the emotional politics of 
divided societies. AV ... offers candidates an incentive to compromise that is lacking under first- 
past-the-post. Clearly, requiring a majority for election demands greater depth of support than 
does the plurality rule, and politicians would indeed have good reason to woo subsequent 
preference votes (Sisk 1993, 84).
The experience of preferential voting in Papua New Guinea, and the claims put forward 
for preferential voting in the Sri Lankan and Fijian contexts, suggest a need to look at 
preferential voting in a more expansive way than Lijphart and other commentators have 
attempted. In particular, the PNG case illustrates the differences between AV and FPTP
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in situations of fragmented ethnic divisions. The evidence from PNG elections before 
and after the change of electoral system in 1975 suggests that AV probably mitigated 
some of the more extreme examples of vote-splitting and candidate multiplication 
common in PNG elections today. The contention that preferential voting encourages 
collaborative campaigning is also supported by some of the pre-1975 evidence from 
PNG. In this way, the PNG case provides evidence for the argument that the AV 
promotes accommodative political behaviour to a greater degree than FPTP, and 
provides important support for the Horowitz thesis.
Lijphart also takes issue with Horowitz’s claim that AV mitigates the winner-take-all 
aspects of FPTP systems “and generally achieves better proportionality of seats to votes 
than plurality systems do” (Horowitz 1991a, 166). For evidence against this claim, 
Lijphart cites Rae’s observation that AV behaves in all its particulars, including its 
degree of disproportionality, as if it were a FPTP system (Rae 1967, 108). Surprisingly, 
Lijphart does not quote much more recent evidence from his own work and that of 
others which shows that AV is considerably more proportional than most FPTP 
examples. In his book Democracies, Lijphart found that AV sat around mid-way on an 
index of disproportionality of electoral systems: it was as or more proportional than all 
non-PR systems such as FPTP or the double-ballot, but less proportional than all PR 
systems (1984, 160). More recently, Taagepera and Shugart found that Australia, the 
only AV example, had one-half to one-third the deviation from proportionality of most 
FPTP systems, and was actually more proportional than PR systems in Spain, South 
Korea and elsewhere (1989, 106-7). On these examples, Horowitz’s claim that AV is 
more proportional than FPTP is entirely justifiable.7 Nonetheless, AV is clearly less 
proportional than most forms of PR and has often been criticised by electoral reformists 
for this very reason. Enid Lakeman, for example, argued that AV results could be 
“nearly as unrepresentative as those of a British general election”, giving the example of 
the 1948 AV election in the Canadian province of Alberta, at which the Social Credit 
party won a clean sweep of all seats with 58 percent of the total vote (1974, 63-64).
Discussion of proportionality in this context refers specifically to the seats-votes 
relationship: an electoral system is proportional to the extent that a party’s share of the 
vote is matched by its share of the seats in parliament. For many, this has become the
7 But see Lijphart 1997 for a response to this argument.
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pre-eminent criterion against which electoral systems should be judged. As Lijphart has 
put it, “there is wellnigh universal agreement that electoral proportionality is a major 
goal of electoral systems and a major criterion by which they should be judged”; 
particularly for supporters of PR systems it is “virtually synonymous with electoral 
justice” (1994, 140). Proportionality between votes and seats is often considered to be 
something of a sine qua non of electoral systems: Lijphart has summarised the case for 
PR as a “feeling that disproportional electoral results are inherently unfair and 
undemocratic” (1996, 176). Proportional election results are often considered to be 
particularly important for ethnically-divided societies because they enable minorities to 
be represented in the legislature and (through power-sharing arrangements) to take part 
in governing coalitions.
However, under certain conditions majoritarian systems can also produce proportional 
results. In an important article on the choice of electoral systems for southern Africa, 
Joel Barkan has argued that, particularly for agrarian societies in developing countries, 
the benefits often claimed for PR in terms of fairness of representation can be replicated, 
under conditions of regional aggregation of minority groups, by single-member 
majoritarian systems. Looking at the founding list PR elections held in Namibia (1989) 
and South Africa (1994), Barkan found that the proportional distribution of seats under 
PR would have been substantially the same if single-member districts had been used. 
This is because of a fundamental difference in voting patterns between agrarian village- 
based societies in developing countries and urban industrial societies in the West. In the 
latter, politics tends to be issue-based and characterised by a geographical dispersion of 
the vote. In the former, electors tend to vote in far more homogenous blocs for their 
‘local’ candidate. Electoral boundaries that are drawn so as to encapsulate tribal groups 
can result in levels of proportionality roughly equivalent to those of PR systems, but 
with a far higher degree of contact between a representative and his or her constituents:
Voters in agrarian societies tend to vote in geographic blocs that are highly homogenous. As a 
result, it is not unusual for parties to obtain more than 90 percent of the vote in some areas and less 
than 10 or 15 percent in others. What appears from a distance to be a multiparty system is in 
actuality a collection o f regional one-party systems ... The more agrarian the society, then, the 
higher the geographic concentration o f the vote and the more closely the distribution o f seats 
under [a single-member district] system will mirror the distribution of the total vote, as well as the 
distribution o f seats that would be obtained under PR (Barkan 1995, 114).
All forms of PR require multi-member electorates of some type, meaning that there can 
be no single representative for each constituency. Barkan believes this lack of linkage
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between representatives and constituents greatly reduces the prospects for democratic 
consolidation when PR systems are used in developing countries with large rural 
populations (1995, 107). While the true closeness of these links have often been 
overplayed in regards to the developed industrialised world, they retain a great degree of 
salience in many agrarian societies:
Because under the purest forms of PR legislative seats are allocated from party lists according to 
each party’s proportion o f the total national vote, individual MPs do not identify with, nor can 
they be held accountable to, the residents of a specific geographic constituency. Yet in agrarian 
societies, this lack o f linkage between representatives and constituents greatly reduces the 
prospects for the consolidation o f democratic rule ... In agrarian societies, people evaluate parties 
and candidates in terms of their potential for, or past record of, constituency service. Yet PR 
consistently frustrates such voter expectations. Not only are MPs not responsible for addressing 
the needs of specific localities, but their political careers depend primarily on satisfying their 
party’s leadership, which determines their rankings on the party list for the next election (Barkan 
1995, 107- 8).
Barkan says that “the experience of southern Africa offers substantial evidence of PR’s 
primary shortcoming, and has given rise to calls for the system’s abolition or 
modification” (1995, 108). How far Barkan’s arguments are applicable to a country like 
PNG, where most constituencies encapsulate a comparatively large number of small 
clan or tribal groups and where party identification does not appear to have a significant 
influence on voter behaviour, is difficult to say. Nonetheless, the wider point is clear: 
there are identifiable circumstances where PR may not be the most appropriate electoral 
system for a divided society, and where the accountability and access to political 
representation facilitated by single-member systems may be more appropriate devices 
for building sustainable democracy. It is worth recalling at this point that the Fiji CRC 
also considered, and rejected, PR electoral prescriptions as an option for the new 1997 
Fijian Constitution. In keeping with Barkan’s arguments, the CRC’s major objection to 
PR was the lack of geographic accountability and effective representation provided by 
the system — because party-list PR systems necessarily treat provinces, regions or even 
a whole country as a single constituency, they “often fail to provide the important links 
between a voter and his or her member” (CRC 1996, 307).
This is also an issue of considerable importance to geographically large countries, where 
regional variations mean that some form of identifiable geographic representation is all 
but essential. If we take the ten largest ‘established’ democracies identified by Lijphart 
(forthcoming) in descending order of geographic size — Canada, the USA, Australia, 
India, Colombia, Venezuela, Botswana, France, Spain, and Papua New Guinea — it is
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noteable that eight of the ten utilise some form of single-member district representation 
for their national elections, either via FPTP, AV, TRS or MMP systems (Colombia and 
Spain, which use list PR, are the only exceptions). If we look at transitional 
democracies, this trend is even clearer: while list PR has been the most popular choice 
for many new democracies, geographically large countries such as Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Mongolia have all chosen systems which incorporate single-member 
representation.
Single-member constituencies also enable electors to vote specifically for a candidate 
rather than a party’s pre-assigned list of chosen candidates. One of the orthodoxies of 
much of the literature on electoral systems is the assumption of ‘party identification’ on 
the part of the electorate: that voters primarily identify with and vote for parties as their 
basic object of political loyalty. While such an assumption may hold true for Western 
democracies, in many non-Westem cases the opposite is often truer: parties are built 
around dominant personalities, and voters cast their ballots predominantly for 
candidates, not parties. In some countries such as Uganda there is a mandated ‘no 
party’ system (Kasfir 1998); in others like PNG or the Solomon Islands, parties are so 
weak as to have little or no meaning and often campaign on essentially the same 
platform. 'Where the primary level of voter identification is with individuals rather than 
parties, list PR systems are not feasible, and consideration needs be given to systems 
that enable voters to express their political opinions for candidates instead.
This is not to argue that single-member methods such as AV will be superior to PR for 
all divided societies. The accommodation-inducing appeals of AV are based on the 
assumption that moderation on the part of political leaders will see them gain more 
secondary preference votes from other communities than the first-preference votes they 
may lose from their own group by appearing ‘soft’ on communal interests. This 
assumes that there is a portion of the electorate in which sufficient sentiment for 
moderation exists to make such strategies electorally appealing (Sisk 1995, 38). 
However, in very deeply-divided societies which have experienced extremely bitter 
ethnic antagonisms, this assumption may not hold. In cases involving genocidal inter­
ethnic relations such as the ‘ethnic cleansing’ strategies employed by various groups in 
Bosnia or Rwanda, relations between the major ethnic groups are so deeply hostile that 
it is difficult to envisage conditions under which electors of one group would be
186
prepared to vote for candidates from another. In such cases, the only viable form of 
democracy may be a consociational one in which elections are contested 
overwhelmingly by ethnically-based parties, with minimal pre-election contact between 
competing parties and their supporters, and with any accommodation having to take 
place in negotiations between ethnic elites after the election rather than before. The 
problem with such an approach is that it assumes that elites are willing to be moderate, 
when much of the evidence from places like Bosnia tends to directly challenge such an 
assumption.8
There has been an ongoing debate amongst scholars of ethnic conflict as to the 
applicability of the various electoral engineering options to conflicts of different levels 
of intensity. On the one hand, advocates of consociationalism and list PR point to its 
use as a successful conflict-management tool in the divided societies of Western 
Europe, such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland — societies which have 
become less conflictual over the course of this century (Lijphart 1977). On the other, 
advocates of centripetal approaches point to the general failure of consociationalism in 
the developing world, arguing that it is precisely the low level of conflict in the divided 
societies of Western Europe which accounts for consociationalism’s success there 
(Horowitz 1985, 571-72). The limited empirical evidence available suggests that 
centripetal approaches based on AV elections may work best in situations where there is 
a degree of fluidity to ethnic identities and relationships, while approaches based on 
consociationalism may be more appropriate for more intense inter-ethnic hostilities. 
Countries which have adopted AV electoral methods appear to be characterised by more 
moderate conflicts and/or more fluid group identities (such as those in PNG and Fiji), 
than those that have adopted list PR systems for transitional elections following intense 
conflicts (such as South Africa, Cambodia, Bosnia). This fits with the theoretical 
speculation that systems which require a degree of bargaining and cross-ethnic voting 
(such as AV) may be less realistic in extremely deeply-divided societies — where inter-
8 The experience of list PR in Bosnia is a good example o f how proportionality itself will not encourage 
accommodation if other required characteristics are not present. In Bosnia, groups are represented in 
parliament in proportion to their numbers in the community as a whole, but because parties rely 
exclusively on the votes o f members o f their own community for their electoral success, there is little 
incentive for them to behave accommodatively on ethnic issues. In fact, the incentives are in the other 
direction: as it is easy to mobilise support by playing the ‘ethnic card’, the major parties in Bosnia have 
every incentive to emphasise ethnic issues and sectarian appeals. The result, at the 1996 Bosnian 
elections, was effectively an ethnic census, with electors voting along ethnic lines and each o f the major 
nationalist parties gaining support almost exclusively from their own ethnic group.
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ethnic bargains, if any, will have to be made by elites alone, elected proportionately by 
list PR systems — than in cases where there is a degree of fluidity to ethnic identities 
(Reilly and Reynolds, forthcoming).
A secondary weakness of AV is the way it can discriminate against third-placed parties 
or candidates. To give a simple example: in a situation where there are three major 
parties supported by three main ethnic groups, a candidate with 32 percent of the vote 
will be eliminated before other candidates with 33 and 35 percent. Tiny differences in 
vote share can result in major differences in the order of elimination and thus in 
determining successful candidates. While it could be argued that the preferences of the 
eliminated candidate will at least determine which of the remaining two wins the seat, 
this may be completely unsatisfactory in situations of ethnic division: in an extreme 
case one party or group may be left with no representation at all. This suggests that AV 
may not be a good choice for a country facing a three-way split between major ethnic 
groups. AV can also be as capricious as FPTP when dealing with a situation where one 
party is in a permanent minority, as Johnston has argued:
If one party has, say, forty percent o f the first preference votes, but those who do not rank the 
party first rank it last, then it may fail to win any seats. This would only occur if it won forty 
percent of the votes in each constituency, o f course, but the greater the number o f constituencies in 
which it fell below fifty-percent in the first preferences, the greater the probability o f it being 
underrepresented in the allocation o f seats (1984, 63-64).
While this scenario does indeed highlight one of the disadvantages of AV, it also serves 
to illustrate precisely why preferential voting can exert a centripetal force on politics in 
divided societies. By providing incentives for parties to moderate their policies in the 
search for second preferences, AV encourages parties seeking to govern outright to 
move away from extreme positions and towards the policy centre. If a party has a solid 
support base of 40 percent but is ranked last by all other voters, then clearly it needs to 
examine the reasons that it so polarizes the electorate — why, for example, is it not 
picking up at least some second preferences? Such soul-searching may well lead to a 
recognition that a move towards the middle ground on some important issue is required 
to attract preferences if the party is to be electorally viable. Preferential voting also 
enables minority interests to swap lower-order preferences for policy influence. The 
ALP victory at the 1990 Australian federal election was dependent to a significant 
extent on the preferences it received from green voters in precisely this manner.
188
The arguments for and against AV are a good example of the contextual nature of 
electoral system design, and how proponents of different approaches run the risk of 
talking past each other. There is no perfect electoral system, and no ‘right’ way to 
approach the subject of electoral system design. The major criteria for designing 
electoral systems for all societies, not just divided ones, are sometimes in conflict with 
each other or even mutually exclusive. Devices which increase proportionality, such as 
increasing the number of seats to be elected in each district, will almost inevitably 
lessen other desirable characteristics, such as promoting geographic accountability 
between the electorate and the parliament. A tension also exists in the range of electoral 
system options for divided societies between systems which put a premium on 
representation of minority groups (such as list PR) and those which try to emphasise 
minority influence (such as AV). As Horowitz has noted, “measures that will guarantee 
representation to a given ethnic or racial group may not foster the inclusion of that 
group’s interest more broadly in the political process” (1991, 165). The best option, of 
course, is to have both: representation of all significant groups, but in such a way as to 
maximise their influence and involvement in the policy-making process. This goal is 
best achieved by building devices to achieve both proportionality and incentives for 
inter-ethnic accommodation into the electoral system itself. However, these goals are 
not always mutually compatible.
Conclusion
Prescriptions for constitutional engineering via manipulation of electoral rules tend to be 
based on an underlying presumption of rational, self-interested behaviour on the part of 
political actors. Previous chapters of this thesis have demonstrated how the 
campaigning behaviour of PNG politicians and their supporters appears to have been 
influenced by the electoral system in place. The message of these chapters is that PNG 
politicians are no different to those elsewhere: they are rational actors who will respond 
to the incentives present under different electoral rules in order to facilitate their 
election. In the language of rational choice theory, they are self-interested utility 
maximisers. They will do what they have to do to win, and when the rules of the game 
change, many will change their behaviour accordingly. While a general finding that 
politicians want to win and hold on to power is a truism, this argument has a special 
significance when applied to the study of political behaviour in PNG, which — heavily
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influenced by anthropology — has often focussed on the exotic or colourful examples of 
political behaviour as much as the rational. To give but a few examples: the
discussions of the ‘election sickness’ that swept the Gadsup after the 1964 elections9; 
election-related cargo cult movements such as the Johnson cult10; the election of the 
cult leader Yaliwan at the 1972 elections (with a record 87 percent of the vote)* 11; and 
the persistence of candidates who contest elections without receiving a single vote (not 
even their own) at recent elections12 are all examples of apparently non-rational 
behaviour on the part of PNG politicians and/or their supporters. But concentration on 
these incidents has tended to obscure what is an underlying rationality on the part of 
PNG’s political actors, who in most cases make rational responses to electoral 
incentives in search of victory. Tsebelis has argued that a successful rational-choice 
explanation of a political event “describes the prevailing institutions and context in 
which the actor operates, persuading the reader that she would have made the same 
choice if placed in the same situation” (1990, 44). This thesis is not a work in the 
rational choice genre, but the conclusions I draw are very similar to those of rational 
choice theory in comparative politics outlined by Tsebelis: if we can show that the 
behaviour of political actors is an optimal response to the institutional environment, it 
therefore follows that the prevailing institutions are to some degree responsible for the 
behaviour of these actors, and thus for political or social outcomes (Tsebelis 1990, 40).
This leads me to the core normative argument of this thesis: because political actors 
will respond to the rules of the game, and to the incentives or constraints inherent in 
these rules, so deliberate engineering of these rules can have a marked effect on political 
behaviour. The PNG comparison of an electoral system which acts as a zero-sum game 
(FPTP) compared to an electoral system which, under certain circumstances, acts as a 
positive-sum game (AV) illustrates this point quite well. As detailed in previous 
chapters, there is evidence that AV served to encourage co-operative and 
accommodative political strategies and behaviour. There is also evidence for the
9 See Watson 1964, 111.
10 The Johnson cult was a well-publicised case at the 1964 elections where a significant number o f  
electors on the island of New Hanover apparently wanted to vote for U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson 
rather than the local candidate. The villagers had apparently been told that they were free to nominate 
whoever they liked for election and, perhaps with the abundance of American wartime supplies and 
equipment in mind, chose to nominate President Johnson. See Hughes and van der Veur 1965, 403-4.
11 For a good discusssion of the Yaliwan case, see Winnett and May 1983, 255-67.
12 This has occurred in each o f the past three elections.
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obverse: that is, when incentives for co-operation were removed, ethnic groups reverted 
to their traditional hostilities. This return to conflict appears to have been encouraged 
by incentives for non-accommodative behaviour inherent in the new FPTP electoral 
system, which rewarded vote-splitting and appears to have contributed to zero-sum 
campaigning styles. Attempts since 1975 to constrain these activities have generally 
proved unsuccessful: candidates have reacted to the incentives within FPTP by
focusing their energies on maximising their clan-based vote and in many cases 
restricting the campaigning of opposition candidates to their own home areas. This has 
led to politicians being elected on increasingly small pluralities, and to ever-increasing 
numbers of candidates standing for election, as the higher the number of candidates, the 
smaller the total vote needed to gain a plurality and hence win the seat. These all 
represent ‘rational’ responses to the incentives provided by the FPTP electoral system.
The PNG experience of AV, by contrast, suggests that in ethnically-fragmented 
societies, centripetal electoral institutions can provide important incentives towards 
ethnic accommodation. This has clear implications for many other multiethnic societies 
searching for appropriate electoral institutions. As Esman has noted of ethnic politics in 
general,
Electoral systems in which politicians depend on votes only from coethnics tend to reward ethnic 
extremists who assert maximal demands. Systems in which politicians seeking election must 
appeal to members of more than a single ethnic community and depend on their electoral support 
generally produce more moderate politics and reward accommodative politicians with cross-ethnic 
appeals (1994, 258).
The evidence from PNG lends support to Esman: integrative electoral institutions did 
indeed appear to produce more moderate politics, in terms of campaigning behaviour at 
least, and rewarded those politicians who made cross-ethnic appeals. In addition, the 
Australian experience discussed earlier suggests that the use of AV there has 
encouraged a broad search for the political ‘middle ground’ by the major parties, as well 
as encouraging coalition arrangements and preference-swapping deals, and assisting the 
consolidation of a relatively stable party system. These are precisely the type of 
qualities that political engineers in other regions have identified as desirable. To give 
but two examples: Arturo Valenzuela has argued that what is most needed for
democratic consolidation in Latin America “is an institutional context that encourages 
the formation of coalitions among parties and groups [and] the search for a majoritarian 
consensus that is so essential for govemability in a highly variegated political society”
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(1993, 14). Looking mostly at Africa, Larry Diamond has argued that the optimum 
political institutions for the consolidation of democracy include “settled and 
aggregative” party systems in which “one or two broadly-based, centrist parties fight for 
the middle ground” (1996, 239). The evidence from Australia in particular suggests that 
AV electoral arrangements have contributed to precisely these types of outcomes.
But Australian politics has not had to deal with the zero-sum implications of political 
competition that are a feature of deeply-divided societies, and consequently has largely 
been spared the necessity of designing moderating political institutions, or of examining 
the relationship between preferential voting and ethnic relations. As this thesis has 
attempted to demonstrate, this is not the case elsewhere. Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka 
and Fiji have all suffered violent ethnic conflicts which have prompted sustained 
examination of how adequately to represent diverse ethnic interests in divided societies. 
The ongoing debate about the appropriateness of electoral structures in these countries is 
thus directly related to serious questions about regime stability and performance: for 
example, PNG’s first prime minister, Michael Somare, has claimed that PNG’s FPTP 
electoral system is “the root cause of the country’s political instability” (‘Somare Calls 
for Reforms’, Post Courier, 4 May 1988). The failure of an electoral system to produce 
accommodative, effective and (perhaps) legitimate government is thus seen as an issue 
that goes beyond one of government function, to having wider implications for a 
country’s security, stability and long-term viability as a nation state. The comparative 
evidence presented in previous chapters suggests that by encouraging accommodation 
between competing groups, by encouraging moderation in policy positions and by 
increasing the influence of minorities, preferential voting may be a useful institutional 
instrument for assisting these aims.
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Chapter Seven:
Preferential voting in comparative perspective
So far, this thesis has largely focussed upon the conflict-management potential of one 
preferential electoral system: the alternative vote. However, as defined at the start of 
this thesis, there are actually three different preferential voting systems used for national 
elections, consisting of two majority systems — the alternative vote and the contingent 
vote — plus the single transferable vote (STV) form of proportional representation. All 
three systems can themselves be further broken down into ‘compulsory preferential’ and 
‘optional preferential’ versions, depending upon whether the decision to mark 
preferences beyond the first choice is left to the voter (as in most cases) or whether, as 
in Australia, it is a legislative requirement for a valid ballot that a complete rank- 
ordering of preferences for all candidates be expressed. Compulsory preferential AV is 
used for Australian federal elections to the House of Representatives and for Legislative 
Assembly elections in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory. The only national-level application of optional preferential AV was in PNG 
between 1964 and 1975. It was, however, also used as the electoral system for the 20 
‘white’ seats in Zimbabwe’s 1979 elections.1 It was also used for elections to state and 
provincial parliaments in Australia and Canada earlier this century, and has more 
recently been adopted in the Australian states of New South Wales and Queensland.
All examples of the contingent vote (CV) to date have featured optional preference 
marking. The contingent vote was developed as a simple alternative to a two-stage run­
off election and was first used in Queensland from 1892-1942. It was also used for 
Democratic primary elections in the American state of Alabama between 1915-1931 
(where it was known as the ‘second-choice vote’) and, as detailed in Chapter Five, for 
presidential elections in Sri Lanka since 1978 (where it is known as the ‘preferential 
vote’). In 1993 it was also recommended as an alternative electoral system for Britain 
by the Labour Party’s Plant Commission, who (thinking they had invented a new 
electoral system) called it the ‘supplementary vote’. The system has thus been 
independently ‘invented’ on at least four separate occasions.
Finally, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) form of proportional representation is used 
today for elections in Ireland, Malta, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the
1 See Sithole 1986, 77. Thanks to Andy Reynolds for bringing the Zimbabwean case to my attention.
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Australian Senate, with only the latter making a complete expression of all preferences 
compulsory.2 It has also been used in ‘one-off elections in Northern Ireland (where it 
is still used for local elections) and Estonia. While STV always utilises multi-member 
electoral districts, both AV and CV elections can be held in both single and multi­
member districts, although the single-member version is much more common. Today, 
multi-member AV survives only in Nauru, and even there in an unusual form, and in 
state upper houses in Victoria and Tasmania, although it was also used (with 
spectacularly unsatisfactory results) in the Australian Senate from 1919 to 1946. When 
Queensland used CV, some two-member electorates were used alongside the more 
familiar single-member districts, although all other applications of the system appear to 
have occurred exclusively in single-member seats.
This combination of optional versus compulsory preference marking and single versus 
multi-member electoral districts at first glance presents a potentially confusing range of 
preferential voting alternatives, but in practice most jurisdictions make preference 
marking optional rather than compulsory, while almost all contemporary systems of 
preferential voting, with the exception of STV, utilise single-member rather than multi­
member districts. A full typology of the national and state level usage of preferential 
electoral systems around the world is presented at Table 7.1.
2 In Tasmania, voters must express as many preferences as there are candidates to be elected (five per 
electorate).
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Table 7.1: A Typology of Preferential Electoral Systems
T ype of Single Contingent A lternative A lternative A lternative
election transferable vote vote (optional vote vote in m ulti-
vote preferences) (com pulsory m em ber
preferences) districts
National Ireland 1922- - Papua New Australia 1918- Nauru 1968-
legislative Malta 1947- Guinea 1964-elections (lower 1975
house) Estonia 1990 Zimbabwe
Northern 1979 (white
Ireland 1973, 
1982
seats only)
National Australia - - - Australia
legislative (Senate) 1949- (Senate) 1919-
elections 
(upper house)
1946
National - Sri Lanka Ireland 1937- - -
presidential
elections
1978-
State and Tasmania Queensland Queensland Victoria 1916- South Australia
provincial
elections
1907- 1892-1942 1992- Queensland 1929-1935
Australian New South New South 1962-1992 Victoria
Capital Wales 1926- Wales 1981- (Legislative
Territory 1993- 1928 Northern Australia 1912- Council) 1916-
New South Alabama 1915- Territory 1980
S o u th  A u str a lia
Tasmania
Wales 1918- 
1926
New South 
Wales
1931 Victoria 1911- 
1915
1936- (Legislative Council) 1907-
New South 
Wales 1929- 
1980
Western 
Australia 1907- 
1911*
Alberta 1926- 
1955
(Legislative 
Council) 1978-
Western 
Australia 
(Legislative 
Council) 1989-
South Australia
British
Colombia
1952-1954
(Legislative Manitoba
Council) 1982- 1927-1936
Sources: Wright 1980; Crisp 1983, 137; Goot 1985; Jaensch 1995; Farrell, Mackerras and McAllister 
1996; Corry and Hodgetts 1960. Note that Wright 1980 and Crisp 1983 both classify Western Australia 
1907-1911 as using the contingent vote.
Interestingly, all of these system variations have been advocated, at various times, as the 
most appropriate electoral systems for divided societies. STV has attracted legions of 
admirers and many advocates of its suitability for multiethnic societies (e.g. the Street 
Royal Commission in Fiji), but has been introduced in relatively few cases. CV was, as
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we have seen, introduced as part of Sri Lanka’s 1978 constitutional settlement, and 
subsequently recommended by Horowitz as being particularly appropriate for divided 
societies elsewhere. Single-member AV has attracted a considerable degree of support 
in Papua New Guinea, and has recently been instituted as part of the constitutional 
settlement in Fiji. Finally, multi-member AV was recommended as the most 
appropriate system for post-apartheid South Africa by Horowitz, and also by the Fiji 
CRC, but was not instituted in either. Moreover, the question of optional versus 
compulsory preference marking has also been the subject of disagreement and debate 
amongst the various advocates of the different systems (Laponce 1957, CRC 1996, 
Punnett 1987). Despite this range of support for the different system variations, 
sustained examination of the theoretical and practical consequences of each system 
choice suggests that not all preferential systems are equally effective as instruments for 
encouraging moderation in divided societies. In particular, the consequences of the 
different forms of system structure all have significant impacts upon the efficacy of 
these systems as instruments of constitutional engineering. The following examination 
of the development and practical experience of these different system choices enables a 
sustained comparative examination of the relative performance of these different 
preferential systems.
The historical development of preferential voting
Preferential voting evolved as a compressed form of two-round system (TRS) or 
‘runoff election, which utilises a second round of voting if no candidate secures a 
majority in the first round. TRS elections have much older antecedents than preferential 
ones, being commonly used for parliamentary elections in many countries until the end 
of last century.3 Speaking in 1891, Sir Samuel Griffith claimed that “the system of the 
second ballot is part of every democratic programme put forward in every country”.4 
The system continues to be used today in France and countries associated with France, a 
number of former Soviet republics, and for presidential elections in many countries. 
The TRS has three central advantages in common with preferential voting procedures: 
it encourages candidates to broaden their support base in search of a majority; it limits
3 In Great Britain attempts were made in 1872 and 1882 to introduce the runoff; and it was briefly tried in 
New Zealand and New South Wales in the early part o f this century. See Steed 1975, 40, 43.
4 Quoted in Wright 1980, 58.
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the impact of vote splitting; and it ‘manufactures’ majority support for one candidate or 
another. These factors together provide a powerful institutional incentive towards 
centrist politics — but, it must be noted, only in those cases where no candidate gamers 
a majority in the first round. In such cases, the TRS forces both of the top two 
candidates from the first round of voting to broaden their appeal on partisan issues for 
the second-round runoff. When the runoff winner assumes office, this should lead to 
greater responsiveness and moderation on policy positions than would be the case if the 
winner had a plurality of votes alone. One of the most graphic examples of the 
‘moderating’ impact of the TRS has been its use in combating the Ku Klux Klan in 
several American states:
The rise o f the Ku Klux Klan in the South spurred interest in the runoff provision in at least one 
state as a way to consolidate anti-Klan voters behind a more moderate candidate in a second 
primary. If nominations were made simply by plurality vote, a candidate relying on the solid 
support of the Klan (or some other extremist group) could conceivably snatch victory from the 
hands o f a crowded field o f contenders —  including some candidates more widely acceptable to 
the electorate —  with only a small percentage o f the total vote (Bullock and Johnson 1992, 6).
This quote also illustrates a second advantage of the TRS: it reduces the possibility of 
several candidates from similar support bases ‘splitting’ their vote between them. 
Diverse interests which competed with each other in the first round election can, if 
necessary, coalesce behind successful candidates in the lead up to the second round. 
The adoption of the TRS in Arkansas in 1924 was a reaction to the fear of splitting the 
anti-Klan vote in a straight plurality election contest (Bullock and Johnson 1992, 6). Of 
course, as pointed out earlier, if the original support base is so fractured that none of the 
candidates from that group make the runoff stage, then the vote-splitting advantage is 
negated. Nonetheless, a second round of voting almost always encourages bargains and 
trade-offs between parties and candidates. Sartori also praises the TRS as a “two-shot” 
system which enables voters to have a second choice or even change their mind between 
the first and second round (1994, 63). By contrast, a major disadvantage of TRS 
elections is the pressure they place on the electoral administration by having to run a 
second election a week or two after the first, thus increasing costs, instability and 
uncertainty (Reynolds and Reilly 1997, 44).
The final and most apparent advantage of the TRS is that it ensures whoever is elected 
will have received a mandate of an absolute majority of the voters. It is this advantage, 
so conspicuously absent from many FPTP elections, that encouraged 19th century
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electoral reformers to think of ways of merging the advantages of the TRS in ensuring a 
majority victor with the simplicity of a single election. To do so required some method 
of rank-ordering candidates on the ballot, such as a systematic comparison of preference 
schedules. The possibilities of such aggregations of rank-orders was originally 
suggested by Charles de Borda in the eighteenth century in relation to decision-making 
procedures in assemblies and committees, but was vigorously criticised by one of the 
giants in the field of voting theory, the Marquis de Condorcet, when adopted in this 
form by the French in 1789 (McLean and Hewitt 1994, 45). As Rokkan has shown, the 
‘French method’ of successive runoff elections was developed in response to the 
requirements of decision-making assemblies, which often needed to make choices 
between a number of alternatives via sequential runoff elections which were repeated 
successively until a majority winner was reached. Such a system thus entails an implicit 
rank-ordering of preferences (1968, 15). Such exhaustive repetition of runoff elections, 
sequentially eliminating lowest-placed candidates one-by-one until a majority winner is 
found, continues to be used in a number of such assemblies (the International Olympic 
Committee’s means of choosing the venue for the Olympic Games being perhaps the 
best known of these). But it is an impractical method for mass-suffrage political 
elections, where a sequence of runoffs need to be compressed from several elections 
into one. The solution was what Rokkan described as “the great innovation” of British 
electoral reformers: the single transferable vote (1968, 15).
The Single Transferable Vote
The first serious proposal for applying the preferential ballot to nationwide elections 
was put forward by Thomas Hare in 1856 as part of his manifesto for a new form of 
proportional representation, The Election o f Representatives, Parliamentary and 
Municipal.5 A classic product of Victorian liberalism, Hare’s proposal for a ‘single 
transferable vote’ (STV) was publicly championed by his mentor John Stuart Mill, who 
called it “among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of 
government” (McLean and Urken 1995, 46). The core principles of the system had 
been independently invented around the same time by Carl Andras in Denmark. STV 
uses multi-member districts with voters ranking candidates in order of preference on the 
ballot paper (i.e. 1, 2, 3, etc.) in the same manner as the alternative vote. After the total
5 All references here are to the fourth edition: Hare 1873.
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number of first preference votes are tallied, the count then begins by establishing the 
‘quota’ of votes required for the election of a single candidate. Any candidate who has 
as many or more first preferences as the quota is immediately elected. If no-one has 
achieved the quota, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is 
eliminated with his or her second preferences being redistributed to the candidates left in 
the race. At the same time, the surplus votes of elected candidates (i.e. those votes 
above the quota), are redistributed according to the second preferences on the ballot 
papers. This process continues until all members have been elected.
The ‘Hare system’, as it was known, was to be much admired but much modified by 
future electoral reformers (such as, in Australia, Catherine Helen Spence and Andrew 
Inglis Clark) as they attempted to fashion a functioning electoral system from Hare’s 
ambitious but impractical basic model. One of the few parts of Hare’s original scheme 
for STV not to require modification was the idea of the transferability of preferential 
votes “from one candidate to another until it reaches a candidate whom the elector has 
named” (1873, 121-22). This transferability of votes from both excluded candidates and 
those elected candidates with a ‘surplus’ of votes formed a central part of Hare’s new 
scheme for a nationwide system of proportional representation. From the outset, the 
proposal that votes should be transferable was criticised as being overly complex and 
beyond the understanding of ordinary voters (Hare 1873, viii). Hare saw it instead as a 
“vast augmentation of their electoral power” and criticised those who had argued that it 
was beyond the capacity of the average elector as being mischievous and patronising 
(1873, viii).
Like Mill, Hare was not reluctant to ascribe wider benefits to his electoral proposal, 
seeing it as “bringing to the duty of voting reflection, judgement and moderation” (1873, 
122) which “by the opportunity the voting papers afford of separating, distinguishing, 
and bringing out every form of political opinion, will give an immeasurable increase of 
force and strength to the representative principle” (1873, 127). This polemic approach 
to STV continued into the academic study of electoral systems in the 20th century. 
Taagepera and Shugart see the “missionary zeal of early twentieth-century electoral 
reformers” as having stunted the growth of genuinely comparative research on 
the subject of electoral systems, defining the debate as increasingly an argument between 
the proponents and opponents of proportional representation in
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general, and its STV variant in particular (1989, 49-50). Even more recent descriptive 
works such as (in Great Britain) Bogdanor’s What is Proportional Representation? 
(1984) and Farrell’s Comparing Electoral Systems (1997) or (in Australia) Wright’s 
Mirror o f the Nation’s Mind (1980), are unable to escape the lure of becoming 
implicitly (or in Wright’s case explicitly) advocates of STV.
Although many aspects of Hare’s original STV scheme were found to be impractical for 
mass elections, and were subsequently abandoned or re-fashioned, the idea of granting 
each voter as much individual say as possible via a new form of ballot structure was 
quickly grasped as a significant technical innovation by many commentators. It was a 
useful institutional expression of many of the ideals in vogue amongst British liberals in 
the second half of the 19th century, such as the growing acceptance amongst elites that 
people behaved in politics as rational individuals, forming their own opinions and 
considering their own interests, and that such diversity of opinion between thinking 
individuals was to be encouraged rather than repressed. In short it was, as Birch has 
noted, a logical expression of the individualist philosophy of Victorian liberalism6, and 
Mill’s “virtual intoxication with Hare’s scheme” (Hart 1995, 55) was the most striking 
example of the way in which the system’s institutional arrangements were seen as being 
an embodiment of the liberal ideals of the time.
While STV has long been advocated by political scientists as one of the most attractive 
electoral systems, its use for national parliamentary elections has been limited to a few 
cases — Ireland (since 1921), Malta (since 1947), and once in Estonia in 1990. The 
system is also used in Northern Irish local elections, and in Australia for elections to the 
Tasmanian House of Assembly, the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 
and the federal Senate. As a mechanism for choosing representatives, STV is perhaps 
the most sophisticated of all electoral systems, allowing for choice between parties and 
between candidates within parties. The final results also retain a fair degree of 
proportionality, and the fact that in most actual examples of STV the multi-member 
districts are relatively small means that an important geographical link between voter 
and representative is retained. Furthermore, voters can influence the composition of 
post-election coalitions (as has been the case in Ireland) and the system provides 
incentives for inter-party accommodation via the reciprocal exchange of preferences.
6 For a discussion see Birch 1964, 63-64.
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STV also provides a better chance for the election of popular independent candidates 
than list PR, because voters are choosing between candidates rather than between parties 
(although a party-list option can be added to an STV election, as is done for the 
Australian Senate). However, the system is often criticised on the grounds that 
preference voting is unfamiliar in many societies, and demands, at the very least, a 
degree of literacy and numeracy. The intricacies of an STV count are themselves quite 
complex, which is also seen as being a drawback. STV also carries the disadvantages of 
all parliaments elected by PR methods, such as increasing the power of small minority 
parties under certain circumstances. Moreover, STV can provide pressures for political 
parties to fragment internally, because at election time members of the same party are 
effectively competing against each other, as well as the opposition, for votes.
STV in divided societies: Northern Ireland and Estonia
Some scholars have also argued that STV is the best electoral system for ethnically- 
divided societies, as “political considerations can gradually assume more importance 
and racial ones less, without the elector ever being faced with a conflict of loyalties” 
(Lakeman 1974, 136). However, the use of STV in divided societies to date has been 
limited, inconclusive and generally not supportive of this argument. Two ethnically- 
divided states have utilised STV for ‘one-off national elections: Northern Ireland in 
1973 (and again in 1982), and Estonia in 1990. In both cases, little vote-pooling or 
accommodation on ethnic issues took place. In Northern Ireland, STV was deliberately 
introduced as part of a power-sharing formula for elections to a Northern Ireland 
legislature as part of the British governments attempts at relinquishing ‘home rule’ and 
devolution.7 At the 1973 elections to the abortive Northern Ireland Assembly, most 
parties neither campaigned for nor received votes across the Protestant-Catholic divide, 
in part “because the chances of winning an extra seat by adding a few votes from the 
other community were much less than the chances of losing votes by appearing ‘soft’” 
on key sectarian issues (Rose 1976, 78). The 1973 election results represented a 
decisive rebuff to moderation, and it was estimated that less than 0.25 percent of vote 
transfers crossed the sectarian divide.8 Similar sectarian voting patterns were evident in 
1982. In both elections, there was no campaign for preferences between the two major
7 Northern Ireland has also used STV for local elections (since 1973), for the 1975 Constitutional 
Convention election, and for European Parliament elections since 1979.
8 See Dixon 1997, 5.
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groups, no vote-pooling, and no accommodation. In both 1973 and 1982, attempts at 
electing a centrist legislature actually went in the other direction: the dearth of ‘middle 
ground’ between the unionist and republican representatives saw the power-sharing 
experiment collapse almost before it had begun.
In Estonia, which is similarly divided between the majority local Estonian (60 percent) 
community and a minority (35 percent) immigrant Russian one, STV was used for the 
first national independence elections in 1990 before being replaced with list PR. Again, 
ethnicity appeared to be the dominant factor in voter choice at these elections.9 Russian 
electors, for example, voted predominantly for liberal democratic ‘Russian’ parties, but 
their second preferences “went overwhelmingly to reactionary imperialist Russian 
candidates rather than liberal but ethnically Estonian ones. Likewise, voters with 
Estonian first preferences continued with Estonian names” (Taagepera 1996, 31). The 
elected parliament, with a majority of ethnic Estonians, also exhibited little in the way 
of inter-ethnic accommodation, passing legislation that disenfranchised non-citizens and 
required Estonian language competence as the basis of citizenship and employment 
rights.
Both the Northern Ireland and Estonian cases lend support to theoretical speculation that 
the threshold for winning a seat in a multi-member STV districts may be too low to 
ensure that incentives for preference-swapping influence party campaign strategies 
(Horowitz 1991a, 191). For example, even for the minimum realistic district size under 
STV — a three-member constituency — the threshold for election is only 25 percent, a 
level easily reached without vote pooling by the major ethnic groups in both Northern 
Ireland and Estonia, both of which feature ‘bi-polar’ splits between two large and 
relatively cohesive ethnic groups. The lack of inter-ethnic preference transfers at STV 
elections in both Northern Ireland and Estonia, and the non-accommodative policies 
pursued by elected governments in both cases, undermines claims for the 
accommodative effects of STV in such cases, as there were few districts where the 
relative size of the groups did not exceed the required quota for election under STV.
9 See Taagepera 1990, 303-11.
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The Alternative Vote
The alternative vote was developed as an adaptation of STV so as to enable its use in 
single-member rather than multi-member electorates. It had been pointed out as early as 
1863 that Hare’s original STV proposal made elections in single-member districts all 
but impossible due to the overly high quota for election in Hare’s version (McLean and 
Urken 1995, 46-47). The next step was to find a way of reworking the preferential 
mechanics proposed by Hare into a practical package for the election of a single 
member. Although the essentials of the system were originally proposed (and 
dismissed) by Condorcet, the first documented example of such a method appears to 
have been carried out by Professor W.R. Ware of Harvard University in 1871. In a 
letter to Hare (published as Appendix M to the fourth edition of The Election o f 
Representatives under the heading ‘The Preferential Vote’) Ware detailed the efficacy of 
Hare’s method when used for a mock election by Harvard students to select their four 
favourite writers (Shakespeare winning handsomely) (Hare 1873, 351-55). Ware also 
showed that Hare’s method could be utilised to fill casual vacancies (and thus obviate 
the need for by-elections) by re-examining the ballots cast for a retiring member and 
distributing the second and later preferences accordingly.10 Ware used this example to 
show that “contrary to the generally received opinion, the system of preferential voting 
is applicable to the choice of a single candidate” (Hare 1873, 353). What Ware’s 
experiment demonstrated was that, where no candidate has an absolute majority, the 
sequence of elimination of the lowest-placed candidate and the transfer of his or her 
votes to continuing candidates could work as well for single-member elections as for 
Hare’s more complex scheme of proportional representation: thus the alternative vote 
was bom.
While the significance of this advance appeared to be lost on Hare (who thought it 
demonstrated the applicability of preferential voting to school education classes) (1873, 
v), it was recognised as a potentially significant practical advance by E J. Nanson, the 
Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University from 1875-1922 and an influential 
campaigner for electoral reform in Australia and internationally. In 1882 Nanson 
published a pamphlet explaining the mechanics of the ‘Ware method’ as he called it, 
which he praised for its lack of susceptibility to strategic voting and for its relative
10 This is how casual vacancies are filled under the Hare-Clark system used in Tasmania.
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simplicity, making it “extremely suitable for political elections” (Nanson 1995). By the 
late 1890s, with the framing of the Australian constitution in progress, Nanson 
concentrated his efforts on influencing the choice of electoral system for the new federal 
parliament. It was clear that political pressures would ensure that the House of 
Representatives would utilise single-member electoral districts, and Nanson was at 
pains to ensure the selection of AV, which he saw as being “far superior” to other 
single-member systems (he also campaigned unflaggingly for the adoption of STV in 
the Senate, which would have been his favoured system for the House of 
Representatives were multi-member electorates to be utilised). In a series of articles in 
the Age and Argus, collectively published in 1900 under the title The Real Value o f a 
Vote and How to Get it at the Coming Federal Elections, Nanson emphasised “the 
absolute necessity of insisting that no candidate be elected in a single electorate unless 
he poll an absolute majority of the votes”, initially advocating the contingent vote, as 
used in Queensland (1900, 10). Intriguingly, Nanson claimed that “there is nothing new 
in preferential or contingent voting. This method was used in France and Switzerland 
130 years ago” — a claim which presumably refers to Condorcet’s writings, which 
Nanson was known to have read. However, Nanson went on to emphasise that even 
better than the contingent vote was a procedure which entailed an exhaustive use of 
preferences — in other words, the alternative vote, a system which was, at that time, 
unused anywhere in the world (1900, 7, 12).
Following the successful federation of the Australia colonies in 1901, Nanson’s 
proposals had a significant influence upon the first Electoral Bill presented to the new 
Commonwealth Parliament in 1902, which provided for AV in the House and 
proportional representation in the Senate. The government’s stated aim in introducing 
AV was “to bring out in the most certain way possible the choice of the majority of the 
electorate”. The progressive lineage of the proposed systems was clear from the 
ensuing parliamentary debates: references to John Stuart Mill, Thomas Hare, Helen 
Spence, Nanson and Andrew Inglis Clark were made by both supporters and opponents 
of the bill. As it was, the conservative opponents emerged victorious: both AV in the 
House and STV in the Senate were deleted during the passage of the bill, to be replaced 
with the safe options of FPTP and the Block Vote (i.e. FPTP in multi-member 
constituencies) respectively. According to Reid and Forrest, with the wisdom of 
hindsight
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it is easily seen now that the major proposals of 1902 were decades ahead of their time ... it took 
seventeen years, until 1919, before the contingent (preferential) method of voting for the House of 
Representatives with single-member divisions was acceptable; and it took almost fifty years, until 
1948, before the Parliament finally accepted a brand of proportional representation for the 
Senate’s State-wide, multi-member electorates. In both cases the reforms came not as a result of 
the pursuit of principles of electoral justice, put from pragmatic considerations of party gain 
(1989, 99).
The first attempt at resurrecting AV came before the third federal election in 1906 when 
protectionist Prime Minister Alfred Deakin wrote to his Labor counterpart, Chris 
Watson, suggesting a deal to isolate the free-trade forces of George Reid:
Have you thought of the exhaustive ballot —  compulsory voting for every candidate. The lowest 
dropped out & his votes divided until someone gets a majority. With this our candidate & yours 
could not do each other anything like so much harm & and one or others of us would win in 
several Reidite constituencies. Of course it must be compulsory voting for all candidates. It 
would be a great safety valve for both of us. What do you think? (Reid and Forrest 1989, 114).
Watson, whose Labor Party was the clear beneficiary of vote-splitting amongst the non- 
Labor candidates, was not interested. The Deakin government introduced another bill 
for AV in August 1906, but it lapsed with the Parliament’s dissolution. A Liberal private 
member’s bill in 1911 met a similar fate (Reid and Forrest 1989, 115).
It was not until 1918 that AV was finally introduced for federal elections to the House of 
Representatives (1919 for the Senate), after having previously been introduced at the 
state level by Liberal governments in Western Australia (1907) and Victoria (1911). At 
the federal level, the increasing incidence of minority Labor candidates beating a divided 
field of conservatives prompted Sir Joseph Cook’s short-lived Liberal government 
(1913-14) to appointed a royal commission into electoral matters, which recommended 
that AV and STV be used for elections to the House of Representatives and Senate 
respectively. After Cook’s defeat, the issue lay dormant until 1917 when the newly- 
formed Nationalist Party, under the leadership of W.M. Hughes, was able to form a 
governing majority. Under considerable pressure from the farming lobby, which 
threatened to split the Nationalist Party’s vote by standing its own candidates, the 
Hughes government introduced full preferential AV for the House and passed the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, a piece of legislation which, while much amended, 
remains the statute governing electoral competition at the national level today. The 
introduction of AV was thus intimately related to the need to counter the possibilities of 
vote-splitting and to encourage and reward collaboration or coalition arrangements
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between parties.11 For most of this century, AV has had two main positive effects for 
the non-Labor parties: it has facilitated the coalition arrangement between the Liberal 
and Country (now National) parties by enabling them both to stand candidates in some 
seats without the danger of vote splitting, and it has enabled the preferences of one small 
party, the Democratic Labor Party, to flow predominantly against the ALP and hugely 
assist the Coalition maintain government in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the ALP advocated 
a return to FPTP. But when the ALP regained office in 1983, its policy was to retain 
AV, but make the expression of preferences optional rather than compulsory.
Optional preferential A V
Optional preferential AV is, as described earlier, identical to full preferential AV except 
that voters are not required to express a preference for every candidate; if they wish, 
they can express a preference for only one. In the words of former Australian Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam, optional preferential AV is “perhaps the only electoral 
procedure in the world which allows electors to express their indifference to candidates” 
(1985, 679).12 A national survey in 1979 showed that the majority of Australian 
electors favoured optional AV, with 72 percent preferring the optional version and only 
26 percent favouring compulsory preference marking (Hughes 1990, 141). One clear 
advantage of leaving the decision to mark preferences beyond the first in the hands of 
the voter is that the problems of spoilt ballots due to numbering errors associated with 
the full preferential system are largely removed. For this reason, the optional version is 
probably the only form of preferential voting suited to conditions of low literacy or 
numeracy.
Optional preferential AV was first used earlier this century for elections to Australian 
state lower houses in Western Australia and Victoria and in the Canadian provinces of 
Alberta, Manitoba and British Colombia. In all of these cases it was abandoned — for 
full preferential AV in Australia, and for FPTP in Canada — after voters increasingly 
used their vote to ‘plump’ for one candidate rather than expressing preferences, thus 
effectively turning the election into a FPTP contest (Corry and Hodgetts 1960, 272). 
There were also several unsuccessful attempts to introduce optional preferential AV to
11 See Graham 1962, 164-81.
12 Whitlam was presumably unaware o f approval voting, in which voters mark their ballots only for those 
candidates they 'approve' of.
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New Zealand in the early part of this century. The short-lived Mackenzie government 
of 1912 introduced a bill to do so, but it lapsed with the defeat of the government after 
only 15 weeks in office, and further attempts in 1923 and 1938 met similar fates (Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System 1986, 31, A-56). More recently, optional 
preferential AV has been introduced for state elections in New South Wales (in 1981) 
and Queensland (1992) — in the latter case on the recommendation of the Electoral and 
Administrative Review Commission, who considered that compulsory preferential 
voting forced voters to express preferences for candidates about whom they may know 
little or nothing (1990, 59). The rate of ‘plumping’ in both these cases has tended to 
increase over time. Voters’ expression of preferences also appears to be closely related 
to the recommendations made by parties on their ‘how-to-vote’ cards. In a survey 
conducted at two by-elections in 1992, fully 75 percent of electors followed party voting 
directions, resulting in plumping rates of 43 percent in one district (Gordon) and 63 
percent in another (Kuring-gai). In the Kuring-gai case, less than 33 percent of electors 
filled in all squares on the ballot paper.13 In Queensland, plumping rates stood at 23 
percent at the first optional preferential AV election in 1992, but were significantly 
higher in those seats where how-to-vote material from one of the major parties did not 
suggest marking preferences (Electoral Commission Queensland 1995, 14). There is 
also a clear partisan component to plumping rates which reflects the long-standing 
coalition arrangements between the Liberal and National parties: in both New South 
Wales and Queensland, Labor voters are considerably more likely to ‘plump’ than 
supporters of the coalition parties (Lucy 1982, 105).
At the federal level, Labor traditionally opposed preferential voting of any sort, seeing it 
(correctly) as a means by which the non-Labor forces were able to aggregate their vote 
shares to defeat Labor candidates. Until 1974, Labor was actually committed to a 
change to a FPTP system, but this was changed by Whitlam to in-principle support for 
optional preferential AV. In 1983 the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Electoral 
Reform recommended the introduction of optional preferential AV for all future federal 
elections in Australia. This recommendation was not accepted by the Hawke 
government, principally because without a majority in the Senate, the government knew 
that it had little hope of forcing through any change. This proved to be a fortunate
13 Personal communication, State Electoral Office o f New South Wales, 12 July 1996.
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outcome: as new issues on the left of the political spectrum such as environmentalism 
became increasingly prominent, so the second and later preferences of voters supporting 
minor parties drifted increasingly to Labor. The ALP consequently changed its official 
policy in 1991 to support “full preferential voting for all elections for lower houses of 
Parliament” (Australian Labor Party 1991). Recent electoral history has thus 
emphasised the truth of Richard Rose’s dictum that, once chosen, electoral rules tend to 
persist by their own inertia: legislatures are almost always the product of the existing 
system and tend to be wary of the uncertain ramifications of change.14
The Alternative Vote in the UK
This golden rule of electoral reform was evidenced also by the case of the near-adoption 
of AV in the United Kingdom in 1918. The most interesting aspect of the pro-AV case 
in Britain is how closely the progress of the debate matches the Australian experience, 
both chronologically and in substance. As in Australia, the key motivator for change 
was the perceived danger of vote-splitting under FPTP. In Britain in 1903, the Liberal 
government came to an agreement with the new Labour Party not to encroach upon the 
other’s electoral territory. While this pact, known as the Gladstone-MacDonald 
agreement, worked reasonably well, it soon became clear that it was not an arrangement 
that could last indefinitely, and that the Liberals would have to consider AV “if they 
were not to hand a number of seats to the unionists on a split vote” (Bogdanor 1981, 
121). Like their counterparts in Australia, the British Liberals established a Royal 
Commission on Electoral Systems; its report released in 1910 recommended the 
adoption of AV but made little impact, and was not debated in either house of 
parliament. Support for AV, however, remained widespread if not constant: in 1912 the 
first draft of the Liberal government’s abortive franchise bill provided for its adoption, 
and only a shortage of parliamentary time saw it omitted from the final bill introduced 
to the Commons. The bipartisan Speaker’s Conference of 1916-17, which grappled 
with numerous issues of electoral reform, made a majority recommendation that AV be 
adopted in all non-borough constituencies, about two-thirds of all electorates. The 
government refused to accept this recommendation and moved a free vote on the choice 
of electoral system, with the majority of the Commons in favour of AV but the House of
14 See Rose 1983, 42-43.
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Lords committed to STV. The end result was a stalemate between the two houses and 
the maintenance of FPTP — to the historical cost of both the Labour and Liberal parties.
Since the emergence of a disciplined party system in Britain after 1918, a calculation of 
likely partisan impacts has been the dominant criterion by which political parties have 
assessed proposals for electoral reform. Another attempt by the minority Labour 
government (with Liberal support) to introduce AV in 1931 met with a similar lack of 
success when a Commons vote to change to AV was subsequently blocked in the Lords, 
after Winston Churchill had derided AV as “the worst of all possible plans” which 
guaranteed an outcome “determined by the most worthless votes given to the most 
worthless candidates” (Hansard, 2 June 1931). In 1958, by contrast, concern that a rise 
in the number of Liberal candidates would split the anti-Labour vote prompted a flurry 
of interest in the system from Conservatives, who saw it as “a mechanism by which the 
Tory-preferring middle vote would not be ‘wasted’” (Steed 1975, 50).
It is clear that the major reason AV was not adopted in Great Britain was because of this 
mutual antipathy from supporters of the status quo on the one hand and the PR 
proponents on the other. The result for most of this century has been a proliferation of 
vote-splitting, both accidental and deliberate. The effects of this phenomenon on 
electoral results should not be under-estimated. Research from the early 1990s suggests 
that, in recent British elections, the selected withdrawal by one of the main opposition 
parties (then Labour and Liberal Democrat) of their nominated candidate in selected 
constituencies would have allowed the remaining candidate to beat the Conservative; 
and that the effective use of such strategies could be enough to change government. A 
party can theoretically increase its likelihood of participating in government by 
selectively withdrawing some of its candidates — a fact which surely represents “one of 
the more bizarre properties of the first-past-the-post voting system” (Sharp 1997, 129). 
Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that electoral reform is back on the 
political agenda in the United Kingdom. Following its election in 1997, the Blair 
Labour government pledged to hold a referendum on electoral reform during its first 
term of office. Some sources have argued that AV is the only feasible electoral reform 
likely to be acceptable to both the British general public and incumbent MPs:
It is fairer than Britain’s current voting system, because it means that MPs will generally have the 
support o f at least half their voters, and not just a plurality o f them. It will make it even harder for 
any government to win an overall majority when it has only an overall minority o f votes. But it
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retains many of the virtues o f the current system. It is nearly as simple. It still allows each MP 
individually to represent an individual constituency, which is good for them and good for their 
constituents. It does not require a leap in the dark to an entirely new system with unpredictable 
social and political consequences (The Economist, 28 October 1995).
At the time of writing, Blair was reported to favour AV over FPTP, despite opposition 
from colleagues in favour of the status quo (The Guardian, 4 June 1996). Blair has not 
revealed his favoured choice openly, but is on record as stating that an electoral system 
must “aggregate opinion without giving disproportionate influence to splinter groups” 
— a succinct description of one benefit of AV (The Economist, 14 September 1996). 
The only prediction on the future of Britain’s electoral arrangements which can be made 
with confidence is that partisan interest, as ever, will be the determining factor behind 
any change.
A V in multi-member districts
Outside of the case of Nauru mentioned earlier (which has no political parties and is 
really too small to facilitate useful comparison), the only national example of the use of 
AV in multi-member districts was in the Australian Senate between 1919 and 1946. 
Under this system, three members were elected from each of the six states at regular 
‘half-Senate’ elections held every three years. This experience graphically illustrated 
the dangers of using a majority electoral system in a situation which demands a 
proportional one. When AV is used in multi-member districts, the majoritarian features 
of the system become overwhelming. In order to utilise AV in multi-member districts, 
each Senate seat was effectively filled by a separate election, but with the same 
electorate voting at each. Because of the stability of party support in the electorate, this 
procedure displayed a strong tendency to produce an outcome under which the same 
party grouping won every seat in a state. Of the 60 occasions on which a state-based 
Senate election was held under multi-member AV, 55 produced such an outcome. The 
system’s configuration meant that it gave virtually no encouragement to minor parties to 
participate in Senate elections. At House of Representatives elections during the same 
period, it was from time to time possible for party dissidents to win election as 
independents or as representatives of new parties, particularly if they had a 
geographically-concentrated base of support: 33 such candidates were elected at general 
elections from 1919 to 1946. At Senate elections, however, the use of entire states as 
electorates saw these pockets of support swamped, excluding minor party representation 
completely. This created periods of such sustained and nationwide dominance by one
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party that on a number of occasions the Senate was scarcely workable as a legislative 
body, let alone as a house of review: in the period from 1947 to 1950, for example, 
there were only three opposition Senators — a leader, a deputy leader, and a whip — 
facing 33 government Senators.
This level of system dysfunction and extreme disproportionality meant that the electoral 
system itself was primarily responsible for the erosion of public confidence in, and the 
legitimacy of, half the federal Parliament; some have argued that it increased popular 
opposition to any strengthening of the federal government’s powers.15 Multi-member 
AV was replaced with STV in 1948 which, having been designed for multi-member 
constituencies, has operated in a far more logical way. The inappropriateness of multi­
member AV evidenced by the case of the Australian Senate was such that no proposal 
for multi-member AV has ever again been forthcoming in Australia.
Given the extremely lop-sided and disproportional election results that multi-member 
AV delivered, it is highly likely that the system would be even more damaging in an 
ethnically-divided society, as it could result in ethnic minorities being excluded 
completely from parliamentary representation. Nonetheless, in recent years several 
proposals featuring multi-member AV have been advanced by constitutional engineers 
as part of an institutional package for democracy in divided societies. In 1991, 
Horowitz proposed that multi-member AV may have to be used to ensure sufficient 
electorate-level heterogeneity in the case of South Africa, and it is notable that most 
critiques of his proposal focused on the unworkability of multi-member AV as one of 
their major criticisms.16 Similarly, the Fiji CRC’s recommendation that 45 seats in the 
Fijian parliament be elected from 15 three-member constituencies was widely criticised 
by electoral system scholars, who pointed to the inequitable results delivered at 
Australian Senate elections under precisely this configuration.17 As noted earlier, the 
multi-member AV recommendations were dropped from the final draft of the 1997 
Constitution, and replaced with single-member AV for all electorates.
15 See Goot 1985,226.
16 See Lijphart 1991; Reynolds 1995; Lijphart 1997.
17 See, for example, Reilly 1997c.
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The Contingent Vote
The most obscure and poorly-understood form of preferential voting electoral system is 
the contingent vote (CV). Put simply, the CV is a two-round runoff election 
compressed into one round via the expression of second and later preferences. Under 
this system, any candidate who receives an absolute majority of first preferences is 
declared elected. If no candidate has an absolute majority, all candidates other than the 
two leaders on first preferences are eliminated, and the votes for eliminated candidates 
are re-distributed to one or the other of the top two, according to the preferences 
marked, to ensure a majority winner. This method was used in Queensland from 1892- 
1942, in Alabama from 1915-1931, and in Sri Lanka since 1978. Nonetheless, the 
contingent vote remains virtually unknown, even in academic circles. The following 
sections trace the history of the development of the system since its adoption in 
Queensland and Alabama earlier this century.
Queensland
The first occasion on which the CV was used for legislative elections appears to have 
been in Queensland in 1892, after the conservative government of Sir Samuel Griffith 
(who went on to become one of the primary drafters of the Australian constitution) 
proposed that a two-round runoff be introduced for Queensland elections so that all 
winners would enjoy clear majority support. In 1891 a member of the Queensland 
Legislative Assembly, A.H. Barlow, argued for the advantages of compressing the two 
rounds of voting into a single election, proposing that in those districts where no 
candidate received a majority of first-round votes, “all candidates but the two with the 
highest totals of votes should be excluded and the votes of their supporters should be 
transferred to either of the two top candidates for whom the voters had shown 
preferences” (Wright 1980, 58). This system was consequently used for 18 state 
elections until 1942, in a mixture of single-member and two-member electorates. The 
expression of ‘contingent’ preferences was not compulsory, and voters could number as 
many preferences as they wished. New South Wales also experimented with the 
contingent vote at one election, in 1927, before adopting AV.
The CV appears to have been introduced by a conservative government in an attempt to 
avoid splitting the non-Labor vote in the face of a growing and disciplined Labor Party 
— the same essential reason behind the introduction of the alternative vote for federal
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elections in Australia in 1918.18 Ironically, it was a Labor government that abandoned 
the CV in favour of FPTP in 1942, after concern at the appearance of splinter groups 
within its own ranks and the loss of the safe seat of Cairns at a by-election when 
preferences from the non-Labor side were successfully directed towards an independent 
Labor candidate.19 A hypothetical example of how the system works in a four-candidate 
contest with two major-party candidates and two minor candidates is given in Table 7.2. 
The contingent vote enables the Liberal and Independent Liberal candidates to defeat a 
Labor candidate who would have won under first-past-the-post.
Table 7.2: A Hypothetical Example of the Contingent Vote (1)
Candidate First count Second count Result
Independent labor 600 Eliminated — all second 
preferences to Labor
Independent liberal 2000 Eliminated — 1 600 
second preferences to 
Liberal; 400 to Labor
Liberal 3500 3500+ 1600 = 5100 Liberal elected
Labor 3900 3900 + 600+ 400= 4900
Total votes 10 000 10 000
Majority needed to win 5 001 5 001
Alabama
The short-lived experience of the contingent vote in the U.S. state of Alabama between 
1915 and 1931 had its origins in the Democratic Party’s first experience of a two-round 
runoff primary election in 1914, in which there was a steep drop in turnout at the 
second-round runoff election.20 In a bid to overcome this problem it was decided to 
compress the two-stage process into one election via a system of ‘second-choice’ votes, 
which would be counted to determine the outcome if no candidate received a majority of 
‘first-choice votes’ (the idea was apparently borrowed from a similar system briefly in 
use in Florida). Several reasons were advanced for the change: the cost of holding the 
second-round election, the low turnout of voters in the second-round, and the
18 See Graham 1962.
19 Queensland adopted the alternative vote in the 1960s, and in 1991 changed to an optional 
rather than compulsory expression of preferences.
20 Thanks to Paul Wilder for pointing out the significance of the Alabama case and for 
providing the article on which this account is based: Brewer 1993.
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desirability of requiring the winning candidate to receive a majority of the vote. As it 
was, the expected increase in voter participation under the new system did not 
eventuate: in 1918, for example, only about 20 percent of electors cast a ‘second- 
choice’ vote. With mounting criticism from some quarters that the system was 
iniquitous, the 1926 gubernatorial primary saw a candidate win with less than 29% of 
first- and second- choice votes. This was the final straw: a system which was supposed 
to guarantee majority victory had dramatically failed to do so. Alabama returned to a 
two-round runoff in 1931.
The Plant Commission Proposal
The contingent vote was effectively a ‘dead’ electoral system until its revival by Sri 
Lankan constitutional drafters in 1978. However, the system gained considerable 
publicity in Britain in 1993 when it was recommended by the Labour Party’s Plant 
Commission as a reform to Britain’s existing FPTP system. According to media 
reports, this system was devised by Labour MP Dale Campbell Savours as a clever 
compromise between a two-round runoff and the full alternative vote. The Plant 
Commission called this new system the ‘supplementary vote’, describing it as an 
achievable change to the British FPTP system which would temper some of the more 
extreme results of the existing system and would be “practical, straightforward and 
comparatively modest” (1993, 21). Most observers were far less kind. David Butler 
called it “silly answer” which “has probably set back the cause of electoral reform” 
(1993, 77-79). Others of the left and the right variously described it as a “half-baked 
compromise” and “the worst option” (The Guardian, 2 April 1993, 20) which would 
encourage tactical voting (Georghiou 1993, 82) and could actually produce more 
disproportional results than FPTP (Wainwright 1993, 79). While these were serious 
charges, they were not necessarily fatal: the cause of electoral reform in Britain has 
long been caught between the defenders of the status quo on one side and enthusiasts for 
radical reform on the other. More telling perhaps for the credibility of the proposal was 
the charge that it was, to quote Pippa Norris, ‘a new system which had never been used 
elsewhere’ (1995, 82). Former Conservative MP Keith Best described it as ‘an idea 
dreamed up by a Labour MP which is not in existence anywhere in the world: it has no 
record’ (1993, 80). Despite what appears to be a widespread acceptance of their 
veracity, these claims are of course quite incorrect.
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The Effects o f the Contingent Vote
It is difficult to make many generalisations about the effects of the contingent vote from 
the limited practical experience of the system to date. A common strategy has been to 
adopt the CV in the hope of marginalising the electoral prospects of third parties, such 
as the rising Labor Party in Queensland or the Liberal Democrats in the United 
Kingdom. More recently, an awareness of the need to encourage majority victors with 
broad nationwide support for the new office of executive president prompted Sri Lanka 
to adopt the contingent vote. In Queensland, the longest running example of CV to date, 
the system was introduced by one government when it was seen as being to their 
political advantage, and abolished by another for the same reason. The central issue was 
the question of vote-splitting — i.e. the endemic problem under FPTP of several 
candidates with similar support bases ‘splitting’ their support between them, when their 
combined support would have been enough to win the seat.
The other claim often made by advocates of the CV is that it promotes majority victors. 
On the evidence to date this claim is less defensible, especially where few voters mark 
their second and later preferences. The major weakness in the experience of the CV to 
date has been that most voters do not mark any ‘contingent’ preferences. Considering 
that the contingent vote (unlike the alternative vote) effectively requires voters to guess 
who the top two candidates in any election will be in order to use their preferences 
effectively, it is perhaps not surprising that the expression of ‘contingent’ preferences 
has always been optional. However, this has meant that the system has rarely worked as 
planned: in Queensland, for example, few voters expressed second or later preferences, 
and consequently nearly all seats returned results identical to a FPTP contest (although 
when the system did start to be used more effectively by voters — and against the 
government — it was promptly abandoned). As Table 7.3 shows, at 16 elections 
between 1896 and 1935 the contingent vote changed the final result in only seven seats, 
until the rise of the Protestant Labor Party in the late 1930s.
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Table 7.3: Effect of the Contingent Vote in Queensland 1896-1941
Election No. of members 
elected
No. of districts where 
preferences were 
counted
No. of electoral 
districts where result 
was changed
1896 72 11 0
1899 72 10 1
1902 72 8 1
1904 72 4 0
1907 72 16 1
1908 72 4 1
1909 72 5 0
1912 72 3 0
1915 72 7 1
1918 72 2 1
1920 72 5 1
1923 72 4 0
1926 72 3 0
1929 72 2 0
1932 62 6 0
1935 62 3 0
1938 62 20 3
1941 62 5 2
Source: Electoral and Administrative Review Commission 1990, 57.
Similar problems appear to bedevil the system in Sri Lanka, where only 2 percent of 
voters expressed preferences at the first presidential election in 1982, and where popular 
understanding of the system is low.21 There the system does afford voters the 
opportunity to express some kind of choice between candidates on their ballot, and gives 
minority groups the chance to have some influence on which majority candidate is 
selected — neither of which is possible under FPTP. As noted in Chapter Five, this can 
provide a stake for minority groups in the system, who know that even if they do not 
have the numbers to elect their own candidate outright, they can certainly influence 
which majority candidate gets elected via their second or third ‘contingent’ preferences. 
Unfortunately, the experience of most cases to date has been that, unless voters are 
forced to express preferences, the contingent vote tends to degenerate into a straight 
FPTP contest, with all the attendant disadvantages of that system.
21 See Commissioner of Elections 1983, 60.
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As noted earlier, discussion of the CV is almost completely absent from the standard 
literature on electoral systems. None of the major comparative works on electoral 
systems of the past thirty years mentions the system.22 On the rare occasions when a 
CV election is cited — usually by reference to Sri Lanka’s presidential elections — the 
system is often misclassified as AV. Horowitz, for example, provides two definitions of 
AV, one of which is actually a description of the CV (1991a, 188). A similar error is 
made in Shugart and Carey’s otherwise comprehensive volume on presidential systems, 
which compounds the error by comparing presidential elections in Ireland (where the 
specified electoral system is actually STV, which is identical to AV in single-member 
elections) with elections in Sri Lanka, which they assume to be an identical system 
(1992, 210fft). Even the doyen of the comparative study of electoral systems, Arend 
Lijphart, makes the error, mistakenly classifying Sri Lanka as an example of AV 
(1995a, 413). This could be dismissed as a semantic quibble of little importance, were 
it not for the fact that the two systems will often produce quite different results. If we 
take the example used earlier, but change the relative vote shares slightly, this is 
illustrated quite sharply (see Table 7.4). Under CV rules, the two independent 
candidates are eliminated and their votes passed on to Labor or Liberal, with the result 
that the Labor candidate is narrowly elected, with 5050 votes to the Liberal’s 4950. 
Under AV rules, by contrast, the independent labor candidate’s preferences go to the 
other independent, who now has 3100 votes — more than the Liberal’s total of 3000. 
The Liberal is thus the next to be eliminated; his preferences ensure the easy election of 
the independent liberal over the Labor candidate.
22 These include Rae 1967; Lakeman 1974; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart and Grofman 1984; 
Lijphart 1984; Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Shugart and Carey 1992; and Lijphart 1994a.
217
Table 7.4: A Hypothetical Example of the Contingent Vote (2)
C andidate First count Second count Result
Independent labor 600 CV and AV: Elim inated 
—  all second preferences 
to Ind. Liberal. Third 
prefs to Labor.
Independent liberal 2500 CV: E lim inated—  1950 
second preferences to 
liberal; 550 to Labour.
AV: 2500 + 600 =  3100
AV: Independent 
liberal elected
(2500 +  600 + 3000 
=  6100)
Liberal 3000 CV: 3000+ 1950 =  4950
AV: Elim inated 2nd. All 
second prefs to 
independent liberal
Labor 3900 CV: 3900 + 550+ 600= 
5050
AV: 3900 + 0 =  3900
CV: L abor elected
Total votes 10 000 10 000
M ajority  needed to win 5 001 5 001
The point of this example is that AV and CV are clearly distinct systems, and should not 
be confused or discussed as if CV was a mere variation of AV. In fact, in conditions of 
high candidature, it becomes more and more likely that the two systems will elect 
different candidates, because the votes of lower-placed candidates are more likely to see 
a candidate initially placed third or fourth (who would be eliminated under the CV) gain 
enough preferences under AV rules to leap-frog one of the two leaders during the 
distribution of preferences.
The pros and cons of preferential voting: theoretical perspectives
We have examined the enthusiasm with which politicians and reformists in some 
countries have embraced preferential voting. What has been the situation with electoral 
theorists? Here preferential voting’s support has been more equivocal: preferential 
voting can be shown to have a number of theoretical qualities that almost every theory 
of voting favours, but it can also be easily proved that preferential voting fails (in 
common with almost all other voting systems) some other relatively straightforward 
measures of fairness and rationality. On the pro side, the most obvious advantage of 
preferential voting is that it enables an individual voter’s personal preferences to be both
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expressed and aggregated. The cons are that preferential voting will often fail to pick a 
Condorcet winner and is not always monotonic. These terms will be defined below. 
First, however, this thesis will examine the theoretical claims made in favour of 
preferential voting.
Preferential voting: the arguments in favour
A fairly fundamental test of any electoral system is whether it enables a voter to 
formally express their personal rankings of parties and candidates on the ballot. As 
McLean has argued, most voters can normally rank at least some of the candidates for 
election against each other — and the more information a voting procedure can use, the 
better (1987, 154). This needs to be tempered somewhat: a voting system which 
requires electors to express preferences they may not in fact possess, such as a full 
preferential system, is susceptible to random effects such as the ‘donkey vote’ 
phenomenon observed for federal elections in Australia, in which some electors simply 
number sequentially from 1 onwards down the ballot paper. In most cases, a system in 
which electors rank only as many preferences as they actually possess is clearly superior 
to one that forces them to invent preferences. Of course, if all electors only expressed 
one preference, then the resultant contest would effectively become a first-past-the-post 
contest, which has some serious theoretical limitations of its own. Nonetheless, it is 
hard to find anyone interested in electoral systems who will oppose the rank-ordering of 
candidates: Lijphart argues that the facility for transferring and accumulating votes — 
possible only with some form of preferential ranking — are two innovations “that 
appear to work particularly well and that deserve to be recommended as models for 
electoral engineers elsewhere” (1994a, 145), while McLean claims that some facility for 
preference ordering is one of three basic requirements of a good voting system (1987, 
154).
Of course, the actual manner in which transferability, accumulation and rank-ordering of 
preferences is achieved depends primarily on the way an electoral system permits the 
expression of preference information: what electoral theorists call ‘ballot structure’. 
Rae’s ground-breaking study of electoral systems, The Political Consequences o f 
Electoral Laws (1967), was the first to introduce the concept of ballot structure, and the 
distinction between categorical and ordinal ballots. A ballot is categorical if it forces 
voters to say they prefer one party in parliament as opposed to all others — as exists in
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FPTP systems, ‘closed’ list PR systems and those ‘open’ party lists which enable voters 
to choose between candidates but not between parties. An ordinal ballot comprises a 
ballot structure that allows a more complex expression of choice via a rank ordering of 
parties or candidates — such as is explicitly required under AV, CV and STV elections 
(Rae 1967, 17-18). Rae also defined as ordinal those systems that enable ‘cumulation’ 
(the ability to give more than one vote to the same candidate) or ‘panachage’ (the ability 
to vote for several candidates from different party lists), as exists in Switzerland and 
Luxembourg. The distinction between ordinal and categorical ballots exists on a 
different dimension to the standard typology of electoral systems, which seeks to 
classify different systems into examples of majoritarian formulae on the one hand and 
proportional representation formulae on the other.23 Instead, ordinal ballots are found 
in both PR and non-PR systems. They are also a feature of the two-round runoff 
system, which effectively forces voters to make choices about their preferred candidates 
in two separate contests. By contrast, most versions of PR do not enable electors to vote 
for more than one party or to express the strength of their choice. All of the continental 
European democracies bar Fifth Republic France use some form of party list PR, for 
example, and most of these give the voter some choice as to the ordering of candidates 
within a party list24 But in all of these cases, bar the exceptions of Switzerland and 
Luxembourg noted above, voters can only choose between candidates within a chosen 
party list, not between candidates from rival parties. The defining feature of preferential 
voting, and the factor that makes preference swapping such an effective political tool — 
the ability to rank candidates from different parties — is not present.
While most political scientists would argue that the greater choice available under an 
ordinal ballot makes it unequivocally a good thing, there are also more subtle 
difficulties in forcing voters to make an ordinal choice when they register their vote. 
Most famous is the ‘voters’ paradox’: that for any three given voters (A, B, C) and 
options (p, q, r) it is possible that A ranks the options pqr, B ranks the options qrp and 
C ranks the options rpq. On any choice, p  beats q, q beats r and r beats p. In such a 
case the options are said to ‘cycle’, meaning that there is no Condorcet winner. A 
Condorcet winner is any option that can beat all other options in a pairwise contest. In 
1785, the Marquis de Condorcet first observed that in many voting systems, results were
23 See Lijphart 1984, 150-68.
24 For a detailed discussion see Katz 1986, 85-103.
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not necessarily fair if each option (or, in the case of an election, each candidate) could 
compete individually with each other candidate. If there are only two options, one of 
them must always be a Condorcet winner; but if there are more than two, then it is 
possible that none of them are, meaning that there is not always an overall (Condorcet) 
winner. A good illustration of this paradox is the following example based on British 
parliamentary elections in which three candidates from the Conservative (C), Labour (L) 
and Liberal-Democrat (D) parties are competing for election. A hypothetical but 
plausible preference ordering of voters might be as follows:
Table 7.5: A Hypothetical Preference Ordering for British Parliamentary
Elections
C o n serv a tiv e  voters (45% ) L abour v oters (35% ) L ib era l-D em ocrat v o ters (20% )
C L D
D D L
L C C
In a pairwise contest, it can be seen that 45 percent of voters prefer C to L; 35 percent 
prefer L to D; and 55 percent prefer D to C (the other combinations are the obverse of 
these, i.e. 55 percent prefer L to C; 65 percent prefer D to L; and 45 percent prefer C to 
D). The Condorcet winner is clearly D, who can beat both L and C in a pairwise contest 
(by 65 percent and 55 percent respectively). However, if this was a real British election 
held under FPTP then candidate C would have won the seat and candidate D would 
have come last. This example perhaps helps to explain the enthusiasm of British 
electoral reformers in general and those associated with the Liberal Democrats in 
particular in ensuring that any electoral system will pick the Condorcet victor. McLean, 
for example, argues that any good voting system should pick a Condorcet winner if it 
exists (1987, 154). The problem is that all preferential systems clearly fail this 
condition. If we examine again the results from the seat of Richmond at the 1990 
election (Table 6.1), it is clear that candidate Blunt of the National Party is, on first 
preferences, the most popular candidate. His first-preference vote (28,257) is clearly 
superior to his two main rivals, candidates Newell (18,423) and Caldicott (16,072), and 
to all other candidates. However, as the distribution of preferences show, it is equally 
clear that Blunt was the least-favoured candidate of a majority of all voters: more 
people wanted someone other than Blunt to win the seat than wanted Blunt himself to
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win. As we are not privy to the preference orderings of those who voted for the non- 
eliminated candidates (Blunt and Newell), it is impossible to know whether there was a 
Condorcet winner; it may be that there wasn’t one. Assuming that Downs’ median 
voter theorem applies, and that issues are unidimensional, there should always be a 
Condorcet winner.25 Where issues are multi-dimensional — that is, are not capable of 
being placed on a linear continuum, such as left-right — then all bets are off: there are 
no guarantees that a Condorcet winner exists.
When a Condorcet winner does exist, preferential voting systems will sometimes fail to 
pick the Condorcet winner, but they can never pick the Condorcet loser — that is, least- 
favoured option. By contrast, any system which does not take account of a complete 
ordering of preferences (such as FPTP), and even sometimes those that do, are open to 
the possibility of the Condorcet loser being chosen. This paradox is at the centre of the 
burgeoning field of social choice theory, which seeks to examine the relationship 
between individual preferences and social choices in a range of fields far beyond 
elections. For the purposes of this thesis, however, its significance lies in the nature of 
‘strategic voting’. Under a categorical ballot, a voter is often faced with a dilemma: is 
it better to support the most favoured candidate even though that candidate is unlikely to 
win, or to support a less preferred but more widely popular candidate who may have a 
better chance of victory? The dilemma of ‘strategic voting’ — voting for a candidate 
who is not one’s first choice — is one of the most basic problems with all ordinal ballot 
voting systems, particularly those that use a FPTP formula. One of the great advantages 
of preferential voting systems is that they are effectively immune to the effects of 
strategic voting — partly because the requirement to rank candidates makes strategic 
voting largely unnecessary26, and partly because the information requirements to 
successfully effect strategic voting under preferential voting are so onerous.27 Lijphart 
has found a “virtual absence of strategic voting” (1994a, 98) in Australia, and there is no 
evidence that strategic voting of the type that regularly occurs at British elections ever 
having been a factor under any preferential voting system anywhere. Nonetheless,
25 See Downs 1957, chap. 8.
26 See Lijphart 1994a, 189fh.
27 See Bartholdi and Orlin 1991, 341-54.
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under certain theoretical scenarios, all non-dictatorial voting systems can be subject to 
manipulation and strategic voting, and preferential systems are no exception.28
Preferential voting: the arguments against
If the two major theoretical advantages of preferential voting are that it enables both the 
expression and aggregation of voters preferences amongst candidates, and that it is not 
(except in extremely unlikely circumstances) susceptible to strategic voting, what then 
are the theoretical disadvantages of preferential voting? One disadvantage has already 
been identified: compulsory preferential systems, such as exist in Australia, compel 
voters to express preferences which they may not in fact possess, while optional 
preferential systems are susceptible to become straight FPTP contests if nobody 
expresses more than a first preference. These are potentially serious problems, but 
relatively minor when compared to the more fundamental theoretical objection that 
preferential voting is not always monotonic. A voting system is monotonic if gaining 
more votes can never hurt a candidate. While it is true that simply gaining more first 
preference votes will not harm a candidate’s chances under preferential voting, it does 
not follow that a change in the number of first preferences taken from one candidate and 
given to another will always help the beneficiary of those votes. It is easily proven that, 
as a result of altering the sequence in which lower-placed candidates are eliminated, 
gaining more first preference votes can see a candidate lose an election he would have 
otherwise won. The following example is taken from Brams and Fishbum’s analysis of 
the vagaries of STV, but it applies equally to other forms of preferential voting such as 
the alternative vote or the contingent vote:
Assume there are four classes o f voters, with the indicated numbers o f voters in each class ranking 
four candidates (a,b,c,d) as follows:
I. 7: abed
II. 6: bacd
III. 5: ebad
IV. 3: deba
Since no candidate has a majority (i.e. 11 votes out of the total number o f 21), the lowest scoring 
candidate, d, with 3 votes, is eliminated and his second preferences passed on to candidate c, 
giving c 8 votes. Because none of the remaining candidates still has a majority, the (new) lowest 
placed candidate, b, is eliminated next, and his six second preferences go to candidate a, who is 
elected with 13 votes.
28 This is the essence of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on the manipulability o f electoral systems 
(see Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975). For a discussion of strategic voting applied to preferential 
systems, see Dummett 1984, 210-30.
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Now examine the situation where the three class IV voters raised candidate a from fourth to first in 
their rankings, so that their new ordering would be adcb. Now a has ten votes (one short o f a 
majority), b has six votes and c has five votes. As the new lowest placed candidate, c is eliminated 
and his five second preferences passed on to b, who is elected with an absolute majority o f  11 
votes (Brams and Fishbum 1984, 150-51).
This remarkable result is illustrative of one of the fundamental paradoxes of all voting 
systems: they are all open to manipulation in some manner, and almost all can be 
proven to fail relatively undemanding tests of fairness and rationality. The explanation 
for the apparently capricious scenario outlined above is in the sequence by which 
preferential voting systems eliminate lower-ranked candidates if no-one has an absolute 
majority of first preferences. When the candidate with the lowest number of first 
preference votes is eliminated, his or her second and later preferences are then allocated 
to the continuing candidates as required. However, this allocation of preferences is 
essentially arbitrary, the later preferences of voters who chose a relatively unpopular 
candidate are counted before the later preferences of those who chose a relatively 
popular candidate (who will still be in the running). There is no logical reason for 
privileging one preference ordering over any other, but this is precisely what happens 
under preferential voting. Indeed, in many cases the later preferences of the leading 
candidate(s) will not be counted at all. In enabling all voters to express their preference 
orderings, AV inadvertently makes some preference orderings count more than others.
The question of monotonicity may seem theoretical and remote from the real world: it 
isn’t. The lack of monotonicity was crucial to the Plant Commission’s rejection of STV 
(and, by implication, AV) as desirable electoral systems for Britain in 1992 29 The 
Plant Commission, influenced by Oxford professor of logic Michael Dummett, was 
apparently sufficiently concerned at the theoretical possibilities of extra preference votes 
harming an individual candidate as to reject STV as a viable electoral system for Britain 
— although curiously its favoured system, the supplementary vote, has this same 
weakness. A more likely explanation for the Labour Party’s unexpected interest in the 
theory of voting paradoxes was that the stated concerns about monotonicity were in fact 
a convenient justification for ruling out a PR system which would not necessarily have 
assisted the party’s electoral prospects. As one Labour campaigner explained:
Dummett’s criticism concerning the lack of monotonicity ... was the excuse Labour was looking 
for because, with the press we have and the internal variety which goes to make up the Labour
29 See Plant Commission 1992, Appendix 1.
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coalition, there was no way that Labour would, on its own, embrace a system where its candidates 
fight each other (Georghiou 1993, 82).
Nonetheless, the question of monotonicity has introduced a significant theoretical 
argument against the use of any preferential electoral system into the ongoing debate on 
electoral reform in the UK. While the non-monotonicity of preferential voting is a 
serious theoretical flaw, it would appear that the likelihood of Brams and Fishbum’s 
scenario taking place in a real-world contest is remote.30 The Chief Electoral Officer 
for Northern Ireland, which uses STV, has found no evidence in 22 years for a non­
monotonic election result (Bradley 1995, 46-47), while one estimate has put the likely 
incidence of a non-monotonic election result under STV in the United Kingdom at less 
than one case every century (Allard 1995, 46-47).
Conclusion
The message of this chapter is a simple one: ail preferential systems are not equal, and 
apparently minor technical differences between the various electoral systems can have 
major consequences in terms of outcomes. In addition, a number of systems which have 
been advocated as being particularly good choices for ethnically-divided societies are 
found, upon closer examination, to have a range of undesirable consequences. 
Examination of the practical experience of multi-member AV, for example, suggests 
that it suffers from some major technical flaws which may lead to extremely 
disproportional election results, making it unsuitable for political elections in general 
and particularly unsuitable system for multiethnic societies, where it could quite likely 
lead to the complete exclusion of even large minorities from representation. Similarly, 
analysis of the effects of the single transferable vote (STV) at elections in the ethnically- 
divided states of Estonia and Northern Ireland raise doubts as to the efficacy of STV in 
promoting inter-ethnic accommodation, particularly in cases of bi-polar ethnic divisions. 
Examination of the historical experience of the CV also suggests that it has been 
considerably less effective at ensuring preference-swapping than AV; and the ‘optional 
preferential’ version of AV is itself less effective in this regard than ‘full preferential’ 
AV which makes marking of all preferences on the ballot compulsory.
30 See Dummett 1984, 222.
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While this thesis has served in part to validate and supply empirical evidence for a 
theory of multi-ethnic democracy first advanced by Donald Horowitz, the specific 
institutional prescriptions that constitutional engineers should consider as a result of the 
evidence presented herein thus differ substantially from those advanced by Horowitz 
himself. In most of his writings to date, for example, Horowitz has concentrated on the 
Sri Lankan contingent vote system when discussing the accommodative potential of 
preferential voting. As the above discussion of the relative properties of the alternative 
vote and the contingent vote make clear, however, on most comparative indicators AV 
is a superior system. Because its counting rules ensure the progressive elimination of 
lower-placed candidates one-by-one rather than simultaneously eliminating all but the 
top two, AV offers much greater potential minority involvement in an election than CV. 
Under AV, any candidate bar the lowest-placed has a chance to win the seat; under CV 
only the two top-placed candidates have this opportunity. CV also requires electors to 
guess who the two leading candidates will be in order to utilise their vote effectively — 
a situation which provides an incentive for strategic voting, which most electoral system 
scholars would regard as a marked disadvantage.
Moreover, the evidence from the use of CV in Sri Lanka and STV in Northern Ireland 
suggests that optional rather than compulsory preference marking is a definite weakness 
in divided societies. In both of these cases, only a small minority of voters expressed 
any preferences after the first. Similar results have been found in other optional 
preferential voting systems: at STV elections in Malta only one percent of votes for 
major party candidates are transferred across party lines (Hirczy and Lane 1997, 23), 
while at Estonia’s 1990 STV election ethnicity overrode other concerns in ranking of 
candidates, with most voters restricting preference transfers to members of their own 
ethnic group (Taagepera 1996, 31). This confirms Laponce’s theoretical speculation 
that with optional preference marking, voters in divided societies are more likely to fail 
to indicate any secondary choices than to give their preference vote to members of 
another community:
it is very doubtful that the different choices o f an elector will go from the candidates of one
community to that o f another. If the elector runs short of candidates he likes within his own
community he will usually, rather than give a second, third or fourth choice to a candidate of a
community other than his own, fail to indicate such subsidiary choices (Laponce 1957, 327).^
31 Of course, a system where preference marking of all candidates is a requirement for a valid ballot, as in 
Australia, does not suffer from this drawback.
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This is also a potential disadvantage of an optional preferential version of AV: in a 
comparison of optional and compulsory preferential AV forms, Punnett found that
the optional use o f preferences does undermine at least two o f the supposed merits o f the 
Alternative Vote: the efficient mutual delivery of second preferences between allied parties, and 
the election of ‘legitimate’ MPs who can claim to have the support of an overall majority of  
electors (1987, 43).
The experience of PNG’s optional preferential AV elections, however, suggests that, 
where incentives are strong and/or communities are less divided, voters will sometimes 
be prepared to give their lower-order votes to members of other ascriptive groups. 
Nonetheless, making preference marking compulsory to some degree, as recommended 
by the Fijian CRC, clearly increases the chances of inter-community vote transfers 
taking place (CRC 1996, 319-320).
A further significant distinction between the evidence of this thesis and Horowitz’s 
proposals is the distinction between single- and multi-member AV. As the account of 
the experience of multi-member AV in the Australian Senate has made clear, the 
extreme disproportionality and unpredictability of multi-member AV makes it an 
inappropriate system for any society, not just a divided one.32 But when looking at 
South Africa, Horowitz suggested that there “may need to be multimember 
constituencies” used with AV in order for electoral districts to be sufficiently ethnically- 
heterogeneous (1991a, 195). This suggestion represented a serious flaw in his overall 
prescription, and the one which attracted the most criticism from electoral systems 
scholars, and it is notable that most critiques of his proposal focused on the 
unworkability of multi-member AV as one of their major criticisms.33 It also served to 
some extent to overshadow the considerable merit in his basic proposal for AV, and 
may well have retarded more serious investigation of the benefits of single-member AV. 
Horowitz revived a similar proposal when discussing electoral options for Fiji, arguing 
that if it was not possible to ensure sufficient ethnic heterogeneity under AV in single­
member districts,
then it would be possible to draw boundaries for larger constituencies, in which two or three 
separately-elected seats would be located. These would not be multi-member seats; two or three 
members would have to be elected by the same electorate to fulfil the requirement of constituency
32 The exception to this is the system of multi-member AV used in Nauru, where preferences are counted 
as fractional votes —  a second preference being worth half a vote, a third preferences worth a third o f a 
vote, and so on —  which appears to work quite well there.
33 See Lijphart 1991a; Reynolds 1995; Lijphart 1997.
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scale for heterogeneity, but candidates competing for one seat would compete only with 
candidates competing for that same seat, and preferences would be transferred only within single 
seats (Horowitz 1997, 31).
Unfortunately, this proposal would have mirrored, in practice, the way multi-member 
AV worked in Australia — because each vacancy is effectively filled by a different 
election, stable party identification in the electorate could easily see every seat won by 
the same party. It would also be likely to create serious headaches in terms of party 
nomination strategies, and was not adopted in Fiji.
In sum, and contrary to much of the existing literature, a comparison of the relative 
performance of the various preferential electoral systems suggests that single-member 
AV with compulsory marking of preferences is likely to be the most powerful electoral 
system for encouraging centripetal outcomes. However, such a system will only work 
to encourage vote-pooling and centripetal outcomes in divided societies where there is 
sufficient ethnic heterogeneity at the electorate level and sufficient proliferation of 
parties and candidates for preference-swapping deals to be a rational strategy for 
electoral success. The centripetal approach also assumes that there is the political space, 
even in divided societies, for political appeals made on issues other than ethnic identity 
to succeed — which presumes that there are a sufficient number of ‘floating’ voters 
prepared to cast their vote on the basis of an issue other than ethnicity. If there is no 
room for appeals to other interests, and no cross-cutting cleavages evident in the 
political spectrum, then the prospects for constitutional engineering prescriptions to 
encourage such interests to emerge is limited. The core appeal of centripetalism is its 
ability to promote and give voice to the underlying moderate sentiments of the 
electorate in a sustainable manner, but it cannot promote moderate sentiments that do 
not, in fact, exist.
Because of our identification of single-member AV as the most promising centripetal 
electoral system, the question of what socio-structural conditions facilitate the use of 
single-member AV methods is therefore crucial to any accurate assessment of the utility 
of centripetalism as a legitimate strategy for promoting democracy in divided societies. 
Because of the rejection of multi-member AV as an acceptable electoral system, and 
question marks about the strengths of the incentives for moderation provided by STV, 
any workable system of single-member AV for parliamentary elections will have to 
utilise relatively small, contiguous electoral districts. But centripetal methods can only
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work to encourage inter-ethnic accommodation when constituency boundaries can be 
drawn in such a way as to create ethnically-heterogeneous districts. This focuses 
attention on the different types of ethnic group distribution in different ethnically- 
divided states. In PNG, for example, there are so many ethnic groups, numbering in the 
thousands, that even relatively small single-member districts tend to include, in most 
cases, a number of different ethnic groups all competing for election. Thus the key 
facilitating conditions for centripetal electoral methods to succeed — ethnic 
heterogeneity and a corresponding multiplicity of candidates — are both present. This 
is a situation common to other territories with similar social structures to PNG — other 
states in Melanesia, for example — but appears to be relatively unusual elsewhere. The 
final chapter of this thesis will therefore look at how widespread the applicability of the 
centripetal model of constitutional engineering may be to other ethnically-divided 
societies around the world.
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Chapter Eight:
Conclusion
Divided societies, like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, tend to be divided in different ways. 
This may seem a simple or even simplistic statement, but it is surprising how many ‘one 
size fits all’ conflict-management packages have been recommended for divided 
societies without sufficient understanding of the structure of the society itself. 
Ethnically-divided societies can be ‘fragmented’ into many contending groups (such as 
PNG) or ‘balanced’ between a few similarly-sized configurations, which can then be 
broken down into ‘bipolar’ (e.g. Fiji, Cyprus) or ‘multipolar’ (e.g. Bosnia) structures. 
They can feature ‘dominant majorities’ (e.g. Sri Lanka) or ‘dominant minorities’ (e.g. 
Rwanda).1 Minorities can be based on indigenous or other ‘homeland’ societies, or on 
settler diasporas.2 Ethnic groups can be divided by international boundaries between 
several states or entirely encapsulated by them.3 Groups can be territorially 
concentrated or widely dispersed. The nature of the ethnic divide can have a significant 
influence on the way ethnic conflicts are manifested, and consequently on the possible 
strategies for dealing with them. This is particularly the case when we examine the 
prescriptions of the dominant model of democracy in divided societies, 
consociationalism, and alternatives based on centripetal methods. This chapter will 
argue that, although proponents of both approaches have typically paid insufficient 
attention to the significance of ethnic group structure in different types of divided 
societies, both are highly dependent upon questions of group demographics.
Centripetalism versus consociationalism
Consociational prescriptions for ethnically-divided societies are based on a model in 
which each ethnic polity enjoys a degree of local autonomy and veto powers over 
matters directly affecting its welfare, while being guaranteed proportional representation 
in parliament, the executive and the civil service of its own members. Arend Lijphart, 
the most prominent supporter of consociational measures, has claimed that 
consociational democracy is “the only workable type of democracy in deeply divided 
societies” and that centripetal prescriptions are “deeply flawed and dangerous” (1994b,
1 See Sisk 1996, 15-16.
2 See Esman 1994, 6-9.
3 See May 1996a, 9.
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222, 224). This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the arguments for and against 
consociationalism, which have generated a small mountain of literature, much of which 
is well outside the boundaries of this thesis.4 But it is clear that a number of the central 
tenets of consociational theory are simply inapplicable to traditional societies like PNG. 
Most consociational prescriptions, for example, presuppose the existence of functional 
political organisations headed by social elites which represent the component ethnic 
groups. Under conditions such as those applying in PNG, where civil society is weak 
and where most ascriptive ethnic identities exist at the local clan, tribe and village level, 
such organisations are often simply not present. Similarly, the consociationalist reliance 
on elites as the driving force for inter-ethnic moderation appears to be questionable in 
PNG, especially considering the incidence of violence at the local level and the role of 
elite instigators in virtually all the micro-nationalist and secessionist ethnic movements 
in PNG to date.5 By contrast, the centripetal approach relies on popular rather than elite 
activity as the driving force for moderation: inter-ethnic moderation is dependent on the 
behaviour of campaigning politicians and their supporters ‘on the ground’. Moreover, 
unlike consociational prescriptions which rely on constraints (such as minority vetoes) 
against hostility, the centripetal approach produces incentives for accommodative 
behaviour — via the search for secondary support. The Fijian case provides another 
area of contrast: centripetalism is hostile to the type of communal-roll based electoral 
system used for many years in Fiji, as such a system requires a formal identification of 
ethnicity, and can thus contribute to the consolidation of ethnic politics rather than its 
breakdown. By contrast, as long as communal seats are distributed proportionately, as 
in pre-coup Fiji, communal rolls and other devices which explicitly recognise ethnic 
identity are entirely consistent with consociational approaches (Lijphart 1985b, 25fh). 
This further distinguishes the centripetal model from consociationalism.
The arguments for the specific electoral recommendations of consociationalism, in the 
form of proportional representation electoral laws, are also worth briefly considering in 
the PNG context. Lijphart has said that “the electoral system that is optimal for 
segmented societies is list PR in large districts” (1990, 13). His arguments are based on 
the tendency of PR to produce multi-party systems and parliaments, so that all segments 
of the population can be represented in parliament, and the empirical relationship
4 See Lijphart 1985a, 83-117 for a summary of these.
5 See May 1982, 424-28.
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between PR and ‘oversized’ or ‘grand’ coalitions, which is the fundamental tenet of the 
‘power-sharing’ approach on which consociationalism is based. Lijphart favours list PR 
in large districts because that is the system which has been shown to maximise 
proportionality of election results, and because it is a relatively simple system for both 
voters and electoral officials (1990, 11). PR election rules are thus important of 
themselves — because they are likely to facilitate parliamentary representation of all 
groups — and also an important component of wider consociational prescriptions which 
emphasise the need for grand coalitions, group autonomy and minority veto powers.
The evidence from PNG, however, suggests that such prescriptions can be rendered 
meaningless in extremely heterogeneous societies which evidence high levels of 
multiplicity and fragmentation of ethnic groups. In PNG, for example, the granting of 
proportional representation to all ‘minority’ ethnic groups is simply not feasible. The 
legislature itself would have to be eight times larger just to represent all languages 
spoken — a ‘Parliament of a Thousand Tribes’, to quote the title of one work on pre- 
independence PNG (White 1972). Likewise, proportional representation of political 
parties in the legislature according to their share of the popular vote is meaningless 
because there is no real party system of which to speak. Parties tend not to be organised 
around ideologies or even policies, but rather around dominant personalities. There 
appears to be little party identification on the part of the electorate. Members frequently 
change their party allegiance after they have been elected in the hope of being able to 
secure a ministry or to take advantage of some other aspect of government patronage.
A list PR electoral system would thus be virtually impossible to operate in PNG, as it 
would force voters to choose between parties rather than between candidates. At the 
1997 elections, the major ‘party’ was in fact independent candidates, who gained 61 
percent of the total vote and 36 seats. By contrast, the most successful self-declared 
party, the People’s Progress Party, could gain only six percent of the total vote 
(although it did win 16 seats in parliament). One result of PNG’s weak party system is 
that governments are, by necessity, coalitions of several parties and independents. This 
has important implications for the argument over electoral systems in divided societies: 
one of the reasons consociationalists favour proportional electoral rules is because of 
their association with multipartism and hence with multi-party coalitions — Lewis, for 
example, argues that “one of the advantages of proportional representation is that it
232
tends to promote coalition government” (1965, 79). Like Horowitz, Lijphart sees the 
formation of inclusive multiethnic coalition governments as a crucial factor for 
sustainable democracy in divided societies (1991d, 505). In PNG, by contrast, 
governments have always been loose coalitions of various parties and groups regardless 
of the electoral formula in use. There is no need to ‘engineer’ coalition government in 
PNG — the fragmentation of the society and weak party system mean that coalitions are 
almost inevitable.
Given this situation, the centripetal approach would appear to be the only feasible 
mechanism for accommodating ethnic divisions and reducing ethnic conflict in PNG 
and other highly fragmented societies. By providing sufficient incentives for groups to 
co-operate and compromise before the election, and by providing an electoral system 
which rewards those candidates who reach beyond their own group for second and later 
preferences, centripetalism allows conflicts to be managed at the popular rather than the 
elite level, before the election rather than after. Centripetalism posits the electorate, not 
elites, as the engine of moderation in divided societies, and is thus particularly suitable 
for societies in which the focus of political competition is at the local rather than 
national level. Sisk has argued that because centripetalism encourages political leaders 
to appeal to the moderate forces in an electorate in order to maximise their electoral 
prospects, it also promotes “the kind of compromises they must make at the centre if the 
divided society is to be truly democratic and stable” (1995, 36).
In PNG and other highly fragmented societies, centripetalism may well be the only way 
to manage ethnic conflict which enables all groups to have a stake in the success of the 
process. Because there are many more groups than can be represented in the legislature, 
a process whereby those groups are given sufficient incentives to behave 
accommodatively towards one another before an election is vastly preferable to 
expecting the representative of one particular ethnic interest to behave accommodatively 
after the election. Because candidates in many cases have no possibility of winning a 
clear majority from their own supporter base alone, they have no choice but to seek the 
support of others. This support does not necessarily have to be a by-product of 
accommodatory behaviour: indeed, it may be that more extreme positions will win 
greater secondary support than less extreme ones. The available evidence, however, 
points in the other direction. In PNG, groups previously engaging in ‘tribal warfare’
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were coerced to the equivalent of the negotiating table by the overriding need to achieve 
majority support, whilst in Australia there is a strong scholarly consensus that AV 
encourages centrist politics and rewards the middle ground.
However, just as the applicability of consociationalism appears to be dependent upon 
questions of social structure, so the centripetal approach is likely to work well only 
under certain conditions. The most important precondition of all is that electoral 
constituencies are ethnically heterogeneous. The more ethnically-fragmented a 
constituency, the more likely it is that meaningful vote pooling will take place. In many 
ethnically-divided countries, however, members of the same ethnic group tend to cluster 
together, which means that the relatively small, single-member districts which are a 
feature of AV would in most cases result in constituencies which are ethnically 
homogeneous rather than heterogeneous. By contrast, societies where ethnic groups are 
extremely fragmented and/or dispersed are likely to result in electorates which are 
sufficiently heterogeneous for vote-pooling to take place under AV. In instances of 
extreme ethnic fractionalization, vote-pooling becomes a virtual necessity: in these 
cases, where it is extremely unlikely that there will be an outright majority victor, 
second and later preferences will almost always be counted to determine the winner. In 
these cases there is thus an in-built incentive for candidates to seek the second and later 
preferences of other groups to give them a chance of victory.
This condition for meaningful vote pooling again illustrates the contextual difference 
between the consociational and centripetal approaches. According to Lijphart, the 
optimal number of segments for a consociationalist approach to work is three or four, 
and conditions become progressively less favourable as more segments are added (1977, 
56). For the centripetal approach to succeed, the situation is reversed: three segments 
would be the minimum number of groups necessary for vote-pooling to work, and 
conditions for success increase as the number of segments increase. This has clear 
implications for future discussions of institutional design for ethnically divided- 
societies: if some models of conflict-regulating measures work well in one setting but 
poorly in others, as the above analysis suggests, then it is clear that more attention needs 
to be paid to the context and demographics of a particular case when suggesting 
institutional prescriptions for conflict management.
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The significance of group demographics
Under conditions of ethnic ‘census’ voting patterns, where electors overwhelmingly cast 
their vote for their ascriptive candidate or party, the territorial distribution of ethnic 
groups is all-important for recommendations about electoral system designs. Vote 
pooling formulae will only provide incentives for inter-ethnic accommodation if 
electoral districts are sufficiently heterogeneous for preference-swapping to be an 
attractive political strategy. Outside of the highly fragmented ethnic structure typified 
by PNG, the best conditions for this is if the members of different ethnic groups are 
widely dispersed and inter-mingled throughout a country. The worst conditions are 
where groups are geographically concentrated or segregated into particular areas. Under 
such conditions, any single-member electoral districts are likely to be ethnically 
homogenous rather than heterogeneous, meaning that there is little possibility of inter­
ethnic preference swapping occurring.
For consociational models based on list-PR formulae to function, by contrast, large 
regional or national electoral districts are usually necessary in order for a full spectrum 
of minority representation is to be achieved in a proportional manner. This means that 
approaches based on members representing particular geographical areas, and servicing 
the needs of a particular constituency, are inimical to the consociational approach. List 
PR systems are thus more likely to work well in conditions where a few large, 
territorially-defined ethnic groups can be represented, in close proportion to their actual 
numbers, in a national parliament. When combined with other conflict-mitigating 
arrangements, such as federalism and grand coalition governments, ethnic 
accommodations can be negotiated between elites, and ethnic conflict can be minimised 
by accentuating the territorial distinctions between groups.
Moreover, a social structure comprising a few large ethnic groups concentrated in 
particular regions is likely to be unconducive to the application of centripetal 
approaches. Where one group has an absolute majority in an electorate and is 
represented by only one party, there is little incentive for it to engage in preference­
swapping arrangements with other groups, and little likelihood of minorities being taken 
into account at election time. This perhaps goes some way to explaining Lijphart’s 
hostility to the AV proposal for South Africa, where there are indeed several large 
ethnic groups of roughly similar sizes which tend to be geographically concentrated in
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particular areas.6 By contrast, in PNG there is, as we have seen, an average of 21.8 
candidates per seat, each usually backed by his or her own clan grouping. The 
fractionalized nature of clan groupings has meant that in most seats no ethnic group 
forms anything close to a majority.
A major reason for the success of AV in PNG was thus the highly fractionalized nature 
of PNG’s multi-ethnic society which, when combined with relatively small, single­
member electorates, provided the necessary level of candidate multiplication for 
centripetalism to succeed. Moreover, the evidence from PNG’s three AV elections 
clearly points to accommodative campaign practices being encouraged by the 
preferential electoral system. Although there are still fewer examples than would be 
ideal, there is now some evidence that the centripetal approach can work and has 
worked to encourage accommodation within a divided society. This raises the question 
of precisely how representative PNG is when discussing the wider locus of ethnically- 
divided societies. How useful is the PNG case as a comparative model when discussing 
institutional remedies for managing ethnic conflict? And how representative is the 
extremely high degree of ethnic fractionalization which exists there of the wider locus 
of ethnic division and conflict around the world?
The answer would appear to be that instances of extremely fragmented multiethnic 
societies are, while more widely dispersed than many observers may realise, still a 
relatively small sub-section of the global scope of ethnically-divided states. The social 
structures of PNG, for example, are a basic component of Melanesian societies, and are 
thus replicated to greater or lesser degrees throughout much of the south-west Pacific. 
Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands both exhibit similar social structures to PNG. The 
Solomon Islands is very similar — predominantly Melanesian, with small minorities of 
Polynesian (6.6 percent) and i-Kiribati (1.5 percent) immigrants, but home to over 80 
Melanesian languages as well as Polynesian, Pidgin and English. Vanuatu has 
approximately 105 different language groups, and is also divided along an overarching 
anglophone-francophone language division, a legacy of its status as a joint Anglo- 
French condominium until independence in 1980. These Melanesian states therefore
6 See Scarritt 1993.
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exhibit the basic ethnic structure which makes vote pooling a theoretically attractive 
proposition.7
By contrast, the social structure of the fourth Melanesian state, the Republic of Fiji, is 
quite different: there the primary ethnic cleavage runs along a bi-polar division between 
Indian and indigenous Fijians. Both groups are, however, internally divided: the
mostly Hindu Indian community has a sizeable (15 percent) Muslim minority and a 
number of sub-identities, often based on family roots in India, while the indigenous 
Fijian population combines elements of the basic Melanesian social structure with the 
Polynesian distinction between chiefs and commoners, all of which serve to 
significantly fragment the indigenous population. As noted earlier, the 1997 Fijian 
Constitution adopts a centripetal approach to ethnic conflict management via AV 
electoral laws. The ultimate success or failure of centripetalism in Fiji, however, will be 
heavily dependent on the demographic distribution of ethnic groups and the way in 
which electoral boundaries are drawn. There is a significant degree of territorial 
segregation of ethnic groups in rural Fiji, and the outer Fijian islands are almost entirely 
indigenous Fijian, so vote pooling there will have to take place on issues other than 
ethnicity, if it takes place at all. The situation on the main islands and in urban centres 
is more mixed. Some commentators have argued that, even in urban areas, “ethnic 
residential self-selectivity” occurs, rendering districts predominantly Indian or Fijian 
(Premdas 1995, 12). However, the smallness of the islands and the highly inter-mixed 
nature of many urban areas mean that electoral boundaries can be drawn in such a way 
as to create ethnically-heterogeneous electoral districts — that is, districts which have a 
reasonable mixture of both indigenous Fijian and Indian populations. If the makeup of 
these electorates is sufficiently diverse to enable genuine trading of preferences between 
groups, then the new system could well promote meaningful accommodation across
7 Moreover, three much larger countries also lay claim to other parts of Melanesia. The Torres Strait 
Islands between PNG and Queensland are territorially part o f Australia. The western half o f the island of 
New Guinea, Irian Jaya, which has much the same social structure as PNG, is territorially part o f  
Indonesia, the world’s fourth most-populous country. Irian Jaya was forcibly incorporated into Indonesia 
in 1969 under a so-called ‘act o f free choice’ by local leaders, and the indigenous Melanesian population 
has now been joined by some 150,000 Indonesian settlers on government-sponsored ‘transmigration’ 
schemes. The island o f New Caledonia is technically part o f metropolitan France, and elects 
representatives to the French parliament. Its population is split roughly equally between immigrant 
caldoche (French settler) and indigenous Melanesian populations. In both Irian Jaya and New Caledonia 
there are local independence movements, although these continue to be vigorously repressed in Irian Jaya 
in particular. But they do illustrate that the type of extremely fragmented structure o f ethnic groups 
typical o f Melanesia is considerably more widespread, in terms of states, than the geographical boundaries 
o f the island region would initially suggest.
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cleavages, “the object being to force political parties to appeal for votes for their 
candidates from communities other than the one in which they are based” (Lai 1997, 
79). The Constitution Review Commission considered this question at some length and 
concluded that it is “entirely possible to draw constituency boundaries in Fiji in a way 
that achieves reasonable heterogeneity” (1996, 314-15). In other words, even with an 
ethnic structure very different from that of other Melanesian states — a bipolar division 
rather than a highly-fragmented one — the crucial factor of ethnically-diverse electoral 
districts (a precondition for inter-ethnic vote-pooling) can still be achieved.
For the centripetal approach to work, it would thus appear that ethnically-heterogeneous 
constituencies are a virtual necessity. Ethnically-heterogeneous constituencies assume 
one of two situations: a considerable multiplicity of ethnic groups, so that even
relatively small single-member districts will include several ethnic groups; or a small 
number of ethnic groups but a high degree of group dispersion and geographic inter­
mixing. As we have seen, the South Pacific region provides good examples of both 
types of structure: the case of PNG is the best illustration of group multiplicity, while 
the case of Fiji is a clear example of group dispersion. If either of these factors is 
present, then it should be possible to draw electoral boundaries in such a way as to 
create ethnically-heterogeneous districts, and thus to facilitate meaningful vote pooling. 
In either case, the presence of a number of roughly equivalent-sized ethnic groups in 
most constituencies virtually ensures that no group will have anything like enough 
support to win an outright majority. If a majority threshold is in place, successful 
candidates must receive secondary support from outside their own group.
An additional, although less important, favourable condition for vote-pooling is a 
situation in which the major ethnic groups are themselves sufficiently internally 
fragmented — either by divided responses towards ethnic issues (e.g. conciliatory 
versus non-conciliatory positions) or by non-ethnic cleavages (e.g. class) — for 
incentives to vote pooling still to occur. This is actually the rule rather than the 
exception in most ethnically-divided cases: it is rare for a single ideology or leader to 
represent an entire ethnic group.8 As discussed in Chapter Five, in Sri Lanka, where the 
overwhelming majority of the population is Sinhalese, there is some evidence from 
presidential elections that the dominant parties will seek the preference support of the
8 See Horowitz 1985, 574.
238
minority (13%) Tamil population in order to surpass the majority threshold. Similarly 
in Fiji, the indigenous and Indian Fijian communities are themselves politically divided 
between several parties on both sides, which makes meaningful vote pooling more 
likely than if the two groups were united behind two dominant ethnic parties.
Prescriptions for electoral engineering are thus heavily dependent on questions of social 
structure and, in particular, group demography. Clearly, we need to look more carefully 
at the type of ethnic division within a particular country or region. An analysis of the 
different conditions prevalent in southern Africa and the South Pacific makes clear how 
much the structure of ethnic conflict can vary from region to region. In many regions of 
southern Africa, there tend to be a few large ethnic groups, most of which are 
territorially-concentrated in particular regions, meaning that there is little if any prospect 
for the creation of ethnically heterogeneous electorates. A recent survey found that:
African minorities are more highly concentrated in single contiguous geographical areas than are 
minorities in other regions. More than 70 percent of black Africans minorities were coded as 
concentrated in one region in comparison to ... 48 percent in the rest o f the world. Concentration 
... guarantees that many electoral constituencies and informal local power bases will be controlled 
by a single ethnopolitical group (Scarritt 1993, 256-57).
This situation holds true for most of the multi-ethnic states of sub-Saharan Africa. It is 
therefore likely that only the most highly ethnically fragmented states in this region — 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire — would be appropriate candidates for vote-pooling 
techniques, and even then much would depend upon the degree of politicization of this 
ethnic fractionalization. In the South Pacific, by contrast, ethnic groups are either so 
numerous, or so highly intermixed, that even small single-member electorates are 
typically ethnically heterogeneous, and thus likely to promote accommodative outcomes 
if integrative institutions are used. On such prosaic details rest much weightier 
prescriptions for the success or failure of consociational and centripetal approaches to 
the management of ethnic conflict.
Facilitating conditions for centripetalism
As the above discussion indicates, there are two distinct sets of facilitating socio- 
structural conditions which favour the use of centripetalism as a mechanism for 
encouraging inter-ethnic accommodation in a divided society, namely:
(a) an extremely high number of ethnic groups (e.g. Papua New Guinea), or
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(b) a low number of ethnic groups, but a high degree of ethnic group dispersion 
and geographical inter-mixing (e.g. Fiji).
There are two broad categories of countries which satisfy one or other of these criteria. 
The first case represents an unusual type of ethnic group structure: a situation in which 
groups are so large in number and so small in size that none has the capacity to 
dominate other groups at the national level. In this scenario, ethnic conflict can be 
deadly, but it is usually concentrated at the local, rather than national, level. Institutions 
which build in incentives for inter-group accommodation are thus of most utility for 
moderating the behaviour of various groups ‘on the ground’ — for example, in the 
course of election campaigning. And, because there are so many ethnic groups, even 
relatively small single-member electoral districts will be sufficiently heterogeneous to 
encourage accommodative electoral strategies under integrative systems like AV. As 
we have seen, such a structure is typified by the Melanesian cases of PNG, the Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu. In all of these cases there are hundreds — or in the PNG case, 
thousands — of competing ethnic micro-polities due to the extreme linguistic diversity 
and the tribal or clan-based nature of ethnic identity. While characteristic of Melanesia, 
this degree of micro-fragmentation appears to be rare in other regions. Even the most 
ethnically-fragmented regions of sub-Saharan Africa, which many analysts erroneously 
believe to be the world’s most fractionalized tribal states, exhibit considerably lower 
levels of ethno-linguistic fragmentation than Melanesia.
In the other type of facilitating social structure, featuring a high degree of ethnic group 
dispersion, the sheer number of ethnic groups tells us only half the story. We also need 
to know something about the geographic concentration of those groups. Those 
countries which have a dispersed and inter-mixed structure of ethnic demography are 
likely to produce a high degree of electorate-level heterogeneity, even when there are 
only two or three ethnic groups. As Lijphart himself has noted, this type of plural 
society tends to be based upon “geographical mixture but mutual social avoidance” 
(1977, 17) — a good description of the basis of ethnic relations in highly inter-mixed 
but antagonistic ‘bi-communal systems’ such as Fiji, Malaysia and Guyana.9 Such 
mutual social avoidance does, for course, involve some degree of residential segregation 
— similar communities are likely to live in the same street or suburb. But barring
9 See Milne 1988, 101-13.
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ethnic gerrymandering, when overlaid by the much larger boundaries of single-member 
electorates, the result will tend towards ethnic heterogeneity.
Such a structure is relatively uncommon in some regions, such as Latin America and 
much of Africa. But it is a common feature of regions in which large immigrant 
populations have been imported or immigrated during times of colonial rule, and then 
stayed and integrated into the society while retaining their own ethnic identity. As the 
following table shows, it is a particularly common model of ethnic group structure in the 
Asia-Pacific region.10 The table, adapted from Robert Ted Gurr’s Minorities at Risk, 
lists those ethnically-divided countries in the developing world in which at least 10% of 
the population is classified as minorities, ranked in order of the aggregate proportion of 
minority groups which see themselves and act as a politicised community (and can 
therefore be expected to vote along ethnic lines). One of the most useful aspects of 
Gurr’s study for our purposes is that it examines not only the size of minority groups, 
but also their type, ideological coherence and, most importantly, their level o f 
geographical concentration or dispersion. When this factor is included, it is possible to 
identify those states in which groups are widely dispersed across urban and rural areas, 
compared to those who tend to be concentrated in one or two regions (Gurr 1993, 326). 
Where most groups are coded as geographically dispersed, many electorates will 
necessarily be ethnically heterogeneous, and should thus present the necessary 
preconditions for vote-pooling approaches to succeed. Cases in which all or most 
groups are classified as geographically concentrated, by contrast, will usually feature 
ethnically homogenous electorates and thus limited prospects of vote-pooling as a 
solution to ethnic conflicts.
10 This has been emphasised by another study of ethnic conflict, which found that the Asian region had 
the highest number of ethnopolitical groups involved in serious conflict in the postwar period of any 
region in the world. See Gurr 1994, 349-53.
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Table 8.1: Minority Group Proportions and Geographic Concentration
Country Main minority groups Aggregated 
proportion 
of minority 
groups
Index of 
group 
concent­
ration
Guinea Fulani (30%); Malinke (30%); Susu (16%) 0.760 5.6
Niger Djerema/Songhai (19%); Hausa (46%); Tuareg (11%) 0.760 5.0
Cameroon Kirdi (22%); Westerners (20%); Bamileke (27%) 0.690 6.0
Ethiopia Afars (5%); Eritreans (7.5%); Nilo-Saharans (1.6%); Oromo 
(40%); Somali (5%); Tigreans (9%)
0.670 5.6
Bolivia Native highland peoples (61%); native lowland peoples (2%) 0.630 6.0
Zambia Bemba (37%); Lozi (Barotse) (7%); Tonga (19%) 0.630 5.3
Zaire Bakongo (10.3%); Luba (Kasai Province ) (6.1%); Lingala 
(20%); Lunda, Yeke (5.6%); Kivu Region (13%)
0.550 5.6
Uganda Ankole (8%); Baganda (16%); Kakwa (3%); Karamojong 
(2%); Konjo, Amba (3%); Langi (6%); Lugbara, Madi 
(4.9%); Nyarwanda (Rwandans) (5.9%)
0.528 6.0
Mauritius* Creole speakers (36%), Moslems (10%), Chinese (5%) 0.510 2.0*
Malaysia Chinese (34%); Dayaks (3.95%); East Indians (8.3%); 
Kadazans (3.9%);
0.502 4.0
Mali Tuareg (4.7%); Mande (43%) 0.477 6.0
Angola Bakongo (14%); Ovimbundu (33%) 0.470 6.0
Nigeria Hausa/Fulani (29%); Ibo (11%) 0.460 5.0
Nauru** I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans (26%); Chinese (9%), Europeans 
and Indians (8%)
0.430 1.0'
Pern Afro-Americans (0.5%); native highland peoples (40%); 
native lowland peoples (1.2%)
0.417 5.7
Ghana Ashanti (28%); Ewe (13%); Mossi, Dagomba (16%) 0.410 6.0
Kenya Kikuyu (21%); Luo (13%); Masai (1.6%); Somali (2%); 
Turkana, Pokot (3%); Redille, Borana (1%)
0.410 5.7
Sierra Leone Creoles (1.9%); Limba (8%); Mende (31%) 0.410 4.6
South Africa* Zulus (15%); Coloureds (8%); Afrikaners (8%); other Whites 
(6%); Indians (2.4%)
0.394 4.0
Togo Ewe (22.2%); Kabre (14%) 0.362 5.0
Ecuador Afro-Americans (8%); native highland peoples (26%); native 
lowland peoples (1%)
0.350 6.0
Burma Arakanese Muslims (3.7%); Zomis (Chins) (2.4%); Kachins 
(1.1%); Karens (10.2%); Mons (2.5%); Shans (7.7%); Hill 
tribes (2.5%)
0.301 5.3
Brunei** Chinese (17%); Dusun (8%); Indians (4%) 0.290 3.251
Singapore* Malays (15%); Indians (7%); Europeans (2%) 0.240 2.01
India Kashmiris (3.4%); Muslims (11.6%); Nagas (0.01%); Santals 
(0.066%); Scheduled tribes (6.1%); Sikhs (1.88%); Mizos 
(Lushais)(0.07%); Tripuras (0.07%)
0.208 4.6
Sri Lanka Indian Tamils (5.5%); Sri Lankan Tamils (12.6%); 0.181 4.0
Thailand Chinese (10%); Malay Muslims (2.5%); Northern Hill Tribes 
(1.5%)
0.140 4.0
Bangladesh Chittagong Hills peoples (0.49%); Hindus (12.2%) 0.127 3.5
Source: Gurr 1993, 326-28.
* Data from Minority Rights Group International 1997 ** Data from Asian-Pacific Cultural Center 1995. 
1 Author’s estimate.
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At face value, the above table would appear to indicate that the most favourable cases 
for utilising centripetal methods to encourage inter-group accommodation are mostly 
located in Africa, as the degree of ethnic heterogeneity is so much higher in Africa than 
other regions. However, when we take into account the geographical concentration of 
threatened minorities, this situation changes markedly. As Table 8.1 indicates, Gurr’s 
study found that countries in the Asia-Pacific region had the lowest degree of ethnic 
group concentration of any region in the world, while the countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa had the highest degree of concentration. The Asia-Pacific region is defined as 
those countries coded by Gurr as ‘Asian’, with the addition of the three nations of the 
region coded as ‘Western’: Australia, New Zealand and Japan. On Gurr’s scale of 
group concentration from 1 (“widely dispersed in most urban and rural areas”) to 6 
(“concentrated mainly in one or several adjoining regions”), the average ethnic group 
concentration is 4.00 for the Asia-Pacific, compared to 4.25 for Western Europe, 4.58 
for North Africa and the Middle East, 4.78 for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, 5.06 for the Americas and 5.09 for Africa South of the Sahara (1993, 326-28). 
Significantly, in most Asia-Pacific countries the largest minority groups were all coded 
at the highest level of group dispersion: Hindus in Bangladesh, Muslims in India, 
Chinese and Indians in Malaysia, and Malays and Indians in Singapore all fell into this 
category. Much of the reason for the Asia-Pacific’s degree of group dispersion is due to 
the presence of the vast Indian and Chinese diasporas within the region. Many of these 
groups were imported as foreign guestworkers under British colonial rule last century, 
or arrived under the guise of economically-motivated migration earlier this century. 
The final section of this thesis will thus examine, on a state-by-state basis, the reasons 
for the highly-intermixed settlement patterns in much of the Asia-Pacific, and the 
applicability of centripetalism as a strategy for managing ethnic tensions in the divided 
states of the region.
Malaysia
We have already examined the ethnic division in Fiji, where indentured Indian labourers 
were imported in large numbers to grow sugar cane. A broadly similar situation exists 
in Malaysia, in which the Chinese (34 percent of population) and East Indian (8.3 
percent) minorities were originally imported (or encouraged to migrate) for specific 
labour-market purposes: the Chinese primarily to work in tin mines and the Indians to
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work on colonial rubber plantations. Both immigrant groups succeeded to such an 
extent that the three major groups of Malaysian society — Malays, Chinese and Indian 
— became intermixed and dispersed around much of peninsula Malaysia. The result 
was that the single-member electoral districts drawn for Malaysia’s first council 
elections in 1952-53 were ethnically heterogeneous. The Alliance party formed to 
contest these elections responded to this electoral reality by endorsing an ethnic mixture 
of candidates — Malays in predominantly Malay seats, Chinese in Chinese seats and so 
on — so that it effectively operated as a multiethnic coalition.11 To succeed in 
heterogeneous districts, however, the component parties of the Alliance had to be able 
to convince at least some of their supporters to vote for candidates from other ethnic 
groups in some seats, and to gain this cross-ethnic support, those candidates had to 
campaign and behave moderately on ethnic issues.12 Similarly, the main opposition 
parties, which were mostly seen as being representative of Chinese interests, had to 
attract at least some support from Malays (Brown 1994, 235). A number of studies have 
emphasised the key importance of these heterogeneous districts in promoting the 
ongoing success of Malaysia’s broad, catch-all UMNO coalition, which runs an 
ethnically-mixed slate of candidates across the country.13 But Malaysia’s first-past-the- 
post electoral system does not enable the expression of second preference support, 
implying that vote-pooling arrangements are institutionalised more by historical 
circumstance and the nature of the coalition than by the electoral law itself. As 
successive boundary delimitations have increasingly reduced the heterogeneity of most 
seats in favour of Malay majorities, so the inter-ethnic nature of the ruling coalition has 
declined, along with Malaysia’s claims to be a competitive democracy.14
Singapore and Brunei
Like Malaysia, the city-state of Singapore exhibits a three-way ethnic split between a 
Chinese, Malay and Indian population, although here the Chinese are a clear majority, a 
fact which strongly influenced Singapore’s withdrawal from the Malay Federation to 
form a separate state in 1965. Singapore today is home to significant Malay (15 
percent) and Indian (9 percent) minorities, both of which are, to a considerable extent,
11 See Horowitz 1991b, 466.
12 See von Vorys 1975, 302-5.
13 See Hannum 1996,464-71.
14 See Rachagan 1993, 49-86.
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interspersed with the majority Chinese population. The multi-ethnic composition of 
Singapore’s population, its geographic position between two much larger Malay 
countries (Malaysia and Indonesia) and its authoritarian and technocratic approach to 
governance in the context of rule by one dominant party (the People’s Action Party) has 
encouraged Singapore’s leaders to find ways of balancing its multi-ethnic status with 
their oft-stated desire to build a inclusive ‘meritocracy’.
One way of achieving this end has been via engineering of the electoral system. 
Singapore’s electoral system provides for a combination of single and multi-member 
constituencies, and requires parties to run multi-ethnic slates of candidates in the multi­
member ‘group representation constituencies’ in order to facilitate minority 
representation in parliament.15 Since 1991, of each four-person team competing to win 
a group representation constituency, one must be a member of a minority group (i.e. a 
Malay, Indian or Eurasian). The result of this move is that Singapore’s main ethnic 
groups are now represented in parliament in close proportion to their overall numbers in 
the community. While the nature of the electoral process in Singapore is decidedly 
authoritarian, it does thus enable the representation of minority ethnic interests. 
Furthermore, the use of mandated ethnic slates means that members of one group will 
always be voting for members of another, so competition between groups will have to 
take place on the basis of factors other than ethnicity. In addition, the advent of 
government policies of multiculturalism and meritocracy, and public housing policies 
which encourage an even ethnic distribution of the population, have resulted in a 
significant depoliticization of ethnicity (Ganesan 1996, 74). Singapore thus appears to 
represent a largely successful attempt, within the confines of a system of benign 
authoritarianism, at reducing the political importance of ethnicity through a combination 
of constitutional design and public policy.
Other states in the region have similar social structures to Singapore but not the 
successful history of de-emphasising ethnicity. Brunei, for example, which has not had 
any direct elections since 1965, has relatively coherent and geographically interspersed 
minority populations of Chinese (17 percent) and Indians (4 percent), as well as 
indigenous Dusun tribespeople (8 percent) which are inter-mixed with its Malay 
majority population. Unlike Singapore, however, public policies in Brunei deliberately
15 See Brown 1994, 102.
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discriminate in favour of the majority Malay community, and against the economically- 
powerful Chinese population (Asian-Pacific Cultural Center 1995, 14). Brunei’s small 
size and the concentration of its population in the major city, Banda Serei Bagawan, 
ensures that most groups (with the exception of indigenous tribespeople) are highly 
intermixed with each other. Were Brunei to make a transition to democracy at some 
time in the future — an unlikely prospect at the time writing, it must be said -  then 
electoral mechanisms to manage ethnic tensions and secure minority representation, 
such as those used in Singapore, would be an important element of building a 
sustainable system.
Burma
Ethnicity has had a powerful impact upon the fractured course of democracy in Burma 
(Myanmar). Despite successive attempts to impose authoritarian mono-ethnic rule, 
Burma remains a country of extraordinary ethnic diversity, with over one hundred 
indigenous languages spoken by ethnic minorities, and with a long and ongoing history 
of minority ethnic insurgencies against the majority Burman population. Burma’s more 
significant ethnic minorities include the Karen in southern and eastern Burma, the Shan 
in the east, and the Chin, Kachin, Mon and Arakanese in the north and north-east. 
However, many of these groups -  such as the Mons, Karens and Arakanese — also live 
intermingled with Burmans in the Burma delta and coastal regions (Silverstein 1997a, 
153fii). Like many other Asia-Pacific states, colonial rule had a powerful impact upon 
the construction of ethnic identity in Burma. May argues that the British partition of the 
country into Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma had a profound effect upon future 
ethnic insurgencies and separatism amongst the Shan and Karen peoples, creating and 
reinforcing a sense of difference between these groups and the Burman majority. 
Successive efforts on the part of military-backed regimes to centralise political power 
and create a unitary state have resulted in repeated ethnic insurgencies and separatist 
movements (May 1990, 44-47).
In keeping with the situation in other parts of the Asia-Pacific, ethnic tensions in Burma 
appear to be as much the result of proximity and intermixture as of regional 
concentration. Although many of Burma’s dozen or so indigenous ethnic minorities are 
regionally based, particularly in the frontier areas, there are nonetheless significantly 
mixed populations of Karens, Arakanese Muslims, Chinese, Indian Hindus and various
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hill tribes widely interspersed with the Burman majority in lowlands Burma. In fact, the 
scattered distribution of some of the major ethnic minorities has had a significant impact 
upon their capacity for self-determination. At independence, indigenous minorities who 
lived intermingled with the Burmans included the Mon, Arakanese and other smaller 
groups (Silverstein 1997b, 178). The Shans were “spread across Burma’s political map 
in a manner which ultimately disempowered [them] from taking an active part in 
broader national affairs” (Smith 1997, 101). The demographic spread of the Karen 
people, the largest of Burma’s minorities making up approximately 10 percent of the 
total population, meant that they did not have sufficient regional concentration to form a 
separate state under colonial rule and were ultimately divided across five different 
political units. Similarly, the Kachin state was actually a mixture of Kachin and 
Burman ethnic groups. Rangoon itself was a highly cosmopolitan city under colonial 
rule, “with Indian, Chinese, Anglo-Burmese, Karen and other ethnic communities 
predominating over the ethnic Burman minority” (Smith 1997, 105). In short, the ethnic 
landscape was a complex intermixture of peoples and languages -  unsurprisingly, 
considering that the main ethnic Burman migration to ‘Burma proper’ (i.e. the lowlands 
delta) only occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century under British colonial 
rule (Smith 1997, 105).
The constitutional reaction at independence in 1948 to this complex ethnic structure was 
a combination of ethnically-based states, reserved parliamentary seats for various 
groups, and ethnic ‘councils’ comprising the members of parliament from that group to 
look after the special interests of intermixed or dispersed minorities. In the 
constitutional discussions which preceded independence, considerable attention was 
given to the autonomy demands of the various ethnic groups. The independence 
Constitution provided for a federal Union of Burma, with three ethnic states (the Shan, 
Kayah and Kachin) and one ethnic ‘special division’ (the Chin) comprising part of the 
Union; in 1951 the Karens also gained their own state. The Shan and Kayah groups 
were also given a constitutional right of secession after ten years, although this option 
was subsequently denied to them (Maung 1959, 169-94). Provision was also made in 
the 1947 constitution for a bi-cameral legislature, with an upper house (the Chamber of 
Nationalities) elected on communal terms, and the lower house (the Chamber of 
Deputies) elected on a population basis. In the Chamber of Nationalities, the Shan, 
Kachin, Chin, Karen and Kayah peoples collectively commanded a majority over the
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Burman representatives, with 72 out of 125 seats.16 This reflected the communal basis 
of representation in Burma’s 1937 Constitution, in which 40 of the House of 
Representative’s 132 seats were reserved for Karens, Indians, Chinese, Anglo-Indians 
and Europeans — a system which, as in Fiji, probably aggravated rather than reduced 
ethnic tension (Fumivall 1948, 169). Burma’s 1947 constitution survived for 14 
turbulent years of democracy between 1948 and 1962, before democracy was 
overthrown in a military coup which also had strong ethnic motivations.17
The inability of the political system to defuse the salience of ethnicity in these early 
years and promote inter-ethnic co-operation was central to the failure of democracy in 
Burma. It has also served to stymie democracy’s re-emergence: when a 1988 popular 
uprising against the Burmese government took place, ethnic cleavages between Burman 
and non-Burman remained so pronounced that the type of inter-ethnic cooperation 
necessary to bring down the military-backed government simply did not occur (May 
1990, 55). Violent ethnic conflict is now so entrenched in Burma’s history that if and 
when democracy is restored, the electoral system will have to encourage ethnic 
accommodation and cross-ethnic political loyalties if democracy is to survive. Given 
this, centripetalism is probably the only realistic electoral strategy for a return to 
democracy in Burma. It is worth noting that three key socio-structural conditions for 
the success of centripetal electoral methods are all present in Burma. First, there is a 
multiplicity of ethnic groups: Smith claims that “over one hundred different languages 
or ethnic sub-groups are still clearly recognisable today” (1997, 104). Second, as 
discussed above, there is a considerable geographic dispersion and intermixture of a 
number of the larger ethnic minorities (which together make up approximately 30 
percent of the Burmese population) with the Burman majority, plus an estimated 1.5 
million ethnic Indian and Chinese inhabitants. Third, ethnic identities in Burma appear 
to be relatively dynamic and fluid. Smith sums up the situation by noting that despite 
its
16 The Second Schedule to the 1948 Constitution of the Union of Burma provided that, o f the 125 seats in 
the Chamber of Nationalities, 25 were reserved for representatives from the Shan State, 12 from Kachin, 
eight from the Special Division of the Chins, three from the Karenni State, 24 for representatives o f  
Karens, and 53 seats for the Burman remainder. A constitutional amendment in 1951 changed these 
proportions to 15 representatives from the Karen State and 62 representatives from the remaining 
Burmese territories.
17 See May 1990, 44-45.
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extraordinary ethnic diversity and depth ... few areas of Burma can be described as ethnically 
exclusive. In Burma’s complex ethnic mosaic, many parts o f the country have gone through 
periods of considerable social flux. In such an ever-changing political environment, regional 
loyalties have often superseded ethnic loyalties, and a complex process o f change and assimilation 
has constantly been taking place (Smith 1997, 103).
These conditions suggest that the potential for creative constitutional engineering to 
enhance prospects for democracy in Burma are surprisingly high. Considerably less 
high, however, are the prospects for democratic transition in Burma in the foreseeable 
future, given the entrenched military rule since the 1990 election of the National League 
for Democracy was overturned and replaced by an authoritarian one-party regime. 
Nonetheless, constitutional options for a return to representative democracy have 
focussed on the need to include all minority groups as equal partners in a revived federal 
system as the first step in building an enduring democracy in Burma.
Micronesia
The size of a state in both geographic and population terms has long been considered to 
have an impact upon its prospects for sustainable democracy, although experts have 
disagreed as to whether size ultimately helps or hinders democratic prospects (Dahl and 
Tufte 1972). Most studies have argued that a relatively small population size should 
increase the chances for sustainable democracy due to the increased manageability and 
greater inter-elite contact facilitated by smallness (Lijphart 1977, 65-70; Powell 1982, 
31-34). The high levels of democracy in the small island states of the Pacific and 
Caribbean provide some empirical support for this proposition. For our purposes, 
however, the question of small size is also directly related to questions of ethnic 
demography. In very small states, it is almost inevitable that members of different 
ethnic groups will be geographically interspersed with each other.
The region of the world with the highest proportion by far of such ‘microstates’ is the 
Pacific in general, and Micronesia in particular. Unlike the relatively homogenous 
indigenous populations found in much of Polynesia, or the extremely fragmented 
pattern of ethno-linguistic groups in Melanesia, the Micronesian region also provides 
several examples of the type of intermixture of three of four ethnic communities found 
in much of south-east Asia. A scattered arc of islands stretching across the central 
Pacific, many of Micronesia’s island populations exhibit both highly intermixed 
patterns of ethnic settlement and some degree of inter-ethnic tension, and thus appear to
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offer suitable facilitating conditions for centripetal techniques to facilitate the 
management of inter-ethnic conflict. However, the extremely small size of most 
Micronesian states in both geographic and populations terms (generally less than 100,000 
people and sometimes less than 10,000) means their comparative value is relatively 
limited.
As elsewhere, the influence of colonialism and labour migration has impacted upon 
ethnic structure. The major influence upon ethnic demographics, however, is simply the 
sheer smallness of scale, which makes local-level heterogeneity almost inevitable. In 
Guam, for example, issues of ethnicity, indigenous rights and immigration have fuelled 
ethnic tensions (Larmour 1994, 50). Similar issues have arisen in the Federated States of 
Micronesia (Levine 1997). It is the tiny former Australian colony of Nauru, however, 
that provides the best example of the application of centripetalism to small states. There, 
the majority Nauruan population are intermixed with other Pacific Islanders of mostly 
Kiribatian and Tuvaluan origins (26%), Chinese (8%), and Europeans and Indians (8%), 
most of whom came to Nauru to work in the phosphate industry or associated services. 
Recent economic difficulties have seen increasing tensions between these groups and 
Nauruans. As noted earlier, Nauru provides an example of centripetal electoral 
institutions through a multi-member version of the alternative vote, which was adopted 
at independence in 1968 as a modified version of the system used in Australia, which had 
administered Nauru as a United Nations Trust Territory since 1947. With only 9,400 
people, no political parties and little in the way of political campaigns, it is difficult to 
generalise about the impact of ethnicity on politics in Nauru, although the limited 
evidence available suggests that identity factors such as family links and religion are 
major influences upon voter choice (Crocombe 1988, 41-61). Preference-swapping 
strategies are thus virtually inevitable due to the combination of divided and intermixed 
ethnic groups with centripetal electoral institutions.
Other ethnically-divided states in the Asia-Pacific
Other dispersed but less politically cohesive minorities in the Asia-Pacific region include 
the Muslim population in India (11.6 percent), the Hindu (Indian) population in 
Bangladesh (12 percent), the Chinese (10 percent) in Thailand, Maori (12 percent) and 
Pacific Islanders (5 percent) in New Zealand, and Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders 
(2 percent) in Australia. In all cases, however, despite their geographic
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dispersion, there is a significant regional bias in the distribution of these groups: 
Muslims are found predominantly in several states in northern India; Bangladesh’s 
Hindu population is concentrated in Dhaka and the Indian border regions; the Chinese 
population in Thailand is concentrated in urban areas, particularly Bangkok; Maori and 
Pacific Islanders predominate on New Zealand’s North Island in general and Auckland 
in particular; and aboriginal Australians, while small in overall numbers, make up 
significant proportions of the population of many remote areas, particularly in the 
Northern Territory, north Queensland and the Torres Strait. In most of these cases, the 
relatively small size of these groups combined with their regional spread and lack of 
political organisation has made it difficult for them to gain meaningful representation in 
the political system via the electoral process.
In contrast to these intermixed patterns of ethnic group demography, there are also large 
but regionally-concentrated ethnic populations in other parts of the Asia-Pacific such as 
Indonesia (Arakanese, East Timorese, Papuans, Dayaks etc), the Philippines (Cordillera 
peoples, Moros), Pakistan (Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis), Laos (various hill tribes) and 
elsewhere. While such regionally-concentrated ethnic groups essentially rule out 
preference-swapping as a useful device for legislative elections, they would not have the 
same consequence for elections of a national president. One of the clearest examples of 
regionally-concentrated ethnic group distribution in the Asia-Pacific region is the case 
of Sri Lanka, which adopted a variant of AV to elect its president in 1978. Sri Lanka’s 
Tamil minority (12 percent) are geographically concentrated in the north-east of the 
country, but this has not ruled out the use of centripetal approaches to encourage inter­
ethnic accommodation for Sri Lankan presidential elections. As discussed earlier, the 
Sri Lankan presidential electoral system utilises a preferential formula which takes 
voters’ second and third preferences into account if no candidate gains an absolute 
majority of first preferences. Because presidential elections effectively treat the whole 
island as one constituency, a heterogeneous single-member electoral district is 
effectively created. While the three presidential elections to date have all been won by 
absolute majorities, the possibility that preferences may one day determine the outcome 
of a presidential election has given the major Sinhalese parties in Sri Lanka an incentive 
to moderate their policy positions and to take account of minority ethnic and religious 
groups when campaigning — incentives conspicuously lacking under other systems, 
such as first-past-the-post. This example underlines the potential of preferential voting
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and presidentialism to encourage inter-ethnic accommodation even where groups are 
predominantly concentrated in one geographic region.
One of the interesting aspects of electoral system design in the Asia-Pacific is the way 
that the most ethnically-divided democracies of the region -  India, PNG, Malaysia -  
have chosen FPTP electoral laws, which usually under-represent minority groups, but 
have attempted other ways of accommodating ethnic diversity (such as via 
constitutional recognition of traditional customs in PNG, multi-ethnic coalitions of 
parties in Malaysia, reserved seats for ‘scheduled’ castes and tribes in India, and forms 
of devolution or federalism in all three countries). By contrast, forms of proportional 
representation have usually been adopted in more ethnically-homogenous states such as 
Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Cambodia. This represents a reversal of the choice of 
electoral systems in Europe, where
the earliest moves towards proportional representation came in the ethnically most heterogeneous 
countries ... In linguistically and religiously divided societies majority elections could clearly 
threaten the continued existence of the political system. The introduction of some element o f  
minority representation came to be seen as an essential step in a strategy o f territorial 
consolidation (Rokkan 1970, 157).
As we have seen, the need for recognition of minorities through the electoral system in 
the Asia-Pacific has generally been achieved through methods other than proportional 
representation. These have tended to explore ways to combine majoritarian electoral 
methods with devices which ameliorate the potentially damaging effects of such 
systems upon minorities. Such devices include the use of group representation 
constituencies in Singapore; preferential voting in Sri Lanka; provincial electorates in 
PNG; communal electoral rolls in Fiji; and reserved seats for minorities in India, 
Indonesia and so on. From 1867 to 1993, New Zealand was also an example of this 
tendency, combining FPTP electoral methods with four seats reserved exclusively for 
Maori representatives. In 1994 however, New Zealand became a prominent exception 
to this general trend when it adandoned majority electoral methods and moved to a 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system of proportional representation.
New Zealand
New Zealand’s adoption of MMP in 1994 appears to be one of the few conscious 
choices of proportional representation in the region which was motivated, at least in 
part, by a desire to better represent minority populations. As predicted by its advocates,
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the change from FPTP to MMP had an immediate positive impact upon the 
representation of ethnic minorities in the New Zealand parliament. At the first MMP 
elections in 1996, one Asian, three Pacific Islanders and 13 Maori won parliamentary 
seats, thus ensuring for the first time their representation in the parliament in rough 
proportion to their numbers in the general community. Moreover, a Maori political 
party, New Zealand First, found itself in a crucial balance-of-power position after the 
elections, and after protracted negotiations formed a governing alliance with the 
conservative National Party. MMP in New Zealand thus provided the means for 
minority groups in general, and Maori in particular, to have a much greater impact on 
the political process than had been the case previously.18
Cambodia
The Asia-Pacific region also provides one of the most graphic examples of the folly of 
relying purely on proportional mechanisms for democracy in divided societies without 
any concomitant mechanisms for encouraging inter-group accommodation, in the shape 
of the transitional constitutional arrangements for the restoration of democracy in 
Cambodia in 1993. The deep divisions in Cambodian politics are not ethnic but 
ideological, with electoral support being split between the former Communist 
government, in the shape of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), and the Royalist 
FUNCINPEC party. There is also, however, a significant ethnic factor overlaying 
Cambodian politics due to the historical influence of Vietnam, with the CPP being seen 
as more pro-Vietnamese and FUNCINPEC as more nationalist Cambodian. The Khmer 
Rouge, who did not participate in the 1993 election, were violently anti-Vietnamese in 
their rhetoric and actions — and hence gave some tacit support to FUNCINPEC for this 
reason.
After two decades of war, Cambodia was therefore unquestionably a divided society at 
the time of the UN-sponsored peace process which culminated in national elections in 
1993. The institutional arrangements for these elections and their aftermath were, on 
paper at least, highly consociational. A highest-remainder list PR system was used for 
the elections, which produced proportional results in which the two largest parties — 
FUNCINPEC and the CPP — each gained just under half of all seats in the 120-seat 
National Assembly (a third party, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic League (BLDP),
18 See Sharp 1997,439-40.
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won ten seats, with one seat going to the very small MOULIN AKA party). After the 
election, a ‘grand coalition’ power-sharing deal was negotiated between the major 
parties, with the leaders of FUNCINPEC and the CPP, Prince Rannaridh and Hun Sen, 
being installed as ‘first’ and ‘second’ prime ministers, respectively. Ministerial 
positions were “farmed out evenly between FUNCINPEC and the CPP. Four were 
granted to the BLDP, and ... MOULINAKA was also given a post. All parties were thus 
included in the government” (Rowley 1996, 30). There was even a minority veto 
enshrined in the new constitution, courtesy of a two-thirds majority requirement for 
constitutional amendment and for no-confidence votes, and an element of group 
autonomy due to the combination of provincial governments and the regionalized 
patterns of the major parties’ support bases. The basic provisions of a fully 
consociationalist package were thus in place by the end of 1993.
The problem with these arrangements was that they provided the structure for a classic 
‘coalition of convenience’ between the two major parties in government, but very little 
in the way of incentives for accommodation between those parties. As no mutual 
obligations were built into Cambodia’s political institutions, the two parties had little to 
gain by compromising or working together. By late 1997, the coalition arrangement 
between the CPP and FUNCINPEC was effectively dead, with military units loyal to 
both sides on the point of armed conflict, terrorist attacks on party supporters, and 
government virtually paralysed (‘Cambodia: death of hopes’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
26 April 1997). This stand-off was ‘resolved’ by an intra-government coup, with forces 
loyal to the ‘second’ prime minister, Hun Sen, vanquishing allies of the ‘first’ prime 
minister, Rannaridh, who fled across the border into Thailand. The divided nature and 
zero-sum history of politics in Cambodia meant that the coalition arrangements between 
the two sides were weak and without substance. Moreover, the list PR electoral rules 
used for the 1993 election meant that there was little relationship between elected MPs 
and their constituencies, thus undermining the institutionalisation of democratic 
institutions and encouraging a call for a return to a single-member district system for the 
next elections due in 1998.19 In sum, none of the traditional consociational
prescriptions of grand coalition executives, proportional representation and minority 
vetoes appear to have helped the institutionalisation of democracy in Cambodia. While
I9 See Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies 1996, 6.
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it is by no means clear that alternative arrangements would have produced a better 
result, the Cambodian case does emphasise the necessity of building, at the very least, 
some form of mutual dependence and reciprocal support mechanisms into electoral rules 
if coalition arrangements are to succeed in deeply-divided countries.
Conclusion
Centripetalism has not received the prominence it deserves as an alternative model of 
democracy and inter-ethnic accommodation in divided societies. Partly this is because 
of the relative obscurity of the best empirical case for the model, Papua New Guinea; 
partly it is due to a misunderstanding, even by some of the major scholars in the field, of 
the importance of political geography in ethnically-divided societies. For example, 
Donald Horowitz, who pioneered the academic description of the centripetal model of 
ethnic conflict management, chose South Africa as the major case study to demonstrate 
the utility of the model. However, the ethnic demography of sub-Saharan Africa in 
general and South Africa in particular is likely to be unfavourable to the application of 
centripetal techniques, due to the geographic concentration of ethnic groups and, in 
South Africa, the demographic legacy of apartheid which deliberately segregated groups 
of different races (Mattes 1994, 6). For his part, Arend Lijphart has recently argued that 
“in ethnically divided societies, groups tend to be territorially concentrated, and single­
member districts are therefore likely to be ethnically homogenous” (1997, 13). While 
this statement is probably true for much of Latin America and Africa, it is untrue as a 
general proposition, and particularly untrue for the Asia-Pacific region. A more 
accurate description of the nature of plural societies in this region was given by 
Fumivall back in the 1940s, who defined a plural society as one in which different 
sections of the same community live side by side but separately within the same 
political unit so that “they mix but do not combine” (1948, 304).
In summary, outside of the rare cases of extremely highly-fragmented states, such as 
those found in island Melanesia, the centripetal approach is likely to work best in cases 
where ethnic or communal groups are geographically intermixed amongst a population, 
and where conflicts are of a relatively low intensity. This is a fairly common scenario in 
the Asia-Pacific region due, in large part, to the impacts of colonialism (such as the 
presence of Chinese and Indian diasporas) and the ‘plural society’ model of antagonistic
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but not necessarily deeply hostile inter-group relations. The apparent structural 
suitability of the Asia-Pacific region for centripetal approaches to the management of 
ethnic conflict is emphasised by the fact that all the examples of centripetalism cited in 
this thesis — Australia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Sri Lanka and Nauru — are located in 
the Asia-Pacific. Other identifiable cases of the appropriate facilitating conditions for 
centripetalism, such as the highly-fragmented ethnic structure found in most of 
Melanesia (such as in PNG, the Solomons, Vanuatu and New Caledonia) or the 
intermixed ethnic settlement patterns common in south-east Asia (such as in Malaysia, 
Singapore, Brunei and Burma) are also Asia-Pacific countries (see Map Four). 
Moreover, cases cited by other scholars as being examples of centripetal politics without 
centripetal institutions — such as Malaysia20, the Indian state of Kerala21 and the U.S. 
state of Hawai’i22 — are also all located in the Asia-Pacific. This regional 
concentration of cases provides additional support for the argument that the socio- 
structural conditions present in much of the Asia-Pacific are likely to be conducive to 
centripetal approaches to the management of ethnic conflict.
20 See von Vorys 1975, 302-5.
21 See Horowitz 1994, 50-51; Chiriyankandath 1997, 16-39.
22 See Haas 1996, 169-90.
256
Map Four: Centripetalism in the Asia-Pacific region
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This is not to suggest that centripetalism is exclusively an Asia-Pacific model of conflict 
management. Indeed, as a strategy for ethnic conflict management it may well be 
applicable to ethnically-divided states in a range of other regions as well, depending on 
the depth of hostilities and the nature of group demography. Cases in which members 
of various ethnic groups are geographically interspersed and intermixed, and where 
ethnic tensions appear to be the result of such intermixture, are present in many regions 
of the world: for example, the Caribbean (Guyana, Suriname, Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago), the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the former Yugoslavia (where ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ has, however, dramatically increased ethnic homogeneity in many regions), 
the Middle East (Lebanon, Israel), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Kazhakstan) and Africa 
(Mauritius), to name a few.23 All of these states are genuinely multi-ethnic, and all 
feature a high degree of ethnic intermixing and, to varying degrees, ethnic tension. 
Depending upon the level of geographical dispersion of ethnic groups, the centripetal 
approach may well be the most fruitful method of encouraging co-operative, multi­
ethnic politics in cases such as these. It is worth noting that in virtually all of these 
countries, the nature of the multi-ethnic society is a result of immigration (e.g. Russians 
in the Baltic) or colonial labour importation (e.g. Africans in the Caribbean) — which 
suggests that centripetal solutions may be particularly appropriate for the multi-ethnic 
socio-structural conditions found in many post-colonial polities.
But beyond such cases, the centripetal model of inter-ethnic accommodation is also 
likely to attract attention in many regions in the future due to the increasingly inter­
mixed nature of ethnic group distribution. According to the United Nations, over three 
fifths of the world’s population will be urban by 2030.24 This worldwide trend of rural- 
urban migration towards large, multi-ethnic ‘world cities’ appears to be leading 
inexorably towards the development of massive, ethnically-heterogeneous urban 
metropolises as models of human settlement in the 21st century. As these patterns of 
inter-mixed urban settlement become increasingly common, so the nature of ethnic 
conflict will necessarily change: tensions will be based on proximity rather than
distance, and identities will likely become more fluid as other cleavages are added to 
ascriptive ones. But this does not imply that the salience of ethnic identity will 
necessarily break down itself. As ethnic groups increasingly find themselves in close
23 Unfortunately, none of these countries were included in Gurr’s study.
24 See United Nations 1997.
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physical proximity but separated by growing distinctions between rich and poor, and as 
both education levels and voter sophistication continue to rise, so the centripetal model 
of inter-ethnic accommodation is likely to become an increasingly attractive option for 
constitutional engineers worldwide.
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